

 $forward\ together\cdot saam\ vorentoe\cdot masiye\ phambili$

Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network

(EPON):

The international responses to hybrid threats in Africa after Afghanistan





Multilateral Peace Operations

2021

1918 - 2018

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

ABOUT SIPRI'S MULTILATERAL PEACE

The SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database is a unique source

of transparent and reliable data on all multilateral peace operations conducted around the world. It contains historical information on all United Nations and non-United Nations peace operations conducted

since 2000, including location, mandate, participating countries, approved and actual personnel numbers disaggregated by personnel types, dates of deployment, budgets and mission fatalities. For more information, see: www.sipri.org/databases/pko

OPERATIONS DATABASE

UN 🤫 United Nations

Peacekeeping Operations

MINURSO

MINUSCA

MINUSMA MONUSCO

UNDOF

UNFICYP

UNIFIL

UNMIK

UNMISS

Special Political Missions

UNAMA

UNAMI UN Assistance

UNMHA

UNOCA+


UNOWAS* UNRCCA*


UNVMC

UNSCOL*




Halti BINUH ==











These charts may not correspond with other SIPRI research or infographics, see disclaimer.











The map only shows operations that were active on 1 May 2021. All figures are estimates of the actual number international personnel deployed as of 31 Dec. 2020, unless otherwise noted. The figures do not include national civilian staff.

 * Not a multilateral peace operation according to the definition applied by SIPRI.

** The JF-G₅S is headquartered in Mali and operates in three distinct geographical sectors along and across the borders of Mali and Mauritania (West); Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (Central); and Chad and Niger (East).

DISCLAIMER ___

This map shows all multilateral powe operation that were notive as of May 2012. They are complemented with all engine field based (M. Special Political Mossion, OSEC field operations, missions and operations continued under the EU's Common-Security and Defence Polity (CSDP), and multinational military operations are the contracted by the AU and are evolable the super of the definition of a multilateral power operation applied by SPIC (Y. A. SPECH, M. S



EUAM Iraq

Sector Reform in Iraq, 2013 M-0 | P-0 | C-63

EUAM RCA

EUCAP Sahei Mail

EUCAP Sahel Nige

EUCAP Somalia

EUAM Ukraine

EUBAM Libya

EUBAM Refeh

EUPOL COPPS

EUTM Mail

M-721 | P-0 | C-5 EUTM RCA

EUTM Somalia

EUFOR ALTHEA **EULEX Koeovo**

EUMM Georgia

EUNAVFOR MED/ Operation irini*

EUNAVFOR Somelia Operation Atalanta*

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

OSCE Centre in Ashgabat^a

OMIK

OSCE OSCE

OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

OSCE Mission to Montenegro*

M-0 | P-0 | C-32

OSCE PRCIO

OSCE Mission to Skopje

OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk

OSCE Progr in Bishkok* OSCE Mission to Serbis

OSCESMM

OSCE Progra Nur-Sultan*

OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine*

OSCE Project Co

MISAHEL

AU 🍮 African Union AMISOM

AU Observer Mission in Burundi

M... | P... | C...

MISAC

RSM AU Mission in Libya

ECOWAS 💮 Economic Community of West African States ECOMIG

NATO -

KFOR

NATO Kasava Force, 15 M-3482 | P-0 | C-0

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

LCBC 🕒

Lake Chad Basin Commission MNJTF*

G5 Sahel 😉 Group of Five for the Sahel JF-Q58*

IGAD 🏐 Intergovernmental Authority on Development

CTSAMVM

OAS Organization of American States

MAPP/OEA

Ad hoc


Ad hoc coalitions of states

JCC/JPKF

IMT

Perceptions, constructions, reforms/revisionism....etc





Studies



- Studies published to date:
 - AMISOM Somalia
 - MONUSCO DRC
 - UNMISS South Sudan
 - MINUSMA Mali
 - MINUSCA CAR
 - UNAMID Darfur





EPON defines **effectiveness** as the overall strategic impact of a peace operation, understood as reducing conflict dynamics in the area of operation over a particular period of time, in the context of its mandate and resources

An EPON study is a strategic-level assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness of a specific operation, which reflects the complexity of the objectives of a peace operation, the means at its disposal, and the environment in which they are pursued



Methodology



- Analytical tools:
 - context analysis
 - identification of effects:
 - I. Preventing violent conflict, increasing stability & protecting civilians
 - 2. Building and fostering sustainable peace
 - review of explanatory factors:
 - I. political primacy
 - 2. mandates and resources
 - 3. people-centred approaches
 - 4. legitimacy and credibility
 - 5. coordination and coherence
 - 6. women, peace and security

Cross-cutting trends and observations that have emerged from these studies



- Prevention of large-scale violent conflict
- Ending violent conflict
- Protection of Civilians
- Women, Peace & Security
- Coherent political support
- Comprehensive approach
- Primacy of politics
- People-centred approach
- Political & strategic HQ accountability



Prevention of large-scale violent conflict



- AMISOM, MONUSCO and MINUSMA: significant contributions to preventing major civil war and largescale violent conflict
 - level of violent conflict would have been much worse if these operations were not present
 - Thus had deterrent effect and have contributed to preventing larger-scale violent conflict
- UNMISS: not sufficient deterrent to prevent the outbreak of war in South Sudan in 2013 & 2016
- Withdrawal of all these operations likely to result in a significant increase in violence
 - Communities at risk want UN presence
 - Kinshasa and Juba would like missions withdrawn



Ending Violent Conflict



- Missions in CAR, DRC, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan are not able to bring about an end to violent conflict on their own
 - All lack a viable political, governance or peace process that can realistically be expected to bring about an end to violent conflict
 - They don't have the political support, requisite mandates, resources and thus capacity to end or even successfully suppress violent conflict at the scale required
 - Sustainably bringing an end to violent conflict can only be achieved politically
 - Doctrinal crisis assets
 - Geography and infrastructure
 - Silos
 - Knowledge the intel and early warning question



Protection of Civilians



- Missions in CAR, DRC, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan have not met (local and international) expectations when it comes to protecting civilians
 - They have protected many civilians directly and indirectly, but they simply don't have the resources and capacity to protect civilians at scale
 - Important role of civilian protection means other than physical protection
 - Conflict resolution, good offices and local peace initiatives
 - Child protection, human rights & conflict-related sexual violence





- The effects of the efforts to promote the WPS agenda have been mixed
 - Modest gains in improving the representation of women in the peace operations
 - Overall effect has been negligible to date
- Sexual Abuse and Exploitation (SEA)
 - Although the number of allegations have been low, the inability of these operations to
 prevent SEA, despite their stated zero-tolerance policies, and their inability to find a
 solution to the issues of jurisdiction when it comes to punishing those guilty of
 offenses is disappointing and unsatisfactory

Coherent Political Support



- Peace operations more successful during periods when they enjoyed coherent political support
 - when there was alignment among a sufficient number of key stakeholders
 - UN Security Council, AU Peace and Security Council, T/PCCs, host state, neighbors and key partners, regional organisations & peace operation
- Implication: peace operations have only weak leverage on one of the most important success factors
 - Need to also assess political and headquarters role in building and sustaining coherent political support

Comprehensive Approach

"Military force — especially when wielded by an outside power — cannot bring order in a country that cannot govern itself." Robert McNamara



- Peace operations are just one instrument among many (can't assess effectiveness in isolation)
 - It is the combined and cumulative effect of all of the national and international actors together that constitute the larger political project
- Peace operations need to understand their role in this larger political project
 - they need to have the capacity to support the effort necessary to coordinate, track and take stock of this larger political project
 - Effectiveness depend on the degree to which a peace operation contributes to shaping and maintaining the strategic political coherence of the larger national and international effort to sustain the peace in a given country or region.

Primacy of Politics




- The Missions the CAR, DRC, Mali, Somalia, Darfur and South Sudan all lack(ed) a clear political project,
 - aimed at resolving their respective conflicts, that the operations can support politically
- Instead, all these operations have a conflict management mandate,
 - focussed on stability, and in some cases on the protection of civilians



Primacy of Politics



- Need to reconsider how the focus on protection & stabilization can be sustained without trapping operations in situations where this conflict management approach serve to entrench political elites, undermine the social contract and serve as a disincentive for longterm settlement
 - Ironically, the more effective these operations, the less incentive there is for the
 political elites in power to seek a political settlement



People-centred approach



- HIPPO recommendation & central lesson from critical peacebuilding literature
- All the mission are all still predominantly state centric
 - focussed on supporting the host government and state institutions, or threats to them
 - Although Protection of Civilians mandates have brought about more engagement with local communities, these efforts are mostly concentrated around managing risk
 - Missions are very weakly connected to the people whom they are meant to protect, and whose lives the missions are meant to influence



People-centred approach



- All the operations were very weak when it comes to involving social and civic representatives
 - in assessments, analysis, planning, coordination and evaluation or performance assessments
- Missions rarely make an effort to assess their impact on the societies they are meant to protect and serve
- The operations remain primarily accountability to their member state bodies.




Conclusion



- Significant role in preventing large-scale violent conflict & war
- Unable to end violent conflict on their own
- Unable to protect at scale with current levels of support
- Coherent political support critical factor
- Lack of political primacy
- Importance of comprehensive approach
- Lack of people-centred approach
- Need to pay more attention to political and strategic HQ level

The EPON Network



25-10-2021