

# **SIGLA Expeditionary Logistics Seminar**

**Learning from the Private Military  
Domain: Commanding and Controlling  
Logistics for Expeditionary Forces in  
Africa**

# Preface

- Cannot speak for/on behalf all PMCs
- Can only discuss what we are involved in
- All campaigns part of larger govt-led campaigns
- Our engagements with govt clients are based on Composite Warfare
- Despite large measure of independence...and decentralised C4I, certain problems always abound
- We are integrated into contracting governments armed forces
- This creates unique challenges and hurdles
- Also result in loss of operational momentum and tempo
- We have little to no control over most logistical aspects but run own supply chains.



# Introduction

- Without effective logistics, operations by Alexander, Hannibal, Julius Ceaser, etc would have failed
- Sun Tzu: Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus, the army will have enough for its needs
- Napoleon: An army marches on its stomach
- Genghis Khan's nökors expected to forage for themselves. Also, 100 000 horses requires a lot of feed and water
- De Jomini: The art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely military branches,—viz. : Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Engineering and Tactics
- Operation Overlord: No logistics = failure
- Lacking adaptive, coherent, flexible, and functioning logistical supply chain and its associated actions, methods, techniques, procedures, and policies, no military action, operation, or campaign can be executed or indefinitely sustained
- With logistics and delivery deficits, no successful expeditionary operation can be conducted
- We must 'do what we can with what we have'.

# The Power Conundrum

- Any successful expeditionary operation requires ability of govt/armed forces to project credible hard, soft, smart and sharp power
- Also requires:
  - Political and military will;
  - An intelligence-driven campaign strategy;
  - Balanced ORBAT and TOE;
  - A strong/resilient national economy;
  - A correctly-structured expeditionary force;
  - Intent-driven security;
  - Popular buy-in and national support;
  - Efficient and effective logistical system to ensure force sustainment;
  - Requisite horizontal and vertical assets to ensure operational deployments and supply chain operations
- Above deficits create numerous challenges regardless if they are related to peacekeeping or other offensive operations
- Creates uncertainties and challenges re the balancing of Ends, Ways, and Means.





# Uncertainties

- All operations fraught with uncertainties
- Uncertainties - resultant from lack of intelligence - force assumptions,
- Assumptions relate to equipment requirements, stockpiles/supply dumps, reserves, lines, delivery, recovery of equipment, and the protected movement thereof and the enemy actions/reactions
- Includes condition of roads during inclement weather patterns, vegetation, critical infrastructure, and seasonal variations and the impacts thereof on both the supply chain and the participating forces
- To validate assumptions/overcome the uncertainties and the foginess of the supply chain, logisticians must be read into the intelligence picture as early as possible
- Art and science of military logistics is and ought to always be the cornerstone upon which all MORW and MOOTW campaign strategies are built –OMIO in different category
- We place great emphasis on intelligence-driven logistics to ensure momentum and tempo, and maintain, sustain, enable, and preserve forces as well as ensure force protection and morale.



# Challenges

- Cloned ORBATs and TOEs but lack the requisite equipit
- Logistician's greatest challenge and his supply chain: to ensure the requisite equipment, materiel and/or stores are available at the correct place and time to guarantee the combat forces can maintain operational momentum and tempo
- Many African GS4 compartments are antiquated, inadequately staffed and trained, and lack the requisite doctrine, equipment and assets to sustain operations domestically, let alone expeditionary
- This impacts severely on the levels of logistics: strategically, operationally, and tactically
- The lack of investment in military logistics has, in turn, had a negative impact when government forces are mandated to deploy and engage in peacekeeping operations or possible expeditionary operations beyond their national borders
- Impacts on both the morale and fighting spirit of the combat forces
- Other challenges:
  - Colonial clones
  - Coercive diplomacy
  - Poor foreign training
  - Bad advice
  - Asset deficit
  - Supply chain vulnerability



# Logistical Lines of Support

- **First line:** Carried in the F-echelon, this includes all stores (ammunition, FOL, rations, water, and medical) required for immediate combat operations and is intended to last for three (3) days. There is no true first line reserve.
- **Second line:** The second line fulfils the role of first line reserve as African armies are unable to sustain the large logistical tailback required to enable the traditional A and B-echelons. This line includes all stores and equipment not required for immediate battle. It is intended to last for five (5) days, and these requirements must be able to immediately replenish the F-echelon. This line is kept at the Battle Group FOB.
- **Third line:** Kept at Combat Operations Group assembly area (COGAA) or HQ. This includes all logistical requirements to replenish the equipment and stores drawn from the second line. The line's requirements are held at the Division assembly area (DAA) or HQ and are intended to last for seven (7) days.
- **Fourth line:** This includes all logistical requirements necessary to replenish the division's equipment and supplies. It is kept at the Army Group's assembly area (AGAA) or HQ, and it is intended to last for fourteen (14) days.
- **Fifth line:** This includes all country-located defence-related and supportive industries. The fifth line provides the equipment and stores to replenish the AGAA or HQ, and on demand.
- **Sixth line:** This encompasses all equipment, materiel, spares and such that must be sourced, purchased and imported from foreign sources. It is at the sixth line that African governments usually find themselves under foreign blackmail, sanction, supply-lethargy, and/or sabotage.

**A problem throughout is the requisite assets to ensure the integrity of the supply chains – and their vulnerability**



# Principles of Composite Warfare Logistics and Supply Chains

- Expeditionary structure
- Planned anticipation
- Movement
- Storage
- Adaptability
- Flexibility
- Simplicity
- Efficiency
- Responsiveness
- Control
- Delivery
- Recovery.



# Approaches to Supply Chain Delivery

- Road delivery by the armed forces' logistical units
- Road delivery using civilian contractors
- Air landed delivery using the air force's cargo aircraft
- Air landed delivery using civilian aircraft
- Delivery by helicopter
- Delivery by air drop/supply
- Utilising the local population to assist with delivery
- Harnessing government departments to effect delivery
- Delivery by using naval/riverine forces
- Utilising the reserve forces to collect stores at field stacking areas.



# Conclusion

- Expeditionary warfare is the transnational projection of military power
- Force preservation and sustainment requires intelligence, structure, and logistics
- Sustainable campaigns require adaptable, efficient and well-structured, planned, correctly staffed, and controlled logistical systems and associated supply chains
- Must be simple
- Good logistical and supply chain administration ensures system simplicity along with the sustainment of the expeditionary forces

**Bottom line: If you don't have agile, flexible, sustainable intelligence-driven logistical supply lines, supported with decisive military and political will, don't attempt expeditionary operations!**



**QUESTIONS?**

