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Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network

(EPON):

The international responses to hybrid threats in Africa after Afghanistan

Perceptions, constructions, reforms/revisionism...etc



- Studies published to date:
 - AMISOM - Somalia
 - MONUSCO – DRC
 - UNMISS – South Sudan
 - MINUSMA – Mali
 - MINUSCA – CAR
 - UNAMID – Darfur



EPON defines **effectiveness** as the overall strategic impact of a peace operation, understood as reducing conflict dynamics in the area of operation over a particular period of time, in the context of its mandate and resources

An EPON study is a strategic-level assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness of a specific operation, which reflects the complexity of the objectives of a peace operation, the means at its disposal, and the environment in which they are pursued



- Analytical tools:
 - context analysis
 - identification of effects:
 1. Preventing violent conflict, increasing stability & protecting civilians
 2. Building and fostering sustainable peace
- review of explanatory factors:
 1. political primacy
 2. mandates and resources
 3. people-centred approaches
 4. legitimacy and credibility
 5. coordination and coherence
 6. women, peace and security

Cross-cutting trends and observations that have emerged from these studies



- Prevention of large-scale violent conflict
- Ending violent conflict
- Protection of Civilians
- Women, Peace & Security
- Coherent political support
- Comprehensive approach
- Primacy of politics
- People-centred approach
- Political & strategic HQ accountability




- AMISOM, MONUSCO and MINUSMA: significant contributions to preventing major civil war and large-scale violent conflict
 - level of violent conflict would have been much worse if these operations were not present
 - Thus had deterrent effect and have contributed to preventing larger-scale violent conflict
- UNMISS: not sufficient deterrent to prevent the outbreak of war in South Sudan in 2013 & 2016
- Withdrawal of all these operations likely to result in a significant increase in violence
 - Communities at risk want UN presence
 - Kinshasa and Juba would like missions withdrawn



Ending Violent Conflict

- Missions in CAR, DRC, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan are not able to bring about an end to violent conflict on their own
 - All lack a viable political, governance or peace process that can realistically be expected to bring about an end to violent conflict
 - They don't have the political support, requisite mandates, resources and thus capacity to end or even successfully suppress violent conflict at the scale required
- Sustainably bringing an end to violent conflict can only be achieved politically
 - Doctrinal crisis – assets
 - Geography and infrastructure
 - Silos
 - Knowledge – the intel and early warning question



Protection of Civilians

- Missions in CAR, DRC, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan have not met (local and international) expectations when it comes to protecting civilians
 - They have protected many civilians directly and indirectly, but they simply don't have the resources and capacity to protect civilians at scale
 - Important role of civilian protection - means other than physical protection
 - Conflict resolution, good offices and local peace initiatives
 - Child protection, human rights & conflict-related sexual violence



- The effects of the efforts to promote the WPS agenda have been mixed
 - Modest gains in improving the representation of women in the peace operations
 - Overall effect has been negligible to date
- Sexual Abuse and Exploitation (SEA)
 - Although the number of allegations have been low, the inability of these operations to prevent SEA, despite their stated zero-tolerance policies, and their inability to find a solution to the issues of jurisdiction when it comes to punishing those guilty of offenses is disappointing and unsatisfactory

- Peace operations more successful during periods when they enjoyed coherent political support
 - when there was alignment among a sufficient number of key stakeholders
 - UN Security Council, AU Peace and Security Council, T/PCCs, host state, neighbors and key partners, regional organisations & peace operation
- Implication: peace operations have only weak leverage on one of the most important success factors
 - Need to also assess political and headquarters role in building and sustaining coherent political support

Comprehensive Approach

“Military force – especially when wielded by an outside power – cannot bring order in a country that cannot govern itself.” Robert McNamara



- Peace operations are just one instrument among many (can't assess effectiveness in isolation)
 - It is the combined and cumulative effect of all of the national and international actors together that constitute the larger political project
- Peace operations need to understand their role in this larger political project
 - they need to have the capacity to support the effort necessary to coordinate, track and take stock of this larger political project
 - Effectiveness depend on the degree to which a peace operation contributes to shaping and maintaining the strategic political coherence of the larger national and international effort to sustain the peace in a given country or region.


Primacy of Politics

- The Missions the CAR, DRC, Mali, Somalia, Darfur and South Sudan all lack(ed) a clear political project,
 - aimed at resolving their respective conflicts, that the operations can support politically
- Instead, all these operations have a conflict management mandate,
 - focussed on stability, and in some cases on the protection of civilians



Primacy of Politics

- Need to reconsider how the focus on protection & stabilization can be sustained without trapping operations in situations where this conflict management approach serve to entrench political elites, undermine the social contract and serve as a disincentive for long-term settlement
 - Ironically, the more effective these operations, the less incentive there is for the political elites in power to seek a political settlement



- HIPPO recommendation & central lesson from critical peacebuilding literature
- All the mission are all still predominantly state centric
 - focussed on supporting the host government and state institutions, or threats to them
 - Although Protection of Civilians mandates have brought about more engagement with local communities, these efforts are mostly concentrated around managing risk
 - Missions are very weakly connected to the people whom they are meant to protect, and whose lives the missions are meant to influence



- All the operations were very weak when it comes to involving social and civic representatives
 - in assessments, analysis, planning, coordination and evaluation or performance assessments
- Missions rarely make an effort to assess their impact on the societies they are meant to protect and serve
- The operations remain primarily accountability to their member state bodies.



Conclusion



- Significant role in preventing large-scale violent conflict & war
- Unable to end violent conflict on their own
- Unable to protect at scale with current levels of support
- Coherent political support critical factor
- Lack of political primacy
- Importance of comprehensive approach
- Lack of people-centred approach
- Need to pay more attention to political and strategic HQ level

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