Security governance and African ungoverned spaces

Understanding and addressing the void

Francois **Vreÿ** & Thomas **Mandrup** (Eds)

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Preface

Security governance in Africa is a popular topic covered in a wide range of literature sources. While much of the literature tends to take a very critical stance on the matter, it is also necessary to view and contribute to the myriad of debates in a more constructive manner. Given the wide ambit of topics and views often 'dumped' into the security governance field of publication, selecting particular topics becomes difficult. Therefore, this publication attempts to cover selected areas of African security governance. In its broadest sense, the selected authors cover both the landward and maritime domains of security governance of the African continent. Thematically the chapters move from the conceptual to the more practical to reflect development of approaches, some case studies, as well as contributions that bring suggested approaches to help contain, structure, and address the many actors, threats, vulnerabilities, and intricacies making up the dynamics of African security governance. This is a complex tapestry of players, spoilers, indicators, and narratives. However, several players attempt to address the complexity. The extensive Mo Ibrahim Foundation's *Index on African governance*, opinions from the media, field research from projects such as *The Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON)* across Africa, and ambitious forward looking continental agendas such as *Agenda 2063 : The Africa we want*. Together with academic interests and communities of practice, ongoing initiatives, hold the potential, call for, and are directed at enhancing the quality and effectiveness of security governance in Africa – whether directly, or indirectly – to offer Africans human security benefits in its widest sense and those benefits they are entitled to.

Africa is a vast continent, and it is therefore impossible to cover the full ambit of its security governance dilemmas in a single publication. The authors therefore attempt to contribute from their academic, practical, and field experiences in their respective contributions. These experiences are deemed to collectively address selected matters on security governance with the maritime security contributions on two of Africa's active offshore domains building out the publications value. For the reader it is thus necessary to also consider what each chapter contributes to the African security debates at the national, regional and to an extent, the continental levels.

The publication commences with a more theoretical overview on how peace support evolved over time and what some of the latest views entail followed by more particular themes on alternative thought, migration of missions in the

SAHEL and Somalia, actor proliferation, regional alternatives by bringing in Regional Economic Communities, the utility of private actors and responding to security governance threats and vulnerabilities in the Gulf of Guinea and the Western Indian Ocean.

The editors trust that the selected contributions on security governance in Africa and its surrounding oceans contributes to the overall debates, efforts, time, and funding dedicated and aspirations of African people to live without fear, want and with dignity as per the aspirations of Agenda 2063.

The Editors

Introduction

Francois Vreÿ • Thomas Mandrup

Background

Ungoverned spaces remain perceived catalysts for a range of security-related threats and vulnerabilities experienced by many societies. Following the events of 9/11, narratives on 'empty' spaces or ungoverned territories as threat catalysts regularly feature in debates on the rise and impact of terrorism, radicalisation, violent extremism, and transnational crime. The latter threats cluster remains prominent when labelling dangers emanating from weakly-governed geographic entities and places with limited statehood. Geographically, scrutiny also turned to Africa's landward and maritime territories. Governance lapses in African spaces, such as the Sahel region, which includes states such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, and countries bordering the waters off the Horn of Africa in the east, and the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa, continue to inform ongoing deliberations about responses to threats emanating from landward and maritime spaces lacking good governance.

'Governance' is used liberally to describe a multitude of causes and solutions to insecurity in geographic spaces. Simply stated, governance refers to the level of performance of governments (whether elected or not) directed at the delivery of public goods to meet the expectations of their constituencies. The World Bank, for example, views governance as '... the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that regulate economic and social interactions among them.'[1] Furthermore, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) proposes five principles to guide good governance practices to prevent or lower dysfunctionality: legitimacy and voice (underpinned by participation and consensus), direction (guided by strategic vision), performance (based on responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency), accountability (to the public and transparency via the free flow of information), and

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[1] World Bank. (2021).

fairness, with equity and rule of law as main features.[2] These principles of governance are qualified by whether governments do this responsibly and effectively to lower the probability of dissatisfaction and destructive responses[3] (Rotberg, 2015: 7).

A subsequent matter is to frame exactly what must be delivered and how that brings the quality and strength of institutions into vogue. Rotberg (2015: 8) denotes five clusters of political goods and outputs on each as indicative of how governments perform. Citizens demand and deserve to feel secure and safe, in that their governments prevent or oppose invasion, civil war, and domestic instability, while also ensuring protection from crime and personal danger. The normative strand on governance links a well-functioning government harbouring efficient institutions with using its capacity to deliver quality services or political goods that citizens expect in return for their taxes, support, and good citizenship. Primary goods fall in the fields of safety and security, rule of law and transparency, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development. The quality of public goods delivered expresses how well government functions in this role. It is also a significant indicator of how efficiently authorities extend governance to satisfy societal needs for security (freedom from both fear and want), law and order, political, economic and social services, or any subset thereof.[4] Security governance based on rule of law are two major stimuli for the quality of public goods that societies receive, as both form the bedrock and enabling environment to establish and extend quality goods and services to all citizens. Satisfying the needs arising from different sectors of governance to claim 'good governance' collectively makes for a human environment that counters predisposing conditions of societal dissatisfaction. Good governance is intrinsically dependent upon strong institutions and collectively both shrink the space for competing negative, non-state actors to enter and successfully compete with legitimate, weak or fragile public authorities. Within the overall trajectory of bringing about good governance, state-building links to peacebuilding that crystalised as modern-day liberal peacebuilding, as noted in Chapter 2.

On governance

Constituent elements of good governance designated to benefit citizens first and foremost, suppose the presence of a functioning government embedded in strong institutions. Unfortunately, a fully functional government is too often absent, with the expected quality of governance the UNDP outlines not materialising. The 2019 World Governance Index[5] for Africa places most countries in the 0–10th and 10–25th percentile range on government effectiveness, with only Namibia, South Africa, and Botswana in the 50–75th range. On the rule of law, a similar profile emerges, with only Ghana and Tunisia joining South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana in the higher percentile band. A growing governance-government disconnect turns the attention to geographic spaces where absent or weak governance is prevalent, continuous, and even historic. While indexes such as the Mo Ibrahim Index on Africa, The Fragile

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[2] United Nations Development Programme. (2021).

[3] Rotberg, R (Ed.). (2015).

[4] See note 1.1.

[5] World Bank. (2021).

State Index (Global), and World Governance Index (Global) connect the quality of governance to categories of state strength or weakness, what is often termed 'ungoverned spaces' do not imply a permanent and complete absence of government institutions, services, and influence. The focus, however, remains on quality of governance and its institutions that implement governance, and whether the state itself is the threat most feared by its citizens, as appears to be the case (for example) in Darfur (Sudan) and recently, in Tigray, Ethiopia.[6] The harsh reality is one of too many deserving citizens experiencing weak or no delivery of the public goods they are entitled to, voted for, and which subsequently become marginalised or neglected due to governmental weakness or intentional government interferences, or even intentional denial of services.

Given the reigning norm, supposing the government-institution-governance nexus and the international regime of national governments extending jurisdiction over their sovereign territory (land, air and sea), weak or absent governance often bares the void between sovereignty claimed as a right and sovereignty exercised as a responsibility.[7] Sovereignty as a responsibility appeals more strongly to the duty of delivering public goods that society expects from those who govern. Unfortunately, too many rulers claim sovereignty as a right and use it for reinforcing control or coercive mechanisms, and as a shield to disrupt responses to mitigate weak or absent governance. Behaviour informed by sovereignty as a right often reinforces insecurity in weak or ungoverned spaces, alongside negative perceptions, and experiences, of undue risks such spaces harbour. In essence, sovereignty as a right competes with the sovereignty as a responsibility approach. The latter, however, affords less room for exploitation and allows subsequent weak or absent governance that negatively impact on the range of public goods that civil society rightfully expects.

While some endeavours propose threats and vulnerabilities as the outcome of weakly or ungoverned spaces, alternative views that such spaces are often not ungoverned, but allow for a range of actors to enter and play the role of government, also gain traction. A 2007 RAND Corporation report addressed the threat of ungoverned spaces in an elaborate study that described both its nature as well as prevalence across several geographic regions in West and East Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Afghan-Pakistan border region.[8] On governance in particular, the RAND report identified contested governance, incomplete governance and abdicated governance as a typology to explain why certain territories become labelled as ungoverned or weakly governed.

Contested governance refers to forces other than the state actively disputing government control, and often providing competing informal governance systems. Incomplete governance stems from official authorities not being able to maintain a competent and qualified presence that is stronger and more influential than competing power elements. Abdicated governance plays out when central government fails to extend service delivery to certain territories due to cost effectiveness and even more

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[6] Bader, L. & Braunschweiger, A. (2021).

[7] Etzioni, A. (2006).

[8] Rabassa, A. et al. (2007).

dangerous when in tandem with political distancing from certain communities deemed peripheral or even hostile or marginalised minorities.

Irrespective of its manifestations and finer nuances, Clunan, A.L. and Trikunas, A. (eds) explored the absence of governance in their 2010 publication *Ungoverned spaces: Alternatives to state authority in an era of softened sovereignty* that notes a shift away from a right to a responsibility on claiming sovereignty.[9] They emphasise the responsibility of governments to govern in an accountable way and in the interests of their citizens. In 2014, Keister furthered the notion that 'ungoverned' does not always imply empty spaces, but upon closer scrutiny depicts the authority of non-state entities of various kinds spread over geographic spaces.[10] Taylor followed in 2016, arguing that spaces labelled ungoverned are in fact more of a threat, stemming from how they are governed.[11] Inherently, Taylor points to the state as well as non-state or other dubious actors imposing their brands of governance over a said territory. In doing so, they extend some form of governance that frequently does not meet the requirements of good governance as directed by quality national and personal safety, fostered through security, rule of law, economic opportunities, human development, and social service delivery to the likes of quality public goods in the health, education, housing, infrastructure, and sanitation sectors.

A further dimension of ungoverned spaces relates to ungovernability. Indicators present as the absence of state institutions (which invokes the notion of liberal state-building), the state of physical infrastructure, presence of a shadow economy and corruption, as well as cultural differences or cultural resistance to state penetration. These markers appear alongside features, such as the level of state penetration, state monopoly on the use of force, control of borders, and threats of external intervention.[12] Indicators of ungovernability and its different iterations of weak and absent governance rest upon the absence of those public goods that government must extend, beginning with security and the rule of law as mobilising platforms for distributing quality political, economic, and social goods. If security provision and the rule of law are weak, it is quite improbable that quality social goods are forthcoming.

Extending government presence over sovereign territory is not limited to land. By the first decade of the 21st century, extending good governance offshore around Africa attracted much attention. Piracy and robbery off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea placed the absence of maritime security governance off Africa at centre stage.[13] Maritime insecurity became increasingly linked to the absence of security governance over territorial waters and raised a difficult challenge compared to what is often encountered on land, given the regular absence of a maritime mindset and corresponding service delivery culture at sea.[14] The sea as an environment does not make for easy governance, while ungovernability at sea not only holds a security

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[9] Clunan, A.L. & Trinkunas, H.A. (Eds). (2010).

[10] Keister, J. (2014).

[11] Taylor, A.J. (2016).

[12] Rabassa, A. et al. (2007).

[13] Siebels, D. (2020).

[14] Bueger, C. et al. (2021).

risk, but also extensive safety implications as the oceans serve as a flow and stock resource for landlocked and coastal African countries. Although non-traditional maritime security threats receive much attention, the safety implications of dysfunctional, damaged, stolen or destroyed infrastructure and navigation aids on the coast and at sea are critically important as well. As on land, the absence or partial absence of security and related public goods at sea and in coastal communities create opportunities for crime to flourish.[15] Examples of how non-state actors enter and exploit or even directly contest official maritime security governance play out as piracy and armed robbery; smuggling of illegal goods and substances; illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, and for insurgents and terrorists to make use of such spaces for mobility and logistics.[16] As a counter, the field of, and practices comprising, maritime security capacity building emerged as a leading debate to assist African littoral governments to set up new or better institutions, forms of coordination, enforce rule of law, capacitate security agencies, retrain and enhance existing forces, and invest in equipment, buildings and vessels.[17] As on land, weak maritime governance allows for maritime spaces to be taken over by other actors that compete with the state as the legitimate governing maritime authority over its sovereign maritime waters. In response, strong institutions to govern and maintain rule of law became a rallying platform for African governments to better govern their sea territories.

Air space is another domain where good governance is a critical factor for safety and to limit exploitation of this field through illegal activities that ultimately manifest as, or reinforce, security threats on land and at sea. As for maritime security, a secure air space is subject to land and airspace risk factors.[18] Smuggling, shifting of illegal forces and arms, supporting rebel groups and insurgents, and supporting criminal syndicates, by way of illegal or undeclared flights with unserviceable or unregistered aircraft and compromised access control, promote unsafe air spaces. If not governed well by way of air space control systems and international, regional, and national legislation, vulnerabilities arise that give rise to threats to the likes of air terrorism, unsafe passenger services, and the movement of illegal cargoes.[19] Both the landward and air sectors must be governed appropriately to ensure an overall safe and secure airspace. In the absence of weak or absent governance in one or both domains, opportunities for actors conducting illegal activities and their sponsors gain more traction. Weak governance can also give rise to an insecure aviation environment for flight and air safety, as noted by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as the most dangerous African country for aviation. Weak airspace governance also promotes illegal activities and support to non-state actors if airspace control is dependent on outdated and questionable airport infrastructure, air traffic navigation, and surveillance equipment.[20] Weakly

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[15] HIS Aerospace Defence and Security Analysis: Illicit activities in ungoverned maritime areas. (2013).

[16] Cordner, L. (2018).

[17] Bueger, C. et al. (2021).

[18] International Civil Aviation Committee. (2017).

[19] See for example Klenka, M. (2018).

[20] Anon. (2019).

governed land, maritime and air spaces collectively make for geographic spaces where societies experience layers of weak governance and associated vulnerabilities offering entry points for threats, human insecurity, and vulnerability of the range of public goods societies depend upon.

Turning to security governance

The need for good governance covers landward, maritime and aviation sectors, where governance deficits collectively foster hard and soft security threats to citizens. Overall, the security of citizens is strongly impacted by threats resulting from the quality of governance in geographic spaces. The void between desired and rendered quality governance emanates from governance deficits in public goods' delivery. In essence, the deficit is an outcome of the strength of institutions responsible for delivering the expected quality goods at national and lower levels of governance on land and at sea, as well as for aerospace domains. A geographic approach must also be understood alongside the array of security sectors at play, to account for shifts that locate security in multiple domains that weaken the state-military nexus as a priority, but also as a response mechanism. This widening and deepening debate[21] is critical of a narrow scope for security and how it relates to the relationship between the state and the citizens it must serve. Both underpin the notion that ungoverned or weakly governed spaces give rise to a range of threats that tend to dovetail with a broader understanding of security threats and vulnerabilities and their societal impact.[22]

One approach is to frame security as the collective outcome of preventing or containing multi-sector threats and vulnerabilities, such as politics, economics, the environment, health, as well as sectors of policing, justice, and military service delivery when required. Widening and deepening security threats allow for noting an array of security threats and vulnerabilities that societies experience daily and their impact.[23] The aforementioned outlook aligns with security, politics, rule of law, economics, and social goods to which citizens are entitled. In this regard, national governments are probably best geared within their functional national and local departmental hierarchies, which dovetail with the multiplicity of security sectors, to satisfy the overall security needs of their citizens. The functioning of national departments is optimised through state-building, focusing on good governance, and this outcome is strongly embedded in liberal peacebuilding as a dominant pathway to address multi-sector security deficits.

When approached inclusively, any interference or disruption in one or more governance sectors implies a security threat to citizens or endangering some sector of society (such as the likes of children, women, or the elderly), for example health, food, climate, or matters of law and order. Whether arising from the quality of governance or from political interference domestically or externally, the disturbing reality of a widening spectrum of security threats to people remain. The World Bank, for example, outlines the human and economic costs of the COVID-19 pandemic and not military wars as the major risk to societies for the immediate

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[21] Bourbeau, P. et al. (2015).

[22] Ojo, JS. (2020).

[23] Gueldry, M. et al. (Eds). (2019).

future.[24] This is also illustrated by surveys on what people fear most: Africans for example are particularly concerned with threats to education, healthcare, agriculture and infrastructure, with traditional security threats of less concern.[25] The 2020 African Youth Survey saw young Africans flag unemployment and climate change as apex threats, which is significant given that about 60% of Africa's population is younger than the age of twenty-five. South Africans are most afraid of crime and unemployment, merging with the notion of security as freedom from want and freedom from fear.[26] Although perhaps subjective, the fears expressed all reside within the widened security governance ambit and for governments to address individually, or in collaboration with like-minded public and private partners.

Narratives tend to simplify the situation where ungoverned spaces are filled by an alternative (non-state) actor and its brand of a governance system, and where the social ecology and local resilience against radicalisation, extremism and criminal influences vary tremendously from one area to another. The importance here is that state responses dominate, but are moulded by how challenges are understood, which in turn often taint the response. In recent years, what came to be understood as governance problems have been countered through military means, while a need for an approach inclusive of the historic background, alternative policy tools, and technological support remain neglected.[27] Within the context of good governance, this is a dilemma, as citizens require delivery of multiple public goods other than that offered by way of military coercion. Governments also regularly fail to overcome opposition and other intrusions by employing more constructive means other than coercion, as is visible in the response of the Mozambique government to the armed insurgency in Cabo Delgado.[28] This military grab-back also shows where weak governments are often stronger and better resourced with coercion, and is therefore the first option in response to threats arising in weakly governed spaces in rural and urbanised settings.

Regional operations against Boko Haram by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) serve as a case in point where large coalitions of African armed forces lead the charge, but face difficulties in their endeavours, with few prospects of overall success.[29] The situation in Somalia (governance count 19.2/100)[30] with al-Shabaab is not much different, as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) did well, but can hardly withdraw, as the Somali state is unable to fill the governance void.[31] In the interim, AMISOM has morphed into another African military mission (the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, or ATMIS) to perpetuate the military

[24] World Bank. (2021).

[25] Werft, M. (2016).

[26] Faul, A. (2018).

[27] Ali, FA. (2017).

[28] Moffat, C. (2021).

[29] United Nations. (2018).

[30] Governance counts taken from the 2020 counts on overall governance of the IIAG in Africa.

[31] Mandrup, T. (2021).

response.[32] Events in the Central Africa Republic (CAR) (governance count 30.7) reflect similarities with the growing prevalence of the Russian Wagner Group – military contractors assisting government[33] poses comparable dynamics with the emphasis on military endeavours to hold the line. The reasoning that the use of robust military tools to counter 'governance gone wrong' and allowing it to continue unfortunately opens opportunities for competing actors to promote their interests in a similar way. This raises a researchable question: How is this tendency reversed, and how can one 'pre-empt and prevent armed conflict' and avoid a dominant military response, which too often delays attempts to infuse good governance?

Good governance, through liberal state- and institution-building became an over-arching response to counter the dangers of ungoverned or weakly governed spaces. Both concepts underwent theoretical as well as conceptual refinement, as will be alluded to in Chapter 2. Levels of weak or absent governance continue to plague several African states. The Sahel region (governance count below 50/100), Central Africa (only Rwanda and Uganda rising above 50/100 on governance), and the wider Horn of Africa (only Kenya rising above 50/100 on governance), are some of the worst affected areas, where violent extremism and even terrorism, poverty, environmental degradation and underdevelopment flourish.[34] One conundrum is how can states, which constitute the source of the grievances that foster localised violent extremism and terrorism, be the primary tool to address such governance deficits? Too many governments privilege military responses, but military coercion also gives rise to expensive and often destructive short-term solutions. One example is currently unfolding in Mozambique's northern Cabo Delgado province by way of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) comprised of military contingents from Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, and the entry of a large contingent of non-SADC soldiers and police elements from Rwanda that continuously capture news headlines.[35] Although militant actors often step into weakly or ungoverned spaces and then attempt to extend their governance over the inhabitants, this only heightens the rationale for coercive responses, as described by Unver (2017).[36] A military predilection and militancy are not norms for successfully countering the forcefulness or belligerency so often the reigning model or culture.

To address the governance deficit that fuels conceptions of threat-generating empty spaces, weakly governed spaces or contested spaces to be exploited, the literature points to distinct categories of governance. Areas presumed devoid of quality governance at times harbour governance of a different kind, by entities other than official state authorities. To capture some of the latter ideas by observing specific cases, the chapters that follow cast light on how actors other than the state compete with official authorities or become a 'governance actor' in the absence of a meaningful government presence – whether due to weakness or a deliberate withdrawal of

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[32] Dessu, M. (2022).

[33] Fabricius, P. (2022).

[34] Governance counts for the regions calculated from the 2020 IIAG for Africa.

[35] Staff Reporter. (2021).

[36] Ünver, H. (2017).

presence and influence. The chapter contributions cover arguments on how the debate evolved over time, the roles of liberal state-building, leadership, a drive for more attention to indigenous resolution mechanisms, and a review of the role of peace missions and regional reconciliation. The chapters also attend to the role private security contractors play, an in-depth look at events in Mali and in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as threats and governance in the western Indian Ocean off East Africa, to bring weak governance at sea into the fold, and concludes with a closing chapter outlining the most prominent contributions. The outlines presented below point to the broad themes covered by each of the chapter contributors, commencing with some theory and progress on peace- and state-building for good governance.

Chapter 2 Peace- and state-building governance

This chapter, by Katelyn Cassin and Professor Benjamin Zyla, traces the predominant literature on fragile states, state-building and peacebuilding, following the common thread of debates surrounding the legitimacy and effectiveness of both interventions, and the institutions they aim to build and strengthen. The fragile states' literature contends with the notion of power and legitimate governance, as well as the greed versus grievance debate. The state-building literature relatedly explores neo-realist and liberal institutionalist conceptions of fragility, and the impact of these understandings on structuring both the imperative and the approaches to rebuilding states in the aftermath of crisis. The predominant approach of the last 30 years, liberal peacebuilding, is assessed for both its paradigmatic and enduring normative influence on third-party intervention, and its limitations with respect to both legitimacy and effectiveness. Hybrid peacebuilding and the 'local turn' are discussed as manifestations of the growing consensus on the importance of legitimacy to sustainable peace, and the remaining constraints to decoupling interventions from normatively liberal state engineering projects. Despite a progressive trend toward privileging the legitimacy of interventions in both policy and academia, there remain normative and institutional constraints to implementing alternative, locally coherent approaches to peace- and state-building.

Chapter 3 From broken Athenian edifice to secure dwelling: Renewing the African peace and security architecture

Professor Dries Velthuizen tends to depart in some way from the ambitious objectives of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the UN to establish world peace, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the aspirations of Agenda 2063 of the AU. He turns the focus to the quest for 'silencing the guns' by 2020. His approach challenges the abilities of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to deal with complex problems, such as violent conflict in Africa. His brief philosophical and theoretical framework from his research is guided by the research question: how can broader participation of knowledge holders in Africa contribute to an integrated peace and security architecture that will end violent conflict in Africa? The main argument is that a need exists for new grounded, engaged theory and practice for peace and security in Africa. A new theory should recognise the broader participation of knowledge holders in Africa, to form a revised paradigm for security management that is grounded in the varying epistemologies or ways of knowing in Africa, and engagement with social communities and communities of

practice in Africa. He argues for an integrative, non-hierarchical security management network that allows adaptive redesign for different situations where solutions are knowledge driven. In this network, social communities in ill-governed spaces should be equal if not leading partners in finding solutions to security challenges such as violent conflict.

Chapter 4 Lessons learned, and lessons identified, from complex missions – the case of AMISOM

Professor Thomas Mandrup focuses on the lessons learned from AMISOM in Somalia, which closed by end of March 2022. At that stage, the Somali security institutions were not able to take over the responsibilities for the security provision in Somalia, as envisioned in the Somali Transition Plan (STP) from 2017. The new mission, ATMIS, was faced with an exceedingly difficult mission, having less than three years to achieve what AMISOM was not capable of doing in 15 years, i.e., creating a relatively functioning Somali state and security institutions in control of Somalia. As argued earlier in this introduction, one of the difficulties in Somalia was that the elites seemed focused on sovereignty as a right of the elites, and not sovereignty exercised as a responsibility. This is also one of the reasons al-Shabaab still commands widespread support amongst the wider population. When AMISOM´s mandate ended, al-Shabaab was still present in large sections of the territory and undefeated. However, the AMISOM mission was also a test case for a new type of partnership and division of labour between the UN and the African Union (AU), where the AU provided the military force and the UN the political and civilian dimension, as well as the logistics for the mission. It was initially viewed as the prototype for future peace missions. However, it is unlikely that the Somali model of cooperation and division of labour between AMISOM and the UN-mission will be copied elsewhere. The model has turned out to be less effective and more bureaucratic than expected. Finally, the AMISOM mission, especially after 2013, highlighted the problems of counterinsurgency and Counter-Terrorism Operations on a UN Peace Support Operations (UNPSO) mandate. The chapter illustrates that when the tools and norms of liberal peacebuilding do not have local ownership, they are unlikely to achieve their goal.

Chapter 5 Negotiating governance in ungoverned spaces: The agency of peace support operations

Dr Linda Darkwa remarks that the absence of state authority in the peripheral parts of countries often results in neglect, under-development, and a lack of opportunities. This, in turn, feeds into nepotism, corruption, and clientelism, as limited opportunities are instrumentalised for personal gain. The toxic cocktail of issues deepens grievances and fertilises the ground for the mobilisation of discontent, resulting in a cycle of violence and worsening fragility in affected countries. Peace Support Operations (PSOs) offer opportunities for the transformation and reimagining of societies. Even though PSOs are relatively short term, the provision of quick-impact projects, support for institutional rebuilding and renewal, and infrastructural development, offer immense potential for laying the foundations for the promotion of governance in the long term, in hitherto ungoverned spaces of affected countries. Drawing from lessons learned from research in Somalia and Mali,

this chapter offers insights on the recalibration of the socio-political and humanitarian aspects of PSOs to support long-term governance in ungoverned spaces.

Chapter 6 Regional reconciliation in Africa's ungoverned spaces

Professor Tim Murithi points out that Africa has endured the debilitating effects of cyclical violent regional conflict systems, which expose the vulnerabilities of its border regions. His chapter argues that since Africa's crises demonstrate that conflicts tend to spill across borders, affecting communities in more than one country, they require a 'regional reconciliation' approach to stabilise them. The African Union Transitional Justice Project (AUTJP) outlines the provisions that are required to address the effects of intractable conflicts through addressing the grievances and violations of the past, as a means to establish the foundations for more inclusive, democratic, and reconciled societies. Transitional justice is a key component of peacebuilding and processes of truth-recovery, restorative and retributive justice, reparations, and institutional reform. To stabilise Africa's ungoverned spaces, it is necessary to pursue cross-border transitional justice through a regional reconciliation framework. Regional reconciliation is a preventative pathway for vulnerable governments to avoid costly military-based counterstrategies, particularly with regards to long-standing and recurring conflicts. This chapter will also assess whether regional economic communities (RECs) have the capacity to coordinate regional reconciliation processes, whether there is a case for enhancing their capabilities through engagement, or whether regional reconciliation is the elusive dimension of consolidating peace and security in Africa's ungoverned spaces.

Chapter 7 Professional private security contractors: Stabilising ungoverned spaces in Africa

Mr Eeben Barlow denotes that the term 'ungoverned spaces' is a contested term that generally refers to an area where governance is lacking. Large remote rural and urban areas barely touched by any state presence, or any form of state control are viewed as 'governance black holes'. These holes or ungoverned areas are not only found within so-called fragile/failed states. This chapter, based on practical experience over several years, aims to show that African solutions to resolving Africa's problems can be achieved by using professional African Private Military Companies (APMCs). The author warns that resolving these issues, usually exploited by anti-government forces, requires more than just military will. Ungoverned spaces will remain a political problem until such time that government reach is expanded and good governance applied. In achieving the latter, APMCs have roles to play in delivering niche services in support of official authorities opposing anti-government forces and establishing more secure spaces for legitimate political entrance.

Chapter 8 The proliferation of security actors in the Sahel: The interplay between international regime complexity and local emergence

'The proliferation of security actors in the Sahel' chapter by Troels Henningsen seeks explanations for the proliferation of local and international security providers in Mali and regions in Burkina Faso and Niger. Based on the theoretical concepts of the international security regime complex and complexity in peacekeeping, it argues that the material and ideational resource scarcity of international security providers,

such as France or the UN, has led to a security regime complex, which severely limits the ability of any international security provider to determine the direction of security provision in the Sahel. At the local level, the constant pressure that local communities and elites face, to react to a highly fluid security environment, means that local (in)security providers strive for control, but cannot achieve it due to resource scarcity. The result has been a self-organising response to build self-defence groups, pro-government militias, insurgency groups, as well as many cases of alignment and realignment with existing groups. The chapter argues that the military coups in Burkina Faso and Mali, and the subsequent realignment of Mali with Russia, are national non-linear reactions to the stasis caused by actor proliferation. However, it is reactions that decrease the level of cooperation among the security providers, which may very well have adverse effects on security provisions in the years to come.

Chapter 9 Governance and blue crime in the Gulf of Guinea

Why have efforts to stop piracy been dominated by military responses? In this chapter Hüseyin Yüsel argues that the predominantly military answer to maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea is the result of two simultaneous factors: first, a convergence of interests among stakeholders on fighting piracy. Second, characteristics of the maritime domain make maritime security governance different to security governance on shore, leading to a more military character in responses to it. While military, kinetic means and capacities are necessary to combat, diminish, and render costly piratical activities, they cannot stand alone. Initiatives to strengthen cooperation are paramount due to the unique qualities of the maritime domain, vis-à-vis 'ungoverned spaces' on land. Through discussions of the case, this chapter concludes that military problem-solving is a part of the solution to maritime insecurity, and that cooperation among security providers in the Gulf of Guinea must be strengthened to obtain this end.

Chapter 10 Governance and threat hybridisation in the Western Indian Ocean off Africa

While non-traditional maritime security threats became prominent directors of governance responses in the 21st century, events in Yemen, Somalia and Mozambique raise the hybridisation banner as military operations, insurgency and terrorism become more prominent. This chapter, by Francois Vreÿ and Mark Blaine, first outlines the void in bringing harder security threats into the reigning maritime security debate before discussing the Gulf of Aden and the events in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique as two cases where armed conflict on land also threatens adjacent sea territories. In Yemen, the threat is real and manifests as armed attacks on shipping requiring its own set of mitigation measures to restore order at sea. In Mozambique, the threat is more potential and thus opportunities for more preventative governance responses to prevent spill overs and future threats to maritime territories in general. Both cases require state and non-state governance approaches that account for the quasi-traditional maritime security threats at play.

In conclusion, the contributions cover an ongoing debate, bring their own views on the matter of absent or weak security governance, and offer multiple pathways to address what essentially amounts to weak or absent security governance with a focus

on Africa. The geographic scope of how the problem and threat manifest across Africa is vast, holds a landward and maritime focus, and it is not surprising that policies, strategies, programmes and related initiatives depict not only a geographic trend, but also portray views that attempt to conform to specific vulnerabilities of the continent. Collectively the chapter contributions reside in the ambit of each, making a particular theoretical and practical contribution to understand and respond to a fluid security landscape shaped by governance deficits not easily mitigated by ongoing responses from an ever-widening range of state and non-state actors.

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Peace- and state-building governance

Benjamin Zyla • Katelyn Cassin[37]

Introduction

Whether it is in the field of development, trade and foreign policy generally, in the 21st century the multi-polar character of the world impacts security governance (Kirchner, 2014). The purview of international engagement in peace operations has expanded substantially since the end of the Second World War, despite debates about the impacts and effectiveness of third-party interventions in conflict zones. While international norms and laws continue to inform interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states, the characteristics of these interventions are shifting as donors and neighbouring countries work to achieve more sustainable resolutions to conflicts, especially over the past thirty years.

This chapter is meant as an overview chapter introducing the predominant literature on fragile states, state-building, liberal peacebuilding and hybrid peacebuilding as a contextual foundation upon which to discuss security governance and conflict responses in the chapters following. Specifically, we discuss the state fragility and state-building literatures with respect to the legitimacy and effectiveness of state institutions as foundational to stability and good governance. Liberal peacebuilding, currently the main practice of post-conflict intervention, enacts a state-building-as-peacebuilding approach, and privileges liberal institutional reforms to enhance the effectiveness of the state, achieving legitimacy through democratisation. "Post-liberal"[38], or hybrid peacebuilding, constitutes a response to the limited sustainability of liberal peacebuilding, privileging the legitimacy of reforms through prioritising local ownership and the endogenous rehabilitation of the social contract.

Fragile states

Fragile states are defined as having a "[...] weak capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a population and its territory, and lack[ing] the ability to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society" (OECD, 2011:21;

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[37] See note 2.1.

[38] See note 2.2.

see also Zartman, 2005).[39] They are unable to exert legitimate political and physical control over their territory, to enforce laws uniformly,[40] and to deliver essential public goods to their citizens (Stewart & Brown, 2009; Stern & Öjendal, 2010; Lemay-Hébert, 2009).

This definition of state fragility fuses two strands of thought in the mainstream literature, which capture different interpretations of what constitutes power (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008). Max Weber places state power primarily in the capability to exercise a monopoly on coercion and violence within a particular territory (Weber, 1919[41]; Call, 2008; Jackson & Rosber, 1989; Goldstone, 2008). In this capacity, the basic functions of a state are the legislature, police, judiciary, and administration (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008). Émile Durkheim, however, argued that the state is the manifestation of the "sentiments, ideals, [and] beliefs" of the society that it represents (1957: 79–80 as quoted in Lemay-Hébert, 2009: 25). Lemay-Hébert calls this tradition, the "legitimacy approach" (2009: 21), which finds its roots in the thinking of Thomas Hobbes[42], who argues that the state is an entity empowered by a "social contract" between the government and its people (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008: 116). In this understanding, a state has three essential functions: the provision of security, representation, and welfare (Berger, 2006; Miliken & Krause, 2002). A failure to realise these functions is indicative of a weak or fragile state with a decreased legitimacy of the government (Lemay-Hébert, 2009).[43]

Several scholars attribute state fragility to the inability of a government to provide equitable economic opportunity to its people (Buhaug et al., 2011). This stems from the logic of Adam Smith (1776) who argues "that capitalist economic systems and the free exchange of goods in an international market economy are the best guarantors of peace" (Levy, 1998: 149). As such, the absence of a free market undermines peace in a society. Rodrik (1999) goes a bit further and connects the presence of weak conflict management institutions and "high-income inequality" to economic instability, which makes nations more prone to experience "growth failure", thus contributing to poverty (Mansoob Murshed, 2002: 388; see also Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Fearon and Laitin (2003) remind us that a USD1 000 drop of income per capita in a fragile state increases the odds of a civil war by 41%. Though widely debated, greed and elite competition over natural resources can fuel grievances (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Zartman, 2005), as it often exacerbates inequalities, benefitting only certain members of the society (distributive conflict).[44] These economic governance failures make the opportunity to rebel 'atypically' appealing, and thus civil war more likely and enduring (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004: 563; see also Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Ross, 2004). Relatedly, insurgents often finance their activities through the natural resources they export. A recent example is the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It illegally sold oil to foreign markets, which

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[39] See note 2.3.

[40] See note 2.4.

[41] See note 2.5.

[42] See note 2.6.

[43] See note 2.7.

[44] See note 2.8.

in turn fuelled the conflict as insurgents were better resourced (Levy, 1998; Cramer, 2002). In short, the literature makes clear that a state is fragile and prone to conflict when it lacks the governance capacity to ensure equitable economic opportunities for its citizens.

Moreover, the number of ethnic conflicts in the early 1990s generated a popular hypothesis that correlated ethnic diversity with the likelihood of civil conflict (Mansoob Murshed, 2002; Goldstone, 2008; Bates, 2008). Indeed, ethnic enmity (see Snyder & Jervis, 1999; Lake & Rothchild, 1996) and societal grievances – that is systematic (political) discrimination (e.g., restriction of political rights and freedoms) against certain ethnic or social groups – have been found to aggravate societal conflicts in fragile states.[45] Critically, these enmities are often connected to colonial legacies that pitted ethnic groups against one another, privileged compliant minorities for power, and fostered the corruption of local political elites (Debiel et al., 2005; Von Einsiedel, 2005; Bates, 2008). In such contexts, ethnic identities and group distinctions are leveraged to address perceived ethnic, social, or religious injustices (relative deprivation) or even discrimination (Tajfel, 1981). The correlation of ethnic diversity to civil war is based on the inability of the state to manage conflict through an institutionalised grievance process (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Rodrik, 1999; Mansoob Murshed, 2002). In reference to Huntington (1968), Mansfield and Snyder explain this point clearly: "the typical problem of political development is the gap between high levels of political participation and weak integrative institutions to reconcile the multiplicity of contending claims" (1995: 22). Lemay-Hébert notes that "for Huntington the key to state stability is not the strength of the institutions per se, but the relationship between these institutions and the overarching society they are supposed to represent" (2009: 27; see also Goldstone, 2008).[46] Horizontal inequalities can exacerbate grievances or impose barriers to upward social mobility, or encourage violent separatist movements (Horowitz, 1985; Jenkins & Gottlieb, 2007; Stewart, 2008; Gurr, 2000). All these factors contribute to a lack of authority, effectiveness, and accountability of the state, which in turn undermines the legitimacy of the government and its representatives.[47]

Regardless of the unique contextual factors that drive a particular conflict, a state can be defined as fragile when there is a lack of balance between society's expectations of the state and the state's capacity to meet those expectations – the so-called social contract. But a social contract is by no means static; it "[...] is better conceptualised as a dynamic continuum, along which societies can experience state failure and violent conflict at one end and a more cohesive society moving up the continuum" (Alexandre et al., 2012: 13). In contrast, a government that is able to manage complications within state-society relations, while avoiding vulnerabilities to internal conflict, a humanitarian crisis, or a collapsing state, is considered stable (Krug, 2016). Thus, it is resilience in the social contract that produces stability in the state (OECD, 2008). While significant academic and policy attention has been paid to understanding fragility, preventative action remains elusive (von Einsiedel, 2005).

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[45] See note 2.9.

[46] See note 2.10.

[47] See note 2.11.

The practical and policy consequence of these various understandings and conceptualisations of state fragility and failure is the necessity of institutional reconstruction, often times orchestrated by the so-called international community through its policy of state-building interventions.

State-building

In what Mary Kaldor calls the "new wars", scholars detected a shift from inter-state to intra-state armed conflicts (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2001) as the main threat to global peace and security (von der Schulenberg, 2014; Kaldor, 1999).[48] This reconceptualization of security has significant implications for conflict affected states and their neighbourhood. For example, World Bank officials calculate that intra-state, or civil, conflict costs the average developing country roughly 30 years of GDP growth (2011). Moreover, countries in protracted crisis can fall over 20 percentage points behind in overcoming poverty, and neighbouring states to a conflict affected state experience a 0.7% decline in their GDP per year. In a context of pervasive institutional and state failure, non-state actors (e.g., rebel groups, radical extremists, terrorists, etc.) emerge as conflict partakers, transnationalising conflicts through, for example, their illegal activities and organised crime (Kaldor, 1999; O'Rourke, 2016; Juergensmeyer, 2007; Duffield, 2001; Münkler, 2002; Makarenko, 2008), such as smuggling, drugs, weapon trades, illegal migration and harbouring terrorism (Herbst, 2004; Hagman & Hoehne, 2009; Stewart, 2007).[49] These are transnational activities that undoubtedly weaken neighbouring states as well (Nay, 2013; Ghani & Lockhart, 2008), and threaten international peace and security writ large (Chandler, 2007; Bliesemann De Guevara, 2010). Against this backdrop, in the post-9/11 era so-called fragile states were added to the vocabulary of international crisis managers, especially those in Washington who put them at the top of the international policy agenda (Stewart, 2011; Rocha Menocal, 2011) and by considering them as a threat to international security writ large (Fukuyama, 2004; O'Rourke, 2016). This was the birth of the statebuilding policy and given political weight.

However, rebuilding states in the aftermath of conflict undeniably represents one of the foremost challenges for the international community in the post-Cold War era, indeed until this day, as the case of Afghanistan shows. State-building is defined as "the creation or recovery of the authoritative, legitimate, and capable governance institutions that can provide for security and the necessary rule-of-law conditions for economic and social development" (Sisk, 2013: 1). In that sense, state-building has "an explicit aim of development, rather than a side-effect" (Marquette & Beswick, 2011: 1, 711) that often is implemented in the post-conflict period of what has become a fragile state. State-building seeks improvements in the capacities of governments to deliver security and development goods (e.g., effective civil services, tax collection, and general infrastructure development [Sandole, 2011; Marquette & Beswick, 2011]). The sister term, peacebuilding, which is often used interchangeably with the term state-building, is the broader analytical concept (Sandole, 2011). It is defined as preventing the recurrence of conflict and addressing its root causes.

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[48] For a rebuttal see (Newman, 2004).

[49] For a disagreement on the link between fragile states and terrorism see (Hehir, 2009; Traub, 2011).

Mirroring the literature on state fragility, state-building can be understood as strengthening the legitimacy and effectiveness, variously conceived as the defining features of the 'state'. Within effectiveness, there are the notions of security, sovereignty, and economic predation. Institutionalists emphasize that without the adequate regulatory institutions and governance mechanisms, liberalisation may in fact worsen development and create the conditions for extremism, which in turn threatens the states' security and thus that of the international community (Fukuyama, 2004). Specifically, Fukuyama (2004) distinguishes between state scope and state strength – that is what is needed is not the breadth of state interference, but rather a strong state that can implement laws and policies. This strength is otherwise known as institutional capacity.[50]

The state-building literature implicitly calls for the cessation of violence as a necessary precursor to substantive state-building activities. However, sustained peace is only attained through the co-constitutive achievement of legitimacy and effectiveness and, as such, liberal institutionalism has been the predominant state-building approach since the end of the Cold War. In particular, the social contract emerges from the interaction between expectations that members of a society have of a state (legitimacy) and the state's capacity to provide services to its population (effectiveness) (OECD, 2008). Liberal institutionalism productively links security and development by illustrating the intimate dependencies between economic and political reforms in state-building interventions. For example, the provision of public services produces the space for equal exchange. Moreover, the enforcement of contracts requires a strong central authority and, as such, the state is fundamentally connected to economic institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). However, those political institutions must be inclusive and pluralist for them to "[...] determine who has power in society and to what ends that power can be used" (ibid. 80, see also Call, 2008). Further, they regulate and provide avenues for the productive resolution of conflicts, and thus better channel resources into economically productive activities (Rodrik, 2007).

To generate these inclusive institutions that manage social conflicts and risks from external shocks, at both the political and economic levels, Dani Rodrik argues for the promotion of bottom-up initiatives primarily led by "participatory political institutions" (2007: 166). These function as "meta institutions that elicit and aggregate local knowledge and thereby help build better institutions" that have legitimacy in the eyes of the populace (ibid.). Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) make a similar point by noting that institutional change in fragile states is not the result of external interventions or technical guidance; it is the result of internal political changes that are inclusive, and reform addressed.[51] The liberal-market orientation of this approach to state-building carves out the co-constitutive nature of legitimacy and effectiveness. It also introduces an underlying paradox of designing external interventions that are contingent on locally-driven processes to be sustainable and enduring.

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[50] See note 2.12.

[51] See note 2.13.

This paradox is underpinned by the distinction between a state and a nation-state. The latter, as Lemay-Hébert reminds us, is a "sociological process subject to alteration, modification, reinterpretation, or even wholesale creation by politics" (2009: 35). In other words, a nation is shaped by collective identity, history, tradition, and language and, as such, is not something than can be constructed externally, such as a state or its institutions. Lemay-Hébert (2009) attributes the failures, or limited successes of the state-building-as-peacebuilding project to the creation of institutions (or state-building), without considering matters of socio-political cohesion, or nation-building (see also Buzan, 1991; Bliesemann de Guevara, 2010).

Nonetheless, state-building has been the international community's 'blueprint' to state fragility and overcoming conflict since the Cold War's end (s.f. World Bank, 2011; Autesserre, 2014; Barnett, 2006; Barnett et al., 2014; Stern & Öjendal, 2010), particularly in the context of humanitarian emergencies triggered by weak governance, necessitating the protection of civilians or delivery of disaster assistance (Wheeler, 2000). In policy terms, state-building has been recommended as a way of strengthening the resilience[52] of fragile states.[53] The World Bank, for example, recommends strengthening the legitimate institutions of the state and the states' means to provide citizens with security, justice, and employment (World Bank, 2011). Specifically, it urges the international community to increase their foreign direct investment (FDI) in fragile states to kick-start the latter's domestic economy, to help build their basic infrastructure, to grow the economy, to ensure the monopoly of violence, and to increase the accountability of the government and its civil servants. These are ultimately liberal institutionalist approaches that reflect the co-dependency of security and development.[54] Similarly, the OECD recommends that donor funding should be aligned with nationally led programmes for peace and state-building through on-budget and multi-sectoral aid (as for example indicated in the 2011 New Deal, see OECD, 2015; IDPS, 2011). This requires risk tolerance from international interveners and commitments to build trust in the governments of fragile states.

As noted, it is widely established in the conflict studies literature that conflict carries significant development costs. As a result, promoting security is instrumental for development to take root (Suhrke & Wimpelmann, 2012). In turn, inclusive development is a vital element for avoiding conflict, and thus development is instrumental to the achievement of security (especially creating security, jobs, and rule of law) (World Bank, 2011; Quian, 2015; Sachs, 2005). In that sense, state-building can be considered as good governance (Sisk, 2013).[55]

The evolution of conflict responses in the form of comprehensive state-building approaches that are rooted in the security-development nexus can be traced back to the concept of human security, as noted. A key paradigmatic moment in the post-Cold War period, human security was written into policy in the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP) (Homolar, 2015; Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Baldwin,

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[52] See note 2.14.

[53] See note 2.15.

[54] See note 2.16.

[55] See note 2.17.

1995; Goucha & Crowley, 2008). This reflected a shift away from traditional approaches considering the security of states towards moving to a people-centred approach and thereby acknowledging the multi-dimensional experiences of (their) insecurity (Shepherd, 2013; Ogata, 2003). Mary Martin and Taylor Owen define human security as "the combination of physical protection and material security" (2010: 219). Inherent in this definition is not only the interdependence of security and development; it also acknowledges the many causes of human vulnerability, including armed conflict, human rights violations, environmental challenges, and resource deprivation (Rothschild, 1995; see also Wibben, 2008). The human security paradigm calls upon policymakers to invest into sustainable economic growth, education, health services, and employment for the poor (Owen, 2004).

While human security has been embraced ubiquitously in policy, it has not been consistently or easily translated into practice, because donors struggle to move beyond stabilisation and security efforts to more sustainable, development and state-building reform in (militarised) international interventions (Thruelsen, 2011; Sedra, 2007). In an effort to produce an actionable approach to human security in peace operations, some scholars have pursued the development of prioritisation schemes for interventions, stipulating stabilisation before governance reforms (Owen, 2004; Imboden, 2012; Thruelsen, 2011; Donais, 2004). One often overlooked aspect, however, is that stabilisation activities must not necessarily undermine or inhibit future governance reforms. They should present one portion of a longer-term, coherent strategy to support a fragile state in reforming not only their security institutions (e.g., police forces), but also judicial and governance institutions. Above all, they should privilege accountability and inclusive local ownership that is "reconciled with the country's history, culture and legal framework" (Sedra, 2007: 8; see also Thruelson, 2011; Donais, 2004; Gordon, 2014; OECD, 2005a, 2007a; IDPS, 2011; World Bank, 2011). In other words, stabilisation activities should be conducive to nation-building efforts and restoring the legitimacy of state institutions. For donors, security is a point of entry into a peace process and is often identified as a "binding constraint" to peace and development (North, 1990). It is an actionable focus on which to devote both material and human resources to contribute to rebuilding the social contract between a fragile government and its citizens (Hansen, 2000; Donais, 2004).

Liberal peacebuilding

In practice, state-building-as-peacebuilding has been enacted primarily through liberal peacebuilding. We distinguish this body of literature from that on state-building by its particular concern with democratisation as both the methodological approach to achieving legitimacy, and the end goal necessary to assure sustainable peace. Generally, like the state-building literature, liberal peacebuilding theorists demand a certain level of security or state effectiveness prior to democratisation (Jarstad, 2008).[56] Effectiveness, they charge, is simultaneously located in democracy and based on the accountability of the state to the populace.

The origins of the 'liberal peace' paradigm as a solution to state fragility are located in the writings of Immanuel Kant, which inspired two approaches to peace: the

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[56] See note 2.18.

republican peace and the liberal peace. They vary in means but share the same ultimate goal. To achieve 'perpetual peace', Kant (1795) identified several principles constraining a state's incentives and abilities to wage war.[57] He argued that a civil state, based on a republican constitution, was the optimal way to combat the "natural state [...] of war" (Kant, 1795). Inspired by Kant's thinking, Barnett argues for the potential advantage of a republican peace, and emphasizes the principles of "deliberation, constitutionalism, and representation" as a pragmatic 'stepping-stone' on the road to liberal peace (2006: 89–90). Its advantages lie in being representative, while also distributing political power (Barnett, 2006), as well as emphasizing the public, civic good, over the rights of the individual.

Liberal peace, by contrast, holds 'individual freedoms' as its conceptual fulcrum, manifested in "representative government", and preserved through "constitutional limits on arbitrary power" (Paris, 2010: 360). Liberal peace ultimately relies on the creation of effective and legitimate state institutions to support political freedoms and the efficient functioning of the market (Paris, 2010). Barnett, Fang, and Zürcher observe that this liberal approach to peacebuilding is characterised by "the desire to produce a particular kind of state, a liberal, democratic state, organised around markets, the rule of law, and democracy" (2014: 610).[58] The strategic idea behind this policy is that democracy and a free-market economy allow citizens to effectively communicate and settle their differences peacefully. This then creates the strongest basis for sustainable development and governance (Newman, 2009). In other words, peacebuilding post-conflict implies a form of liberal state-building that is initiated by international organisations, such as the UN, international financial institutions (e.g., World Bank, Asian Development Bank), states, and non-governmental organisations (e.g., Oxfam, CARE, etc.). As Richmond puts it succinctly, "liberal peacebuilding has been turned into a system of governance rather than a process of reconciliation" (2010: 24–25). Indeed, it became the go to policy tool of all international security organizations (e.g. the UN, NATO, EU etc.; see Diehl, 2014).

However, at the heart of the debate is the central paradox of the liberal peace project, which notes that democratisation and market liberalisation inherently encourage competition and conflict. When applied to contexts incapable of managing such tensions (e.g. in Afghanistan), the result can actually be greater ineffectiveness and instability (Paris, 2004) and not a sustainable peace. As such, the liberal peacebuilding paradigm assumes that necessary preconditions must be in place in a well-sequenced order before democratising post-conflict societies through often divisive elections can or should take place (Fisher & Keashley, 1991; Caplan, 2012; Call, 2008).[59] This perspective of peace- (and state) building acknowledges that what is desirable in the long-term might be incompatible with what is possible in the short-term (Call, 2008). This tension points to what Salamé called the "dual legitimacy" problem (1996, as referenced in Call, 2008: 71), which is the simultaneous need to foster internal legitimacy that may indeed require coercion,[60] and the need to attain and

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[57] See note 2.19.

[58] See note 2.20.

[59] See note 2.21.

[60] See note 2.22.

maintain international legitimacy in order to receive the financial and international support necessary to build a state (Call, 2008: 71; Ayoob, 2001; Visoka & Doyle, 2014). Fukuyama finds that the international community is "effectively locked into a non-sequencing norm with regard to state-building" (2007: 13). In this sense, the rule of law and democracy are promoted and implemented with little to no flexibility for post-conflict states, reflecting international legitimacy norms. Fukuyama reminds us that state-formation is a violent process and cautions that the strategy of the international community may only halt conflicts temporarily, and that violence is likely to return in ungoverned spaces (Menkhaus, 2007; Raeymaekers et al., 2008).

As noted, since the end of the Cold War international security organizations (e.g. the UN, NATO, EU) have expanded their peace operational purview through a liberal peacebuilding lens, anticipating a future of increasingly complex security needs and thus generating demand for more expansive interventions,[61] despite questions about mission effectiveness (Berdal & Ucko, 2015; Mandel, 2013).[62] To quickly recap, the new UN peacekeeping missions evolved from traditional methods of mediation and negotiation (so-called classical peacekeeping[63] operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter), to integrated and multi-dimensional approaches of conflict management and resolution that seek to build peace through comprehensive political, economic, and social reforms (Diehl, 2014; Bellamy et al., 2010). The Agenda for Peace introduced "peacebuilding" and "peace enforcement" to the dictionary of international policymakers, reflecting the increased freedom to engage in interventions with a security council liberated from the deadlock of the Cold War (UN, 1992: 3; Berdal & Ucko, 2015). This document issued a call for expanding military capabilities[64] and enhancing financing mechanisms; it introduced discourses challenging notions of absolute sovereignty[65] and the need for preventative action through diplomacy, military deployments, and development (UN, 1992; Berdal & Ucko, 2015). Further, this document calls for an integrated, comprehensive approach to the peace paradigm, merging security and development policies to be spearheaded by the United Nations (UN, 1992).

Since the release of the Agenda for Peace, UN peace operations have continued to expand to include the protection of civilians and extending the authority of the state (Berdal & Ucko, 2015). The creation of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Fund in 2005 (UN, 2005), constituted an effort to institutionalise and distinguish state- and peacebuilding activities from more traditional peacekeeping interventions (Crocker et al., 2004).

In this expanding operational context, by the end of the 1990s, both theory and policy emphasized the need for longer term, comprehensive approaches to peace (Von der Schulenberg, 2014; Paris, 2010). International donors have widely acknowledged the need to harmonise the actions of civilian and military crisis managers in order to achieve greater efficiency as well as effectiveness in peace- and state-building

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[61] See note 2.23.

[62] See note 2.24.

[63] See note 2.25.

[64] See note 2.26.

[65] See note 2.27.

interventions (OECD, 2006). Furthermore, donors not only need to utilise the 'right' policy tools; they also must have the capacity to interact and coordinate with a wide array of (international) actors (states, international organisations and NGOs), operating concurrently in the same political space of state-building, as well as the local population that is at the receiving end of the external assistance (s.f. Balthasar, 2015).[66] Security governance, which refers to "persuasive" and "coercive" efforts at "institution building and conflict resolution," is increasingly the responsibility of regional alliances and structures, particularly in cases where veto power impedes global governance by the United Nations (UN) (Kirchner, 2014: 3, 6; see also Tschirgi, 2002; World Bank, 2011).

The introduction or proliferation of multi-institutional interventions has led to increasing calls for policy coherence and coordination under the labels of whole-of-government or comprehensive approaches. The capacity to harness a range of human assets in a coherent, collaborative and efficient manner, involving political, civilian, and military instruments, is essential for achieving successful international peacebuilding operations (Patrick & Brown, 2007; Chandler, 2007; OECD, 2011). In short, policy coherence is key to mission effectiveness and efficiency.[67]

Hybridity and the 'local turn'

As noted, liberal peacebuilding has been the favoured approach of international peacebuilders over the past thirty years. At the same time, it has been heavily criticized (s.f. Suhrke, 2007), for example, with regards to the impact and legitimacy of promoting liberal democracy and market economics in conflict-prone societies; the policy of state-building in the developing world; threats to international peace and security; and broader issues relating to Western cultural assumptions, top-down state-building approaches, and neo-colonial variants of peace-building (Newman, 2009; Jones, 2008), to name a few. In line with broader trends in development policy (OECD, 2005b, 2007b, 2008, 2012; UN, 2011; UNDP, 2012), more recent peace- and state-building interventions try to increase their emphasis on promoting local legitimacy and ownership, acknowledging the complex nature of fragility and conflict (s.f. Donais, 2009; Autesserre, 2014; Cohen, 2014). This has led to an influx of the theoretical literature on peacebuilding we discussed in the preceding section. Most recently scholars have called for hybridised approaches to peacebuilding.

For Richmond hybrid peacebuilding is taking the "technology" of state-building central to the liberal peace project and connecting it to the "existing social contract [...] or, more importantly, to open [peacebuilding] up to the cultural, customary dynamics of the local environment concerned" (2010: 31). This presents a "plausible approach" in contrast to those who argue for an entire "dismantling of the liberal peacebuilding system" (2010: 31). This conceptualisation and approach to peacebuilding, however, retains the main goals and values of the liberal peace project, while its emphasis on legitimacy manifests in both the means and the ends of peacebuilding (Fetherston & Nordstron, 1995). At the heart of the hybrid peacebuilding paradigm is a recognition by interveners that institution-building (and thus state-building) is an indigenous and slow process that takes years, if not

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[66] This paragraph draws from Grant and Zyla (2021).

[67] See note 2.28.

months. It also requires local agency or local actors, as well as long-term international commitments.

Particularly in a post-9/11 context, donor states' security concerns have tended to supersede local and national models for reform. They have thus impeded coherence among actors involved (Sedra, 2007; Gordon, 2014; Donais, 2004). While donors are often unable and unwilling to make necessary adjustments to their operating procedures in fragile and conflict affected states, local actors may also be unwilling to accept the sort of transformations donors are promoting due to high adoption costs and threats to their own power (Sedra, 2010; Zürcher et al., 2013). This is particularly true in "non-permissive" environments, where donors' focus on "filling the 'ungoverned spaces'" to prevent insurgencies have resulted in bargaining and lowered standards for what constitutes reform and local ownership (Jarstad, 2013: 384; see also Grindle, 2007; Zürcher et al., 2013; Thruelsen, 2011). External interveners tend to ignore existing, local governance structures and focus solely on officially recognised state institutions, thereby failing to benefit from the capacity and legitimacy of de facto governmental arrangements already in place (Miller & Rudnick, 2010; Eckhard, 2018). In these contexts, "local ownership becomes less about local authorship and control than about getting domestic actors to buy into what remains largely an externally-defined vision" (Donais, 2009: 128; see also Baranyi & Salahub, 2011; Ball & Van de Goor, 2013). Rather than achieving legitimacy by renewing the social contract, local ownership is instrumentalised to attain legitimacy for externally constructed institutions, thus failing to engage civil society and non-state actors in a meaningful way (Gordon, 2014). These shortcuts do little for the legitimacy and sustainability of fragile states, the reforms, or the external actors that drive them.

The sort of emancipatory, locally legitimate, context specific peace called for by advocates of the 'local turn' and hybrid peacebuilding demands that the "subjects of violence" are to be a part of the "reconstruction of peace" (Richmond, 2011: 200). While policy rhetoric may seem progressive from many security actors, in some cases this constitutes rhetorical signaling that is used instrumentally to secure support and align with global policy trends, but not necessarily applied substantively in practice (Richmond, 2012; Chandler, 2007).[68] Aggressors are not often engaged in the peace process; civil society is frequently absent from interventions (in part owing to the security situation); and what constitutes local authority is often dictated by external actors rather than citizens (e.g., Welz, 2014; Boutellis, 2013; Anderson, 2014; Williams, 2013). Further, the power asymmetries between international and local actors impede substantive, locally owned peace practices (Cohen, 2014; Fukuda-Parr, 2014). As a result, some scholars charge that an emancipatory local turn in post-conflict intervention requires 'decolonising' peacebuilding, which would open up an epistemological space for alternative, local knowledges, and relinquishing control on the part of outsiders (Cohen, 2014: 65; see also Miller & Rudnick, 2010).[69]

The point of this critical peace- and state-building scholarship is that a critical rethinking of the international community's peace- and state-building discourse,

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[68] See note 2.29.

[69] See note 2.30.

policy and practice, along with the inclusion and empowerment of locals, is needed to allow for the development of hybridised (local, regional, global) policies and practices that are aimed at creating real, long-lasting peace in conflict-affected states. The liberal peace-as-governance approach has failed to encourage local ownership in the post-conflict rehabilitation process, ignored issues that pertain to local contexts, and relied on top-down, elite-led liberal remedies. Post-conflict peace-building activities and reforms imported by the international community reflect this foreign form of governance, while overlooking informal indigenous societal institutions (Brown et al., 2010; Newman, 2009). Ultimately, there is a disconnect between the local reality of the conflict-affected state and a Western-backed model of the ideal (Weberian) state. In this regard, the liberal peace-and state-building model is criticized for its "alleged ethnocentrism – its promotion of essentially Western values and its belief in the universalism of liberal goals" (Mac Ginty, 2010: 394). Notably, hybrid peacebuilding has received similar critiques from post-colonial and post-modern scholars as yet another perpetuation of the dominant hegemonic narrative (Duffield, 2007), which preserves normative "value judgements" and power disparities rather than disrupting them (Nadarajah & Rampton, 2015: 59–60).[70]

Conclusion

While academic and policy consensus have progressively shifted toward local ownership and legitimacy, there remain significant challenges in reconciling the humanitarian imperatives for interventions with the requirements for sustainable and substantive peace. The literatures on state fragility and state-building are centered on the restoration of institutional effectiveness and legitimacy as foundational to good governance and stability. Liberal peacebuilding, which has been the main approach to post-conflict intervention since the early 1990s, enacts liberal institutional reforms to improve state capacity, achieving legitimacy through democratisation. In response to limited, sustainable results, especially in recent years, scholars, and policymakers have increasingly advocated for hybrid approaches to peacebuilding. In so doing, they further emphasize legitimacy by privileging local governance structures and knowledge. Despite these progressive trends in policy rhetoric, state-building and peacebuilding actors remain embedded in the global liberal governance system and thus constrained in their implementation of alternative, locally-embedded systems of peacebuilding and state-building that sustainably rebuild the social contract between the state and the populace.

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[70] See note 2.31.

From broken Athenian edifice to secure dwelling: Renewing the African peace and security architecture

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Introduction

People living in Africa are concerned about the way they are governed by structures mostly inherited from their former colonial masters, who transplanted the hierarchical structures of Europe to Africa. The concern with these structures, is that they fail to alleviate insecurity in Africa. In the world of the poor and unsafe, poverty and insecurity are a seamless reality, and it makes people aggrieved to see how rulers live with impunity and disregard for those who are not in their elitist fold.

It is in these spaces, where governance structures to promote social justice, equality, dignity and good governance are not functioning, that armed groups emerge to enable a better life for themselves and the society from which they come, even if it means engaging in illegal activities.[71] Furthermore, it is in such insecure spaces that the voices of most citizens are silenced, denying them participation in democratic governance.[72]

The question asked is: How could the participation of African communities who live in weakly-governed spaces, be broadened and deepened to enable peace and security structures in Africa to create peaceful spaces? To respond to these questions, this chapter aims at a new paradigm for peace and security in Africa that will enable citizens of Africa, irrespective of where they are, to participate in decisions that will bring them lasting peace in a secure environment.

In achieving this aim, the discussion departs from a brief explanation of the research that underpins this chapter, to a discussion of the philosophical and theoretical framework to guide personal reflections. In presenting this theory, the chapter explores new thinking outside the over-ambitious (though probably well-intended) objectives of the PSC of the UN to establish 'world peace', the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the aspirations of Agenda 2063 of the AU, which

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[71] African Union. (2022).

[72] Andreas Velthuizen. (2020).

failed in its well-meaning ambition of 'silencing the guns' by 2020. The discussion includes current trends of insecurity in Africa to clarify the complex problem of security governance in Africa. After analysing the different perspectives on the abilities of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the African Union (AU) to deal with complex problems, such as violent conflict in Africa, the African knowledge systems' (AKS) perspective is presented as a paradigm for peace and security governance in Africa.

The research methodology

This chapter is an output of ongoing research into peace, conflict and security in Africa, involving both theory development and empirical knowledge gathering. The approach of the researcher is qualitative, transdisciplinary, and complementary reflective research, allowing for critical reflection and breaking out of dominant paradigms. In this approach, the researcher remains conscious of the work of scholars such as Thomas Kuhn, who postulated in his seminal work of the 1960s[73] that a paradigm starts to crumble and is in crisis mode where there is an increasing insecurity about the capacity of the paradigm to 'solve the puzzles' and when it repeatedly gets the wrong answers. Paradigms such as Copernicus's theory on astronomy or Einstein's special theory of relativity, are possible and it leads to the reconstruction of theories. However, creating new paradigms that lead to theories is an intrinsically revolutionary process that cannot be completed by one person or overnight. Essentially new paradigms are about the people who make and propose them, living in different worlds with different worldviews. Gaining a new paradigm is a sign that the field of study has matured into something real, providing a new lens through which to view the world, admitting the possibility that our current beliefs may be mere assumptions.

The research is therefore an attempt to create grounded theory through the gathering and analysis of data (nowadays including 'Big Data'), testing a wide range of technological research tools that became available because of relative seclusion and enforced immobility of researchers during the pandemic of 2020 and 2021. The analysis is followed by a critical but culturally sensitive complementary reflective dialogue, continuously iteratively applying deductive and inductive reasoning, asking new questions to focus the ongoing research.

The outcome of the data gathering, analysis and reflection is grounded in a multiplicity of knowledge claims on peace and security in Africa, developed from data gathering since 2013, in engagement with several communities and communities of practice mainly in Africa, but also with researchers in the African diaspora. Thematic analysis is used to analyse and apply the complementary reflexive approach to maintain an 'open mind' on issues such as peace and security in Africa. By applying this methodology, the author discovered the lived experiences and consciousness of people in Africa who are involved in violent conflict or recovering from it, important for investigating peace and security governance in Africa.

For this chapter, the author applied a triangulation of research methods, departing from the vast literature of scholarly publications and documents that inform on

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[73] Kuhn, T. (1960).

and criticise security governance in Africa. The literature is complemented by reflexive journaling during attendance of conferences, for example, presented by the African Association of Political Science (2021); the Russian Academy of Science Africa Institute (2021); Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, University of Stellenbosch (2020); the Africa Platform, Ghent University (December 2019); the Bayreuth Institute for Graduate International Graduate School for African Studies (2019), and Mekelle University (2017). Complementary reflections with practitioners, for example students and staff of the Defence and Security Programme of the SA National Defence College (2019, 2020 and 2021); and regular interaction with scholars at universities, provided valuable meaning-making opportunities. These research methods revealed some propositions towards a new paradigm for security governance in Africa.

The philosophical and theoretical framework

Practitioners and scholars sometimes slavishly follow existing paradigms on peace and security hanging onto popular metaphors, such as 'architecture', without sufficiently considering alternative views. New thinking about security governance in Africa requires critical reflection and re-evaluation of philosophies and theories. Seeking a new paradigm and creating new theories are an important part of revisiting dominant epistemological foundations, and critically analyse theories that assume a hierarchical ontology.

The ontological positioning of security governance in Africa

The way security complexes are formed poses many challenges if it solely departs from inter-state security relations as a foundation. Buzan and Wæver[74] acknowledge that a serious analytical challenge emanates from an ontology that largely articulates state-centric information. Furthermore, it allows for non-state focused scenarios with a conceptual construct and an open intellectual space that accommodates non-state-created complexes.

Dokken[75] asserts that transnational actors may possess just as much power as formal state actors and scholars need to acknowledge that when presenting security analyses. Watanabe and Sahashi[76] confirm that it is imperative to consider the role of groups of actors, both as instigators and as potential agents in addressing security challenges. Therefore, it is important to note human agency on multiple levels in peace and security governance.

Therefore, critical reflection in this chapter includes evaluation of state-centred perspectives that focus too much on official and state-sanctioned initiatives, such as the conceptual basis for peacebuilding for the UN system adopted by the Secretary-General's Policy Committee in May 2007, which claims that:

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development.

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[74] Buzan, B. & Wæver, O. (2003).

[75] Dokken, K. (2008).

[76] Watanabe, K. et al. (Eds) (2011).

Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.

In this evaluation, the classical statement of Johan Galtung provides an additional perspective:

The mechanisms that peace is based on should be built into the structure and be present as a reservoir for the system itself to draw up ... More specifically, structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur.[77]

Perhaps the view of Jean-Paul Lederach is valuable here for a new ontology for investigating security governance, when he asserts that: "infrastructure for peacebuilding means that we are not merely interested in 'ending' something that is not desired. We are orientated toward the building of relationships that in their totality form new patterns, processes, and structures."[78] In this regard, prevention of conflict is an important part of security governance, requiring a diplomatic approach to various peacebuilding activities and strategies to pre-empt and neutralise incidents that trigger widespread violent conflict.[79] According to Séverine Autesserre,[80] our "templates and techniques for building lasting peace" just do not work. Real and lasting peace means empowering ordinary citizens. Successful peacebuilding involves 'grassroots initiatives' led by local people, sometimes supported by outsiders often using methods overlooked by the international elite.

The conclusions of John Braithwaite[81] warn that the "top-down architecture of a process" towards agreeing on peace arrangements, can be the greatest weakness in a process because it is unclear whether there is a credible commitment to peace. Braithwaite[82] therefore emphasises that the virtues of "a network governance of reconciliation", where a peacebuilders' network across organisations are responsive to local voices, truth, justice and reconciliation, is "a craft of responsive governance".

These assertions establish an awareness of a belief system of the interconnected reality of societies that exists across and beyond the hierarchy of state-owned institutions. Structural injustices, of historical origin, create an imbalance in power between central governments and marginalised communities. An ontology of historical factors shapes the belief system that guides security governance in Africa. The ending of conflict is not only about the ending of violence but is also a transformative process aimed at redressing injustices, imbalances, and dysfunctions in society to ensure lasting solutions. Lasting peace requires a mutually enabling relationship between a credible and committed architecture aimed at reconciliation, which is not 'top-down' or 'bottom-up' but an equal network of relationships. In

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[77] Galtung, J. (1976).

[78] Lederach, J. (1997).

[79] Peace Direct. Conflict prevention and early warning.

[80] Séverine, A. (2021).

[81] Braithwaite, J. et al. (2010).

[82] Braithwaite, J. (2013).

Africa, for instance, the communities of Africa are a source of solutions founded on relationships beyond what a central government hopes to control. Ontological questions, therefore, emerge, such as where should the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) be situated in the context of continental security governance? How can an ontology of equal relationships be applied to security governance in Africa within the context of global security governance?

The epistemological commitment

From an epistemological perspective, the philosophical approach to this discussion remains committed to empirical peace studies; critical peace studies, and constructive peace studies; the epistemological branches of peace, and conflict studies as proposed by Johan Galtung.[83] However, an additional perspective that will focus the discussion in this chapter on the architectural metaphor is articulated by Ricoeur,[84] who used the metaphor to emphasise the awareness of the emotional needs of people to know what happened in the past and to be able to imagine a future of an improved livelihood.

A further use of the architecture metaphor related to influential power with social foundations derives from Ernst Bloch, who refers to the threat of 'a dictatorship of mediocrity', found where a democracy is based on the middle strata of society with a mix of 'resentment and lack of culture'.[85] It is in these social conditions that architectural styles does not have to be a Greek pantheon, but can rather take many shapes such as in a honeycomb, or an edifice where the pillar is a trunk, the dome modelled on that of a cave and the interior showed to be a forest, located on ground that does not have to be level.[86] The architectural metaphor was also used by Heidegger,[87] who accentuated the social context of knowledge discovery: "Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build". The metaphor, as commonly used referring to structures aimed at peace and security, is therefore useful for critical academic reflection on paradigms, such as the Marxian legacy[88] of tension between gradual reform and revolutionary violence, in the quest of citizens to live in safety.

It is important to be conscious that in many states poor people, who subsist in very harsh material conditions are usually considered subservient. According to Claude Lévi-Strauss,[89] people who are trying to avoid starvation have a fundamentally different kind of thought than those who are in a different situation. However, 'poor' people are also capable of impartial thinking and understanding the society in which they live, and therefore have the intellectual means to contribute valuable knowledge, together with the scientist and philosopher.

This research is also committed to AKS as an epistemological system, according to Hoppers,[90] being a system of special relationships between human agency and

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[83] Galtung, J. (1996).

[84] Ricoeur, P. (1978).

[85] Bloch, E. (1986). p. 572.

[86] Ibid. pp. 734–736.

[87] Heidegger, M. (1971).

[88] Sullivan, S. (2005).

[89] Lévi-Strauss, C. (2014).

[90] Odora-Hoppers, C. (2004).

solidarity, and nature. AKS is the totality of all knowledge and practices, explicit or implicit, used in the management of socioeconomic, spiritual, and ecological aspects of life. Dani Nabudere[91] points out the value-adding relationship between African knowledge and other cultures, draws on the cultural heritage of Africa, and considers new developments in the world. Nabudere[92] refers to the African epistemology of knowledge generation and application as an alternative foundation of knowledge and explains how the people of Africa perceive the world in a time of extreme complexity. The way the people of Africa view the world is rooted in African cosmology, global economics, social relations, the physical environment, and human history. Nabudere continues to explain[93] that some knowledge claims in Africa are derived from 'divine wisdom' situated in spirituality and religion that inform daily decisions to resolve complex problems.

The foundation of AKS is the by-now, well-recognised values embedded in 'ubuntu' (an African metaphor referring to the importance of respect, the dignity of the personhood, and mutual support, also called 'botho' in South Africa), described by Mogobe Ramose[94] as "the fundamental ontological and epistemological category in the African thought of the Bantu-speaking peoples." Nabudere[95] asserts that 'global ubuntu' should be a globally humanising experience, which enables Africans to help humanise the world, affect social transformation in African societies, where the marginalised are empowered and healed after suffering.

In a recent work by Michael Battle,[96] he consolidates the philosophy of the late Archbishop Desmond Tutu, pointing out that that we find the cultural worldview known as ubuntu among the countries of East, Central and Southern Africa. Ubuntu tries to articulate what it means to be human. A person who possesses ubuntu is a person who is considered generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate, and maintains the worldview that a person is a person through other people: "We are human because we live through others, we belong, we participate, and we share." A person embracing ubuntu is open and available to others and does not feel threatened by the achievement of others, recognising that all people belong to a greater whole. From a peacebuilding perspective, by adopting and internalising the principles of ubuntu, we can contribute towards healthy relationships founded on the recognition that within the web of humanity everyone is linked to everyone else. The principles of forgiveness and reconciliation, as advocated by the tradition of ubuntu, provide us with strategies for peacebuilding in Africa.

Several African scholars see indigenous knowledge as an important part of the AKS, meaning knowledge from 'something natural and innate to a specific context',[97] homegrown and unique to a specific culture, valid in that specific

[91] Nabudere, N. (2002). p. 13.

[92] Nabudere, D. (2011). pp. 162–164.

[93] Nabudere, D. (2012). pp. 191–193.

[94] Ramose, M. (2003).

[95] Nabudere, D. (2011).

[96] Battle, M. (2009).

[97] Okere, T. & Nkwocha, L. (2003).

cultural environment and founded on lived experience over a long time, protected by community knowledge holders, and mostly used to solve problems within the locality of where the community is situated.[98] Moreover, indigenous knowledge is derived from the natural setting, as well as the socioeconomic and ecological context of living that formed a specific worldview, belief system, and way of knowing that guides interactions with others. Culturally and locally, specific ways of knowing and knowledge production are also referred to as 'traditional'; 'ecological'; 'community' and 'local' knowledge systems.[99]

AKS is, however, more than just traditional values. Many aspects of AKS are cosmopolitan, anchored in the culture of Western cosmology, scientific discoveries, economic inclinations and philosophies. AKS is of equal importance to any other system of policy development and implementation. Collaboration with communities is required to ensure that AKS is integrated into, for instance, governance programmes.[100]

The input of an AKS is lived experiences, then following a process of complex oral, tacit interpretation from a vantage point where local perspectives meet a holistic view, formed by complementary reflection on phenomena towards an integrated body of knowledge as outputs. Knowledge production from an AKS is a valuable resource for democratic governance, especially when applied to conflict resolution, where traditional dispute resolution practices are combined with modern practices.[101] AKS also offers a critical way of viewing security phenomena, asserting that the notion of liberalism and democracy became synonymous with the projection of military power over thousands of kilometres. Major powers maintain the mentality of domination, ideological mobilisation and 'humanitarian intervention' into vulnerable states under preconceived assumptions that these countries are 'weak', 'failed', and harbour 'weapons of mass destruction', 'chemical weapons', or sponsor terrorism. [102]

From these philosophical and theoretical postulations, a framework of analysis emerges that depicts a breakaway from ontological domination in search for new paradigms for peace and security in Africa. The commitment to an ontology of security governance that meets the expectations of people in Africa to live in safety, prompts one to revisit the realities of insecure spaces of Africa, investigate how peace and security processes can be improved and how citizen participation can be broadened to end violent conflict, creating security for all the people of Africa. It is an ontology that departs from a mentality of perceived superiority and right to the scarce resources of vulnerable countries, a perception founded on superficial cultural understanding, top-down communication and bias about people at the perceived 'bottom' of a global order.

[98] Odora-Hoppers, C. (2009).

[99] Mubangizi, J. & Kaya, H. (2015). pp. 125–142.

[100] Ibid. pp. 125–142.

[101] Nabudere, D. & Velthuizen, A. pp. 48–60.

[102] Dyer, G. (2006). pp. 35–36.

The realities of insecure spaces

The ambitions of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the quest for world peace of the PSC of the UN, as well as the aspiration of Agenda 2063 of the AU (especially the quest for 'silencing the guns' by 2020),[103] is currently frustrated by many realities. Global military expenditure in 2020 was at its highest since 1988, at an average of 2.4% of global gross domestic product (GDP). Most countries in the world experienced serious economic downturns in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic, while military expenditure continued to escalate. In Africa in 2020, expenditure was 5.1% higher than in 2019 and 11% higher than in 2011. Military spending in North Africa increased by 6.4%. Since 2011, the trends are seven years of growth (2011–15), three years of slight decrease (2016–18), reflecting an increase of 42% over the decade.[104] Figure 1 below provides a more complete comparison of expenditure per region.

**Figure 1: World military expenditure by region
(Source: SIPRI Fact Sheet 2021)**

In 2013, Pierre Englebert[105] asserted that although African countries are prone to conflict, "most African societies live in peace most of the time". However, Africa is afflicted with corruption, violent conflict, poverty, and famines. Ambiguous ethnicity is central to African politics but is not the only dimension of collective action or social division. Religion has gained significant momentum as a political force. Furthermore, the political prominence of African militaries with an established tradition of seizing power away from civilian governments, increases the risk for takeover by means of coups d'état and the establishment of military governments.

In 2021, Cilliers[106] observed that since the start of the 21st century, Africa experienced an upward trend in armed conflict, peaking in 2015. Since then, Africa has experienced a downward trend. However, Africa remains 'turbulent' due to activities of militant Islamist groups, poverty, ineffective governance, and

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[103] African Union. (2020).

[104] Da Silva, DL. et al. (2020).

[105] Englebert, P. & Dunn, KC. (2013). pp. 268–278.

[106] Cilliers, J. (2018).

frustrations among young people, despite dynamic growth in some spaces such as West Africa.

The COVID-19 pandemic that reached Africa in 2020 had a significant impact on the level of violent conflict in the world. The level of civil unrest increased in 2020, fuelled by responses to coronavirus restrictions. Between January 2020 and April 2021, over 5 000 pandemic-related violent events were recorded.[107] In Africa, the pandemic presented the opportunity for strongmen who sought to further tighten their grip, such as the governments of Cameroon, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, who used pandemic regulations as an opportunity to close the political space by means of heavy-handed security forces.[108]

Since the warning of Giddens in 1991,[109] that globalisation causes alienation and fragmentation, the international geopolitical competition and tension has continued, together with the criminal, including corrupt behaviour of state and non-state actors. Widespread globalisation and the weakening of developed states shows a rising tendency to seek benefits from business deals with criminal networks and corrupt corporate entities.[110] States who were continuously changing during globalisation, fuelled by persistent geopolitical ambitions, as well as exploitative excavation of money-hungry rulers who entrench poverty and inequality, was fuelled by the coronavirus pandemic.[111]

Currently, many people in Africa are living in 'fragile' conditions characterised by high levels of social and political instability, as well as violent conflict associated with low institutional capacities. Reduced resilience emanates from climate conditions, environmental pressures, and adverse economic conditions. Violent conflict causes the multiplication of internally displaced persons and refugees. These realities undermine sustainable development and threaten the livelihoods of especially rural people. The global collective commitment to peace is essential and security is a key success factor for sustainable local solutions. It is believed that most solutions cannot be found in the national dimension, but a regional approach may lead to the best solutions. However, currently, multi-lateralism to resolve peace and security issues is challenged by nation-states that put their national interest at the forefront.[112]

The emergence of a political ruling class in some African states (as in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Egypt, and others), which rely heavily on ethnic sentiments and ideological loyalties to consolidate a political ruling class, seeks to protect first the interests of its loyal supporters. For example, the situation in Egypt since 2013 has been characterised by a successful authoritarian approach in closing the public space and excluding pluralist politics. The consequence is that an 'embryonic' resistance is emerging in society, with democratic political actors weakened and civil society under siege and pro-democracy activists (mostly young people) mobilising to

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[107] Institute for Economics & Peace. (2021).

[108] Reliefweb. (2021).

[109] Giddens, A. (1991). pp. 70–78.

[110] Van Nieuwkerk, A. (2021).

[111] Cimmino, J. et al. (2020).

[112] Mayaki, I. (2018).

resist.[113] A further consequence is that representative democracy is compromised, and governments fail in addressing poverty and violent conflict in society at large. Incumbent governments rather spend their resources on extreme measures to stay in power. In such cases, the wellbeing of all the citizens of the state is not the main consideration of rulers. It is foreseen those tendencies towards oligarchic dictatorship in Africa will continue and that the public space will probably be increasingly dominated by a political ruling class. This political class is likely to pursue material wealth for itself, while the multi-faceted inequalities that exist in African societies will not be successfully addressed. A political ruling class in Africa is likely to come increasingly in conflict with a neglected civil society.[114]

Reflections

The abovementioned assertions demonstrate that insecure spaces in Africa are characterised by a combination of internal dynamics within the nation state, with differing influences from the global system from which it cannot be divorced. Internal dynamics within a state point to the cynical self-interest and corruption by political elites that result in the ineffective implementation of development programmes and an increasing gap between the rich and the poor. Furthermore, democracy within many states is impaired by dysfunctional processes, institutions, and securitisation that is keeping people from exercising democratic freedoms. In reaction to weak and corrupt governance, we see a proliferation of violent conflict. This situation has been complicated by the COVID pandemic, placing additional pressure on governance systems with growing frustrations among people that can stimulate violent conflict in all dimensions of society in Africa and the rest of the world.

The broken Athenian edifice: The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is part of the AU, working in partnership with the United Nations (UN) and other relevant international stakeholders, such as the European Union (EU) and People's Republic of China (PRC). The APSA was established by the PSC Protocol, adopted in July 2002, in Durban, South Africa, which entered into force in December 2003. The APSA is "built around structures, objectives, principles and values, as well as decision-making processes relating to the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent." The PSC, together with the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace Fund (one of the main pillars of the APSA). The PSC maintains a close relationship with the other key subsidiary components of APSA, namely the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs). Furthermore, the PSC interacts with other AU organs such as the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and several civil society organisations. The APSA follows a

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[113] Hamzawy, A. (2017).

[114] Velthuizen, A. (2020).

comprehensive agenda for peace and security in Africa, which includes early warning and conflict prevention; peace-making; peace support operations; peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction and development; promotion of democratic practices, good governance and respect for human rights, and humanitarian action and disaster management.[115]

Unfortunately, APSA cannot be described as a successful venture and is not the grand edifice that was envisaged by its founders. Despite claims of the successful deployment of various instruments of conflict prevention and operational efficiency, such as in the case of the crisis in Burundi in 2015 and involvement in the South Sudan peace process, the effectiveness of most conflict prevention depends on member states and stakeholders involved in the conflict. Top-down solutions do not correlate well with the views of most member states. Focus on building the national capacities of member states to prevent conflict through domestic early warning systems or domestic peace bodies should be considered, because international responses without local ownership can disrupt the idea of the AU – that all its member states share the same idea of security and are willing to act collectively to prevent violent conflict. The current inadequacy of various instruments of conflict prevention puts the commitment of AU member states to prevent violent conflicts into question.[116]

Although the APSA, as part of the AU, has the potential to project soft power, its incapacity and inefficiency to reduce conflict on the continent, prevents certain member states to commit to the values of peace and security advocated by the AU. APSA, despite some humble progress, struggles to implement strategies and plans in dealing with violent conflict without support from the UN or EU.[117] Instead, violent conflict continues in (for instance) Darfur, South Sudan, Somalia, Eastern DRC, Gulf of Guinea, the Lake Chad basin, and the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique.

According to a 2017 report by the then-Chair of the AU, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, the APSA is failing because decisions are not important to member states. This gives the AU (including APSA) little credibility among Africans and its global partners.[118] A major cause of the incapacity of APSA is that nation-states show a preference for building national defence capacities instead of contributing to Pan-African security. State sovereignty too often leads to the misconception that a state can secure itself without due concern that the security of a nation-state is bound to the security of its neighbours in a complex way.[119]

The assertions above show the APSA as a broken edifice, functioning in an equally shaky global architecture that yet must convince citizens of the world that it can bring lasting peace. In the case of APSA, we see a dependence on external funding compels the AU to follow a model that prescribes concepts such as 'anti-terrorism'

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[115] African Union. (2012).

[116] Bedzigu, Y. (2018).

[117] African Union Peace Fund. (2016).

[118] Kagame, P. (2017).

[119] Murithi, T. (2007). pp. 14–24.

and 'counter-insurgency', which are not suitable for addressing all conflict situations, such as violent protest, corrupt governance, impunity and anarchy. Currently, there is a dire need for APSA to improve the current image of the AU as a broken house where rulers dine to reflect a dwelling where citizens can find protection against violent extremism, including violence perpetrated by dictatorships. Such dwellings can be found in the web of relationship that is integral to AKS.

African knowledge systems: From broken edifice to web of secure dwellings

The idea that 'indigenous' knowledge should be part of a body of knowledge for decision-making for governance, and in this case, peace and security, is not new. However, relevant literature shows that there is limited understanding of what 'indigenous' means, leading to certain misunderstanding and misgivings about the value of 'indigenous' approaches in Africa.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, efforts were made to incorporate and utilise the continent's 'rich reservoir' of traditional institutions, socio-cultural resources and approaches to build peace, and address justice and reconciliation in divided communities and countries emerging from violent civil war.[120] In this regard, the examples of the San of Southern Africa,[121] the Gacaca system of justice and reconciliation in Rwanda, and the use of 'Mato Oput' peace-building of the Acholi in northern Uganda[122] and others, such as the systems of the Afar in Ethiopia[123] and Ibo of Nigeria[124] are often cited.

Severine Autessere,[125] after extensive empirical research on peace-building in various contexts, successfully advanced the thesis that peacebuilding initiatives are more effective when 'interveners' in the conflict value local expertise just as important as their own technical proficiency. Initially, many peacebuilders have good existing thematic knowledge, but no real understanding of the area where they deploy, relying on narratives that are misleading or incomplete, perpetuating their ineffective modes of action. It is only when the peacebuilders develop personal and social relationships with their local partners that the peacebuilders, that new ways of operating emerge. The current way of peacebuilding prompts local people to challenge the dominant practices of international peacebuilders, recommending alternative modes of operation founded on knowledge constructed by removing the firm boundaries between interveners and their local partners towards the construction of a better system.

Within these relative narrow views of what indigenous knowledge is in terms of origins and worldview, some scholars and practitioners pronounced their reservations of the value of indigenous practices for conflict resolution. Romanticising indigenous

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[120] Francis, DJ. (2008). p. 98.

[121] Velthuizen, A. (2015). pp. 75–96.

[122] Nabudere, D. & Velthuizen, A. (2013). pp. 48–60.

[123] Gebre-Egziabher, KA. (2014). pp. 152–164.

[124] Uwazie, E. (1991). pp. 87–103.

[125] Ibid. p. 7.

approaches to resolving disputes, exclusion of women from the primary structures of decision-making,[126] the perception that traditional structures are patriarchal, distorted, emasculated during colonialism, and thus not easily transferrable and applied outside cultural context,[127] are the most recurring reservations.

It is because 'indigenous knowledge' is too narrow, that a more endogenised body of knowledge is needed for decision-making on governance affairs. Murithi suggests a framework that is a hybrid between indigenous traditions and modern 'principles' to ensure human dignity and inclusion of all members of society. People resolve their disputes and strengthen human relations feeding into the attitudes and values of their cultural context. African traditions for peacebuilding, healing and reconciliation create the foundation for re-establishing social cohesion if best traditional practices are combined with progressive modern norms, principles, and standards to ensure the protection of human rights. The people of Africa can promote social solidarity peacefully by confronting corruption and promoting power-sharing, inclusive governance, and the equitable distribution of resources among all members of society. More needs to be done to interface directly with civil society and grassroots communities who do not have access to the means of communication to establish a dialogue with the African Union.[128]

African values are historically embedded, multi-faceted, multi-dimensional and shared values of a revived Africa, together with traditional values, and continuously evolving values, such as constitutionalism, democracy, development, peace, and justice. However, 'extra-national norms, standards and institutions of authority' in the international, regional national are not always harmonised with the village; clan and ethnic spheres, especially consensual decision-making, which requires substantive participation by the community.[129]

African scholars, therefore, offer convincing arguments that AKS is a suitable foundation on which to restore a broken edifice. Today, African communities in conflict, urban and rural, apply their own view of the world to interpret their unfortunate situations in a national and international context and not from a narrow, isolated local perspective anymore. AKS is thus an 'endogenous' asset for decision-making, fully conscious of the political, socio-economic, technological, multi-cultural, and legal context of the space where they dwell, vital for solving societal problems, such as violent conflict. Efforts of the APSA and supporting governance structures can be reinforced by (for instance) community networks to fill the void in spaces where formal governance structures have no foothold or are viewed with hostility. African communities, as a web of resilient dwellings, add a vital element to conflict resolution and security decision-making, not separately, but as an integral part and complementary to a hybrid system that does not present the narrow interests of a few. A harmonised system of relationships between international institutions, central governments, organised civil society and disrupted communities in insecure spaces, broadens and deepens decision-making for peace processes, improving the

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[126] Murithi, T. (2010).

[127] Brettle, A. (2012).

[128] Murithi, T. (2006).

[129] Gutto, SBO. (2010). pp. 12–17.

chances to end violent conflict and create better-governed spaces, characterised by security for all the people involved. In this regard, decision-makers should keep in mind that an AKS developed not from unique African cultures only, but together with other cultures.

Conclusions

This chapter departed from the aim to offer some propositions for a new paradigm for peace and security in Africa. The intention is for a new model for peace and security governance in Africa that will broaden and deepen people participation in decision-making on conflict issues in Africa, irrespective of who people are or where they are, towards lasting peace in a secure environment. In achieving this aim, a brief explanation of the research that underpins this chapter is offered, followed by a discussion of the philosophical and theoretical framework that guides reflections. In presenting this philosophy and theory, a deliberate attempt was made to explore new thinking outside the over-ambitious (though probably well-intentioned) objectives and aspirations of international hierarchies, in general, and the APSA, specifically. The current realities of many insecure spaces that pose a challenge to security governance in Africa were discussed. After analysing the different perspectives on the abilities of the APSA to deal with insecurity, and specifically violent conflict in Africa, proposals on how AKS can complement other formal systems to form a hybrid model for peace and security governance in Africa, was offered.

It was found that there is an urgent need for a new way of thinking on peace and security governance for Africa, especially to reach weakly governed spaces. A new paradigm is required to guide policymaking, strategy formulation, and decision-making on implementation (especially on the viability of unsustainable military intervention and peacebuilding) to create conditions for the sustainable growth of Africa in a peaceful and secure environment. A new paradigm should lead to new theoretical models, one that emphasises the broader participation of people as knowledge holders and citizens of Africa.

A renewed security architecture needs to adjust the current model to incorporate the will of all African societies in various contexts and create opportunities for the communities that form part of societies, to break out of the hierarchical edifice towards broader, deeper, and grounded interaction with communities. A credible intervention capacity, not limited to armed forces, but with an emphasis on humanitarian intervention, is maybe more suitable to restore peace where diplomatic and other soft power measures failed. However, such intervention capacity will bring nothing new if it does not depart from an honest belief that values, such as togetherness, respect and care for people (who were left behind when the rest of the world developed), and restoration of their dignity, are the highest collective interest.

This chapter highlights important pointers of how a new paradigm for peace and security governance in Africa can develop. The most important point of departure is to look at issues, such as military intervention and peacebuilding from the vantage point of the people dwelling in insecure spaces, through a lens that highlights their needs and expectations for sustainable wellbeing. The arguments in this chapter for new models, founded on the lived experiences of practitioners and scholars from both a philosophical and practical perspective, are strong and convincing. However,

the challenge that remains is for policymakers, strategists and operational decision-makers involved in peace and security governance in Africa, to buy into the emphasis on broader and deeper participation of the people in insecure spaces as knowledge holders and citizens of Africa. The renewal of current unsuccessful architectural arrangements will require departure from of a dominant paradigm that guards the very narrow interests of an international alliance of transnational business and an elite political class in Africa, including through the application of military force. The citizens of Africa are in dire need for new models that depict an equal partnership with people of Africa in a mutual commitment, more like a honeycomb than a broken edifice, to security governance that meets the expectations of people in Africa, with the aspirations to 'silence the guns' and dwell in safe, peaceful and secure conditions.

Lessons learned, and lessons identified, from complex missions – the case of AMISOM

An AU mission operating in a non-permissible environment against a strategically asymmetric enemy

Thomas Mandrup[130]

Introduction

On 8 March 2022, it was announced by the AU's PSC that on 1 April 2022, the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) would replace the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), whose mandate ended on 31 March 2022.[131] It also signalled the end of 15 years of deployment of AMISOM (hereinafter called 'the mission'), which arrived in 2007 under challenging circumstances.[132] Since 2007, AMISOM managed to help secure government presence in most areas of South-Central Somalia.[133] For its deployment, AMISOM was the main security provider in Somalia since there was initially no state and no Somali Security Force (SSF) with which to cooperate. The increased government presence and capacity should, in principle, signify the beginning of an end to an era, with the AU playing the role of the primary security manager and provider and, hopefully, the transfer of the primary responsibility for security provision to the Somali authorities. However, the mission is still deployed, albeit under a different banner, and this chapter illustrates the crisis faced by the liberal peace model described in Chapter 2 of this volume. AMISOM, and its partners, have, for the duration of its deployment, found it difficult to apply the tools needed to create progress and stability in Somalia. The big question has also been how these tools might have appeared and if any tool would be suitable if the local actor does not and/or cannot take ownership of the state-building project.

The end of AMISOM

This transition process in Somalia, which led to the closure of AMISOM, was scheduled for over four years and was initiated in 2017. However, the lack of successful implementation and political infighting amongst the political elites in Somalia has delayed the process. On 12 March 2021, UNSC resolution 2568[134]

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[130] See note 4.1.

[131] See note 4.2.

[132] AU-PSC. (2022).

[133] See note 4.3.

[134] UNSCR 2568. (2022).

consequently (under much debate in the UNSC) extended the mandate of AMISOM by nine months until the end of 2021. The resolution put pressure on the Somali political elite. It specified that by 2022 the Somalis were expected to take responsibility for more sections of national security tasks, as stipulated in the Somali Transition Plan (STP). However, the resolution (UNSCR 2568) acknowledged that the AU would need to remain in Somalia beyond 2021, albeit in a reconfigured form, as the SSF could not take full responsibility for Somali security at the conclusion of the mandated period. This process resulted from the decision to establish ATMIS as a replacement for AMISIOM. On 31 March 2022, UNSCR 2628 established ATMIS and signified the end of AMISOM's 15-year deployment in Somalia. The resolution sets clear timelines for the transition of power and security provisions to the Somali authorities. The AU is expected to scale down its presence in Somalia over the coming years, but the mission will continue to help clear and hold areas of Somalia independently and preferably in cooperation with the SSF.[135] The mandating documents[136] also illustrate one of the difficulties the AU deployment has faced since its initiation. The AMISOM mission has been serving two masters, the AU and the UN, and has had to manage the two entities, which has not always been synchronised.

Despite the impressive advances and territorial gains reached by AMISOM and the SSF, Al-Shabaab, the dominant insurgent group, has continued to play a clear and present danger to the authorities in Somalia and international actors. The criticism voiced against AMISOM and the UN in Somalia from international and domestic Somali decision-makers has sometimes been harsh. However, the expectation that by 2021 Somalia would be able to take full responsibility for security provisions when the fundamental causes of the conflict have not been solved was always unrealistic. The given timeframes were unrealistic, and the insurgency has never been defeated and still constituted a significant security threat by the mission's closure by end-March 2022. Al-Shabaab still has substantial local support and fighting between the insurgents, primarily al-Shabaab, and the SSF and ATMIS continue and are expected to do so for the foreseeable future. There is no or limited freedom of movement as stipulated in several UNSCRs and the STP. This chapter will look at the track record of AMISOM and attempt to draw out key lessons learned from the AMISOM deployment and the UN/AU cooperation model. The chapter will furthermore scrutinise how AMISOM was configured.

The international versus domestic political reality

The sentiment amongst the donor countries has increasingly been one of deepening the political pressure on the regional actors and the Somali government to hasten the implementation of the Somali Transition Plan (STP) and responsibility for security provision by the SSF.[137] In early 2022, the USA suggested possible sanctions against key Somali politicians if the delayed elections process had not been concluded by 25 February 2022. The heavy international and domestic pressure on the political elite secured a settlement of the political deadlock that had blocked the process since 2020. This deadlock stresses the feeling amongst Western donors, especially that the Somalis must put aside their internal differences and enable the implementation of

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[135]   UNSCR 2628. (2022).

[136]   UNSCR 2628. (2022); AU-PSC. (2022).

[137]   UNSC. (2020).

the STP. The AU presence in Somalia largely depends on international funding, but the mission still faces the ongoing issue of financing. Therefore, the mission was not UN and could not secure UN funding. The EU financed much of the cost of AMISOM but changed its funding principles from the African Peace Facility to the European Peace Facility, making fewer funds available for the AMISOM/ATMIS mission. The AU had to come up with a different funding model. A UN mission with assessed contributions would have been an easy and logical choice because this would secure mission funding, although this proposal was rejected. Subsequently, ATMIS received funding from the EU Peace Facility to deploy the mission.

As highlighted by UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) James Swan in his briefing on 20 August 2020, the elections failed to fulfil the constitutional requirement of being conducted by end-November 2020 and not failing to fulfil the principles of universal suffrage stipulated in the constitution, which regional states and the federal government have failed to reach an agreement. Swan called on Somalia's leaders "... as a matter of urgency, to meet and engage in dialogue on Somalia's national priorities."[138] The political impasse continues, with several unresolved political issues remaining unresolved, despite a compromise being reached on the selection process successful selection of Sheik Mahamud on 10 September 2022. The unresolved political issues highlight the challenges facing the peace process in Somalia, where the local ownership of the process has often been limited.

The disagreements on the nature and scope of the mandate extension highlighted the challenges facing the UNSC, and the broader international community, in effectively addressing the conflict in Somalia. The security situation did not call for a drawdown and closure of the mission. The decision to provide ATMIS with a robust, counterterrorism-focused mandate should also be understood within that context. During recent UNSC deliberations, the US contended that it was time for the Somali government to fast-track the STP. The US argued that a shorter mandate would pressure the government to implement the STP and resolve the political differences that currently block this process. Despite its limitations, the 2020 Dhusamareb III Conference Agreement could have been an important step in helping unite efforts to defeat al-Shabaab (AS) insurgents. However, the success of the military operations depended very much on the ability of the Somalis to take ownership of the process, which has often been absent.

The disagreements and stalemate within the UNSC in shaping the transition to ATMIS also highlighted differences among members regarding the future of the military presence in Somalia. The UNSC members did not necessarily agree on the nature of the security challenges in Somalia and, consequently, on the design, success, and role of the combined international presence in Somalia. Was AMISOM indeed the right tool for the continued military engagement of the international community in Somalia? The challenge was that the UNSC had resisted re-hatting the mission, which the AU had requested for some time. The AMISOM mission had simultaneously been unable to secure the needed capabilities to make the mission effective. In the coming years, an international military presence will be needed in Somalia to assist the Somalis in reaching a sustainable model for peace and prosperity.

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[138] Swan, J. (2020b).

Security Dynamics in Somalia[139]

Even though myriad armed groupings characterise the Somali conflict, al-Shabaab posed the main threat. The estimated al-Shabaab operatives range from 4 000 to 8 000[140], depending on the source consulted. While AMISOM and the SSF have successfully extended the presence and control of the Somali state, it has been less successful in reducing the combat capabilities of al-Shabaab.[141] The Hayat Hotel attack and siege in August 2022, which left 17 dead and more than 100 wounded, also illustrate that.

The extremist group is still present in most sections of the AMISOM area of responsibility (AOR) and has maintained its ability to recruit fighters from the Somali population. Further, al-Shabaab has also been able to continue financing its operations via local taxation and extortion for the mission's duration. This practice also occurs in urban areas where al-Shabaab may not have a visible presence. Additionally, and critically, al-Shabaab maintained the ability to deliver essential services to the communities under its influence. The ability to execute state-like functions is a crucial drawcard for al-Shabaab among local populations, where it has often shown a better service-delivery capacity than the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). This phenomenon is not unique to Somalia and can be seen in other conflict areas, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Afghanistan.

A further drawcard is that al-Shabaab postures itself as defending Somali national identity and unity, contrasting it to the FGS and its AMISOM allies, seen as an occupying force with significant vested interests. Somalia's relationship with neighbouring countries, such as Kenya and Ethiopia, has been problematic, yet these are vital troop-contributing countries (TCCs) in the mission. This has further helped al-Shabaab reinforce the narrative of defending national interests in the face of foreign intervention. The narrative from al-Shabaab about the AMISOM TCCs being predominantly Christian deployed in a nearly entirely Muslim country has also fuelled support for al-Shabaab.

These aspects raise questions about the participation of frontline states in peace support operations (PSOs). The challenge is heightened by the fact that the dynamics at play in Somalia have deterred most non-frontline states from deploying troops. Therefore, the Somali case raises a peculiar dilemma with which the AU must engage. In the recent, provisionally approved, updated AU PSO doctrine, the AU member states have maintained that regional entities are the principal security managers in their regions, including when it comes to the deployment of military forces in the region.

Significantly, al-Shabaab has changed its tactics from a more conventional force – with units of up to battalion size until its defeat and withdrawal from Mogadishu in mid-2011 – to now employing asymmetric means, primarily using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle-borne *improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). Currently, al-Shabaab is organised in smaller cell structures that consist of two to four individuals who operate independently. It is estimated that al-Shabaab can still*

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[139] See note 4.4.

[140] See note 4.5.

[141] Williams, P. et al. (2018).

assemble a force of 300 to 400 individuals simultaneously, and large-scale attacks on military facilities still occurred by March 2022 and the time of the closure of AMISOM.

Al-Shabaab continuously claimed to have executed attacks, for instance, overrunning a Somali National Alliance (SNA) military base in early August 2020 in Deynunay village near Baidoa, killing several SNA soldiers attacking a Burundian base in mid-2022. However, large-scale attacks on the AMISOM forward operating bases (FOB) and units occurred less frequently than during the early parts of AMISOM deployment. Nevertheless, low-calibre mortar attacks on the airport in Mogadishu and the Hayat Hotel siege illustrate that al-Shabaab is still a potent force capable of striking AMISOM and the FGS at their core.[142]

To recruit members, al-Shabaab draws on a combination of a Somali nationalist narrative, radical Salafi-jihadi ideology, economic incentives – such as daily payment of USD100 per fighter per month,[143] extortion, and forced recruitment. The Islamic State (ISIS) network has also started recruiting from al-Shabaab, paying USD300–500 per month, as their methods and ideology are the same.[144] However, this also illustrates that Somalia is embroiled in the struggle between ISIS and Al-Qaida. This has pitted al-Shabaab and ISIS against each other, and assassinations and confrontations have increased since 2017. ISIS has increased its activities in other parts of Somalia, including in Mogadishu, with the 2018 IED attacks in central Mogadishu. This illustrates that ISIS is freely operating in Mogadishu, an essential warning signal to al-Shabaab, the FGS, and its international partners. The UNSCR 2628[145] call for an increased focus and fight against both al-Shabaab and ISIS is worth noticing and stresses this development. The ill-functioning and underpaid SNA had led to defections amongst its soldiers and swelled the ranks of al-Shabaab and ISIS. However, a biometric payment system for the SNA has been successfully implemented, which ensures that soldiers receive regular payments, which, ideally, should reduce the number of defections.

Defeating al-Shabaab is particularly challenging given its ability to remain concealed among the broader Somali population. For many Somalis, al-Shabaab fighters include family members. This further explains why the insurgents are so difficult to defeat. One interviewee said 'collusion' was a particularly apt word, explaining that Somali society should be understood as a fraternity. This further illuminates the close relationship between al-Shabaab and elements within the FGS. The interviewee noted that many Somalis generally do not consider al-Shabaab a terrorist organisation since it is "part of themselves".[146]

Ideally, the FGS should have led counterterrorism (CT) efforts against the al-Shabaab and ISIS, but in large parts of Somalia, the FGS could not provide adequate security, state presence, and the rule of law. It is essential to recognise that al-Shabaab, on the other hand, can provide state-like functions and a sense of security in the areas they

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[142] Interview 2. (2020); Interview 3. (2018); Al Jazeera. (2022).

[143] Interview 3. (2018).

[144] Interview 3. (2018).

[145] UNSC. (2022).

[146] Interview 3. (2018).

control. Defining al-Shabaab exclusively as a terrorist organisation is too simplistic. A Salafi-jihadist insurgency has managed to conquer and exploit the Somali nationalist narrative, often winning the information war. This is significant. Among other things, it explains why al-Shabaab seems to continue enjoying widespread support in Somali society. Al-Shabaab has effectively used strategic communication to spread its message about the insurgency and its operations. AMISOM and its partners, on the contrary, do not have a functional and practical strategic communication policy. Al-Shabaab has successfully presented its struggle against AMISOM as a war on colonialism – which helps explain the organisation's resilience.

The ten-year review stated that "... [d]espite having a broadly positive narrative to tell, AMISOM continued to lose the battle on social media."[147] The extremist narrative blocks the possibility of finding a political solution to the conflict at several levels. Recent developments in Afghanistan, where the Taliban has been included in dialogue to find a political solution, may provide suitable lessons for a strategy for Somalia and the pitfalls in such a process – especially when negotiating from a position of perceived weakness. AMISOM was not near a point of a military victory, and al-Shabaab had freedom of movement and was economically present all over Somalia. The UN has been considering initiating dialogue with al-Shabaab to find a political solution to a political problem,[148] and the FGS, under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has once again opened the door for such a dialogue.

The initial AMISOM deployment

In 2007, the AU deployed AMISOM to help stabilise South-Central Somalia, including Mogadishu. The UNSC saw the conflict as a significant threat to international peace and security. Since its initial deployment, AMISOM has been the prime formal source of security in Somalia – until the initiation of the STP and the handover of security responsibility to the SSF, which started in early 2018. The sacrifices made by the TCCs have been overwhelming. While the actual number of casualties from the TCCs is not publicly known, it is estimated to be approximately 2 000[149] since the start of the mission.[150] AMISOM has significantly improved security in Somalia, allowing for political and state-building processes in Somalia to be initiated. In the 10-year review (2007–2017), it was concluded:

> [A]lthough AMISOM had achieved a variety of operational successes over the last decade, some of those gains remained fragile. They could be reversed, primarily if Somalia's governance structures could not deliver safety, services and justice to local populations in the areas recovered from al-Shabaab.[151]

The mission has helped the Somali government relocate and operate permanently in and from Mogadishu, which was not the case in 2007. Functional regional

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[147] AU. (2017). p. 12.

[148] Interview 1. (2020).

[149] See note 4.6.

[150] Williams, P. (2019).

[151] AU. (2017). p. 16.

administrations have been established as part of the federal state system. The importance of the physical presence of the government in Somalia should not be underestimated, and this has constituted one of AMISOM's key achievements in its capacity as the primary security provider.

AMISOM has also extended formal state presence throughout South-Central Somalia, incredibly liberating the main urban areas from direct al-Shabaab control. The SSF – with support from and in partnership with AMISOM – has increasingly been undertaking military operations against al-Shabaab strongholds around South-Central Somalia, which is also an indication of increased capacity in the SSF to undertake and plan military operations independently.

The mission has also been able to protect government installations and nodal points and has created a space for the UN and other international partners and agencies to operate more effectively. AMISOM played an essential role in enabling the 2016 election process, allowing power to be transferred to the federal government under former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo. AMISOM has also played a vital role in the planning and organisation of the delayed election, which was slated for 2020/21. However, the election process also illustrates AMISOM's political capacity limitations since the Somali government has called for AMISOM to leave Somalia after being pressured by AMISOM and other international actors.

Another positive outcome of the AMISOM deployment has been the development of relatively strong regional entities and regional security structures in Somalia. A challenge is that the central government has been, and still is, under pressure from the very same regional entities, and the question and level of devolution remain largely unresolved (2020). The Dhusamareb III Conference in 2020 compromise resolved some of these matters, but neither Jubaland nor Puntland were part of the agreement. Therefore, the obstacles surrounding those two key regional actors remain unresolved for a long time. This has been one of the key challenges in delaying elections because no agreement has been reached on the election process and the regional administration's role in providing security.

However, AMISOM, the UN and the Somalis have so far lost their attempts to win the war. The classical truism that it is possible to win military encounters and still lose the war seems to have some truth in Somalia's conflict. A challenge raised in the ten-year review stressed that "despite having a broadly positive narrative to tell, AMISOM continued to lose the battle on social media."[152] The insights of French general and strategist André Beaufre, in his book La Guerre Révolutionnaire (1972), based on French experiences during the colonial wars in Algeria and Indochina, might seem controversial; however, they do provide important lessons learned for future military planners. Beaufre argues that a government under siege needs to create an overall, total, and coordinated strategy within four critical areas. According to Beaufre (1972), governments tend to overemphasise the focus on the security sector, which does not solve the underlying root causes of conflict. Political reforms are essential because they counter the dissatisfaction within the state that feeds and fuels radical elements. In the case of Somalia, the changing governments have lost the

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[152] AU. (2017). p. 12.

battle against the al-Shabaab narrative, and it has been difficult for the government to create the required legitimacy amongst the wider Somali population.

The ten-year review also pointed out that AMISOM had focused too heavily on the military tool. This military focus made sense during the initial stage of AMISOM deployment when insecurity in Mogadishu prevented the deployment of the mission's police and civilian components. However, since late 2011, the mission has slowly implemented its multi-dimensional mandate and configuration. The review concluded that AMISOM's multi-dimensional composition was critical.[153]

The raised criticism is not an attempt not to acknowledge the achievements of AMISOM or the sacrifices made by the TCCs, but to point out that the mission was less successful in adjusting its configuration and concept of operations (CONOPS) to the changing tactical and strategic realities that followed the initial military success of the mission. This has created a fragile and volatile situation that could undermine the achievements reached by AMISOM and its partners. The debates on what should come after AMISOM, both at the level of the UNSC and locally in Somalia, illustrates this fact well.

Addressing stabilisation

Stabilisation was challenging for the mission since the lack of coordination and comprehensiveness meant that the necessary stabilisation initiatives did not occur.

> Although AMISOM began to take on various stabilisation tasks in late 2011, the mission did not develop a working definition of the term until 2013. At that point, it defined stabilisation as 'any post-conflict/-combat activities undertaken to facilitate and promote early recovery of the population and institutions in a locality that has been recovered from al-Shabaab.[154]

It was identified early on that "… *AMISOM needs to strengthen the integration between its military, police and civilian components to deliver the Mission's political objectives.*"[155] However, they struggled to integrate the different components effectively but managed, despite this, to achieve some operational success. In the May 2020 briefing to the UNSC, both SRSG Swan and the AU Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC) for Somalia, Francisco Madeira, stressed that significant military successes have recently been achieved by the mission and the SNA in the fight against al-Shabaab.[156] The March 2020 liberation of the important strategic town of Janaale in the Lower Shabelle province was highlighted. However, as one interviewee pointed out, several towns were lost during the drawdown of forces during the first quarter of 2020, illustrating that the SNA is not ready to take full responsibility for security provisions. This is due to the political crisis between the FGS and the FMS, which has resulted in a fragmented

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[153] AU. (2017). pp. 10–11.

[154] Lotze, W. & Williams, P. (2016). p. 1.

[155] AU. (2017). p. 17.

[156] UNSC. (2020b).

security sector and a largely-failed security-sector reform project. It also illustrates that the lack of coordination and comprehensiveness of the effort in many peace missions also applies to Somalia.[157]

Nevertheless, AU SRCC Madeira – in the 27 May briefing to the UNSC – highlighted several AMISOM success stories that allowed for a political settlement between several parties in the Somali conflict.[158] This provides a valuable indication of the way forward for the mission but requires close coordination with other instruments. It was also stressed by the US representative to the UN, Cherith Norman Chalet, who stated that while the liberation of several towns recently is significant, there is a need for the FGS to provide the security and administrative structures needed for the military forces to withdraw.[159] The recovery effort has often failed, leaving the liberated areas in the hands of a better organised al-Shabaab. However, the SSF often could not take control and 'hold' the liberated areas, and al-Shabaab retook several towns when AMISOM left their bases as part of the mission drawdown. To that end, stabilisation efforts have essentially been unsuccessful, undermining the overall sustainability of the peacebuilding effort. The international community has recognised this, as shown in the statement above, where concern is expressed regarding the fragility of the gains made. Stabilisation and early-recovery efforts are not impossible to achieve but need to be sequenced and coordinated correctly. As an interviewee explained, early recovery efforts must be informed by locally based and accepted solutions that build on early engagement and dialogue with the local community (2020). In the case of Somalia, this failed to occur.

The transition and the political stalemate

In many ways, the delayed 2020/21 democratic election was supposed to constitute a litmus test for the peace process in Somalia and therefore also for AMISOMs role and achievements' in Somalia. The election indicated how far Somalia had moved towards the goal of a sustainable path of peace and development. As in most peace missions, in 2018, the PSC produced a number of goalposts to be achieved by the end of the STP-scheduled, four-year implementation plan. The PSC stated that:

> The council stresses the importance of an AMISOM transition plan that is based on a realistic timeframe and the attainment of the key security conditions suggested by the AU-UN Joint review, in order to ensure sustained progress in the political and economic evolution in Somalia. In this regard, Council underscores the need for capacity building for Somali administrative institutions to enable them to effectively occupy the AMISOM liberated areas.[160]

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[157] Interview 2. (2020).

[158] UNSC. (2020b). p. 6.

[159] UNSC. (2020b). p. 28.

[160] AU PSC. (2018).

UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Somalia, James Swan, stated in February 2020 that the election could mark a significant breakthrough for Somalia but that it would also be a test of the sustainability of the peace process.[161] Since then, the development illustrates the lesson seen in so many other missions – that if the local government and parties to the conflict do not take responsibility for implementing the transition and peace process, it will most likely fail or be significantly delayed.

On 27 May 2020, in his briefing to the UNSC, SRSG Swan reiterated this and stressed that there is a need for consensus-building among Somali actors if a successful election is to be achieved.[162] The election is a crucial and integrated part of the STP, which operates in four phases. By 2021, the STP was in the last part of phase 2, and efforts are being made to prepare for the initiation of phase 3. The delayed STP means that the envisioned transfer of security to the SSF has been possible, neither for the provision of election security nor for a complete withdrawal of AMISOM by 2021 – as foreseen in the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) of February 2021. The configuration of the ATMIS also illustrates that the AU is bound to play a pivotal role as a security provider in Somalia in the coming years.

The prospect of a premature drawdown of AMISOM forces has become evident during phase 2 of the STP, as the Somali National Army (SNA) has been unable to take over security responsibilities from departing AMISOM forces. As a result, some TCCs have chosen to leave military units in Somalia above the mandated force ceiling. These forces were intended to have returned to their home countries due to the drawdown of the forces.[163] As has been the case in other global peace missions, AMISOM has suffered from a discrepancy between mandated tasks and the allocated means and capabilities. Why this occurred is a key question. The STP consequently –

> [E]mphasize[d] that further success on the security institutions in Somalia cannot be achieved without sufficient progress on the political process. In this regard, Council underlines the need for the AU to strengthen further its political and strategic relationship with the FGS [Federal Government of Somalia] and the FMS [federal member states of Somalia] in support of accelerated progress on Somalia's path towards peace and stability.[164]

Since 2018, when the STP was initiated, it seemed that, on the surface, the FGS and the international community had achieved consensus surrounding the transition of security responsibility from AMISOM to SSF and the national institutions. The ambition was for Somalia to be the prime security provider by 2021. The STP should have provided a phased- and conditions-based handover of security responsibility from AMISOM to the SSF by 2021. However, as mentioned above,

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[161] Swan, J. (2020a).

[162] UNSC. (2020b).

[163] Interview 1. (2020).

[164] AU PSC. (2018).

the STP has been delayed, and so has the assumed security provided by the SSF. In May 2019, the AU PSC expressed concern over the slow implementation and stated in its communiqué:

> [It] reiterates that successful implementation of the STP is dependent on the resolution of the differences between the FGS and FMS and political progress underpinned by good relations required to overcome the challenge facing the implementation of the National Security Architecture (NSA), including force generation, as well as agreements on immediate practical approaches to utilise the Regional Forces identified during the Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) of Regional Forces, as part of the NSA.[165]

This statement is important since it underlines the conditional elements within the STP. The plan can only succeed if Somali actors take the lead and assume full responsibility. This highlights a general problem found in many peace missions, where host governments and armed actors fail to create an environment conducive to implementing peace agreements and sustainable peace and development. External actors cannot solve the causes of conflict, but military interventions can create the space for political solutions. In Somalia, the political tension and infighting between members of the political elite – and between the federal government and the regions concerning the levels of devolution – have undermined the implementation of the STP (2020). The crisis is compounded by differing approaches among the political elite as regards the nature of the future Somali political project.

An example is found within the SNA, where, despite significant progress in the ability of the SNA to operate and undertake campaign planning, there is still a lack of clarity concerning the boundaries of responsibility between the different tools within the SNA. One of the critical issues has been the clash between the regional and the national forces, where the SNA has often been denied access to operational areas (2018).

Delineation of responsibilities between the different security services was limited, i.e., between the police, military, and intelligence. That created room for human rights abuses and misconduct by personnel and undermined efforts to reform the security sector. The Somali actors should be held responsible in this regard: several external actors and donors have followed their own interests while failing to coordinate their efforts with those of other actors in the theatre. As one interlocutor stated, it was frustrating to attend meetings between the missions, the government and the donors, and realise that most continued to follow their plans without being open to advice (2020). This has significantly affected the ambitions of state-building and strengthening institutional capacity and has somewhat increased institutional infighting in the Somali NSA. This highlights the critical need for an agreed, coherent, and well-coordinated international political approach.

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165   AU PSC. (2019). pp. 2–3.

The 2018 AU-UN Joint Review of AMISOM recommended that AMISOM should be reconfigured to support the implementation of the STP best. This was later endorsed by both the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC)[166] and UNSC Resolution 2431,[167] which both emphasised the importance of AMISOM's reconfiguration. It was decided that a review should be scheduled in 2019 to assess AMISOM's reconfiguration status and the level of implementation of broader strategic objectives. The review also assessed the capability of AMISOM to implement and undertake the tasks listed in UNSCR 2431, the capability and effectiveness of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), and logistical support to AMISOM operations. Finally, the review also emphasised that the mission had to make recommendations on the progressive transition from AMISOM to the SSF, including over the electoral period, and consider the latter's capacities. The decision in UNSCR 2628 also called for reconfiguring the AMISOM mission to a robust ATMIS force of 19.626 uniformed personnel with clear objectives of both reducing the capacity of the insurgent force and securing the transfer of security provision to the SSF by the end of 2024 at the latest, when the ATMIS is scheduled to close.[168] UNSCR 2628 signifies a clear shift from the previous UNSCR since it includes specific expectations for the different actors and a scheduled drawdown and closure of the ATMIS. What remains to be seen will be what happens if the Somalis fail to implement the specified STP and NSA (2018).

The local security forces and AMISOM

On several occasions, international organisations have expressed concern that progress in building an effective Somali security sector has been slow. In 2017, several international actors expressed concern at:

> … a lack of coordination and coherence in the support to the building of a capable and inclusive Somalia security sector, which could delay the progress required in facilitating effective assumption of full responsibility by the Somalia national security institutions from AMISOM.[169]

A key objective of the mission was to implement the phased handover of responsibility for security to the SSF. Part of that is the successful implementation of a *security sector reform* (SSR) programme, which should have capacitated and enabled the FGS and FMS to exercise control and ideally have exclusive control regarding the use of violence. The SSF must create a security environment conducive to political and economic development. The SRCC Ambassador Francisco Madeira, in May 2020 to the UNSC, emphasised that economic growth and job creation are key factors in fighting al-Shabaab.[170] In the 2018 CONOPS, it was argued, "… al-Shabaab

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[166] PSC. (2018).

[167] UNSC. (2018).

[168] UNSC. (2022).

[169] AU. (2017); UN. (2017).

[170] UNSC. (2020b). p. 5.

continues to demonstrate its resilience by conducting sustained deadly terrorist attacks against AMISOM, Somali security forces and civilians."[171]

AMISOM and the SSF have been unable to implement the planned "clear, hold and build" strategy in liberated areas. The Somali government has, in many instances, been unable to extend to these newly liberated areas the services and institutions that al-Shabaab provides in the areas under its control (2020), which hinders the creation of sustainable solutions on the ground. The result has been a recurring cycle in which the villages and areas that have been 'liberated' several times by AMISOM and the SSF fall into the hands of al-Shabaab once again when vacated.

AMISOM operational readiness assessment

An operational readiness assessment (ORA) of AMISOM was completed in September 2018. The ORA identified several areas requiring focus and support and pointed out how AMISOM resources could be used more effectively, making the mission more efficient in its mandated task of supporting the STP. The ORA recommendations were included in the revised CONOPS of November 2018, which outlined strategic-level tasks for the STP transfer of security from AMISOM to SSF. After adopting the CONOPS by the AU PSC on 13 February 2019, AMISOM and the SNA conducted a sector commanders' planning session in February 2019, where detailed operational plans for each phase were developed. This detailed process identified locations and timelines for handover, joint operations planning, and plans for clearance and securing main supply routes – which has been a big challenge for AMISOM and the FGS.[172] For most of the AMISOM deployment, the mission could not secure these main supply routes and has often had to revert to aerial supply and transport between operational centres. Continued attacks on the main logistical routes in and out of Mogadishu illustrate this point, and the UNSCR 2628 also explicitly called for securing the logistical routes.

Furthermore, AMISOM faced a range of operational challenges, that hampered its operations and ability to achieve its objectives. It has been criticised – with some fairness – for being too defensive and, at times, static in its posture, focusing on protecting the urban centres and keeping the essential logistical supply lines open. AMISOM, unfortunately had limited mobility, and the mission has not had systematic and reliable intelligence for long periods of its deployment. The mission was often too reactive and has not effectively monitored and dismantled al-Shabaab activities and operational capabilities. Consequently, as mentioned above, al-Shabaab continues to be present in most areas of South-Central Somalia, including urban centres. AMISOM being tied up in urban centres meant that, without the critical air assets, al-Shabaab had freedom of movement. The number of US drone attacks increased during the last years of the mission's existence but was often too few and not adequately coordinated with other operational activities.

Further, the lack of effective coordination between the TCCs, and the autonomy of the individual TCCs, meant that the force commander (FC) only had limited control. The lack of coordination between the TCCs allowed al-Shabaab to operate

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[171] AMISOM. (2018). p. 7.

[172] AU & UN. (2019). p. 1.

in the empty corridors between the sectors (2018). In UNSCR 2472, the lack of coordination was highlighted once again. It was emphasised that:

> The FGS, FMS, AMISOM, the UN, the AU and relevant partners [have] to increase comprehensive joint planning, coordination and information sharing through the relevant mechanisms, to enable more effective delivery and monitoring of the Transition Plan.[173]

A lack of operational control can also be found in other multi-national peace missions, where the force commander of the AU and UN mission in Darfur called himself a 'force manager', and not a force commander because the latter gave the illusion of operational control (2020). This points to a need to clarify the role of the FC in peace missions. 'Full command' is never realised in operations of this nature; however, there is a need to strengthen the role of the FC to enable effective operations, navigating between national caveats. Another challenge was that national assets were not shared. That meant the FC could not, for instance, get helicopter assistance from one TCC to another, nor did the FC have assets and enablers at their disposal. This could be solved by signing a legally enforceable and binding memorandum of agreement with the TCCs, where the TCCs agree to hand over operational control to the AU/UN. Increasing the likelihood of TCCs relinquishing complete operational control to a UN/AU FC, especially if the FC is not from a large TCC, will require diplomatic and practical commitments from the side of the AU and its international partners, ensuring the needed operational, logistical support to the deployed troops.

The mandate and the capabilities

Since 2007, AMISOM's mandated force ceiling has gone from an initial 8 000 to 22 000 troops, then down to 19 626 by 2021.[174] The drawdown of AMISOM forces was initiated in 2018 as part of the condition-based STP but was halted due to a lack of progress in implementing the STP. The drawdown changed AMISOM's military strategy, since the reduced force numbers continuously forced it to close and hand over some FOBs. Nevertheless, one interviewee mentioned that it had been difficult to hand over the planned bases by February 2020 since the SNA could not deploy the agreed force numbers. Furthermore, some TCCs left troops in Somalia scheduled to go home because the SSF failed to take over the responsibility at the vacated bases, which would then be at risk of falling under al-Shabaab control again. In UNSCR 2628 (2022), it was consequently specified how many additional troops the SNA was expected to produce until the closure of ATMIS by the end of 2024. AMISOM's priority tasks have been:
- to undertake offensive operations against al-Shabaab and other armed groups;
- to be present in the six sectors identified in the CONOPS as part of assisting the FGS in extending formal state presence in Somalia;

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[173] UNSC. (2019).

[174] UNSC. (2021).

- to secure free movement in and the protection of urban centres, and finally
- to secure logistical supply routes and assist the FGS and international humanitarian partners in getting access to areas in need and previously controlled by al-Shabaab.

However, the CONOPS stipulated that AMISOM was also intended to support the FGS and SSF in their operations, securing the implementation of the transition plan. In the CONOPS, it was furthermore emphasised, based on the mandate given at the AU PSC meeting held in Nouakchott, Mauritania, on 30 June 2018, that the renewed mandate of the AMISOM:

> [I]s directed to take all necessary measures to enhance its operational effectiveness and to better align its operations with political developments and the security environment through development of the Mission's CONOPS.[175]

The AU acknowledges that there was a need for AMISOM to adjust its operational tactics to the task at hand and to improve the military and mission effectiveness – which was difficult to implement on the ground. The decision to establish a quick reaction force required additional force enablers to be made available to increase mobility and agility. As in similar missions, these capabilities were not made available, and the UNSC mandate did not provide for these assets. This emphasises one of the key challenges faced by AMISOM for the duration of the mission, which was a constant discrepancy between the mandated tasks and the deployed capabilities.[176] This should be viewed alongside the mission's failure to swiftly redirect and redefine its roles and tools following the initial military-heavy approach. This lasted until 2013, when AS started changing its tactical approach, becoming more evasive and avoiding direct conventional encounters with AMISOM. Due to the implementation of the STP, an offensive and active role should have increasingly been undertaken by the SSF – and not AMISOM or ATMIS. AMISOM was conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) but was only mandated to conduct COIN. The mission was not well-equipped or suited to perform CT, and it was challenging to get the SSF to take the necessary lead in these types of operations to compensate for AMISOM's CT deficiencies.

The UN did support and share intelligence, but not in a systematic and coordinated way. That made AMISOM operations too reactive. Since AMISOM undertook COIN- and CT-style operations daily, the force headquarters emphasised that the lack of coordinated intelligence was a challenge. Since it had not received guidelines or standard operating procedures (SOP) for this challenge, the force had to invent these along the way. There was a need for clear guidelines and SOP in this area, as the situation hampered achieving the broad objectives and efforts of the mission. Historically, the lack of preparedness of the AMISOM forces has resulted in

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175 AMISOM. (2018). p. 4.

176 AU. (2017). p. 13.

significant loss of life amongst the troops. Additionally, operations have often taken place without sufficient coordination to bring humanitarian contributions into the fold, even though AMISOM leadership reported that they had tried to coordinate efforts with international humanitarian actors.

The AMISOM mandate stipulated that the mission was to conduct joint operations with the SSF to secure a well-coordinated and holistic approach to military operations in close coordination with other partners. The joint operations formed part of implementing the STP and enabling the FGS to take full responsibility for national security provisions. The critical guiding documents, apart from the UN and AU mandates, were the Somali national security plans, which were developed in partnership between international partners and the FGS and provided the framework for the tasks given to AMISOM.

Furthermore, AMISOM was required to undertake limited training and mentoring of the SNA. Training was an area of contention; AMISOM military leadership expressed frustration that the SNA were trained and equipped by multiple partners, with apparently limited coordination. At the same time, AMISOM had to conduct joint operations with the SNA but had limited influence on how they were prepared, equipped and trained. In this regard, a key challenge was that AMISOM did not have a joint training manual and doctrine tailored to the nature of the tasks. In effect, AMISOM comprised five separate forces that operated and trained differently. This was a significant problem for the mission and highlighted the uncoordinated nature of the international engagement towards Somalia.[177]

Another critical responsibility for AMISOM was to facilitate humanitarian access by means of securing logistical routes and creating certain conditions for access for humanitarian actors. This proved difficult for AMISOM, which were often in a defence posture, and stuck on 'isolated islands', i.e., typical urban areas in vast areas of non-control, with limited ability to move. In effect, it meant that the critical humanitarian contribution to assist Somalia's population also largely faltered and the logistical effort to provide humanitarian aid even more so.

The inability to secure freedom of movement meant that logistics were often done by air, since roads in several sectors were not secure. The lack of freedom of movement increased the costs of the operation and further hampered operations. UNSOS was not configured to support a CT and COIN operation and was – in several areas – limited to support the mission via air. The protection of staff, equipment, and installations (including UN personnel) and allowing for freedom of movement were additionally mandated tasks for which AMISOM needed to take responsibility. As illustrated above, AMISOM could not effectively fulfil this part of its mandate. Several interviewees emphasised that access constituted a significant challenge, and that land transport takes place in armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and protected convoys. This, again, illustrates general challenges facing international actors operating in Somalia and explains why progress has been slow. The conundrum was that AMISOM was mandated to provide the space for the UN to fulfil its mandate, supporting the FGS to extend state functions and presence.

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[177] See note 4.7.

However, since AMISOM could not adequately fulfil this part of its mandate, the other actors were also unable to fulfil their mandates.

AMISOM was tasked with engaging with communities in recovered areas and driving a strategy of winning hearts and minds (WHAM). This was intended to support broad stabilisation initiatives conducted with the UN as the leading actor. During a field trip by the author in late 2018, it became clear that, since 2015 and until late 2019, AMISOM has only conducted limited military operations, and the expansion of areas under FGS control has stopped. This changed slightly in 2020, and the SSF, with AMISOM's support, has increasingly undertaken offensive operations. However, maintaining control over these areas remained a challenge. Due to AMISOM's military focus, it was difficult to initiate and implement the quick-impact projects envisioned. Boreholes and the renovation of infrastructure are good examples, but too often, too much time passes after an area has been liberated, before civilian partners arrive. Furthermore, the challenge was that WHAM missions should be undertaken and driven by Somalis – and not the international actors – to generate local support and legitimacy. If AMISOM and the other international actors continued to drive this process, it would undermine the longer-term political project of creating a sustainable Somalia.

A critical task for AMISOM was to protect the FGS, allowing it to build state capacity and exercise formal state functions by protecting critical infrastructure and installations. ATMIS, for instance, still provides security for government buildings, such as Villa Somalia (the presidential residence) and ministries. However, as part of the STP, this responsibility was gradually transferred to the SNA and SPF, the national stadium being an example. As illustrated previously the number of tasks mandated to AMISOM did increase since the mission started in 2007.

The CONOPS from 2016 was, in many ways, an illustration of the challenges that AMISOM has faced – especially since 2015. A CONOPS is generally a military guidance document. However, AMISOM – and the AU's PSO Doctrine from 2013 – stipulate that a CONOPS has a much broader scope than purely military operations. One reason was the discrepancy between the UN mandate, which provided the framework and mandate for AMISOM to operate, and the AU PSC mandate for AMISOM. In the UN mandate, there was no provision for AMISOM containing a civilian dimension, but the role and tasks of the civilian institutions have been included in the CONOPS. This contradiction made the document less useful as a military tool, since the military directives and guidance are less clear. In this regard the deployment of 70 civilian staff as part of AMISOM was a compromise between the AU and the UN.

AMISOM's strategic and operational centre of gravity created an environment conducive to security. However, despite the tremendous achievements in improving security, Somalia remained one of the world's most dangerous places at the time of the mission's closure in March 2022. Ordinary Somalis faced violence and threats as part of everyday life, while AMISOM and humanitarian actors continued to be constrained in their movement and access.

Since at least 2015, and until the successful operation at the end of 2021, AMISOM and the FGS have been unable to expand state authority significantly, despite

military success around Dhobley and other previously key al-Shabaab strongholds. As one interviewee pointed out, there was little agreement between the UN and the AU regarding the nature of the state-building project in Somalia. That constituted a tremendous challenge for the mission. There was no agreement on the project and narrative that the FGS and international partners wanted to present to the local population as an alternative to the vision that al-Shabaab and its Salafi-jihadist allies presented. The fundamental problem was the absence of a viable and overarching Somali-owned political project for the country.

Conclusion

A conventional force is not well-suited for CT operations among the Somali population, where strong intelligence capability and both human intelligence and signal intelligence, as well as police and particular special-operation-force capabilities are required. As an interviewee mentioned, structures for intelligence coordination are in place on paper, but the FGS seldom participates in these meetings. It was argued that intelligence sharing had improved recently, but the lack of adequate and coordinated structures remained a challenge. ATMIS had to address this if it were to undertake effective CT operations in support of the FGS, as stipulated in UNSCR 2628 (2022). The SNA continuously increased its capacity and capabilities, and AMISOM increasingly played a supportive role as part of the STP. This also entails that ATMIS will increasingly be required to possess specialised function teams, e.g., intelligence-based capabilities and mobile, special-operations forces elements.

ATMIS and the FGS needed to enhance people-centric operations to counter al-Shabaab connections within local communities by introducing a better alternative, and for the FGS to cut off the economic support that al-Shabaab generates through the 'taxation' of businesses and individuals in urban centres. By interrupting al-Shabaab's access to the population and funding, al-Shabaab would be compelled to find a political solution and do so from a weakened position. AMISOM did not have the capabilities to undertake these types of operations. This chapter has highlighted the significant discrepancy between the mandate and focus in the CONOPS, and the operations and activities conducted on the ground. Moving forward and beyond the end of the ATMIS mandate in March 2022, there was an urgent need to attract investments and development to and of Somalia, assisting the FGS in establishing a real political alternative to al-Shabaab.

High-threat levels continue to be a reality in Somalia, as is the significant infiltration of al-Shabaab operatives and assets into the FGS. A key challenge remains in distinguishing between civilians and combatants. This underlines that AMISOM and its partners required significant human and signal intelligence capabilities, enabling the mission to identify individual insurgents. As an interviewee pointed out, a challenge in this regard was the lack of trustworthy national partners and intelligence institutions, which often turned out to be unreliable. The last 50 years of military campaigns illustrate that if the intervening international or local government force fails to generate buy-in, support and legitimacy around the state-building project, it will be impossible to win the war. The challenges faced by the international coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan are more recent examples.

AMISOM and the AU should have built a joint concept that closely integrates with partners. The UN should be at the centre of this, being the political and mandating head of the AMISOM mission – as reflected in the Hippo Report (UN, 2015). AMISOM should have strived for enhanced capabilities and planning, but should do so in partnership with a few selected partners, such as the US, and should never operate unilaterally. There is a need for FGS cooperation and support, as the FGS was intended to lead the process. The political pressure placed on the FGS in UNSCR 2628 was long called for and needed to be implemented. Political pressure must be kept on the Somali government to deliver real commitment, while the AU must ensure that the individual TCCs comply with the plans and directives of the FC.

AMISOM became a protracted operation, such as the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, and now MONUSCO). AMISOM was originally only intended to last six months, from January to June 2007, and then transition into a UN peace operation. The mission ultimately deployed for 15 years. The UN's concept of AMISOM as "soldiers for hire" was designed to facilitate the UN to undertake its traditional peace operation concept by circumventing its peacekeeping principles through AMISOM. This model has proved to be unsustainable. The lack of a viable, representative, nationally-owned, political project in Somalia still undermines the possibility of creating sustainable peace. Arguably, the international community has demonstrated a greater commitment to sustained peace in Somalia than national actors.

Negotiating governance in ungoverned spaces

The agency of peace support operations

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Introduction

The concept of ungoverned spaces is highly contested. On the one hand, inhabited territories cannot be ungoverned because some rules must guide social interaction. On the other hand, what may be true is that those rules are not subject to the central authority of a state, and governance within those spaces may not meet standards of good governance associated with liberal democracy. If inhabited territories are ungoverned, it results from the failure of those who govern to extend governance within those areas. Regardless, ungoverned spaces in most instances do not necessarily translate into a complete absence of central governance structures. Instead, the terminology connotes the absence of effective exercise of authority by the central government.[178] As aptly captured by Clunan and Trinkunas, the issue is not a "lack of governance per se but rather, who governs these spaces ".[179] In those areas, a transactional tripartite relationship may exist between the central government, the informal structures of governance, and criminal elements, which are often driven and sustained by corruption, nepotism, and clientelism.

In those instances, there is very little or no trust in the social contract primarily due to the failure of the state to provide public goods and services, including assurance of protection. As a result, (re)negotiating governance in the so-called ungoverned areas requires reordering the referent society. A new social contract can be agreed upon to guide the relationship. It requires an honest interrogation of the complex, interrelated challenges that result from years of neglect, under-development, and inefficiency to decipher and understand the dynamics that underpin the relationships that may exist. The ability to negotiate governance in peripheral spaces requires several considerations. These include acknowledging the existence of some form of governance structures and systems, a willingness to work with those systems rather than supplant them, and the state's effective guarantee of the social contract.

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[178] Lamb, RD. (2008). pp. 15–20.

[179] Clunan, AL. & Trinkunas, H. (2008).

Peace Support Operations (PSOs) are designed to assist in the overall state-building process. They, therefore, have the potential to help affected states in the (re) negotiation of governance spaces to enable the utilisation of existing structures and the development of additional structures and mechanisms where required. However, the utility of PSOs in this domain is dependent on three main factors: one is the need for a fraction of physical security as a primary condition for the consideration of political and diplomatic options for conflict management. (Re)establishing governance is part of the larger state-building efforts that require mutual trust in the social contract. However, without guarantees of physical security, such trust and confidence could be elusive. Second is the primacy of politics as a vector of change. As evidenced in the success stories of East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, and the challenging contexts of Darfur, Somalia, the Central Africa Republic (CAR), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the potential offered by PSOs can only be optimised through the political will of parties to the conflict. Finally, the value of PSOs to state-building efforts lies in a willingness to invest in longer-term peacebuilding and stabilisation.[180] These factors require objective conflict analysis that allows for a holistic accounting of the issues underpinning the conflict. A re-framing of the conflict by all actors, including external actors, makes it possible to reimagine the positive transformation of relationships between parties to the conflict.

This chapter argues that the absence of effective state control within a given geographical area fosters a sense of marginalisation and exclusion, facilitating alienation. These issues generate and sustain multiple drivers of conflict and insecurity, including the development of criminal networks and the mobilisation of discontent against perceived corrupt and/or ineffective governments to contest the state's monopoly over the use of force and, in some instances, threaten the territorial integrity of the state. Multi-dimensional PSOs offer various tools to assist parties in conflict to re-envision new relationships. By providing platforms and opportunities for dialogue, engagement, deconstruction, and reconstruction, PSOs offer the chance to harness diplomatic tools of conflict management for political negotiations, agreeing on pathways for addressing the structural causes of conflicts and the positive transformation of conflict dynamics. (Re)negotiating governance is part of the broader state-building process. PSOs can aid in negotiating the space and format of governance that offer the foundations for stabilisation, peacebuilding and longer-term state-building.

The focus of the chapter is the agency of PSOs in (re)negotiating governance in ungoverned spaces within conflict situations generally. But, this focus requires two caveats. First, even though historically PSOs have been mandated and deployed by the UN, UN PSOs have not been the only game in town. Continental and regional organisations have also deployed PSOs where the UN is unwilling or unable to act effectively. Secondly, because most contemporary PSOs are deployed into conflicts of rampant use of terror tactics, as in the DRC or outright terrorism, as in Somalia, Mali, and the countries within the Lake Chad Basin, the discourse is skewed towards (re)negotiating governance in situations where counterterrorism efforts are significant. The significance of these two points is the complementary roles that the

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[180] Filipov, F. (2006).

various PSOs can play in (re)negotiating governance in situations where the social contract is broken, and the state's monopoly over the use of force is contested.

Negotiating ungoverned spaces: framing the problematique

The securitisation of the so-called ungoverned spaces became a rallying cry to mobilise concerted action in the international system in late 1990. This followed the twin bombings in Tanzania and Kenya in which several foreign nationals, notably Americans were killed. It was, however, given a further impetus in international security discourse in the aftermath of the 9/11 twin bombings in the United States (US) and the subsequent response by the US and the UN.[181]

Two observations on labelling certain peripheral frontier territories as 'ungoverned' are worth noting. One is the relationship between the spaces characterised as ungoverned and the existence of natural resources, including, among others, rare minerals such as uranium. Two, securitising ungoverned spaces has mainly occurred in places associated with active efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism. Since most of the challenges posed by ineffective state control, such as cross-border criminal activities, including smuggling, trafficking, and insurgencies (some of which employ terror tactics), predates the 21st century, the vexed question is why such framing has become necessary in contemporary times. Even though a more detailed study would be required to arrive at a conclusive position, it is not far-fetched to argue that resource control is one of the factors of contestation. A simple explanation is that securitisation conveys the presence of an existential threat that requires extraordinary measures. Securitising the challenges posed by the so-called ungoverned spaces justifies the circumvention of the rule of law, the evocation of emergency powers, and extraordinary response pathways. Securitisation has been used to demonise the other, justify the failure to engage non-militarily (at least at the beginning of counter efforts). It legitimises heavy-handed state responses, even though the populations in those territories are disproportionately affected by the threats and responses. Yet, such approaches further legitimise the narratives of the government as the enemy of the people that should be outwitted, undermined and, when possible, removed.[182]

The labelling of territorial space as ungoverned is overly simplistic. It masks the complex but often unexplored interconnected web of mechanisms, structures, and processes that regulate socioeconomic and political interactions outside the formal state governance structures.

Very often, the referent territory classified as ungoverned is territory that is at the periphery. In that space, participation of the population in the World Bank's classical definition of governance[183] is limited to the selection of governments in what is usually severely flawed electoral processes. The absence of state presence in those spaces affects the implementation of the social contract, particularly on the side of the state, where envisaged public goods are mainly absent. In an attempt to provide essential public goods and services, multiple structures, some of which

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[181] Sherman, J. & Safarti, A. (2021).

[182] Olesker, R. (2018). pp. 312–329.

[183] World Bank. (2021).

emerge as self-help systems, develop to fill the void.[184] Over time, a new dynamic emerges where the respect and allegiance of the populations gradually shift from the non-existent and/or inefficient formal structures of governance to the local and domestic informal structures that deliver some form of public goods.

There are reasons why the so-called ungoverned spaces are characterised by multiple threats of terrorism, inter-communal violence, criminality, and crime-induced violence.[185] The multiple challenges of the geographical size of the so-called governance spaces – their location along the frontiers of affected countries and weak border management capacity of states creates enabling conditions for cross-border criminal activity. For instance, the 2012 insurrection in Mali capitalised on and exploited by violent extremist and terrorist groups was catalysed and sustained by fallouts of the Libyan crisis, and particularly the proliferation of weapons from Libya into Mali.[186]

The high levels of illegality and crime in those areas may be explained through criminal theory and social learning theory. A social environment where criminal behaviour is normalised, and the potential of apprehension and punishment is doubtful encourages criminal conduct as a means of survival.[187] Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine that the confluence of porous, unpoliced borders in a space of neglect, under-development, and high levels of unemployment emboldens criminal behaviour. However, not all criminal behaviour is necessarily political. And the unwillingness or inability of governments to effectively exercise sovereign authority within certain spaces, partly because of the lack of governmental structures and control, does not mean an absence of governance. The issue at stake here, therefore, is not mere criminality but rather, the interaction between crime and the use of violence in political contestation.

The failure of the state to deliver on its part of the social contract facilitates the development of a cocktail of issues. These include horizontal inequality, exclusion, marginalisation, neglect, and unemployment/underemployment. In addition, the inability of the state to provide physical security in instances of violence against civilians, in the areas characterised as ungoverned, are grievances that engender gross discontent that can be mobilised by criminal elements, insurgents, and terrorists to legitimate criminality and violence against the state.[188] In instances of state failure to provide physical security against the attacks by violent non-state actors, relationships are formed between violent non-state actors and the affected population in exchange for protection.

Populated territories are not ungoverned. These territories have been in existence for as long as the countries in which they exist, and have had systems and structures to manage interaction among their constituents. These systems and structures are generally not aligned to the formal structures of the state and may in some instances, exploit the inefficiencies in the formal structures of governance. Critically, these

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[184] International Crisis Group. (2019).

[185] See Reitano, T., & Hunter, M. (2018).

[186] Marsh, N. (2017). pp. 78–97.

[187] Akers, RL. (1990). pp. 653–76; Akers, RL (2009).

[188] Ojielo, O. (2017).

systems are often not subject to the control of formal governance structures and remain outside the remit of formal regulation. Even though the limited capacity of these structures may enable crime and illegality to thrive, it does not necessarily make the entire space an ungoverned space.

Equating the absence of effective state presence and formal structures of state authority in an inhabited territory, and socio-political and economic space to a complete lack of governance, is a misnomer. The inability of states to exercise the social attributes of national power over certain parts of their territories does not negate the existence of systems, structures, rules, and processes to regulate social interaction and accountability. Thus, even though it may be politically incorrect to admit that the absence of state presence and formal governance processes do not translate into the non-existence of governance among the affected societies, such an acknowledgement is necessary for reimagining the relationship between the relevant parties, stakeholders and beneficiaries in those spaces and the centre.

The agency of peace support operations in negotiating governance

A peace support operation is a conflict management tool deployed to aid in the de-escalation of violent conflict and to offer conflict parties the opportunity to reimagine non-violent means of managing contentions.[189] Although the term is used interchangeably with peacekeeping, PSOs are much broader than peacekeeping, and involve all available legal and legitimate means to de-escalate conflicts, protect civilians and provide conflict parties with assistance for the non-violent management of conflicts.[190] Over the years, the nature and scope of PSOs have evolved considerably to include assistance to support long-term state-building efforts that help to develop capacities to mitigate and manage sources of fragility and build resilience.

The report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000 (the Brahimi Report), and the subsequent report of the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), outlines the pre-requisites needed to enhance the ability of PSOs to be better able to assist parties in conflicts and address their security challenges.[191] The Brahimi Report, which argues for a greater role for PSOs in (re) establishing governance as part of state-building efforts deftly captures the need for a balance between the fundamental principles of peacekeeping and the imperatives of contemporary conflict environments.[192] Juxtaposed against the confluence of security challenges that sustain violent conflicts, the report draws attention to the need for a common-sense interpretation of peacekeeping principles to guarantee that the UN does not become irrelevant in peace and security efforts. Even though there are a few classical peacekeeping operations deployed to monitor ceasefire agreements, such as the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), most contemporary PSOs have robust mandates that include the Protection of Civilians, the use of force in defence of the mandate, and assistance for state-building efforts.[193]

[189] Walter, B. et al. (2020). pp. 1 705–1 722.

[190] Johnston, N. (2004). pp. 33–50.

[191] Brahimi, L. (2000).

[192] Ibid.

[193] MINURSO Mandate. (n.d.).

Notwithstanding the nature and dynamics of contemporary conflicts, legislative provisions, and great power politics constrain the UN's response efforts in some situations. HIPPO captures the dilemmas of contemporary peace operations and offers recommendations to maintain and enhance the relevance of the UN in the face of critical challenges to which it may be greatly constrained to respond.[194] Calling for cautious innovation to ensure that the UN can address global security challenges, it advocates for a case-by-case time-bound use of force in UN PSOs, while political solutions are sought. Interestingly, on the matter of countering terrorism, which is increasingly becoming a bane of contemporary PSOs, the Panel calls for partnerships with regional organisations and ad-hoc coalitions. What is evident in both the Brahimi and HIPPO reports and the trajectory of PSOs is an effort to translate into practice the need for physical security as a sine qua non to all other conflict management, including state-building efforts.

In the last three decades, four types of PSOs have been deployed in Africa. One is PSOs deployed by regional organisations or the African Union, cast in the mould of humanitarian interventions, such as the deployment of the Economic Community of West African States to Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990 and 1998 respectively, to essentially stop widespread loss of lives arising out of the activities of parties to violent conflicts.[195] These types of PSOs were not configured to provide the long-term support needed for the state-building project. Two is the neo-traditional peacekeeping operations in which the UN deployed PSOs to work alongside either a regional or continental force to provide complementary support to the affected state. In this second configuration, such as in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early 2000s, and Mali and CAR in the late 2000s, the regional/continental forces with their ability to use force, create a secure environment for medium- to long-term engagement and support for the re-establishment of governance.[196] The third is the model of the United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSC)) – where the UN inserts a force within an existing PSO to use force to provide security to an at-risk population to enable the processes of state-building to continue.[197] Finally, the fourth type of PSO is when the UN operates alongside multiple actors with specific mandates, working towards a common goal in a single theatre of operation, such as in the case of Mali. Mali presents a fascinating case with as many as three distinct entities – the United Nations (MINUSMA), France (Barkhane), and the Malian Forces as part of the G5 Sahel Force operated in its territory.[198] Even though the jury is out on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Malian experiment, the presence of French and Barkhane forces only facilitated a modicum of physical security that allowed the presence of the UN, which among others, provides support to the political processes aimed at transforming the conflict dynamics in Mali. Although far from perfect, these partnerships recognise the limitations of a singular PSO and the need

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[194] Ilitchev, A. (2015).

[195] Darkwa, L., & Attuquayefio, P. (2014); Darkwa, L (2018).

[196] See note 5.1.

[197] MONUC Mandate. (n.d.)

[198] Rupesinghe, N. (2018). pp. 11–18.

to leverage the comparative advantage of the various mandating authorities towards the re-establishment of governance in the affected countries.

The military strategy of 'clear, hold and build' is a useful framework for the (re) negotiation of governance in affected areas.[199] For this framework to be effective and efficient, it needs to be used as part of an overarching strategy built on the primacy of politics. A clearly articulated and well-resourced political strategy that envisages the end state as one in which a new social contract is developed between the government and the governed must accompany the military effort. Against this background, the kinetic efforts of a PSO must be used as a tool to unlock the potential for political engagement to mediate the relationship between security, governance, and stability. When used as a framework, 'clear, build and hold' need not be sequentially deployed as a composite whole. Rather, its constituents, 'clear', 'hold' and 'build' can be disaggregated and deployed as necessary. A failure to situate the framework in grounded political strategy undermines the conflict transforming potential of the PSO. The absence of a political strategy at the very outset of the engagement by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) against al-Shabaab in Somalia has made it challenging for it to effectively transition from playing a purely military role, provide support for the political process in line with the changing dynamics of the conflict.

Central to the agency of PSOs for the renegotiation of governance is a need for adequate resources, including the right mandate, accompanying capabilities, and political willingness, particularly on the part of external influencers, for the re-establishment of governance and by default, negotiation of the governance space. This is particularly important in areas with active counterterrorism operations because of the perception that negotiating with terrorists is unacceptable. Lessons learned from Somalia reveal that the lack of relevant capabilities leads to missed opportunities in re-establishing governance.[200] For instance, the absence of a policing mandate in the early part of the mission's life meant that the military had to clear and hold the ground, which was practically impossible. This led to repeated cycles of the military having to engage and clear al-Shabaab from certain areas multiple times because of the absence of a credible presence to help to hold.

In using this 'clear, hold, build' framework, there is a need for sound analysis, shared by all response actors (UN, regional entities, bilateral partners, and the state) on the threat elements within the area of relevance, to ensure the design and deployment of appropriate designs. Whilst this consideration has always been relevant in military strategy, it is even more critical in contemporary conflict situations where multiple actors, often with distinct interests, exploit conflict situations to their advantage. The new way of working, arising from exploring the Humanitarian Development Peace nexus in post-conflict scenarios, provides platforms for further strengthening such joint analysis.[201] For instance, even though the conflict in Mali has largely been framed as violent extremism and/or terrorism, it is necessary to be reminded that it began as a Tuareg insurgency in demand for a separate state, that was exploited by

[199] For a comprehensive presentation of how to use the 'Clear, build and hold' strategy for rebuilding, see Ucko, DH. (2013).

[200] Williams, PD. et al. (2018).

[201] See UN. (n.d.).

armed terrorist groups. To avoid lumping all parties in the theatre of operation as non-negotiable and thereby alienate moderates who could become allies, comprehensive conflict analysis is necessary for mapping out options for engagement and the identification of those that could be engaged in a non-military way.[202] The strategy of clearing should therefore only be used in instances where the use of non-military efforts is not viable. The context must inform response strategies.

Holding ground after clearing is essential for trust and confidence building, which are critical to re-establishing governance in affected areas. Indeed, affected populations could be at high risk of reprisals from non-state armed groups for collaborating to oust them. In Somalia, al-Shabaab often conducted reprisal attacks against individuals and communities perceived to have collaborated either with AMISOM troops or the Somalia National Army (SNA) once the military forces have left.[203] This poses particular challenges to the trust and confidence-building required for renegotiating governance in those areas. Creating a secure physical environment through the ouster of non-state armed groups also creates expectations of protection from criminal elements. This is particularly dire in places where the presence of non-state armed groups had provided various forms of protection against such elements and kept crime at bay. The inability/unwillingness of the state to offer protection frames the lack of trust and confidence in the central government and its governance structures. This means that confidence and trust-building efforts should be high on the agenda of engagement. Holding requires the provision of basic needs and effective and efficient law enforcement, including robust policing and accessible conflict resolution systems that allow for peaceful co-existence, law, and order.

'Building', the third element in the framework, flows naturally from the 'holding' component. It includes support to the provision of immediate human security needs and assistance to create structures for socio-economic and political development that will lead to long-term rebuilding and reconstruction. 'Building' includes the provision of support to capacitate national institutions for socio-political and economic development. 'Building' is a long-term and resource-intensive engagement that requires several layers of support. Usually, this phase of a PSO elicits new elements within the mandate that allows for the calibration of efforts. It also requires considerable coordination for effective prioritisation and sequencing to avoid duplication.[204]

Through the provision of quick impact projects (QIPS) and community-based labour-intensive projects (CLIPS) designed to provide immediate assistance for the priority needs of affected communities, PSOs can assist with providing basic public goods in the short to medium term and lay the foundation for long-term provisions.[205] QIPS may be a response to the need for public goods, such as potable water, health care, sanitation, etc. It may also be used for infrastructural development, such as refurbishing markets, schools, police stations, courts,

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[202] Karlsrud, J. (2019). pp. 153–157.

[203] Council, DR. (2017).

[204] See note 5.2.

[205] Quick Impact Projects for Communities. (n.d.).

etc.[206] Interventions undertaken through QIPS and CLIPS provide the affected communities with support to improve security and stability of the situation on the ground.[207] For instance, through vocational education and recruitment for public works, the CLIPS, introduced in Darfur by the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), targets at-risk youth and provides them alternatives to taking up arms and recruitment into armed groups.[208] The construction elements of QIPs and CLIPS are labour intensive and helps to provide much-needed short-term employment opportunities particularly for young people, thereby keeping them economically engaged and building trust in the prospects of peace. In some instances, QIPs may also include direct support to revenue generation activities. These projects, which help to meet the direct and often immediate needs of the affected communities, help to foster confidence in the peace process. In Mali, MINUSMA has a dedicated stabilisation and recovery unit responsible for managing funding for QIPS. This has helped to reduce the bureaucratic bottlenecks that usually bedevil accessing funding for QIPS.[209]

Against the prementioned, PSOs can play two main roles in the efforts at (re) negotiating governance in challenging situations. One is support towards the creation of a secure physical environment through the degradation of military capabilities of armed groups and their ability to inflict harm on civilian populations, and the limitation of territorial control and disruption of income generation activities. Two is support for the re-establishment of a social contract through the provision of a convening platform for conflicting parties to explore non-violent options for the transformation of conflict dynamics. Even though these processes used to be linear and sequential, with support to state-building activities often following the signing of a peace process, a considerable shift in approach has been noticeable with the increased involvement of other actors in PSOs. The dynamics of contemporary conflict environments do not lend themselves to linear, sequential processes. As such, as has been witnessed in Somalia and Mali, state-building processes have been ongoing alongside the military efforts.[210]

Creating physical security towards the (re)establishment of governance

The trajectory of PSOs reveals a progressive nuanced interpretation of the principles of non-use of force, consent, impartiality, and neutrality. Whilst non-use of force remains a guiding principle, force is permissible under three conditions: self-defence, protection of civilians, and defence of the mandate.[211] And, whilst PSOs are neutral, they are partial to the objectives of the mandate. This means that the use of force may be employed to aid the effective implementation of the mandate. This has allowed the UN to endorse the use of force in limited instances to support the (re) establishment of governance in state-building efforts.[212] Notwithstanding, the UN

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[206] ACCORD. (2020).

[207] End of Mission Report. (2021).

[208] Elzarov, Z. (2015). pp. 1–7.

[209] Van der Lijn, Jair et al. (2019).

[210] See note 5.3.

[211] Tardy, T. (2007). pp. 49–70; Peter, M. (2015). pp. 351–370.

[212] See note 5.4.

remains severely constrained because of its legislative instruments and great power politics that influence the mandates, resources, and capabilities of PSOs.

Whilst maintaining its core principles of consent, non-use of force, impartiality, and neutrality, the UN, learning from the lessons of past failures, have devised innovative ways to better respond to the issues associated with the complex security challenges of the latter part of the 20th century and the 21st centuries. From its support to nation-building processes in East Timor, and long-term state-building efforts in Sierra Leone and Liberia,[213] the UN has evolved to meet contemporary security needs. In 2013, the UN took the bold step of mandating the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within MONUSCO, to support the government of the DRC to, among others, "prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralise these groups, and to disarm them to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilisation activities."[214] The compromises that must have been made in agreeing to the creation of the FIB is evident in the phrases "on an exceptional basis", "without creating a precedent" and "or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping".[215] At the same time, it lends credence to the threat reduction abilities of properly mandated and adequately resourced PSOs.[216]

Most post-Cold War PSO mandates include an element of support for the restoration of state authority and, as such, contain directives for support to the establishment of the rule of law and support for the security sector and legal reforms. In the 1990s, the deployments of the Economic Community of West African States to Liberia and Sierra Leone were responsible for creating an enabling environment for state-building efforts. In Somalia, the AU's enforcement mission in 2007 ensured the retreat of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu, allowing the commencement of state-building efforts. Since its engagement as an executive mission in East Timor, the UN has assisted states in long-term reconstruction and rebuilding efforts through different configurations. Limited by its mandate and great power politics, the UN, regional blocs, and coalitions of the willing have worked together to create the needed environment for state-building efforts.[217] In Somalia, the UN works closely with the AU mission to Somalia by providing logistics support to aid the fight against al-Shabaab.

The retreat of armed groups denies them the physical area of land used as a platform for planning, mobilising, recruiting, and launching attacks. Even though cyber-space offers opportunities for the same activities, control over physical space also allows for the exercise of empirical sovereignty by non-state actors.[218] Territorial control and the establishment of parallel structures of government provide non-state armed groups with economic lifelines and to some extent, legitimacy with the populations they control. Territorial control provides revenue generation opportunities. Control

[213] Thakur, R. (2016). p. 47.

[214] UN. (n.d.). *MONUSCO Mandate*.

[215] Ibid.

[216] London School of Economics. (2016).

[217] Ishaque, W. (2021); Tardy, T. (2014); UNSC. (2015).

[218] Mampilly, Z. (2003).

over natural resource extraction, trade through ports and other strategic routes, the imposition of taxes on local businesses, and, in some instances, humanitarian actors and kidnapping for ransom provide resources for non-state actors. Such resources provide funding for the provision of public goods, such as potable water, food, shelter and in some cases physical protection – things the state may be unable and/ or unwilling to provide, thereby legitimising the providers of such services – the non-state armed groups. Limitation of territorial control, therefore, disrupts some (although not all) of the income generation activities of armed non-state actors.

Support for the re-establishment of the social contract

Critical to the governance negotiation is the re-establishment of the social contract. The social contract guarantees the durability and sustainability of resolution efforts. It is a highly political process because it anchors the socioeconomic and political processes required to re-establish and re-set governance within an affected society. Interventions for the re-establishment of the social contract must therefore be seen as part of the building blocks for the re-establishment of governance broadly.

PSOs are often deployed into situations of extreme fragility, characterised by mistrust and a breakdown of the social contract, especially in peripheral areas.[219] The failure of the state to uphold its part of the social contract is often an underlying cause of grievance in many conflicts; and even though grievance in itself is not a cause of violent conflict, it can (and has in several instances) been exploited to fan the flames of violence. The inability/unwillingness of governments — as the government or in cooperation with other agencies — in affected states to guarantee freedom from fear and want undermines confidence in the government. Consequently, any effort to (re)negotiate governance must begin with remedying the broken social contract. The creation of a secure environment is the beginning of the continuum for confidence-building among the affected population and external stakeholders. Once a modicum of security is provided, attention must be paid to the development of a framework of governance.

A secure environment generates a platform for and expectations of a return to full normalcy, including sustaining the security attained through the maintenance of law and order, the provision of public goods and services, the creation of economic opportunities, and participation in the governance process. The inclusion of the rule of law elements in PSO mandates, therefore, helps to address some of the expectations within this period and engender confidence in the peace process. For example, patrols by the police component of PSOs, including joint patrols with national police forces, when possible, demonstrates presence and assures security to affected populations. In addition to support for the immediate policing needs of the population, support for the development of the capacity of national law enforcement agencies, including the police and judiciary is important to sustain the gains made in the long term. Training, mentoring, the provision of advisory services, support to institutional development, including infrastructural development and reforms, is necessary for laying the foundations for subsequent engagements on enhancing governance.[220]

[219] UNDP (2016); Hickey, S. (2010).

[220] See note 5.5.

The presence of PSOs in a conflict area promotes confidence for humanitarian, peacebuilding, development actors, and the state to operate within that space. The secure environment that is usually engendered through the presence of a PSO mission greatly helps in the gradual return to normalcy, including a return of the population that may have fled due to physical insecurity in a given area. It also expedites the resumption of public services, such as the reopening of schools, markets, hospitals, public and private offices, police stations, and courts, among others. The population of liberated centres also facilitates economic activities within those areas, thereby providing employment and livelihood opportunities. The refurbishment and subsequent reopening of the airport in Timbuktu and support to road infrastructure development have opened the Northern part of Mali that was almost cut off from the rest of the country.[221] In addition, its limitations notwithstanding, the use of aerial surveillance has helped to identify possible dangers on roads abandoned because of mines planted by the terrorist armed groups in the area.[222]

PSOs also facilitate the return of humanitarian and development actors whose activities directly impact the state-building project and aid in the confidence-building efforts required for renegotiation of the social contract. Despite the limitations and criticisms often labelled against AMISOM and MINUSMA, there is a consensus among citizens, the community of humanitarian and development practitioners, as well as the governments of Somalia and Mali respectively, that without the PSOs, it would not have been possible for humanitarian and development actors that are currently in the two countries to operate.[223]

Acute financial challenges that stem from an inability to generate requisite resources to finance basic needs and economic mismanagement are two interrelated factors that contribute to the inability of states to effectively fulfil their social contract. Using a whole-of-organisation approach, PSOs in the building phase coordinate efforts to assist governments in the development of sound governance, economic and financial mechanisms, structures, and policies to guide the development of prudent economic decisions that promote growth and develop resilience against shocks.[224] Enabling the resumption of economic activities is a critical requirement for the re-establishment of the social contract because it provides employment creation opportunities for the population whilst providing much-needed revenue in the form of taxes for the state. Creating a secure environment and establishing the foundations for the positive transformation of conflict dynamics provides the impetus for engagement on debt relief and development assistance, which affords governments much-needed resources to deliver on their social contract and thereby enhance their legitimacy in their negotiations within the so-called ungoverned spaces.

The re-establishment of the social contract is the main lever for renegotiating governance in affected countries. Facilitating communication between conflict parties is the first step towards the re-establishment of governance in an affected community.

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[221] Rupesinghe, N. et al. (2019).

[222] Ibid.

[223] Williams, PD. et al. (2018). pp. 74–75.

[224] See note 5.6.

The political settlement of conflict becomes appealing to conflict parties only when they recognise that it is the most viable alternative to violence. Put differently, it is only when parties in a conflict realise that the use of armed force is no longer a viable option that they would be open to considering non-violent means of resolution. PSOs can assist conflict parties to appreciate the possibility of realising their needs in a non-violent manner. Non-violent means of conflict resolution require considerable resources, which most countries emerging from conflicts are unable to provide. PSOs provide technical assistance and leverage their political legitimacy to mobilise resources for political processes towards the re-establishment of governance.

PSOs provide facilitative, as well as substantive, support for the development of frameworks for renegotiating governance. Through good offices and other facilitative tools, PSOs can encourage and support dialogue between conflict parties. In Darfur, Somalia, the CAR, and Mali, the PSOs operating in the theatre of operation were instrumental in encouraging the processes that resulted in political agreements for the transformation of the conflicts.[225] In addition, to the technical assistance to encourage peaceful alternatives to violent conflicts, PSO assets, particularly assets for transportation, have been essential in facilitating travel for negotiation efforts in affected countries. In addition, PSOs also facilitate other logistical needs, including security, accommodation, and board, interpretation, and translation services, among others, for political processes. In Mali, UN-operated flights have been indispensable to providing transportation assistance to the ongoing mediation efforts.[226]

Preparing conflict parties for meaningful participation in political processes is necessary for robust engagement and to ensure the durability of outcomes. State negotiators are often better informed and prepared than others who may not have the same level of education and exposure. Yet, the durability of outcomes is dependent on the extent to which those who may perceive themselves to be disadvantaged perceive the process to be fair. PSOs can convince conflict parties of the need to assist those that may be disadvantaged to prepare for the process, and provide such technical assistance where needed.

Finally, PSOs can support the design of the most appropriate process(es) for engagement. An important aspect of PSO support in the governance negotiation process is introducing and encouraging respect for principles that are guaranteed to sustain the process, such as inclusive and participatory processes, transparency, and accountability. These principles encourage conversations that open the space to erstwhile marginalised and excluded groups in the society and, through that, encourage new considerations in the negotiation of the governance within the social contract.

Conclusion
This chapter engages the question of rebuilding societies that have seen conflict and the role that PSOs can play in such a pursuit. 'Conflict' societies have ungoverned spaces that inhibit the processes that lead to post-conflict reconstruction and development. Thus, as this chapter argues, PSOs often clothed with some sense of

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[225] Van der Lijn, Jair et al. (2019). pp. 71–72; Williams, PD et al. (2018).

[226] Interview with MINUSMA official Bamako, September 7, 2018; Focus Group Discussion Bamako, September 12, 2018.

legitimacy and neutrality can and must aspire to be critical actors in the renegotiation of governance in ungoverned spaces. A key point of departure in this pursuit is to facilitate the negotiation of a new social contract that strengthens state capacity and citizens' capacity to seek state accountability.

Successfully (re)negotiating governance presents both opportunities and challenges to the state-building project. On a positive note, it provides a framework for addressing the structural vulnerabilities that feed the fault lines of fragility and the development of resilience. However, its potential to address illegality and crime means that both the process and its outcomes would be subject to considerable resistance by spoilers. The test of the durability of outcomes of the process is the system's resilience in the face of challenges. In accompanying the long-term transformation process, PSOs continue to offer and reinforce relevant support to the transformation processes. They provide guarantees and support for the effective implementation of negotiated outcomes by reinforcing security and strengthening national institutions at various levels through continued support. It is, however, imperative to appreciate the fact that PSOs do not have magic wands to bring about governance. They are only a part of the repertoire of tools available for use in the larger post-conflict reconstruction, stabilisation, and state-building enterprise. Ultimately, the ability to (re)negotiate governance heavily depends on the extent to which the parties to the conflict, particularly the governing elites, are willing to maximise the socio-political and humanitarian spaces created and sustained by PSOs.

Regional reconciliation in Africa's ungoverned spaces

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Introduction

Africa has endured the debilitating effects of cyclical violent conflict for several decades, which has created ungoverned spaces and recurring instability. Despite the existence of well-intentioned policy frameworks and the utilisation of significant resources to stabilise countries, conflicts in the region have remained resistant to resolution. Africa's crises demonstrate that conflicts have a tendency to spill across borders, affecting communities in more than one country, and creating ungoverned zones of instability.[227] These cases challenge the reductionist understandings of traditional inter-state and intra-state wars across the continent. The regional nature of conflicts means that the notion of 'civil war' is anachronistic, with increasingly limited descriptive utility. This chapter seeks to assess the extent to which intra-state conflicts in ungoverned spaces, more often than not, have an inter-state and regional dimension in the way that they are resourced and executed. Consequently, the chapter will further argue that efforts to address them should also take on a regional dimension. Specifically, the chapter will invoke the notion of regional reconciliation as the missing element in addressing the elusive efforts to consolidate peace and security in Africa's ungoverned spaces.

The first section of the chapter will interrogate the notion of regional conflict systems, and strategies deployed to confront them and stabilise ungoverned transboundary spaces. In addition, the theoretical component of the chapter will propose that the notion of regional reconciliation needs to be further developed in order to advance our understanding of how to frame and operationalise efforts to achieve sustainable peace and security in Africa.[228] Currently, the theoretical frameworks relating to regional reconciliation in ungoverned spaces remain under-developed, and there is a dearth of conceptual work relating to this theme. A comprehensive elaboration of such a theoretical framework is beyond the scope of this paper. The chapter will demonstrate how and why regional reconciliation can be thought of as the elusive dimension of sustaining peace and security in Africa.

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227 Dress, T. (2015). p. 132.

228 See note 6.1.

The second section of this chapter will briefly assess the case studies of conflict systems located in Africa's ungoverned spaces, with a focus on the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa region. While there might be some form of informal governance, or a hybrid governance, when it comes to the provision of peace and security in the absence of a clearly defined state apparatus, communities are left to their own self-help and coping mechanisms, which reinforces the notion that these spaces are 'ungoverned'. The chapter argues that regional conflict systems are notoriously difficult to stabilise, because state actors are not adopting coordinated regional strategies to promote and consolidate peace.[229] Wallensteen argues that 'regional peacebuilding' should begin to inform our approach towards advancing peace and security ungoverned spaces.[230]

Consequently, the chapter will interrogate how these regionalised conflicts in ungoverned spaces need to be stabilised, managed and addressed through a regional approach, with a specific focus on reconciliation processes. Despite concerns, such as the lack of resources and capacity, the failure to adopt a regional approach will continue to postpone the long-sought after goal of sustainable peace and security in Africa.

The third section of the chapter will also examine what challenges of operationalising regional reconciliation are in practice. The constraints imposed by a persistent tendency to seek recourse to state sovereignty, which paradoxically is not existent, will be criticised for its short-sightedness and self-defeating posture. In addition, the framework will provide a theoretical foundation for how regional reconciliation can be understood as an intermediate phase, and necessary phase, of regional integration. The paper will conclude with a brief assessment of the limitations of implementing regional reconciliation, as well as strategies that could be pursued to operationalise the process.

Contextualising reconciliation

The key argument that this paper seeks to make is that peace and security in Africa cannot be sustained without effective regional reconciliation processes in ungoverned spaces.[231] However, prior to engaging this argument it is necessary to outline the broad elements of the idea of reconciliation. The idea of reconciliation remains contested and is not subject to simplistic categorisations, due to its multi-disciplinary and multi-level nature. Concretely, reconciliation seeks to address the deep divisions within societies, which are generated by the violation or exploitation of communities by other actors, communities, the state or other states. This understanding of reconciliation falls within the rubric of the UN's definition of peacebuilding as "a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing ore relapsing into conflict" and laying "the foundations for sustainable peace and development."[232]

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229 Ramsbotham, A. (2012).

230 Wallensteen, P. (2012).

231 Murithi, T. (2009). pp. 136–159.

232 United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, November 2022.

In broad terms, the principles that inform reconciliation include pursuing:

i.   truth recovery: determining the truth relating to the violations of the past;
ii. justice: administering accountability for past violations through restorative and retributive-criminal justice;
iii. reparation: pursuing redress for the victims of past violation;
iv. restoration of human dignity: reversing the dehumanising aspects of past violations;
v.   the re-establishment of relationships based on human equality and human freedom: mapping a pathway toward healing the deep divisions premised on an acknowledgment of a shared humanity.

The processes of reconciliation

Reconciliation is a future-oriented process, even though it seeks to remedy the violations of the past, it is predicated on the construction of a new future for the victims, perpetrators, and the wider community. Consequently, reconciliation is a forward-looking process that seeks to contribute towards the formation of equal, inclusive and fair societies. Reconciliation processes can also be operationalised at multiple levels including the interpersonal, communal, and national. Furthermore, reconciliation processes can be operationalised by multiple actors including individual, societal and state actors.

In terms of the processes that can be utilised to promote of reconciliation, given its contested nature, a broad range of approaches and mechanisms that can be utilised to remedy the violations of the past. In brief, truth recovery institutions have to be based on the open and genuine dialogue of the victims and perpetrators. Contemporary manifestations of this include truth commissions, commissions of inquiry or judicial processes. In terms of pursuing justice, this depends on whether the objective is to pursue criminal accountability, which would require national, regional or international courts to prosecute the alleged perpetrators. Restorative justice institutions seek to recover the truth and utilise this to advance a process of reparation, restitution and redemption between the victims and perpetrators. This can include institutions that are designed to promote reparation and restitution for the harm that was endured by the victims. In addition, it is necessary to operationalise institutions that drive processes to restore human dignity, and reverse the dehumanising effects of the historical violations that were endured by victims; these can include national reconciliation bodies. Ultimately, it is necessary to reassure the victims, perpetrators, and the wider society alike, which their institutions will not be utilised again in the future to oppress, subjugate or exploit them. Consequently, it is necessary to also establish institutions that will advance the principle of human equality and human freedom. Specifically, constitutional processes would need to establish institutions of governance that respect the integrity and equality of all human beings, as well as guarantee equality before the law, and protection from harm and violation through the security institutions that are established.

Concretely, in terms of understanding processes of political, social, and economic reconciliation, in effect, parties involved in reconciliation processes need to:

i. recognise their *interdependence* as a prerequisite for consolidating peace;
ii. engage in genuine *dialogue* about questions that have caused deep divisions in the past;

iii.   embrace an *inclusive and democratic attitude* to creating spaces where they can disagree; and

iv.   work jointly to implement processes to address the legacies of *socio-economic exploitation and injustices*, including gender-based violence.[233]

By extension, at a regional level, actors need to recognise their transboundary interdependence, and the symbiotic linkages, relating to the illicit flow of arms and refugee displacements that bind them in terms of their pursuit of peace and security. In addition, regional actors need to engage in cross-border dialogue based on an inclusive democratic attitude to address the legacies of regional socio-economic exploitation and gender-based violence in a transparent manner.

Regional conflict systems in ungoverned spaces

The case for actors to pursue regional reconciliation is further reinforced by the persistent reality of regional conflict systems. Therefore, it is necessary to interrogate to what extent intra-state conflicts have an inter-state or regional dimension in the way that they are resourced and executed in ungoverned spaces. Contemporary conflict dynamics defy simple explanations and are not confined neatly into reductionist categories. These conflicts are often complex, messy, and increasingly they have cross-border dimensions.[234] International relations analysts have defined regionalism "in terms of patterns and networks of interdependence" and the extent to which that interdependence can pose costs on insiders and outsiders.[235] These networks of interdependence replicate themselves in the majority of conflicts affecting the African continent. Studies show that more than half of violent conflicts in Africa can be linked to conflicts in neighbouring states.[236] Conflicts do not stop at the border, but in fact spill over and these linkages are evident in a range of "interconnected political, socio-economic and cultural factors."[237] Specifically, "transnational conflicts that form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other across state borders," suggest that these regional linkages are so strong and interdependent, that a change in dynamics in one conflict often affects neighbouring ones.[238] Specifically, networks of interdependence are evident in the often ungoverned cross-border supply routes for arms, illicit trade and human trafficking. In some instance co-ethnic groups living in different countries can serve as network for this illicit trade, which can contribute towards fuelling conflicts.

Case studies from across the continent have provided insights into the regionalisation of violent conflict and how this can generate new disputes and enflame pre-existing tensions. For instance, the Rwandan genocide, often viewed in isolation, is a contributing and exacerbating factor to the conflicts and violence in the eastern DRC.[239] Similarly, the conflict system generated by the conflict

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[233] Du Toit, F. (2013). pp. 88–91.

[234] Murithi, T. (2016).

[235] Hurrell, A. (1995). p. 44.

[236] Maina, G. & Razia, W. (2012).

[237] Ibid.

[238] Hurrell, A. (1995).

[239] Zounmenou, D. & Kok, N. (2012).

between North and South Sudan, has had a spill-over effect into Northern Uganda and Kenya. The protracted political tension in Zimbabwe has precipitated refugee flows into neighbouring countries, which has implications for the regional stability. In West Africa, instability and conflict in Côte d'Ivoire has drawn in militia from neighbouring countries in the Mano River Region, notably from Liberia. These external militia formed military alliances with ethnicised Ivorian factions and precipitated regional insecurity, which could not be contained by the casualty-prone UN peacekeeping forces in the region.[240] There are a number of other examples that could be cited from across Africa and around the world, which illustrate that "seemingly unrelated conflicts become interconnected through alliances, enmity and opportunism."[241] The regionalisation of violent conflict therefore calls for a coordinated regional approach to reconciliation in ungoverned spaces, if the communities in these vulnerable and affected countries, such as the Cabo Del Gado region of Mozambique, the war-affected Tigray region of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Mali, are to be stabilised, and given the opportunity to forge a new future for their societies.

The cyclical nature of conflict, evident in the recurring failure to addressing the drivers of violence and to stabilise societies across Africa, most evident for example in the long-standing disputes in Somalia, South Sudan and the eastern DRC, for example, points to the critical need to move beyond temporary stalemates and ceasefires, peacekeeping deployments and military operations, that are so common in this era, towards a regional policy informed by intentionally confronting, the underlying grievances that have fuelled decades of animosity and violence on the continent. Yet we seek national solutions or inward-looking state-centric solutions, to problems that require us to adopt a more expansive regional perspective. As an illustration, the long-standing and recurring crisis in the eastern DRC, has had a significant spill-over effect into neighbouring countries, and at one stage the Ugandan-originating Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) made incursions into the DRC, but the UN mission there, MONUSCO was not authorised or mandated to pursue and contain the LRA, because it was not a Congolese-based armed militia. Self-evidently, such a restrictive policy posture only serves to undermine efforts to promote peace and security within the DRC, and it exposes the weaknesses of the state-centred approach to peace support operations and further makes the case for regional peacebuilding and reconciliation.[242]

As an illustration, in April 2012, former members of the DRC national army (FARDC) mutinied and subsequently established the M23 armed militia group. In November 2013, the M23 managed to occupy Goma, in the eastern DRC. In March 2013, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of an FIB, which sought to neutralise the M23 armed militia groups in the eastern DRC. This brigade included troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi, which ultimately suppressed the M23, when Kigali withdrew its support for the militia. However, given the fact that its leadership managed to flee to exile due to the ungoverned nature of this transboundary terrain, the M23 might morph into the M24, M27 or M28. In a decade or so from now, we could still be referring to the M31 in the Great

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[240] Hurrell, A. (1995). p. 21.

[241] Wallensteen, P. (2012).

[242] United Nations. (2013).

Lakes region. This will be an indication of the failure of addressing the underlying causes of conflict in the ungoverned region, which will require us to ask difficult policy questions.

This reality of cross-border violations and the need for cross-border redress is also evident in other countries across the African continent. The Ugandan crisis in which the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has regionalised the conflict, spread into the CAR and South Sudan. The CAR, after the DRC, has perhaps generated the most significant instability and the 'ungovernability' of this region, and drawn in South Africa into a military altercation with the Seleka forces, who were embroiled in a confrontation with the anti-Balaka forces. On 15 December 2013, South Sudan descended into violent crisis, and then again in 2015. Despite the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), on 12 September 2018, the tensions persisted, and the dispute retained its regionalised dimensions. On 22 February 2020, South Sudan formed the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), which was provided for within the R-ARCSS. Despite these provisions, the South Sudan crisis remains anchored across a regional landscape with both Sudan and Uganda maintaining and asserting their self-interests from behind the scenes. Consequently, the most effective pathway towards consolidating peace is through a regional reconciliation process.

In the 1990s, the Mano River Union conflict system, which consumed and flared up the region, drawing in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and subsequently Côte d'Ivoire. The situation in Darfur has drawn in Chad, Libya, and South Sudan. In turn, the crisis in Chad has spilled over and drawn in a number of countries including Libya. In north Africa, the situation in Libya is increasingly assuming a regional dimension, with ISIS already operating across the Sahel. In Mali, the Ansar Dine, an offshoot of the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has illustrated that extremism is already operating across borders. The situation in Egypt and the militant posture of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has regional support, suggests that this may become another theatre for regional actors to engage with the potential for even deeper crisis and an escalation of the conflict in the future.

These regionalised conflicts systems suggest that traditional ways of understanding conflict in ungoverned spaces have become anachronistic and no longer relate to the reality on the ground. More specifically, challenged by the fact that conflicts, atrocities and violations straddle borders, as evidenced in the regional conflict systems affecting the Tigray region of Ethiopia, in 2022, the eastern DRC and Great Lakes region, Somalia, and South Sudan, we have to determine how reconciliation can also take place across borders.[243] Concretely, the question is whether we can scale up national reconciliation to begin to talk about regional reconciliation. It becomes clear that we are talking about processes for which we do not have any precedents in Africa, and consequently it is necessary to engage in policy dialogues informed by analysis to assess the practical modalities for regional reconciliation.

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[243] Aboagye, F. (Ed.) (2016).

The case for regional reconciliation in ungoverned spaces

On the issue of regionalism, Fawcett and Hurrell have postulated a theoretical framework for exploring the emerging dynamics created by regionalisation in world politics.[244] In his seminal book, Rethinking Regionalism, Söderbaum encourages us to adopt "a societal understanding of regional space" as well as recognising that "regions are political and social projects."[245] Akokpari has explored the challenges relating to the revitalisation of Pan-Africanism and dilemmas of regional integration in Africa as they relate to response to conflict and notes that "attempts at providing regional responses to conflicts often tend to undermine unity among countries."[246] Akokpari further argues that "conflicts can undermine integration if regional responses are not carefully crafted or managed."[247]

In terms of its modalities for operationalisation, based on the discussion above, regional reconciliation would require implementing processes of truth recovery, accountability, and redress, including gender justice, and institutional reform across borders. These cross-border transboundary processes need to be convened for both societies, as well as the political elites who govern them, because both are integral to pursuing the goals and objectives of regional reconciliation. From a theoretical perspective, when we apply a regional lens to reconciliation, it becomes evident that the war-affected states and communities in proximity to one another would need to recognise their regional interdependence, despite the ungoverned nature of the transboundary regions that they straddle. Furthermore, these states and communities would need to engage in a genuine regional dialogue in order to identify the issues that have caused deep divisions and generated violence in the past. As with processes for promoting reconciliation nationally or locally, regional reconciliation will require the creation of spaces to develop inclusive narratives of the past and shared visions for the future. The "creation of these spaces" is at the heart of the project of regional reconciliation in ungoverned spaces.

Regional reconciliation would require implementing processes of truth recovery, accountability, and redress across borders as preliminary processes. The practicalities of how we operationalise regional reconciliation are challenging but not insurmountable. The reluctance of nation-states to devolve their sovereignty and adopt processes that might be seemingly outside of their sphere of authority and control, through the establishment of cross-border institutions will be a primary obstacle to implementing regional reconciliation. However, the reality is that these countries do not assert as much 'sovereignty' as they proclaim to in ungoverned spaces. The imposition of the idea of sovereignty in Africa has confined and compressed ethnic groups into an artificial construct, which was alien to the continent prior to colonialism. This imposed illusory sovereign state has led to a pressure-cooker effect in which increasing internal tensions have fostered the cut-throat contestation to capture the state for the benefit of one's own ethnic grouping.

[244] Fawcett, L. & Hurrell, A. (Eds). (1995).

[245] Söderbaum, F. (2016). pp. 218–219.

[246] Akokpari, J. (2008).

[247] Ibid. p. 101.

In Africa, the worst consequences of this pressure-cooker effect were witnessed in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, as well as the as-yet unresolved conflict in the eastern DRC, Burundi, South Sudan, Somalia, Darfur-Sudan, the CAR, Mali, and historically in the conflicts of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mozambique, Angola. This effect of contested sovereignty is also evident in the forgotten conflicts in the Casamance region of Senegal, the Caprivi Strip in Angola and in the secessionist tensions in the Comoros. Consequently, in order to address this pressure-cooker effect it will be necessary to adopt a regionalised approach to finding solutions to these crisis situations that persist in ungoverned spaces. Despite the appearance that crises are domestic or national in nature, they in fact have trans-border and regional dimensions, such as the insurgency in the Cabo Del Gado region of Mozambique, or the South Sudan or Mali crisis, all of which have spilled over into neighbouring countries, a reality that requires a regional response.

Nation states in Africa also utilise sovereignty to harbour perpetrators of human rights violations from neighbouring countries is ultimately self-destructive, because it can undermine relationships between countries and governments. The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the intarehamwe militia, whose remnants are still operating in the eastern DRC, is viewed with suspicion by the Rwandan government because it is concerned they might be fomenting insecurity in Rwanda's borderlands with a view to orchestrating incursions in the future. Following the 2015/2016 Burundi crisis, the Bujumbura government accused Rwanda of providing sanctuary to actors who were involved in the aborted coup of May 2016.[248] In February 2016, a "UN Panel also accused the Rwandan military of training hundreds of Burundian refugees, including children, with the goal of ousting Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza."[249] The Rwandan Foreign Minister, Louise Mushikiwabo, vigorously denied these allegations, leaving a degree of uncertainty in the air regarding the actual situation. Consequently, this has fuelled tensions between Burundi and Rwanda, with implications for the eastern DRC. The relationship between the three countries cannot be restored unless there is a willingness to acknowledge the interdependent nature of their security and stability, as a first step towards establishing a regional reconciliation framework, to address the historical violations in the Great Lakes region, which encompasses the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, as well as other countries.

Consequently, the strict application of notions sovereignty, even though the transboundary reality is that the jurisdiction of states is loosely upheld in the borderlands, is nevertheless a hindrance toward the operationalisation of regional reconciliation. Articulating the compelling case for a policy of regional reconciliation is premised on making a robust critique of a state-centric approach to dealing with the past and ensuring redress and accountability. Through the establishment of cross-border reconciliation initiatives, Africa can usher itself into an era of post-sovereignty and closer political integration, which will contribute towards enhancing the governability of the continent's transboundary regions.

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[248] Al Jazeera. (2016).

[249] Ibid.

Regionalism and reconciliation

Despite the growing acknowledgment of regional conflicts, regional reconciliation has not been the norm. As argued above, regions have to find collective solutions to the conflicts contained in their spheres of influence, through a new policy framework of regional political reconciliation. When we apply a regional lens to reconciliation, it becomes evident that the war-affected states and communities in proximity to one another would need to recognise their regional interdependence. Mengisteab further argues that "another critical potential benefit of regional integration is the mitigation of direct and proxy inter-state conflicts by reducing domestic state-identity conflicts."[250] More specifically, these states and communities would need to engage in a genuine regional dialogue to identify the issues that have caused deep divisions and generated violence in the past. Mengisteab argues that "an integration mechanism has the potential to become an effective mechanism for domestic peace and nation-building."[251] On this basis, processes for promoting reconciliation nationally or locally, regional reconciliation will require the creation of spaces to develop inclusive narratives on the past and shared visions for the future. The creation of these spaces would foster the further evolution of regionalism.

This emerging regionalism could become further entrenched through the gradual emergence of a common regional identity, which would be further reinforced by activities such as cross-border trade, transboundary agrarian programmes, as well as collaboration on the development of services, such as access to water, electricity and the development of infrastructure. The development of common markets and the establishment of cross-border links through road and air transport would further lead to greater regional travel, migration, and cultural exchange. Ultimately, to complement the emergence of a Pan-African citizenship and post-sovereignty era, the political institutions that are required to accelerate "regional political integration will include a regional parliament, a regional commission or authority, a regional president, common regional security forces, common regional defence and common foreign policy."[252] At its 2016 Annual Summit of Heads of State and Government convened in Kigali, the AU issued an AU passport to presidents, ministers and ambassadors. This illustrates that there are parallel processes unfolding on the continent, which are already designed to reconceptualise political community in Africa.[253] However, it is clear that these institutions are currently at various levels of development both within the AU as well as within the regional economic communities (RECs), which are distributed across all of Africa's regions. To further reinforce the reconceptualisation of political community, which the AU is driving through issuing AU passports, there is a compelling case for the AU and the RECs to adopt regional reconciliation as their stated policy of consolidating the elusive quest for peace and security in Africa.

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[250] Mengisteab, K. (2012). p. 16.

[251] Ibid. p. 15.

[252] Bereketeab, R. (2012). p. 41.

[253] Murithi, T. (2005).

The three pillars of regional reconciliation

It is necessary to also consider the levels of engagement, which can be operationalised in the process of cross-border efforts to address deep divisions. Regional reconciliation requires three pillars in order to become functional, namely:

i. leader-to-leader dialogue and problem-solving;
ii. government-to-government joint policy development and implementation;
iii. people-to-people professional, academic, social, entrepreneurial exchange.

Sustained dialogue at the leadership level is the most crucial of these pillars due to the centrality that leaders play, either as warlords or peacemakers. Leaders need to convene the difficult conversations with their counterparts, some of whom they are actively fighting, either overtly (through military support of armed militias stationed in their respective countries), or covertly (through surreptitious intelligence subterfuge).

Building upon the policy- and decision-making guidance provided by leaders, governments need to work out the practical modalities of implementing the regional reconciliation policy with specific concrete interventions. More specifically, governments should identify the resources that will be utilised to support the implementation of these processes, including supporting leader-to-leader dialogues, as well as facilitating access for people-to-people interactions as they are required, without influencing the content and outcome of the people-to-people processes.

The people-to-people exchanges are already a common feature of the regional reconciliation landscape and are happening around the world. They can be convened by civic, academic, business, and cultural leaders without the approval of the states, though they can benefit from the support of governments. Consequently, people-to-people processes are the most flexible of the three pillars to convene and operationalise.

Operationalising regional reconciliation

Since conflicts, atrocities and violations are situated across borders, which generates ungoverned spaces, then we have to determine how reconciliation can also take place across borders. These processes do not have any precedent at the level of Africa's international relations, and in particular Pan-African transitional justice and reconciliation processes. Despite the growing acknowledgment of regional conflicts, regional reconciliation has not been the norm. Regions have to find collective solutions to the conflicts contained in their sphere of influence through a new policy framework of regional political reconciliation. Section Four of the AUTJP states that "RECs play a key role in helping address the regional and transboundary dimensions of conflicts or violent regression, through promoting the normalization of relationships between affected neighbouring countries and creating a common understanding of transitional justice processes."[254] In effect, the AUTJP recognises that since conflicts, atrocities and violations are situated across borders, then we have to determine how reconciliation can also take place through "regional and trans-boundary" processes.

The trial of Charles Taylor, former warlord president of Liberia, who was in command when atrocities were committed in Sierra Leone, was conducted through a Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone, which was relocated in The Hague. The ruling convicted

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[254] African Union. (2019).

Charles Taylor of violating the rights of Sierra Leoneans. In effect, this was a cross-border or a transboundary process of accountability and prosecution, which illustrates the prospects for further regionalising transitional justice interventions. The limits of the reach of international criminal justice exposes the fact that the actual victims on the ground in Sierra Leone are yet to experience the tangible reparation or judicial dividends of the Taylor prosecution. As with the examples of international criminal justice, genuine reparation or redress for past injustice does not seem to affect the victim in a tangible manner that transforms their lives and experiences. The judicial dividends are limited where far-removed prosecutions are conducted on a small number of perpetrators who were the most responsible for the war crimes, experienced by an even smaller group of victims. Cross-border reconciliation in the case of the Sierra Leonean victims who were subject to violations by Liberian perpetrators still remains a distant aspiration, and requires a dedicated process of regional reconciliation involving actors from both countries. This Sierra Leone Special Tribunal intervention, which prosecuted Liberia's Taylor, indicates two important facts: first, that redress across borders and through a regional perspective is possible. Secondly, that there is no statute of limitations on redress initiatives for the violations visited on victims of atrocities. This has implications for the gender-based violence, for example endured by women in the eastern DRC, or even those in the Tigray region who suffered violations by Eritrean forces.[255] Similarly, in the long-term, this will also have implications for cross-border violations in the number of African conflicts current flaring up and for the violations suffered by victims across the continent.

Insights from regional security initiatives

While there is a growing recognition of the value of regional interventions, the idea of promoting 'reconciliation' across borders remains uncharted territory for states and inter-governmental organisations. Regional mechanisms also tend to place an emphasis on security interventions – such as conflict management and peacekeeping – that merely address the symptoms, rather than deeper causes of Africa's conflicts. These approaches overlook the structural origins of conflict that manifest themselves so violently across borders.[256] Consequently, cross-border and joint peace and security operations focus resources on military operations — such as those of the South Sudan-Great Lakes region in pursuit of the Lord's Resistance Army or the war against al-Shabaab. If state resources were deployed in equal measure to lay the foundations for regional reconciliation, this would be a more effective way to stabilise countries and improve their relations with their neighbours. The national budgets across Africa, as elsewhere in the world, dedicated to purchasing the paraphernalia of weapons, equipment, uniforms, and the state institutions for professionalising the military in the form of armed forces academies, substantially dwarfs the amount that governments dedicate to supporting national infrastructures for peace (I4P) and for training peacemakers and peacebuilders. This is a short-sighted and self-defeating posture by our African governments because military operations are only a temporary measure to containing violence and are ultimately doomed to fail, unless concrete efforts are geared towards dealing with the past and promoting regional reconciliation in Africa.

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[255] Human Rights Watch (2021).

[256] Ramsbotham, A. (2012). p. 6.

The military and intelligence sectors are also struggling to introduce a regional security and intelligence approach. However, they are inevitably the first to be deployed across borders in order to contain the immediate security threat posed by armed groups operating across borders. The African Standby Force (ASF) has not received the level of attention that it requires by African Union member states, however the East African Standby Force (EASF) has indicated that it is ready for operations. In July 2021, the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was deployed with a mandate to support Mozambique to "combat terrorism and acts of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado by neutralising terrorist threat and restoring security in order to create a secure environment; strengthening and maintaining peace and security; restoring law and order in affected areas of Cabo Delgado Province and supporting the Republic of Mozambique, in collaboration with humanitarian agencies, to continue to provide humanitarian relief to population[s] affected by terrorist activities, including internally displaced persons." SAMIM includes eight countries: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. The SAMIM is confronted by a challenging situation and the limited resources available to its TCCs mean that the mission cannot adequately project its authority. In addition, the continuing deployment of SAMIM places a significant strain on the resources of the contributing states, which means that the pressing domestic challenges remain unaddressed, which does not augur well for stability in the southern Africa region.

It is self-evident that sharing critical intelligence as a pathway to trust-building is vital for a comprehensive approach to solving some of the regionalised conflicts. This is because the majority of African armed forces are limited in their ability to project power over the vast distances within their borders. Specifically, such a regional security approach could contribute towards addressing human and drug trafficking, as well as poaching and the illicit trade of natural resources. In addition, the AU has mooted the idea of a joint air defence system to secure the continent's skies, a facility that is necessary to locate and neutralise the destabilizing activities of cross-border armed groups which will enhance efforts to promote regional peace and security.[257]

If the military generals are seeking regional approaches to security, it is necessary for the peace practitioners and diplomats to look into regional reconciliation strategies. We cannot afford to continue along the same path and expect different results. It is understood that regional coordination is a necessity not a luxury to achieve regional reconciliation. African governments and intergovernmental organisations are increasingly recognising this reality, and have adopted a number of regional integration processes, which will be discussed further in subsequent sections. In addition, African governments have begun to recognise the importance of strengthening and reactivating some of their moribund regional institutions, which will be a necessary pillar of promoting regional reconciliation.

Infrastructures for regional reconciliation

Regional reconciliation cannot proceed without the establishment of carefully constructed and coordinated infrastructure for promoting peace. We can make

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[257] African Union (2005).

the distinction between formal and informal mechanisms for promoting regional reconciliation.

Formal regional reconciliation processes and mechanisms

Formal regional reconciliation processes would be facilitated by the state. Typically, state institutions would be utilised in promoting regional reconciliation across borders. These institutions would derive their legitimacy, and hence formality, from the authority of the sovereign states that constitute them. Formal regional reconciliation processes could be facilitated by the state or by inter-governmental bodies, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Community (EAC) or other regional bodies like the AU. These institutions would derive their legitimacy, and hence formality, from the authority of the sovereign states that constitute them.[258]

Informal regional reconciliation processes and mechanisms

Informal regional reconciliation processes would operate outside state structures. This would include civil society interventions in regional reconciliation. In addition, the African diaspora can also play a role in actively participating and supporting regional reconciliation initiatives. Typically, informal regional reconciliation processes can complement the more formal process, and ideally, they should proceed without the sanction and imprimatur of the affected states. In practice, state actors will want to be informed of potential, informal regional reconciliation processes due to their claim of sovereignty over their territory.

There might be an argument made that societal reconciliation cannot proceed through regional mechanisms, without the presence of national mechanisms. However, it might be useful rather to interrogate how national mechanisms can be enhanced by regional mechanisms. Regional institutions are necessary to oversee regional or cross-border reconciliation processes. This is predicated on the realisation of regional interdependence, the need for regional dialogue, and the pursuit of regional socioeconomic justice. Regional mechanisms can function as catalysts of national reconciliation, through their ability to reinforce the sense of interdependence and their capacity to facilitate regional dialogue. Regional reconciliation infrastructures can also promote shared economic interests as a means of creating wealth and eliminating poverty.

There are a number of regional mechanisms that seek to promote peace, security and economic development, notably those of the UN, the AU, SADC, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), IGAD, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These RECs do not have definitive policies on how to promote regional reconciliation, but regional organisations, such as the AU, ICGLR, SADC, EAC, and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) already have the mandate to promote regional socioeconomic development. Some institutional structures have already laid the platform for this approach, notably the African Economic Community (AEC), which was subsumed into the AU, and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which is now an AU agency. The Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) also

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[258] Karbo, T. & Murithi, T. (Eds). (2018).

falls in this category and fulfils this same objective, of enhancing socioeconomic development driven by an objective of promoting closer community between the peoples of southern Africa. So, there is a convergence between the need for regional reconciliation and the ongoing efforts to promote regional socioeconomic development.

The issue of whether regional reconciliation mechanisms should be standalone institutions or if they can be constituted through existing regional economic communities, such as ECOWAS or EAC, is an issue that requires further policy analysis. For example, would it be necessary to establish a:
  i.   Great Lakes Regional Reconciliation Commission;
  ii.   Horn of Africa Regional Reconciliation Commission;
  iii. Southern Africa Regional Reconciliation Commission?

Or can these be 'housed' within the ICGLR, IGAD or SADC respectively? They should be integrated into existing REC structures because the over-arching mandate is already contained within these institutions, and therefore this will reduce the need for extensive institution-building. On the other hand, not one of these RECs have a specific policy focused on regional reconciliation and these policies would need to be further elaborated, or alternatively anchored within newly created and established regional reconciliation commissions.

Similarly, civil society needs to coordinate itself to support regional reconciliation initiatives more effectively. Where inter-governmental initiatives are lacking, civil society organisations can nevertheless pursue cross-border regional reconciliation initiatives. For example, given the novelty that will be associated with the notion of regional gender reconciliation, these processes are unlikely to receive the attention and resources that they deserve. This may require informal processes and NGOs to take the initiative to try to put in place processes to promote redress for victims of gender-based violence across borders. This would then require an appropriate infrastructure, such as civil society organising itself through a decentralised regional network to advance work on regional reconciliation.

Functions of the infrastructure for regional reconciliation
The infrastructures for regional reconciliation would have a range of activities including:
  i.   designing and articulating policy frameworks to guide regional reconciliation processes;
  ii.   deploying the necessary resources to ensure their effective implementation;
  iii. monitoring the progress in implementing regional reconciliation initiatives;
  iv.   coordinating the media and communications relating to regional reconciliation, for example through using social media to targeting youth stakeholders.[259]

It is therefore necessary to capacitate regional reconciliation mechanisms to enable them to support cross-border reconciliation, as well as enhance national reconciliation processes.

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[259] Murithi, T. (2019). p. 5.

Regional reconciliation as an intermediate phase towards regional integration

From a logical perspective, there is a sense that regional integration cannot proceed without efforts to engage with the historical and war-related injustices that may have originated or perpetuated across borders. There are currently very few mechanisms that strive to address this specific issue of cross-border violations. Regional integration has been predominantly framed as a largely economic and top-down political process. The development of the notion of regional reconciliation enables us to view it as an intermediate phase towards the consolidation of regional integration. If regional reconciliation is operationalised in a progressive and cascading manner, it can contribute towards regional integration. In the absence of a genuine belief in the intentions of neighbouring countries then it becomes difficult to achieve regional integration. This is currently the situation that bedevils Africa's sub-regions. Consequently, the processes and mechanisms that are designed and adopted to implement regional reconciliation will undoubtedly play a catalytic role in promoting regional integration. Regional integration requires a high degree of coordination and harmonisation of policy agendas, towards which the three pillars of regional reconciliation can contribute. More specifically, leadership, government cooperation and citizen buy-in are equally the core ingredients of regional integration.[260]

Constraints and limitations on operationalising regional reconciliation

There will obviously be limits to regional reconciliation given the fact that it challenges traditionally entrenched notions of sovereignty and citizenship. For example, border restrictions will enable perpetrators to evade justice by seeking sanctuary in other countries, as is the case with former perpetrators of the Rwandese genocide. Similarly, victims in the Timor-Leste Truth and Reconciliation Commission felt that they were denied justice because they could not seek redress from their perpetrators who were hiding in Indonesia. Historically, Liberian perpetrators of atrocities during the Sierra Leone conflict sought refuge behind the false barrier of sovereignty, but they were ultimately brought to justice through the country's special tribunal.

Fostering regional reconciliation requires a more innovative approach that deals with a region in its entirety.[261] It requires identifying new ways to facilitating synergy between regional, national, and local processes for reconciliation. It requires national policies to support regional frameworks and regional frameworks to support the development of national policies.[262]

In terms of the way forward, regions have to find collective solutions to the conflicts contained in their spheres of influence through a new policy framework of regional political reconciliation. Concretely, African governments need to adopt people-to-people and government-to-government regional reconciliation processes as a strategic objective of their foreign policy. Government institutions with reconciliation mandates could integrate a regional approach in their work for example: the Burundian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Rwandan

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[260] Ibid. p. 10.

[261] Wallensteen, P. (2012).

[262] Nyambura, K. (2012). p. 27.

National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, the proposed South Sudan Truth and Reconciliation Commission; the Kenya National Cohesion and Integration Commission; the Zimbabwean National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, and the Ugandan Justice, Law and Order Sector. These are governmental institutions that can be convened through inter-governmental frameworks to assess the most effective way to operationalise regional reconciliation.

Furthermore, governments should mandate regional institutions to function as the infrastructures for regional reconciliation. This in turn requires the allocation of the necessary resources and personnel to further develop and implement regional reconciliation. For example, governments and inter-governmental organisations can designate and appoint advisors on trauma and reconciliation for all regional sub-bodies, who will generate policy initiatives to be implemented on the ground.

In terms of monitoring and evaluating the impact of their interventions, governments, inter-governmental and civil society actors can conduct baseline studies to map their implementation of regional reconciliation initiatives, which will also contribute towards avoiding the duplication of activities. As a practical way forward, notions of regional reconciliation can already be mainstreamed into Africa's education curricula. Specifically, this can be achieved through ministries of education adopting and integrating peace, gender, trauma, and reconciliation studies into the curricula at the primary, secondary and tertiary schooling levels. Politically, this would require national and regional parliaments to adopt legislation that encourages cross-border media interaction on reconciliation issues.

Governments, inter-governmental and civil society organisations can operationalise the three pillars of regional reconciliation within Africa's regions in order to launch the process of regional stabilisation and integration. In addition, these actors can support and strengthen cultural exchanges in order to enhance people-to-people interaction, as a strategy to enhance regional reconciliation in Africa. For example, institutions can develop specific programmes for youth within regional reconciliation processes, for example, cross-border radio programmes to strengthen the prospect for dialogue and relationship building.

At the continental level, the AUTJP provides guidelines for transboundary peacebuilding and reconciliation. As an immediate intervention, the AU can also extend the access and use of the recently launched AU passports to African citizens and genuinely adopt policies to promote the free movement of people between regions in order to encourage regional economic development and the growth of cross-border entrepreneurship and business development. Similarly, international development partners can contribute to regional reconciliation by ensuring that the notion of regional reconciliation is adopted as a key pillar of peace agreements to reflect the interdependence of countries.

Academia and civil society can also contribute towards this endeavour by researching, generating and sharing knowledge, as well as developing education courses and training programmes on regional reconciliation. The insights generated from this research can be utilised to build and enhance the capacity of local leadership structures to facilitate cross-border reconciliation in ungoverned spaces.

Conclusion

While there is growing recognition of the value of regional interventions, the idea of promoting 'reconciliation' across borders, specifically in ungoverned spaces, remains uncharted territory for states and inter-governmental organisations alike. In effect, it has not been addressed sufficiently and therefore there are few precedents and practices upon which to base the operationalisation of regional reconciliation. Historically, interventions to promote reconciliation have been overly state-focused and unable to address the cross-border dimensions of conflict in Africa. State-centric security interventions – such as conflict management and peace enforcement operations – merely address the symptoms rather than the deeper causes of Africa's conflicts. Even more self-defeating, cross-border and joint peace and security operations focus resources on military operations in ungoverned spaces – such as those pursuing Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, or the South Sudan conflict system. These state-centric and over-militarised approaches overlook the structural origins of conflict that manifest themselves so violently across borders.[263] Military operations are only a temporary measure for containing violence and are doomed to fail. Ultimately, reconciliation processes that address the violations of the past as a prerequisite for laying the foundation for future coexistence is necessary for stability. Consequently, military and security interventions have only had a limited impact and failed to address the broad dimensions of regionalised conflict systems.

This chapter has argued that unless concrete efforts are geared towards dealing with the past and promoting regional reconciliation in Africa's ungoverned spaces, then the consolidation of peace and security will remain an elusive quest. More specifically, if state resources were deployed in equal measure to lay the foundations for regional reconciliation, this would ultimately be a more effective way to help stabilise countries and improve their relations with their neighbours.

Although Africa has a growing number of regional and sub-regional organisations, the absence of a coordinated approach to reconciliation, and the lack of resources and capacity, mean that these mechanisms remain incapable of promoting and sustaining regional peace, justice, and reconciliation. If our intention has been to ensure regional stability in Africa's ungoverned regions, then the model we have been using has not succeeded in achieving this. To date researchers, policy analysts and decision-makers have been unable to see the bigger picture. It is therefore time to re-think our state-centric approach and work increasingly across borders and in a regional formation. Specifically, there is a need to move beyond transitional justice and reconciliation processes that have been largely state-led and restricted to national borders. Clearly, there is further scope for future academic research on this nascent notion of regional reconciliation and the strategies for its operationalisation in ungoverned spaces. What is increasingly self-evident is that it is necessary to pursue policy coherence on the issues discussed in this chapter in order to provide concrete modalities for governments, inter-governmental and civil society organisations to utilise in implementing regional reconciliation processes, and fostering a new regionalism with deepening cooperation, which remain the elusive dimension of peace and security in Africa's ungoverned spaces.

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[263] Ramsbotham, A. (2012). p. 6.

Professional private security contractors

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Stabilising ungoverned spaces in Africa

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Introduction

Ungoverned spaces, or so-called 'black holes' or 'orphan areas', are indicative of a lack of government reach, and the resultant impact the lack of governance has on the populace who inhabit these areas. These areas are not only resultant from the perceived depopulation of rural areas, but also result in an influx of anti-government forces (AGFs), including terrorist movements and criminal networks – popularised as 'non-state actors' – who increasingly view these areas as safe havens.

However, ungoverned spaces are not restricted to depopulated areas; they also occur in sparsely populated areas, and neglected urban areas and slums, across the cyber domain, as well as on the oceans. Despite factors such as low rainfall and drought, a lack of employment opportunities, fragile economies, a rising anti-government sentiment and others, it is the lack of governance, or the apparent lack thereof, which gives rise to the dynamics of ungoverned spaces.[264]

Rural populations are increasingly migrating to cities in search of work and a better way of life. Whereas this migration has resulted in areas becoming depopulated, it has added its own challenges to cities in terms of infrastructure and overpopulation and has also resulted in the growth of slums and an apparent increase in crime.

One dominant narrative suggests that there are linkages between ungoverned spaces, state fragility or failure and rising political or religious violence led by AGFs. Whereas it is generally accepted that criminal and political violence are contests for control and power, and not the vacuum created by a lack of political power,[265] a lack of state reach can create numerous potential challenges and threats to a government, and the resultant impact thereof on legitimacy and civil society.

The potential threats are further enhanced by the apparent lack of coherent national strategies underpinned with numerous conflicting policies that negatively affect the populace. Policies that focus on political exclusion, economic and religious

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264 Whelan, T. (2006).

265 Raleigh, C. & Dowd, C. (2013).

marginalisation, and so forth, give rise to popular anger and frustration and create a fertile breeding ground for anti-government sentiment; this in turn becomes a driver for the establishment of anti-government forces and criminal networks. In some instances, these groups form loose politico-criminal alliances where both parties benefit from the activities and actions of one another.

Remote, depopulated rural areas, especially in so-called fragile states – defined as states that have weak capacities to carry out basic governance functions and lack the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society[266] – are barely impacted by state presence. So too are large urban slums often devoid of any form of governance and/or law and order. This phenomenon, which manifests itself in both rural and urban environments, presents numerous challenges to the state especially where civil society, criminal networks, and armed groups have found ways of imposing their own forms of control and governance in these areas.[267]

Despite the dominant narrative, it is a truism that the footprint and efficacy of the security forces in ungoverned areas is both weak and ineffective, factors that dramatically offer an advantage in the formation and growth of anti-government forces and their so-called alternate or remote power bases. The failure of the frequently over-stretched and ill-equipped security forces in stabilising and exerting government control over these areas has given rise to many African governments looking to foreign powers for security aid and assistance. In certain instances, the national security of states has been surrendered to foreign powers. In the scramble for aid and assistance, one asset that states have, but frequently overlook, is the potential assistance and support of the private security and military companies.

Scope

This chapter will discuss the causes of ungoverned spaces along with the challenges these areas present to governments. It will, furthermore, investigate the national security risks and threats posed to governments and include contemporary examples of such risks and threats. Given the increasing role of PMSCs in adding value to government security forces, the manner in which PMSCs view these areas should be recognised. The role of professional PMSCs, and their efficacy in augmenting and assisting governments stabilising ungoverned areas in Africa, needs more exposure, and this matter is addressed in the last section of the chapter.

The formation of ungoverned spaces

In a 2008 US Department of Defence report, an 'ungoverned space' was defined as:

> A place where the state or the central government is unable or unwilling to extend control, effectively govern, or influence the local population, and where a provincial, local, tribal, or autonomous government does not fully or effectively govern, due to inadequate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy, the presence of conflict, or restrictive norms of behavior ... the term 'ungoverned areas' encompasses under-governed, misgoverned, contested, and exploitable areas as well as ungoverned areas.[268]

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[266] Anon. (2021).

[267] Van Dijk, H. (2016).

[268] Lamb, R.D. (2008).

The above definition implies a more accurate description for such areas, that it might be to simply refer to them as 'under-governed' areas or 'contested spaces'. However, the term 'ungoverned spaces' is also frequently used to refer to areas where states may actually exercise some form of governance, albeit to a limited degree. Whereas these areas are lacking in effective governance, the reach of the state is minimal, yet it exists in some form or another. Legitimate economies, for instance, exist in several areas of the eastern DRC and northern Mozambique, where international mining and oil and gas companies operate, despite numerous security challenges and threats. To overcome these challenges and threats that are the result of a lack of security control, PMSCs are frequently contracted to provide a host of security services to protect these companies.[269]

Whereas there are numerous underlying causes for the formation of ungoverned spaces, the creation of these 'black holes' can be encapsulated in the lack of a coherent, realistic, and sustainable national strategy, and the resultant lack of or erosion of governance. A deficient national strategy gives rise to a national policy disconnect, impacting not only on the erosion of governance, infrastructure, and the economy, but also on the wellbeing and the lens perception through which civil society views the government.[270]

A poorly directed trajectory for the national strategy will give rise to an unrealistic and unsustainable national security strategy – the strategy that must underpin, guide, protect, and direct the national strategy. When there is no coherent national strategy, the national security strategy will be unstructured and disharmonised. This failing creates numerous security gaps making it relatively easy for AGFs and criminal networks to seize or contest control in and dominate both rural and urban ungoverned areas.

It is particularly in the domain of the national security strategy – the aligned and synchronised efforts of the National Intelligence Strategy, National Law Enforcement Strategy, and National Defence Strategy – that the impact of a deficient or disconnected national strategy becomes apparent, and fosters threats to the state, its sovereignty, and its longevity. Ungoverned or weakly governed spaces are not only restricted to rural areas but may occur in urban areas, cyberspace, and the oceans. These spaces are, however, all characterised by a lack of or poor governance, inadequate or a general lack of policing, and a lack of safety and security.[271]

Given the national security threats that spaces lacking good governance hold, these spaces ought to be identified by the national security strategy, as well as the threats and challenges they pose to the constituent elements of the state that inherently represent its legitimacy and operating fundamentals. Failure to do so has dire consequences for the state, the government, and ultimately civil society, which too often bears the brunt of weak or absent governance.

It is especially within an ungoverned space that civil society elements feel lost and abandoned by their government—or believe they are perceived as unimportant.

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[269] Bosch, S. & Maritz, M. (2011).

[270] Kaplan, MA. (2014).

[271] Barlow, E. (2016).

Apart from becoming potential safe havens to both AGFs and criminal networks, weakly or ungoverned spaces can force the populace to create their own alternate government and forums, even giving rise to vigilantism where law is practised beyond the bounds of a judicial system.[272]

In order to reclaim these areas, re-establish law and order, increase government reach and expand government control, the security forces (intelligence services, the law enforcement agencies, and the armed forces) are frequently ill prepared, and act in a heavy-handed manner, further alienating an already despondent populace and breeding hostility towards authorities. It is in this vein that the adage penned by Alan Moore "People shouldn't be afraid of their government. Governments should be afraid of their people,"[273] becomes relevant.

The greatest danger is that the populace trapped within these areas believe they have been forgotten by the state and living under unbearable conditions. This perception could ignite a belief that despite risks of rising against the state, it will be worth the efforts and dangers. This belief could spread beyond the mere ungoverned space and permeate deeper into civil society and awaken negative views of the state.

According to Keene, what transpires within ungoverned spaces are not limited to the physical world: "Complete virtual economies, and in fact entire virtual ecosystems, have developed online in the form of Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games. Terrorist organizations, Drug Trafficking Organizations, and criminal subversives are all increasingly availing themselves of the internet as a viable medium for recruitment, operational planning, money laundering and financial exchange, as well as the spread of ideologies and tactics."[274] A symbiotic relationship exists between the physical and virtual worlds, as one entrenches and supports the other.

A challenge to governments

Ungoverned spaces present governments with considerable security challenges, especially in an era characterised by contested, degraded, or limited sovereignty. Continuous advances in technology and finance, coupled with rapid globalisation, and fuelled by the bright flame of political instability have created areas where governments face substantial difficulty consolidating control over both physical and virtual spaces. Such spaces pose serious challenges to state sovereignty as they allow numerous variations of AGFs and criminal networks – whether violent or non-violent – to establish control through the creation of alternative regimes, by co-opting governance functions unfilled or poorly filled by the state. In addition, absence of government authorities also allows for coercion being used to garner support for alternative actors aspiring to establish a presence.

Although ungoverned spaces can present governments with numerous opportunities to regain control and alter and reshape negative popular perceptions, the options are seldom accessed and exploited. In turn, this merely adds momentum to, and entrenches the prevailing negative perceptions regarding the state, the government, and the application of governance.

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[272] Rabasa, A. et al. (2007).

[273] Anon. (2021).

[274] Keene, S. (2012).

Whereas the risks and threat posed to national security are not necessarily focused on merely occupying the vacuum resultant from a lack of government reach and governance, they ultimately form part of the contest for either control and/or political power. Left unchecked, the dangers posed to a government, and the state, can be significant, and include, inter alia, the legitimacy of the state being questioned due to government inaction; the domestic, regional, and continental perception that the government is unable or unwilling to exercise control over its territorial sovereignty; the creation of a large internally displaced population (IDP),[275] and the challenges the refugees pose to government in terms of, for example, shelter, food, water, hygiene, medical support; the wilful destruction of, or lack of maintenance on, existing and/or critical infrastructure; the creation of alternate forms of government whereby people attempt to create sense in the space government has neglected; threats of succession, especially in resource rich ungoverned spaces; the collapse of basic services and state infrastructure, and the reaction of societies within those areas; and importantly, the creation of safe havens and springboards for AGFs and criminal networks.

The abovementioned challenges are further compounded by numerous factors that have an impact on the operating environment, such as excessive rainfall, dust storms, swollen rivers, the intervention by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), domestic and foreign political pressures, a clash of interests, and the disruption and/or flight of inward investment.[276]

Negative media reporting focussed on ungoverned spaces, especially where government actions and forces, along with the apparent heavy-handed deployment of security forces, further entrenches a negative perception towards the state.

National security risks and threats posed by ungoverned spaces
The primary and rapidly growing risks and threats associated with ungoverned spaces include violent nefarious groupings, such as armed anti-government forces and criminal networks, including violent street gangs and narcotics traffickers, with a multitude of opportunities to perpetuate violence, fear, and crime by establishing parallel governance structures that erode and/or destabilise the existing and often vulnerable political and security order. These areas can also be used as safe havens or areas from where planning can be conducted, and activities launched.

The ungoverned space narrative as outlined in the introduction of this publication is frequently underscored by a context of state fragility and failure, and the trigger mechanisms for insecurity and instability are variously presented as poverty, religion, and environmental change. Whereas there is truth in the narrative, it is also a valid assumption that government disconnection with societies and disparate policies or their weak implementation can create hotbeds for political and other violent actions. However, the rates of violence are dynamic and shift over time and space,[277] where the type and use of space is dictated by both political and physical considerations.

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[275] Anon. (2020).

[276] Buddhika, J. et al. (2019).

[277] Raleigh, C. & Dowd, C. (2013).

Regardless of the narrative, numerous ungoverned spaces in Africa are illustrative of the enormous security risks and threats posed to governments.[278] Not only do they present potential safe havens and springboards for domestic and transnational AGF actions and criminal networks, but they also enable undisrupted training of AGFs, the movement of weapons and contraband, and risk domestic and transnational spill over. These activities have a profound impact on the economy and the populace trapped within these areas – or fleeing from them.

The inability of a government to intervene timeously and/or effectively in ungoverned spaces restricts or even prevents the security forces from entering the area and working at creating a climate of stability, a commodity the government requires to access the area, and which impacts directly on several of the Pillars of State as reflected in Figure 2.[279] As noted in the introduction, weak or absent governance in several sectors where citizens require service delivery, fosters a deleterious effect that promotes predisposing and precipitating conditions for local dissatisfaction and opposing actors, whether armed and violent, or not.

Figure 2: The Pillars of State

It is, however, the lack of government action and the failure of governance in terms of basic service delivery in these areas that further incentivises the AGFs and criminal networks, allowing them to act with impunity and exert control over the local population. This can extend to the creation of alternate political and armed structures driven by conflict, criminality, fear, and even religious beliefs. However, it is not unheard of for these alternate structures to provide limited essential services to a despondent community, and institute taxes.[280]

In conflict zones located in spaces devoid of good governance, the perpetration of human rights abuses, indiscriminate bombings, killings and other violent acts and damages created by the conflicting parties, along with policies of impunity, isolates the local population and forces them to deal with the unaccountable violations perpetrated by the reckless conflicting parties. These conflicts create lucrative markets for both the legitimate and illegitimate arms trade. Furthermore, they alienate the populace from the national political trajectory, and the desires and wishes of the

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[278] Taylor, AJ. (2016).

[279] Barlow, E. (2016).

[280] Ibid.

government whether contained in counterstrategies or by way of increased service delivery programmes.

Criminal gangs and vigilante groups play a role as well. The danger of such groups resides in how gangs hold the potential to become powerful and transition from criminality to political agendas or criminality and exploited by groups with a political agenda.[281] This is a dangerous phenomenon, but such escalation to political agendas is not a given as noted by analysts. The 'Boko Haram' gang in a Pretoria township – a densely populated urban area – uses the growing breakdown and/or absence of law and order in some South African localities to threaten and extort businessmen who are forced to pay 'protection money' to ensure their safety. Although not part of the notorious and violent Nigerian Islamist terror group with the same name, it has been reported that:

> The name Boko Haram strikes much fear among businessmen and foreign shop owners in Mamelodi township, east of Pretoria, where the vigilante group has wreaked havoc for more than two years.[282]

A growing trend, especially in the Africa and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in particular, is to contract private military and security contractors to reduce the security gaps to advise, assist and support the national law enforcement agencies and the armed forces. This trend is mainly the result of the government forces having been poorly trained and requiring some form of assistance in countering armed threats or concluding conflicts.

As has been witnessed in some conflict areas, not all private military and security contractors are professional, and as was illustrated in Libya and Mozambique,[283] these organisations can create immense problems for a government through attacks on the population and the creation of immense collateral damage. The collateral damage caused by poorly led and trained PMSCs in other areas such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and such has been well documented. This distorts the perception of the populace towards the government and creates a fertile breeding ground for willing recruits for the AGFs or even criminal networks.

A lack of control over natural national resources, such as copper, diamonds, gold, precious wood, and other high value natural resources allows them to be illegally extracted in these areas and exported to countries willing to purchase these commodities.[284] Foreign resource extraction companies are driven to create their own security structures to compensate for the lack of state-based law and order. Oftentimes, these security structures create additional problems for both the foreign companies as well as the government. This form of collateral damage is not easily rectified – or forgot – by the local population.

Other dangers are compounded by the rapid expansion of technology. The knowledge of how to utilise and exploit technology, has given both AGFs and criminal networks advantages not previously held. Using monies obtained through

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[281] Nicholl, K. (2014).

[282] Modipa, D. (2021).

[283] Sixto, D. (2021).

[284] Bakumanya, BM. (2021).

illicit activities, they are able to purchase or develop disruptive technologies and tactics, however crude. Utilising cellular telephony, email, and a host of social media platforms, they can communicate and plan and execute hostile activities, and share intelligence and tactics much more efficiently in areas where governance and policing is absent.

An angry and despondent populace, often mere victims within these areas, frequently resort to protests and violence to voice their frustrations and in the process, cause untold damage to both private property and state infrastructure. A large IDP also presents numerous infiltration options to AGFs and criminal networks who frequently have direct family members as part of the IDP. As is the case in Mozambique, many insurgents are known to maintain contact with their families in the settlement areas.[285] Furthermore, many IDPs have no identifying documents or claim to have lost all personal documentation, making their claims at being bona fide refugees difficult to confirm or refute. The uncomfortable and often unhygienic situations within IDP resettlement camps give further rise to anger against the government.

Ungoverned spaces can be targeted for destabilisation, in turn, creating investment uncertainty. A recent example of the violent exploitation of an ungoverned space is the Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado, where Islamist militants have, through their armed actions, disrupted the fledgling oil and gas industry.[286] The impact of this disruption on an already fragile economy is enormous. A lack of security uncertainly also results in further investor hesitancy giving rise to a chain reaction of hesitancy and withdrawals.

Compounding the numerous risks and threats posed by ungoverned spaces is the impact of mainstream and social media reporting on the perceptions of the populace, especially those living in the ungoverned spaces and adjoining areas. Modern AGFs have become increasingly sophisticated and adept at exploiting the informational environment and use the numerous media platforms to their advantage.[287] Media toxicity can be compounded by reporters who create fake news, distort facts, or who use the media as their own private agenda platforms. This too has a further negative impact on potential investors and the populace.

The sluggishness with which governments respond to negative media messages places them at a perception disadvantage and increases the risk that AGFs will alter and shape perceptions to gain the moral high ground and generate sympathy for their cause. A lack of government response adds to further investor concerns.

The failure or apathy with which governments respond to ungoverned spaces, and the deterioration of governance, along with negative media reporting, increases the frustration loop of the populace. Trying to temper the frustration with false promises merely increases the risks and threats these areas pose to government.

It is, however, the contested definition of ungoverned spaces that "prevents policy makers, civic leaders, NGO workers, law enforcement officers, and military

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[285] Raleigh, C. & Dowd, C. (2013).

[286] Anon. (2021).

[287] Awan, I. (2017).

leaders from properly framing the problems posed by ungoverned spaces of all permutations – from densely packed, rapidly growing urban slums that stretch a state's ability to provide basic services, police poorly controlled areas of cyberspace that allow criminals and terrorists to launder money and share effective tactics".[288] Actor proliferation in ungoverned spaces thus sit side-by-side with the multitude of threats and vulnerabilities that arise and must be mitigated by government and the myriad actors that enter the fray.

How do private military and security contractors view ungoverned spaces?

Within the private military and security environments, it is generally accepted that the security of the state is no longer dependent on a balance of power or the threat of conquering or defending states. Global stability has been jeopardised by weak or fragile states. Fragile states, frequently containing large tracts of ungoverned spaces, represent potential chaos, disorder, and underdevelopment, and can erode and even collapse the Pillars of State.

Not all PMSCs view ungoverned spaces through the same lens. Regardless of their personal or corporate views, PMSCs largely agree that an ungoverned space is the result of the erosion or collapse of the Pillars of State, and the subsequent lack of control over territory, and deficient state reach and governance, subsequently resulting in insecurity and instability.

Professional PMSCs recognise that the state must exercise both hard and soft power to regain control over these lost territories, but with minimal collateral damage to the affected populations and their properties.

Anti-government forces (AGFs) are skilled at engaging and/or exploiting local populations, where anger and frustration have become the norm due to collapsed or non-existent infrastructure, unemployment and weakened state institutions, and a lack of service delivery. The tactic of terror and coercion is also used to force populace compliance. The prevailing perceptions of how the local population view the government are seldom, if ever, successfully addressed by the government, creating ideal conditions for AGFs to leverage popular anger and frustrations against the government.

Similarly, ungoverned spaces create numerous opportunities for criminal networks that are able to identify security gaps and exploit the absence or lack of law and order and the erosion of the judiciary. Frequently, the population are coerced into aiding in these areas to both the AGFs and criminal networks. The AGF/criminal nexus adds an additional dimension to the risks and threats posed by unattended ungoverned areas and have become a common fixture within weakly governed spaces.[289]

The above creates a complex area of operations (AO) where the impact of the operational environment (OE) is seldom assessed. For example, in Somalia, al-Shabaab leveraged the power of the traditional clan system to insert itself into communities,

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[288] Diggins, C. (2011).

[289] GNTC (2019).

further tapping into religious institutions to turn them into vehicles for radical preaching and recruitment.[290] Such a tactic enables the spread of anti-government sentiment, increasing government resistance and reducing government efficacy.

Professional PMSCs understand that the dangers posed to a government within an ungoverned space are magnified by:

i. poor strategies and policies resultant from a lack of or poor intelligence;
ii. divisive or poor government-driven policies;
iii. a rise in populism within the ungoverned space alongside a deteriorating socio-political environment that can result in calls for secession;
iv. an increase in violent protests and riots resultant from a disconnect between government and civil society;
v. transnational crime and conflict;
vi. a lack of investment, service delivery and/or maintenance of critical infrastructure;
vii. a lack of discipline by, and heavy-handedness of the security forces;
viii. large national game parks that can be used and exploited by AGFs and criminal networks;
ix. poor or negative behaviour by PMSC members giving rise to false or negative media reporting.

Professional PMSCs advise, assist, and support governments in mitigating the dangers and risks posed by ungoverned spaces.

Contrary to the above, there are both foreign governments and PMSCs that hold an alternate opinion on ungoverned spaces and view them as opportunities to exert control, influence and power, and as financial opportunities for exploitation and enrichment.

The role private military and security contractors can play

As Pfotenhauer argues, the many failures by foreign forces in Africa such as the Somalia disaster,[291] along with the "general operational disengagement of western powers from the shambolic and costly nature of peace support operations, the cupboard of external support for security operations is frighteningly bare."[292]

The reality is that impoverished, weak, and ungoverned areas and states have become very fertile breeding grounds for domestic and transnational threats. These threats can extend beyond continents, as witnessed on 11 September 2001, when Al-Qaeda launched its devastating attacks from one of the world's most war-torn and poverty-stricken nations, against a superpower. This resulted in the realisation within the Bush administration that the United States was "now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones."[293]

Although PMSCs can offer tangible solutions in terms of innovation and flexibility in services and capabilities, there appears to be an international (and media) dilemma when African governments contract African PMSCs. Underlying disruptive factors that constrain the positive roles that professional PMSCs can play include

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[290] Ali, FA. (2017).

[291] Bowden, M. (2019).

[292] Pfotenhauer, D. (2014).

[293] Steward, M. (2010).

the following: first, controversies caused by some PMSCs are a given, but are also indicative of a lack of imagination on the part of governments and regional bodies as to how to employ them sustainably and effectively; secondly, adding to the dilemma is the economic and political pressure placed on African governments to instead utilise foreign PMSCs and not African-based and staffed ones. This approach to foreign policy has frequently increased the challenges and threats to governments from the very PMSCs they employ; thirdly, effective PMSC engagement also raises concerns within elements of the UN along with NGOs that will have no role to play in former ungoverned spaces when peace has been secured through both hard and soft actions involving PMSCs.

Although the efficacy of PMSCs has been exploited by foreign governments, the recognition of their importance and value as legitimate security actors has begun to dawn on African governments but at present, that is where the story ends. The future of PMSCs in Africa will be contingent upon good governance with robust, strategically aligned frameworks that utilise PMSCs to add value and cultivate, but not replace, indigenous security and military capabilities.

The ongoing foreign scramble for Africa to control and secure its resources and control its development and political trajectory has brought numerous threats and challenges to the continent.[294] Not only has this created tension and conflict, but it has also resulted in the creation of ungoverned spaces. These dark holes extend further to territorial waters and even cyberspace.

Frequently spearheading the foreign business interests and government penetration into Africa have been both foreign and continental PMSCs. Large foreign mining houses, exploration companies, business development enterprises, oil and gas installations, and banks have turned to the private sector to offset the deficit of law enforcement. Similarly, foreign embassy protection, diplomatic guarding and foreign government delegations have looked to the private sector to satisfy their security needs. Foreign PMSCs have frequently acted in support of these forces and have remained in place to conduct missions, such as convoy protection, base and logistical support, close-protection missions, and such like.

However, not all PMSCs are competent, professional, or even qualified for the role they intend to play in securing peace, stability, and security. This merely increases the risks and threats governments face in managing and stabilising ungoverned spaces. Furthermore, unprofessionalism following a self-serving agenda adds its own challenges and problems. On numerous occasions, PMSCs have been cited for transgressing domestic and international laws. These acts have included arms and human trafficking, narcotics trafficking, physical violence towards innocents, theft, and so forth. The so-called 'Nissour Square' incident serves as a good example of how PMSCs can add to tensions, break international laws, and yet continue their activities.[295]

A further reality is that the domestic deployment of PMSCs is indicative of an eroded or fragile national law enforcement – or armed forces – capability. Here too PMSCs can increase the reach of stability and prevent the government forces from being overstretched.

[294] Lee, M. (2016).

[295] Chapman, KJ. (2019).

National and even local law enforcement agencies are, however, frequently tainted by allegations of mismanagement, poor leadership, inadequate training and corruption, lack of objective crime intelligence and collection capabilities, thus eroding civil society's confidence in their abilities and capabilities to fulfil their mandate. These law enforcement failures have contributed to a growth in criminal networks and have even incentivised anti-government forces, in especially ungoverned spaces.

Whereas domestic security challenges, threats, and problems remain part of the law enforcement mandate, there are times when the armed forces are called on to either operate under law enforcement command or take over control from the law enforcement agencies. In such instances, the armed forces are often not correctly structured, trained, equipped, or led. This is frequently resultant from inadequate force preparation and misaligned strategies in especially ungoverned spaces.

Professional PMSCs that practise and abide by a strict code of conduct and rules of engagement can, however, add value to faltering government efforts to alleviate the numerous risks, threats, challenges, and problems generally associated with these 'dark holes'. It, however, remains in the interests of the state that these companies need to be vetted, agree to abide by the state's national security strategy, deliver on undertakings, and remain within their mutually agreed and contracted mandate.

In developing countries especially, PMSCs can add to the intelligence and law enforcement deficiencies and, when contracted to work in ungoverned spaces, these organisations can increase the state's reach in terms of crime prevention and intelligence gathering. However, unless these organisations are vetted and committed to their role, the danger exists that they may act in ways that will disadvantage the state. In some instances, for example, while working under the auspices of the UN, some PMSCs have reverted to illegal activities, such as sexual slavery.[296]

Despite the frequent concerns and negativity surrounding the employment of PMSCs by governments, in especially ungoverned or contested spaces, these organisations can add value to government efforts by fulfilling multiple tasks in complex environments. Apart from providing unique force multiplier skills, the tasks can include, inter alia, the following:

  i. advise, assist, and support the contracting government's law enforcement agencies, intelligence services and armed forces;
 ii. advise, assist, and support the development of campaign-specific operations, or even domestic operations related to national security;
iii. in conjunction with the government's security forces, monitor, secure and stabilise ungoverned spaces;
 iv. provide effective training and inputs related to command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I),[297] especially in terms of intelligence, law enforcement, and composite warfare;[298]
  v. provide coherent and realistic input in the development of force structures, tables of organisation and equipment, and doctrine;

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[296] Slanjankic, A. (2016).

[297] Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence.

[298] Barlow, E. (2016).

vi.   increase the government's security reach especially regarding cyber space and the government's territorial waters;
vii. provide advice, training, input, guidance, and mentorship to lesser-experienced African intelligence services, law enforcement agencies and armed forces;
viii. assist with the movement and protection of refugees;
ix.   provide advice and assistance with respect to critical infrastructure and national key points (NKPs);
x.   on behalf of government, provide positive influence towards the local population in ungoverned spaces, especially to remote villages and nomadic tribes;
xi.   assist with the protection of, and medical support to, remote populations;
xii. provide technical innovation and support to the national security forces;[299]
xiii. assist with the creation of an environment for positive government dialogue;
xiv. assist and support government on matters relating to the restoration of governance, and so forth.

While the initial focus on the roles and contributions of private military and security companies shows a dominant landward focus, private security contractors have played an important role in securing seafaring vessels passing through hazardous sea lanes and exercising maritime security.[300] Their deployment off the east and west coasts of Africa have been instrumental in the decrease of pirate activities and the kidnap and ransom efforts that once dominated international headlines and for the Guld of Guinea still do. The invaluable role played by PMSCs in countering seaborne criminal attacks has been recognised by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as part of best practices for vessels passing through pirate-infested waters off the African east coast, and the dangerous waters of the Gulf of Guinea.[301]

There have, however, been cases where, for example in South Africa, PMSCs have added to the complexities and problems encountered in ungoverned spaces.[302] Poor working conditions, late payment of salaries, poor vetting procedures, inadequate training, a lack of management, and so forth, have resulted in unacceptable and disruptive behaviour by the effected PMSCs. Furthermore, members of PMSCs have been complicit in crime in areas where law enforcement is weak.[303] These actions have not only raised questions in terms of their efficacy but have also rippled across several Pillars of State, casting doubts on the utility of such companies when employed in weakly governed or ungoverned spaces.

Private military and security companies do, however, not operate in isolation nor in a vacuum. Apart from having to align and synchronise their activities with the national security strategy and legislative matters, they require political will to support their endeavours. In addition, the private defence manufacturing industry, sometimes linked under the banner of PMSCs, is rich in innovation and able to provide numerous technology solutions to ensure support to governments trying

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[299] See note 7.1.

[300] Doeg, BK. (2011).

[301] Safety4sea Editorial Team. (2011).

[302] Tlhabye, G. (2021).

[303] Staff Reporter. (2021).

to reclaim and/or monitor ungoverned spaces that have been usurped by AGFs and criminal networks. This combination of PSMCs and defence technology contractors collectively make up a strong alliance to reclaim ungoverned or weakly governed spaces (in general) and from AGFs (in particular).

Conclusion

The challenges, problems, and threats resultant from under-governed or ungoverned spaces remain a serious concern to both states and their neighbours. These spaces and their associated vulnerabilities have already provided impetus and safe harbours for numerous anti-government forces and criminal networks with invaluable openings. Where issues related to governance further deteriorate, it could result in a fractured state or even a civil war. In such chaos, the AGFs and their criminal associates could build on their current associations with civil society in these regions to increase their domestic footprint – and threat to the state.

Inherently, ungoverned spaces can pose a threat to state sovereignty, insofar as they allow several combinations of anti-government forces and criminal networks – whether violent or not – to establish alternative government structures by co-opting governance functions unfilled or poorly filled by the state.

Although PMSC assistance and support can add value to the efforts of the state, it must be complemented with development assistance, infrastructure development and sustainable governance to ensure effective, durable, and accountable institutions. This will give civil society a stake in the broader issues commonly associated with poor governance or a lack of governance associated with ungoverned spaces. Unfortunately, the turn to coercion remains popular when governments realise what is happening in domestic spaces they have neglected, but this only renders more alienation and violence.

Whereas PMSCs do not offer governments a 'silver bullet' in terms of regaining control and establishing governance in ungoverned spaces, they do, if utilised correctly, provide governments with numerous multi-dimensional options, and even act as a force multiplier. Given the efficacy and resultant success of professional PMSCs in complex and multidimensional environments, especially in ungoverned spaces, they remain an asset to which governments ought to give more consideration.

The proliferation of security actors in the Sahel

The interplay between international regime complexity and local emergence

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Introduction

To whom do you turn for protection and security? In Mali, western Niger, or the northern parts of Burkina Faso, the answer is particularly tricky. The answer is most likely, "it depends". It depends on your own social and ethnic position, and it depends on your ability to navigate and utilise the many potential security providers, from UN peacekeeping soldiers, local police forces and ethnic self-defence militias, to militant Jihadist groups. The convoluted answer to a simple question reveals how the proliferation of security providers in this part of the Sahel deeply affects the daily life of millions of citizens. Reality in these regions is far from either the absence of security governance or a state monopoly on violence. This is in striking contrast to the purpose of 'Serval', the French military intervention in Mali in January 2013, which was the re-establishment of the Malian state on all its territory. Its theory of success was to defeat the units of the insurgency alliance operating in the open in order to create space and time for a peace process and the return of the state to the ungoverned regions in the northern parts of Mali.[304] Yet, almost ten years later, the Malian state still struggles to govern its northern parts. What is worse, the loss of state authority has spread to the central part of Mali. Even in the northern parts of Burkina Faso and the western parts of Niger, states struggle to maintain control. Instead, the number of local and international security providers has steadily increased without a corresponding decrease in violence.

The proliferation of security providers, in Mali especially, has attracted a great deal of scholarly interest. The cooperation, or lack thereof, among international security providers, such as MINUSMA, the European Union (EU), G5 Sahel, and France, has been analysed in order to identify the constitutive effects of the many interventions. The sum of these international efforts has been characterised as a traffic jam,[305] as a counterterrorism patchwork,[306] or counterinsurgency governance.[307] In an attempt

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[304] Chivvis, CS. (2020).

[305] Cold-Ravnkilde, SM & Jacobsen, KL. (2020). pp. 855–74.

[306] D'Amato, S. (2021). pp. 1 518–1 540.

[307] Charbonneau, B. (2021). pp. 1 805–1 823.

to encapsulate the dual proliferation of local and international security providers, Phillipe Frowd and Adam Sandor introduced the concept of security assemblage in a Sahelian context.[308] However, the existing studies of security provider proliferation in parts of the Sahel provide few cues to the causes behind this proliferation. This chapter, therefore, aims to examine why there has been a proliferation of security actors in Mali and parts of Burkina Faso and Niger since 2013.

This chapter applies the resource exchange theory to explain the emergence of an international security regime complex consisting of international organisations and states involved in the provision of security. It argues that resource scarcity has caused the introduction of new security providers to compensate for the lack of material or ideational resources of the actors first involved in Mali. However, as the existing literature argues, the result has not been seamless cooperation. The second part of the argument is that local proliferation of security providers, such as a militia, is a non-linear response by local actors who make up a complex social system. The root of the complexity of local security is not only the faltering security situation, but also the resource scarcity of the local states, which means that they govern in different ways than the ideal typical Weberian state.[309] The final argument is that international and local resource scarcity and inadequate synergy of the efforts have set the stage for the dramatic changes in recent years, most prominently the military coups in Burkina Faso and Mali and the Malian military junta's realignment with Russia.

The first section of the chapter introduces a two-fold theoretical framework that draws on theory on security regime complexity and complexity in peacebuilding at the local level. The second section analyses the creation of a security regime complex in parts of the Sahel since 2013 as the outcome of the different forms of resource scarcity among international security providers. The third section examines the local level as a complex social system and explains the proliferation of local armed groups as a non-linear response to the current security situation. The fourth section ties together the previous two sections, discussing the unexpected outcomes of local and international security provider proliferation, especially the military coups in Burkina Faso and Mali, the political crisis among ECOWAS, France, the EU and the military junta in Mali, and the realignment of Mali with Russia.

Resource scarcity, complexity, and emergence

The introduction made the basic observation that no actor in the conflict-ridden areas in the Sahel has been able or willing to use sufficient resources to provide security and suppress violence. This is an important starting point for building a theoretical explanation of the security actor proliferation in the Sahel. Resources cannot be reduced to material properties of an actor, but must also include ideational factors, such as legitimacy in the eyes of the local or international population. Without sufficient material or ideational resources, international and local security providers may choose to interact and adapt in order to develop responses that can compensate for their individual lack of resources. This dynamic is not unique to the Sahel and has spun research agendas that encompass the study of cooperation and competition

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[308] Frowd, PM. & Sandor, A. (2018). pp. 70–82.

[309] Raineri, L. & Strazzari, F. (2019). pp. 544–59.

among international organisations involved in security governance.[310] Moreover, the literature on peacebuilding operations has increasingly come to understand the local environment as a complex social system that may produce unexpected, non-linear responses[311]. This chapter builds an explanation of actor proliferation that focuses on resource scarcity and the inability of any security provider to control the complex security system that has emerged in the Sahel.

The first part of the theoretical explanation addresses the propagation of international security providers in the Sahel. The resource dependency theory claims that resource scarcity and the inability of any single organisation to reach its goal will, under certain circumstances, lead organisations to choose interaction and cooperation.[312] The dependence on the resources of others is not equal to a lack of resources. Rather it must be considered in relation to the resources that a specific context requires and the material resources that the decision-makers of a security provider are willing to allocate to this specific context. Moreover, the legitimacy a materially weak security provider may have in a certain context may be a vital resource for other security providers to acquire through cooperation.[313] Applying the theory to international security providers in the Sahel requires specific attention to the introduction of new security providers, whose appearances are often orchestrated by existing ones. According to Alter and Raustiala the process of accretion is the establishment of new institutions because this is easier than changing or dismantling existing institutions.[314] Understood more broadly, accretion may also involve the introduction of an established international security provider into a new geographical context instead of resolving issues of resource scarcity among existing providers.

A regime complex may arise if resource scarcity results in the engagement of a number of international security providers, who come with different mandates and resources, and who cooperate to varying degrees. In a description of the continental African security regime complex, Malte Brosig describes it "as decentered, with multiple overlap in membership and policy, raising concerns over operative and normative interaction between elemental actors (...) interinstitutional links are usually only weakly institutionalised and do not proscribe hierarchical relations."[315] Whereas a single regime may clarify authority, the co-existence of several regimes in a densely institutionalised environment creates overlapping rules and mandates that may be dealt with cooperatively or may create competition or conflicts.[316] Complexity increases in cases of competition or conflict among the institutions, which means that systemic effects are increasingly difficult to foresee, but nevertheless severely limit the possibility to influence the security environment. Even though certain

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[310] Also see Brosig, M. (2013), Brosig, M. (2021), Brosig, M. & Motsamai, D. (2014), Korosteleva, E.A. (2020), Moe, LW. & Geis, A. (2020).

[311] De Coning, C. (2016), De Coning, C. (2018), Orsini, A. et al (2020).

[312] Biermann, R. & Harsch, M. (2017). pp. 145–6.

[313] Alter, KJ. & Raustiala, K. (2018).

[314] Ibid. pp. 337.

[315] Brosig, M. (2013). p. 173.

[316] Alter, KJ. & Raustiala, K. (2018).

pivotal actors, such as France or Nigeria, may shape the African security regime complex, they still need to take into consideration the system effects of any action they decide on.[317]

The second proposed dynamic that causes actor proliferation is linked to the international level but is situated at the local level. As Cedric de Coning argues, "The key to successful state-building and peacebuilding lies in finding the appropriate balance between external security guarantees and resources on the one hand, and the degree to which the local system has the freedom to develop its own self-organisation, on the other."[318] De Coning's primary concern is external peacebuilders' over-involvement in local communities that takes away the communities' capacity to self-organise peacefully. Yet, international resource scarcity or unwillingness to engage in local communities may result in an unwanted local adaption and self-organisation, namely the proliferation of armed groups that increase the overall level of violence. In situations where the international security regime complex fails to achieve sufficient synergy or suffers from a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of local communities, local groups may find their security concerns best addressed by, for example, forming a self-defence militia or cooperating with militant Islamist groups. This is the kind of self-organising behaviour found in complex social systems.

Complexity arises in social systems that have the ability to adapt. When the elements of a social system react to information from their interaction with other groups or the general security environment, the result is a complex system that is "highly dynamic, non-linear and emergent."[319] Non-linear relationships between variables can change and be disproportionate. Perceived insecurity among local communities may result in, for example, a massive support for government forces, or conversely, the proliferation of armed groups, which in turn can produce unexpected results, such as turning other social conflicts violent. Emergence describes the advent of new properties of the social system that are adaptions to an external impetus.[320] For example, the failure to stem one violent conflict might create a cascading effect that within a short time frame turns several other social conflicts violent. It would be a case of emergence because it describes a non-proportional change of the properties of the social system, now dominated by violence. The sharp differentiation between the local and the international level is purely analytical. Emergence at either level will trigger a reaction at the other level, although the reaction might be highly unproportioned to the initial emergence.

In line with the two theoretical explanations at the international and local levels, the analysis proceeds in three steps. (1) It tracks the introduction of new international security providers and major changes in their mandate in order to explain the emergence of international regime complexity as a reaction to the 2012 crisis in Mali. The first part of the analysis of the international organisations and states involved as security providers focuses on adequacy of their resources dedicated to the security issues of the area of operation, as well as the actions they take to rectify a

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[317] Brosig, M. (2013). p. 175.

[318] De Coning, C. (2016). p. 31.

[319] De Coning, C. (2018). p. 305.

[320] Ibid. 315.

lack of resources. (2) An analysis takes place at the local level of the geographical and ethnic proliferation of armed groups as a non-linear local reaction to the security environment. This analysis cannot be exhaustive in the light of the number of armed groups, but focuses on the emergences of new patterns of violence by examining the security situation of the involved local communities. (3) An examination of the interaction between the international and local levels in the face of the deteriorating security situation. This section will focus on emergence of an unexpected and highly unstable security situation. Military coups, the introduction of Russian mercenaries, and the reshuffling of the French military missions will be analysed as recent non-linear responses that add to the security actor proliferation in the Sahel.

The creation of a security regime complex in the Sahel

The Sahel had witnessed internal conflicts, inter-state wars, and external interventions before the insurgency in northern Mali in 2012. Yet, previous international interventions were carried out by few international security providers compared to the interventions today. This section seeks to track why the recent spate of violence has had such an altering effect and has resulted in the emergence of a security regime complex from 2013 onwards. For historic and possibly strategic reasons, France perceived the Malian insurgency as an intolerable threat.[321] Already before the initiation of the French-led intervention 'Serval' in January 2013, France sowed the seeds of the ensuing multi-national responses to security threats in Mali. In the autumn of 2012, France worked behind the scenes in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to facilitate an ECOWAS intervention. Ultimately, events in Mali surpassed the diplomatic negotiations, but France persisted in the attempt to establish an AU or UN stability operation.[322] The emphasis on multi-lateral security provisions sprang from the negative experience of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and as a conscious effort to avoid the spectre of France's colonial heritage.[323] Either way, the decision reflected a French awareness of its resource scarcity in terms of material resources to conduct counterinsurgency operations or ideational resources to operate legitimately in the eyes of the Malian population.

In close coordination with France, a number of ECOWAS members, as well as Chad, participated in the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), which was authorised by the UNSC. However, in April 2013, much to the dismay of ECOWAS and the AU, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2100, which transformed AFISMA into MINUSMA. Although MINUSMA consisted largely of forces from ECOWAS member states, it removed political leadership from the African organisations.[324] MINUSMA's objectives were (and still are) very ambitious. According to Resolution 2164 (2014), the objectives were broadened to ensure security, stabilisation and protection of civilians, to support national political dialogue and reconciliation, to assist the reestablishment of state authority, to rebuild the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in

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[321] Erforth, B. (2020).

[322] Chivvis, CS. (2020). pp. 74–86.

[323] Erforth, B. (2020). pp. 90–95.

[324] Karlsrud, J. (2019).

Mali.[325] The signing of the Algiers Peace Agreement in June 2015 held a promise that MINUSMA might be able to focus on the implementation of the peace agreement in the north. However, the violence of the non-signatory militant Islamist groups, the subsequent spread of violence southwards, and the difficulties of generating enough forces for MINUSMA meant that resource scarcity became an urgent issue and made prioritisation among MINUSMA's many tasks extremely difficult. In 2021, in a call for an additional 2 000 armed personnel, the UN Secretary-General stated that "(…) the increasingly complex challenges MINUSMA is facing, the growing level of insecurity and physical violence against the civilian population in central Mali and, more broadly, the expanding terrorist threat."[326] One way to alleviate the UN resource scarcity was to cooperate with other security providers in counterterrorism operations, which Resolution 2100 authorised.

Long before the insurgency in 2012, the French military had permanent garrisons in the Sahel. What began in 1986 as French support of Chad against Libyan aggression only ended in 2014, when France established Operation Barkhane.[327] The primary purpose of Barkhane was direct counterterrorism operations and indirect operations through local partners. However, Barkhane only comprised approximately 5 000 troops with an immense area of operation and with limited surveillance and airlift capacity. These shortcomings, as well as a significant overlap in interests, motivated cooperation between France and the United States. After 9/11, special forces from the United States had come to the region under the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTP) to strengthen the counterterrorism capacity of the local states, which developed into Operation Juniper Shield that included the largest drone operation on the African continent.[328] Apparently, the United States accepted a low-key role in the region that focused on military-to-military cooperation, and left the political issues to France.[329] Nevertheless, the highly developed drone programme and highly visible counterterrorism emphasis of France and the United States, forced the UN to coordinate its effort with the counterterrorism operations, while at the same time underlining its impartiality. According to Louise Wiuff Moe, this contradiction hampered UN efforts to build trust with the local communities as a way to protect civilians.[330] More generally, John Karlsrud finds that the mandate of MINUSMA contains both the logic of stabilisation and the logic of peacekeeping.[331] Stabilisation operations aim to marginalise violent spoilers through military actions or change in popular support. Conversely, peacekeeping is fundamentally about preserving the peacekeeper's impartiality in order to build trust with and among the warring parties. The two logics may nullify each other if the warring parties come to view the MINUSMA forces as partial, because of their actions against spoiler groups related to signatories of the peace agreement.

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[325] Security Council resolution 2164, S/RES/2164 (2014) (25 June 2014), available from undocs.org/S/RES/2164(2014).

[326] United Nations Secretary-General. (2021).

[327] Erforth, B. (2020).

[328] Rogers, J. & Goxho, D. (2022).

[329] Olsen, GR. (2015).

[330] Moe, LW. (2021).

[331] Karlsrud, J. (2019).

Increasingly, EU missions have added to regime complexity. Under French leadership, the EU-mandated three training and capacity building missions in Mali and Niger, (1) a civilian capacity-building mission in Niger in 2012 (2) a military training mission in Mali 2013, and (3) a civilian capacity-building mission to strengthen the police and gendarmerie in Mali in 2015. All three missions emerged due to French concern for burden-sharing and the added legitimacy of a Europeanised effort – an example of material and ideational resource scarcity.[332] At first, the two missions in Mali dovetailed with MINUSMA's ambition to re-establish state authority in northern Mali, as the missions trained Malian security forces. However, in 2015, the political crisis in Europe that followed the influx of refugees from the Syrian Civil War caused a reorientation of the EU's strategy in the Sahel. Within a very short period, the EU civilian capacity-building mission focused on cross-border trafficking. For example, in November 2015, the Valetta Summit on Migration adopted the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), which provided €4.5 billion to Africa to address causes for migration.[333] Since 2015, EU's migration-oriented policy has tended to emphasize border control and management of internal flows rather than long-term development or peacebuilding.[334] As such, the introduction of the EU as a security provider in the Sahel came about as a French effort to offset French resource scarcity, but the result has been additional regime complexity due to EU's independent agenda. Moreover, the cumbersome decision-making process and risk aversion of the EU led France to look for other European implementation frameworks for a training mission that included advise, assist, and accompany, which eventually led to Task Force Takuba in 2019.[335] Formally part of Operation Barkhane, the new task force compensates for the lack of French material resources, as a number of European states pledged to deploy SOF units and aircraft, and the Sahelian states' frontline units. There is a substantial overlap in the contributions of European states to EU missions, MINUSMA, and Task Force Takuba. However, they do not necessarily share a strategic outlook. For example, Germany is highly critical of the pure counterterrorism focus of Task Force Takabu at the expense of political and developmental efforts.[336]

In 2014, the G5 Sahel was established by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger to coordinate development and security issues. Three years later, the G5 Sahel established a joint force to counter terrorism and organised crime. Although the five countries formally took the initiative for the G5 Sahel Joint Force, France had sought to 'subcontract' counterterrorism operations and together with the EU funded the Joint Force.[337] In this respect, the G5 Sahel Joint Force can be considered an accretion to the security regime complex, as the need to subcontract resulted in the introduction of a new regime. In principal, the EU and France are aware of the necessity to coordinate between new and old international security providers, as stated by the Council of the European Union: "Within the framework of UNSC

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[332] Erforth, B. (2020).

[333] Bøås, M. (2021).

[334] Ibid. 65.

[335] Tull, DM. (2020).

[336] Ibid.

[337] Dieng, M. (2019).

Resolution 2391, the EU confirms its commitment to engage with and support the G5 Sahel (...) in close cooperation with the UN, the AU, and relevant regional and sub-regional organisations, notably ECOWAS."[338] Nevertheless, the strong emphasis on European interests concerning migration and terrorism, and the accretion of new security providers arguably made it difficult for the UN and the AU to set the agenda in the Sahel.

To sum up, even in the period before the realignment of the military junta in Mali with Russia, material and ideational resource scarcities were important drivers for the introduction of new international security providers as well as the accretion of new ones. However, given the security regime complexity associated with other African conflicts, the ubiquity of security providers is not a new occurrence, but the European agenda of migration might have pulled the security regime complex in a specific direction.[339] The net result, however, is that the international security regime complex remains outside the control of any one security provider. Adding to the proliferation of security providers are the local responses to international resource scarcity and insecurity on the ground.

Non-linear local adaption and emergence

Since 2013, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have witnessed a proliferation of local security providers. Irredentist insurgency groups, criminal groups, pro-government militias, militant Islamist groups, and self-defence groups have become more widespread. Although they are highly fluid and often align and realign at a rapid pace, their collective impact adds to the complexity of the security situation in the affected countries. This section analyses the appearance of these (in)security providers as local adaption to new threats and opportunities that collectively give rise to the emergence of new security dynamics, which has deeply affected national and international provision of security. As an admonitory note, the analysis primarily seeks to illustrate the dynamic of adaption and emergence, not a comprehensive overview of the armed groups. The conflicts in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are highly related, yet the spread of violence has resulted in local adaption and often unanticipated outcomes.

Armed groups in northern Mali had formed years before the insurgency in 2012, but the insurgency and the resistance against it (re)activated more armed groups who sought to provide security for their power base. Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA), a militia heavily involved in trafficking and with strong ties to the government in Bamako, provided immediate security for Tuaregs from the Imghad clan against irredentist Tuareg groups from other clans and the Jihadist-inspired Tuareg movement, Anser Dine. Insurgency violence also gave rise to violent reactions, for example from former officers of the Songhaï, who chose to reactivate the Ganda Koy militia. After the first insurgency offensive and the French counteroffensive, proliferation, realignment, fusion, and fragmentation accelerated.[340] The complexity generated by ethnic and social cleavages and the

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[338] Conclusions of the Council of the European Union regarding Sahel/Mali, 25 June 2018.

[339] Brosig, M. (2021). p. 79.

[340] Desgrais, N et al. (2018).

reintroduction of the Malian state (at least by pro-government militias) in the north constantly forced local elites to adapt and, in some cases, to set up armed groups. For example, Lemhar Arabs primarily from Gao formed Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad Loyaliste and broke away from the Jihadist group with which they had cooperated during the insurgency offensive. In 2014, they chose to align with Bamako. Although many motives played into the decision, an influential factor was most likely a political-economy arrangement with the Malian government, which de facto ceded control of trafficking in Gao to the new group.[341] On the surface, the Algiers Peace Agreement in 2015 divided the armed groups in the north into three: pro-government signatories (Plateforme militias) and a new rebel coalition, the CMA; insurgency signatories (Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad), and non-signatory armed groups, which were mostly made up of militant Islamist groups. However, it also meant that armed groups were the primary instrument for access to political and economic opportunities. This gave an incitement to establish armed groups, such as Congrès pour la Justice dans l'Azawad, which was formed by frustrated elite groups among the Tuaregs, who felt that the existing armed groups failed to deliver sufficient political positions and economic benefits for them.[342] The proliferation of armed groups – in addition to other alignments and realignment – created the highly complex security environment that MINUSMA had to navigate. However, the conflict in the region spread in ways that few people imagined possible in 2013.

In 2016, the patterns of violence changed dramatically, when militant Islamists became highly active in the central parts of Mali. The spread was not a coincidence, as the militant Islamist groups came increasingly under the control of Malians, many of whom originated from the central parts.[343] A key event was the formation of Katiba Macina by Amadou Kouffa, a Fulani descendant and senior militant Islamist. Katiba Macina took full advantage of the grievances of Fulani herders, who increasingly lost access to grassing routes as sedentary farmers, encouraged by the government and international aid agencies, cultivated more land. In response, since 2017, a number of self-defence militias have been formed to protect ethnic groups, such as the Dogon group Dan Na Ambassagou, which was initially supported by the Malian military.[344] As a result, inter-communal violence has risen dramatically. Since 2017, the rise in deaths due to violent incidents in Mali has largely been due to the clash between communal militias and militant Islamists. Intra-communal conflicts add an additional layer to the security complex in these regions, which has spread and intensified with remarkable speed despite the efforts of MINUSMA and Barkhane to reorientate their missions to the regions in central Mali.[345]

Regionalisation is the last development that added to the emergence of additional security providers. In another vivid demonstration of the highly disproportionate effects of the complex security system, Ibrahim Dicko, a Fulani and associate of Amadou Kouffa, founded Ansarul Islam in Burkina Faso in 2016. After only a

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[341] Ibid. p. 673.

[342] Malejacq, R. & Sandor, A. (2020).

[343] Desgrais et.al. (2018). p. 668.

[344] International Crisis Group. (2020). p. 12.

[345] Benjaminsen, TA & Boubacar, BA. (2021). pp. 4–26.

few months of existence, Ansarul Islam had tipped a volatile political situation in the north-eastern parts of Burkina Faso. The violence of militant Islamist groups has led to the formation of government-supported self-defence groups, such as the Koglweogo, which in turn has led to a dramatic increase in violence after 2019.[346] In most respects, Niger has been more successful in containing violence. However, the proliferation and recent conflicts among militant Islamist groups have increased violence in the south-western parts of Niger. Already in 2015, a splinter group of the Al-Qaeda affiliated MUJAO formed the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. This group is not confined to Niger but recruits extensively among Fulanis in the border regions of the country and conducts many of its operations against Nigerian authorities and local Tuareg communities. Even though the Al-Qaeda affiliated groups and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara avoided clashes until 2020, they now confront each other and add to the volatility and violence of the tri-border region of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.[347]

As a result of the fragmentation and the rise in the number of security providers, it has become even more difficult for national or international security providers to break the deadlock, as new, local conflicts and violence demand attention. In parallel, the rise of alternative security providers influences the political economy. Land rights, protection of trade, and control of markets are key to functioning economies anywhere, and non-state security providers become more entrenched in the economic life of local communities in the Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Now international security providers have to provide security in regional settings of highly adaptive armed groups in a complex security environment in addition to navigating the complexity arising from the interaction of international security providers. For local communities, the decision of who to support is steeped in uncertainty. Militant Islamist groups may provide efficient justice or control of prices at the local market. On the other hand, unconditional support to militant Islamist groups will very likely draw international attention or revenge from non-Islamist groups. If the local community organises a self-defence militia, the community becomes drawn into a protracted cycle of violence. Finally, if the local community is to rely on national authorities or international interveners it means living at the mercy of those alternative (in)security providers who can take advantage of the lack of permanent state presence. The impossibility of the choice means that non-state security providers find room to operate. Together, the many small attempts to find security result in actor proliferation and unintended complexity.

Military coups and Russian intervention as emergence

So far, the analysis has mostly omitted key security providers, namely the local states. Nevertheless, the states act as the linchpin of international and local security provisions as they authorise (or not) international intervention, and the re-establishment of state authority is a way to alleviate local insecurity and security dilemmas. The series of coups in Mali 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022, and the coup attempt in Niger in March 2021, are very likely connected to the states'

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[346] International Crisis Group. (2020). p. 287.

[347] Baldaro, E & Diall, YS. (2020). pp. 69–83.

inability to provide security.[348] Still, the military juntas face a major political challenge even at the local level. As difficult as it is, the technical and bureaucratic challenge of re-establishing state institutions in contested areas is not the primary one. Instead, the Malian state and most likely the Burkina and Niger states face the political challenge of convincing parts of their population of the legitimacy of (re) building state governance. An expansion of state authority requires political will and a sustained effort to change a complex social system. Moreover, the historical practices of establishing governance 'on the cheap' by dense client networks add to the complexity. Non-state actors who both wield power in their own right and act as agents of the state come to possess local control and potentially legitimacy. The creation of a strong, centralised state in control of the entire territory may be a political aspiration for the military junta, but historical experience and the current power distribution hint at a different outcome.

Russia and the Wagner Group, a private military company associated with the Kremlin, have now entered the security regime complex, though certainly not by design of the current security providers. In fact, in 2022, political relations between France and the military junta in Mali unravelled to a point where the military junta ordered France to remove its troops from Mali. The close cooperation between France and, for example, the EU training missions, the United States, and MINUSMA suggest that the effects might be widely felt in the international security regime complex. Already a number of European states, such as Sweden, have announced that they will withdraw their military presence from Mali.[349] Moreover, the military junta's unwillingness to hold elections in February 2022 has isolated it from ECOWAS, whose other member states chose to impose heavy sanctions on Mali, including closing their borders to Mali.

Arguably, the possible introduction of Russia among the international security providers in Mali reduces the match of institutional security concepts and institutional setup. Malte Brosig and Dimpho Motsamai identified these two factors (together with the match between supplied and demanded resources) as key explanatory variables of cooperation in a security regime complex.[350] While the common international participants in African peace operations, such as the AU, the EU and UN certainly operate out of different security concepts and institutional setups, they have repeatedly cooperated in different missions and in conceptual developments. In contrast, to date Russia has demonstrated little interest in civilian instruments to promote peace in Mali and little regard for the decisions of the AU or ECOWAS in relation to Mali. If the current international security providers remain part of the security regime complex in the Sahel, cooperation among its constituents is likely to become more complicated. Basic parts of the security concept for Mali, such as the need to facilitate the return of a democratic state, which seeks to (re) establish authority through legitimate use of power and respect for human rights, and the implementation of the UN sanctioned peace agreement.

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348 Boubacar, H. (2021).

349 France 24. (2022).

350 Brosig, M. & Motsamai, D. (2014). pp. 45–68.

In parallel, the regional cooperation in the G5 Sahel may be affected by the coups in Burkina Faso and Mali. Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, the leader of the coup in Burkina Faso, had urged President Roch Kabore to employ the Russian Wagner group before the coup.[351] If Burkina Faso realigns with Russia, it will create a fault line within the G5, as Niger is accepting closer cooperation with France and Mahamat Déby, Chairman of the Transitional Military Council of Chad, still cooperates with France. Conflicting interests among the G5 Sahel states are likely to hamper further cooperation on cross-border security issues. In general, the lack of cooperation, or even conflict, among the constituent parts of the security regime complex is bound to increase complexity, as the many actions of the security providers may duplicate or undermine each other. How this will affect complexity at the local level is yet to be seen.

Conclusion

This chapter asks why there has been a proliferation of security actors in Mali and parts of Burkina Faso and Niger since 2013. The chapter argues that the material and ideational resource scarcities of the security providers have been drivers for the security actor proliferation in the Sahel. France especially has been a lead state in the process, as France has worked actively to shape the UN response, to increase the involvement of the EU, and to shape the formation of the G5 Sahel. Undoubtedly, burden sharing played into French considerations given the limited size of the French military and the moderate size of its forces in the Sahel. Yet, the limited ideational resources of legitimacy also influenced French considerations. The post-colonial connotations limit the legitimacy of France in the eyes of the local populations. And French emphasis on supporting the African security architecture and Europeanisation of its security efforts would have been undermined without the introduction of African and European security providers in the Sahel. However, the UN, the AU, and ECOWAS had independent agendas and sought primarily to support the implementation of the peace agreement, which was difficult in the light of the French and EU emphasis on migration and terrorism. The resulting security regime complex severely limits the ability of any international security provider to determine the direction of security provision in the Sahel. At the local level, the ubiquitousness of actor proliferation has displayed an internal dynamic, where local communities and elites face a constant pressure to react to a highly fluid security environment, where many local (in)security providers strive for control but cannot achieve it due to resource scarcity. The result has been a self-organising response to build self-defence groups, pro-government militias, insurgency groups, as well as many cases of alignment and realignment with existing groups. Furthermore, the non-linear adaption of the complex system at the local level has resulted in the spread of violence and actor proliferation. Now violence cuts across several borders and ethnic lines. In that light, the coups in Burkina Faso and Mali are non-linear responses from armed forces stuck in violent and wicked security situations. However, the decision by the military junta in Bamako to postpone the reintroduction of democracy for years and realign with Russia may have ripple effects on the international security regime complex.

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[351] Parens, R. (2022).

Looking at the violent conflicts in the Sahel through the prism of complexity raises a number of questions, upon which the chapter has only touched. At the local level, a complex social system ridden with violence might adapt in different non-linear ways. This chapter explores those reactions that have led to armed actor proliferation, but non-armed ways to adapt among local communities, such as reconciliation or cooperation, might trigger new dynamics. In parallel, at the national and international levels, non-linear responses to new impetuses might result in speedy and unexpected responses. For example, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, the former president of Mali, sought to negotiate with local Al-Qaeda affiliated groups, but France considered that unacceptable. With the French military out of Mali and the security situation worsening, the new Malian leaders might return to the idea of a negotiated settlement, which would create ripple effects locally and internationally. A non-linear and complex order is impossible to control by any security provider, and unexpected emergences of new security dynamics are very likely to alter the situation in the Sahel.

Governance and blue crime in the Gulf of Guinea

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Introduction

On the 24th of November 2021, weeks after arriving in the Gulf of Guinea, the Danish frigate HDMS *Esbern Snare* responded to suspected piracy activity. The ensuing firefight between special operation forces from the Danish Frogmen's Corps and suspected pirates left four suspects dead, three suspects detained, one wounded, and one lost at sea.[352] Even though this chapter was written well before the deployment of *Esbern Snare* and the firefight, the event itself and the ensuing political and legal questions illustrated some of the issues – political and legal – raised in this chapter, which must be addressed if non-regional naval deployment is to effectively contribute to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

In the last few years, the Gulf of Guinea has earned the dubious reputation of being one of the most dangerous waters in the world. Even though the year 2021 saw the lowest number of global reported piracy incidents since 1994, the Gulf of Guinea is still deemed the world's piracy hotspot as all kidnappings at sea took place in those waters.[353] This is a continued trend from 2019 onward, where over 90% of all global kidnapping-for-ransom attacks at sea took place in West African waters.[354] This development takes place amid and despite lengthy efforts on the national, regional, inter-regional and international level to counter this development – efforts that have been declared successful.[355]

Trends in 2021 suggest that there has been an increase in the operational range of pirate attacks. This was seen when a crewmember on board the *Mozart* was shot and killed during a piracy attack.[356] In the same attack, the citadel ('safe room' on board a ship) was breached by the pirates, enabling them to kidnap almost the entire crew.

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[352] Defence Command Denmark. (2021); The Maritime Executive. (2021).

[353] International Chamber of Commerce. (2022).

[354] European External Action Service. (2021).

[355] Adesanya, A. (2021); Edward, T. (2021); Onyenucheya, A. (2022).

[356] Multinational Maritime Coordination Centre (MMCC) in Zone F. (2021); Maritime Executive. (2021); CEMLAWS. (2021).

As underreporting and misclassification of maritime crime, in general, has been widespread, an increasing number of *reported* piracy attacks does not necessarily mean that a substantial increase has taken place – and what is labelled as piracy may in fact refer to other types of (maritime) crime,[357] but the developments do indicate the pirates' level of sophistication, resilience and adaptability vis-à-vis the countermeasures deployed against them.

Citing the threat against seafarers, the maritime industry is increasingly concerned with these developments in the Gulf.[358] On the 17th of May 2021, BIMCO announced the 'Gulf of Guinea Declaration on Suppression of Piracy', which, as of the 14th of March 2022 was signed by 528 maritime industry stakeholders.[359] It calls for a number of measures, including capacity-building activities, and supports the deployment of non-regional naval vessels "(...) to complement regional coastal States' antipiracy law enforcement operations." A number of non-regional states have had a continuous and more-or-less permanent naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea for a long time, but these deployments have primarily focused on capacity building, sometimes along with other political objectives not necessarily related to piracy or maritime security. Some new developments in 2021 may signal a change in this approach.

Citing this threat, its commitment to the right of free navigation, and its economic interests in the Gulf of Guinea, in early 2021, Denmark announced its intentions to deploy a frigate for a five-month term to the Gulf of Guinea, starting from November 2021.[360] The deployment was approved by the Danish Parliament (Folketinget) on the 25th of May 2021. The deployed frigate, along with a Seahawk-helicopter and a maritime task force, have a mandate to prevent and combat piracy, support the right of free navigation through surveillance, area protection, escorting vessels, and search and rescue. In certain situations, the task force can board hijacked vessels to rescue hostages. The deployment is in addition to Denmark's existing maritime security programme in the Gulf of Guinea and its designation of a special envoy for maritime security matters in the Gulf of Guinea.[361] While the announced Danish deployment has been positively received by the industry, the Danish ambition of creating a coalition of likeminded states has not been realised, so far as other European states have generally not followed suit with similar deployments (Italy being a noteworthy exception, more on this later).[362] Consequently, the deployment takes place under national command – the first such deployment in over 150 years. It also potentially marks a significant change in international maritime security efforts in the Gulf of Guinea as a movement away from the primacy of capacity building over towards an additional focus on direct action against pirates. Although this is not the first

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[357] Dixon, G. (2020); Okafor-Yarwood, I. et al. (2021). Also see note 9.1.

[358] Danish Shipowners' Association. (2020); CO-Søfart. (2020); Jakob Paaske Larsen. (2019); International Maritime Organization. (2021); Holmstad, D. (2021b).

[359] BIMCO. (2021); Jakob Paaske Larsen. (2021).

[360] Folketinget. (2021). Also see note 9.2.

[361] Danish Ministry of Defence. (2021c); (2021b); Søfart. (2021); Danish Ministry of Defence. (2021a).

[362] Holmstad, D. & Valeur, IT. (2021); Holmstad, D. (2021a).

time that non-African navies are present in the Gulf of Guinea,[363] international maritime security efforts typically happen within the framework of capacity-building activities, exercises (such as naval exercises, for example, OBANGAME EXPRESS and Grand African NEMO) and anti-piracy patrols in cooperation with West or Central African states. The planned deployment of a Danish frigate is also noteworthy, because it was not made in *a priori* partnership with a West or Central African country. Another noteworthy example of a more direct anti-piracy mandate came with the 2020-announcement that Italy would deploy frigates to the Gulf of Guinea.[364]

The promises and perils of non-regional naval presence

Deployment of non-regional naval vessels to the Gulf of Guinea with robust anti-piracy mandates (instead of capacity building as the focus) undoubtably takes place based on the interests of the deploying countries. Such deployments can contribute positively to maritime security because such deployments can supplement regional efforts. Although improvements have been made, a substantial problem in responding to piracy relates to the inadequate naval or maritime response capacities. Security forces onshore have historically been favoured vis-à-vis their maritime counterparts due to the state's greater concern for land-based threats, but improvements on maritime capacities have been made in recent years.[365] Observers argue that pirate attacks take place farther out at sea due to increasing maritime capacities near the coast.[366] For this reason, non-regional deployments can help patrol the high seas, which is generally out of reach for the regional countries. A notable exception is Nigeria, which has recently strengthened its maritime capacities through the so-called Deep Blue Project.[367]

The deployment of non-regional navies with robust mandates has also received critical remarks. The presence of foreign naval vessels is potentially perceived as an infringement on state sovereignty, highlight a recurring theme in maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, Dr Peterside (the former director of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA)), recently wrote:

> Individual foreign state actors intervening unilaterally, although with good intentions, has global security and bilateral relations consequences. If Nigeria and other Gulf of Guinea states keep allowing foreign countries to police their waters now, couldn't this lead to the surrendering of their total sovereignties to them in due time?[368]

This quote exemplifies the tension between the welcoming of help from a non-regional state and the concerns with regards to how military deployments (here in the form of a frigate) connect to perceptions of the sovereignty of Gulf of Guinea

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[363] Morcos, P. (2021). Also see note 9.3.

[364] Manaranche, M. (2020).

[365] Ukeje, C. & Ela, W.M. (2013); Hassan, D. & Hasan, S. (2017); Okafor-Yarwood, I. et al. (2020).

[366] CEMLAWS. (2021).

[367] Moss, K. (2020).

[368] Peterside, D. (2021).

states. The frigate will operate in international waters in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In this framework, it will thus not infringe on state's sovereignty in a legal sense.[369] The *political* perception of the deployment is another story. As discussed later, the insistence on 'sovereignty as a right' limits what transnational cooperation can achieve. The specificities of the Danish engagements notwithstanding, this case illustrates a crucial point in maritime security governance, especially in the Gulf of Guinea; namely, that sovereignty is an important organising principle for transnational cooperation on maritime security. When states are reluctant to compromise on sovereignty as a right, it delimits the boundaries of what cooperation can entail, and consequently the effectiveness of maritime security activities. If transnational cooperation is perceived as conflicting with sovereignty, it will result in tension and difficulty in cooperation. For transnational cooperation to work, it means that a compromise must be found with regards to the extent of cooperation vis-à-vis politically perceived sovereignty concerns.

In the introduction to this anthology, Vreÿ and Mandrup raised the question of how to move away from exclusive military problem solving to good governance "via quality public goods embedded in prevention, cooperation, reconstruction and capacity building." Governing the maritime domain is substantially different vis-à-vis land because of at least two factors. First, as Jacobsen and Larsen highlights,[370] state territories on land are clearly and visibly demarked and mutually exclusive (ungoverned spaces and territorial disputes is an exception). Maritime boundaries are not visibly marked (although the legal limits often are defined and agreed between the states), and beyond the territorial sea of a state, "states enjoy flexibility in the exercise of their jurisdiction and are subject to limitations on their sovereign rights".[371] Second, as argued later, the seas are inherently a transnational domain where fish, smugglers, and pirates frequently cross the line between different jurisdictions. Maritime security governance therefore requires cooperation between multiple stakeholders (between states, within states, and with non-state actors alike) on dealing with transnational factors and threats to maritime security. Without cooperation, these threats cannot be addressed. Understanding maritime territory and sovereignty as an exclusive right of a certain state (the 'sovereignty as a right' approach) is ill fitted to combat threats to maritime security, because it restricts the opportunities for transnational cooperation and consequently fails to address the transnationality of maritime security issues.[372] The other approach to sovereignty ('sovereignty as a responsibility') offers more space for the requisite cooperation between states but can be politically sensitive.

This chapter first argues that good maritime governance – particularly in waters shared by many sovereign states – requires transnational cooperation. This requirement and its complexity increase with the number of involved stakeholders. Cooperation is necessary because transnationality is a central characteristic of the maritime domain and maritime crime. Without transnational cooperation, instances of maritime crime, such as piracy cannot be addressed effectively. Second, this chapter illustrates

[369] Folketinget. (2021).

[370] Jacobsen, K. & Larsen, J. (2019).

[371] Jacobsen, K. & Larsen, J. (2019). p. 1 038.

[372] Till, G. (2018). p. 347; Glanville, L. (2010).

the importance of the principle of state sovereignty in maritime security governance in the Gulf of Guinea. This is seen clearly in the emphasis on state sovereignty and non-intervention into domestic matters, featured in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCC), which establishes the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security (YAMS). It is also seen in the tension arising between welcoming non-regional support for maritime security on the one hand and the concerns over sovereignty on the other, as exemplified by the Danish deployment of a frigate to the Gulf of Guinea.

To move away from exclusive military problem solving, it is, therefore, necessary to strengthen and expand the frameworks for transnational cooperation in a way that allows multiple stakeholders to cooperate, but which also respects state sovereignty. Therefore, this chapter examines the obstacles and opportunities for transnational cooperation including not only West and Central African states, but also non-African states. It concludes that the YAMS, which is the current West and Central African cooperation structure, can serve as a useful framework for transnational cooperation with participation from non-African states and because it delivers on these two criteria. A prerequisite for this, however, is the mobilisation of sufficient transnational will to implement and adhere to the spirit of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. It resembles a network organisation that allows ad-hoc or temporary participation, as involved actors share the overall goal of reducing maritime crime. The maritime industry, too, could participate in such a network given their interest in maritime security. For the sake of simplicity, the present argument only examines the cooperation between regional and non-regional states as the tensions regarding sovereignty are quite clear here. For the same reason, the analysis has focused on state and inter-state relations. Coordination *within* states has not received attention. Nonetheless, examining the internal coordination in regional countries could also be useful because intra-state coordination problems also affect said country's participation in the inter-state cooperation mechanism. Due to the focus on non-regional states' deployment of naval vessels, the role of private security companies and provision has not been elaborated on either. This is despite the privatisation of maritime security tasks, which falls within the sovereign responsibility and prerogative, potentially playing a role in the blurring of lines of sovereignty. This chapter has been written with the author's previous research as a point of reference[373] and is based on scholarly work on the maritime security situation in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the author's work.

The reader should keep in mind that this chapter was originally written before the deployment of the Danish Frigate HDMS *Esbern Snare* to the Gulf of Guinea.

Maritime security requires cooperation

'Maritime security' has been described as an ambiguous term,[374] its meaning varying according to the perceiver.[375] Bueger calls it a 'buzzword' with no universally agreed-upon definition.[376] Two main approaches exist in the literature on defining the term. The negative approach defines maritime security as the absence of "terrorism,

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[373] Yücel, H. (2021). Also see note 9.4.

[374] Till, G. (2018). p. 283.

[375] Siebels, D. (2020). p. 19

[376] Bueger, C. (2015).

piracy, smuggling, IUU fishing, or conflicts over maritime boundaries. (...)".[377] The positive definition describes maritime security as an ideal end-state in which "the rule of law is imposed, ensuring that the sea does not become ungoverned space" – by removing threats that contradict these ideal end-states, maritime security can thus be attained.[378] While piracy has previously been used as a catch-all term for all kinds of threats to maritime security, it entails more than that.[379] A key criticism of both the positive and negative definition relates to their inattention towards how different actors prioritise among different threats,[380] which can be problematic when many actors must work together. This chapter focuses on piracy because the interests of non-regional states and the maritime industry is particularly concerned with piracy, as it is perceived as a direct threat to their interests. This perception is partly shared with the regional states. This is a reflection of the perceived interest of these actors, although this lens limits insights into other types of maritime crime that different actors would emphasize. The YCC formally covers a wide range of transnational crimes beyond piracy, but has been criticised for its focus on piracy over many other maritime security threats (such as IUU fishing).[381] On the other hand, any effort to increase the maritime law enforcement capacity of West and Central African states in the name of anti-piracy could also benefit the fight against other threats. The divergence in threat perception is an interesting area of study, because it can highlight tension in cooperation as well, and several authors have made the point that external efforts (such as capacity building) alter local maritime security priorities and perceptions.[382]

Cooperation is essential in maritime security matters and is "widely understood as a transnational task,".[383] Till perceives the oceans as a *single entity* and "events at sea are of common interest to countries far and wide, and not just to those in the immediate proximity of the illicit activities in question."[384] The seas function as a crucial avenue for transportation as 90% of global trade volume involves the sea.[385] Till later writes that: "(...) as a rule, fish, and for that matter terrorists, pirates, and drug smugglers too, are, in the jargon, 'non-state actors' and do not observe national boundaries in their operations. The threats they pose are inherently transnational, and will usually need to be treated as such."[386] No matter how strong and organised a single state is, it cannot solve 'non-traditional' threats on its own.[387] The maritime domain could therefore be called an area of gradually *softened sovereignty*,[388] because

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[377] Siebels, D. (2020). p. 20.

[378] Siebels, D. (2020). p. 20.

[379] Vreÿ, F. (2009).

[380] Bueger, C. (2015); Siebels, D. (2020).

[381] Ukeje, C. & Ela, W.M. (2013). p. 44; Okafor-Yarwood, I. (2019).

[382] Jacobsen, K. (2017); Bueger, C. & Edmunds, T. (2017).

[383] Bueger, C. (2015). p. 163.

[384] Till, G. (2018). p. 344.

[385] Till, G. (2018) p. 8.

[386] Till, G. (2018) p. 308.

[387] Till, G. (2015) p. 23.

[388] Clunan, A.L. & Trinkunas, H.A.. (2010).

nominal state sovereignty diminishes with the distance from the coast and changes character beyond 12 nautical miles (nm) from the coast according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This allows other states to play a role in maritime security governance beyond the 12 nm limit, which Jacobsen and Larsen mention as one of the more permanent *contingencies* of the maritime domain.[389]

The following example shows this transnationality in practice. On the 14th of May 2020, pirates in Côte d'Ivoire's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) hijacked the fishing vessel Hai Lu Feng 11. The Ghana-flagged fishing vessel with 18 crew on board (eight Chinese, seven Ghanaians, and three Ivorian nationals) sailed through the EEZ of three countries before being boarded by Nigerian special forces a few days later.[390] During this time, the vessel was tracked by various maritime authorities who shared information with relevant counterparts, and this cooperation was central to the successful interdiction of the vessel and the subsequent apprehension of the suspected pirates. In the summer of 2021, a rare sentencing took place as 10 suspects were sentenced 12 years' imprisonment by the federal high court in Lagos, Nigeria.[391] This case highlights the transnationality of maritime security issues and the resulting necessity of cooperation between stakeholders in countering maritime security threats. This specific case also constitutes a success story in regional cooperation on fighting piracy, because of the involvement of multiple authorities, coordinated efforts, and information exchange. In this case, 'cooperation' covers a broad range of activities and involves a multitude of actors with a common purpose. In this example, the act of sharing information regarding a vessel, following it, interdicting it, and boarding it all constitute a necessary component. These actions were executed by several actors, and without including the sub-state or regional agencies involved, it counts at least four different states (even more actors were involved). The example of Hai Lu Feng 11 was also a success in regional maritime security cooperation because it took place without the involvement of European states. With the deployment of European state's warships to the Gulf of Guinea, the potential for them to assist in such efforts also rises, but as the next section shows, their involvement can be politically sensitive. Avoiding political controversy is key in effective cooperation in fighting piracy.

Capacity building and the importance of sovereignty

Recognising the transnationality of maritime security issues and the need for cooperation, and inspired by the Djibouti Code of Conduct (2009) that played an important role in combatting piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, 25 West and Central African states came together in 2013 and signed the 'Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa' – commonly known as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCC).[392] The YCC declares the signatory's intent to cooperate to fight transnational organised crime. With the YCC, the states

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[389] Jacobsen, K. & Larsen, J. (2019). pp. 1 038, 1 045.

[390] Ralby, I.M. (2020); Ali, Y. & Benning, K.D. (2020).

[391] Alo, C. (2021); Dryad Global. (2021).

[392] Siebels, D. (2020).

authorised the establishment of the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security (YAMS), which was credited for enabling the successful interception of Hai Lu Feng 11 mentioned earlier.

For their part, the international community and non-regional states have also been involved in maritime security governance in the Gulf and the capacity-building approach has been a cornerstone in the international involvement, as this is a way to address this maritime capacity inadequacy. Such efforts often aim at building capacity in states and various levels in the YAMS through training, exercises, and deliverance of technical equipment or systems.[393] These are also closely tied to another type of engagement, namely to organise maritime security efforts and the management of its complexity.[394] Warships are sent to the Gulf of Guinea as a part of these capacity-building activities (although they can also have other objectives). Non-African warships can also engage in direct action against pirates and patrols on the high seas, often in cooperation with African states – for example for training purposes.[395] Capacity building goes beyond strictly military and law enforcement matters in response to the interconnectedness and liminality of the maritime domain to also include efforts to the development and implementation of laws and policies to develop sustainable governance practices, what Jacobsen calls "institutional capacity building" in contrast to "military capacity building."[396] This is done in the recognition of the interconnected nature between different maritime crimes and to its connection to adverse conditions on land. In Nigeria, the environmental devastation of the Niger Delta region (along with several other societal problems, or so-called root causes) is often described as a reason for piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.[397] Yet despite the recognition in thought of the interconnected and liminal nature of maritime crime, the capacity building activities are hard to do comprehensively in practice.[398]

From capacity building to direct action?

The Danish deployment of a frigate exemplifies a potential shift in the international engagement in the Gulf of Guinea, as it was not initially presented in cooperation with an African state and in contrast to earlier deployments, capacity building did not constitute a significant part of its mandate. This resembles the international engagement off the coast of Somalia where several non-regional nations and coalitions deployed naval vessels to carry out anti-piracy operations.

Although capacity building can also be seen as a form of intervention, it is "less likely than large-scale interventions to be framed as 'transgressions' of state sovereignty,"[399] because it takes place with the blessing of the 'receiving' state. Capacity building

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[393] Okafor-Yarwood, I. et al. (2020).

[394] Bueger, C. & Edmunds, T. (2017).

[395] Okafor-Yarwood, I. et al. (2020). p. 84.

[396] Bueger, C. & Edmunds, T. (2017). pp. 1 300–1 301; Jacobsen, K. (2017).

[397] Hasan, S. & Hassan, D. (2016); Herpolsheimer. (2018); Nwangwu et al. (2015); Hassan & Hasan. (2017).

[398] Jacobsen, K. (2017).

[399] Jacobsen, K. (2017). p. 250.

through invitation is thus becoming a way for the receiving state to "tame the intervention."[400] Even though it is a legal act according to the UNCLOS, unilateral deployment of a warship to directly act against piracy is easier to perceive as a transgression. The resulting political sensitivity reveals itself in at least four ways. Unless these points are addressed, political and legal issues are sure to follow.

First, in an instance where a suspected pirate vessel crosses the 12 nm limit into the territorial waters of a state, a foreign ship cannot follow unless it has a legal right to conduct a 'hot pursuit'. Doing so without a priori agreement would constitute a violation of territorial boundaries. The lack of agreements with littoral states will decrease the mission's effectivity. Second, if a suspected pirate is apprehended by the frigate, it is necessary to have protocols in place that make it possible to bring the suspects to trial in a West African state. The legal contingency highlighted by Jacobsen and Larsen relate strongly to this point:

> [N]o one state has an exclusive right or obligation to act, react or extract. Second, and pulling in the opposite direction, the oceans are a space of universal jurisdiction, specifically in respect of piracy, that thus includes all state parties in the possibility of exercising their sovereign rights over that crime: all state parties *may* act on the provisions addressing the crime of piracy."[401]

The emphasis on *may* is important as it does not entail an obligation to prosecute. For example, prosecution of suspected pirates in Denmark is complicated, as it requires a Danish connection either to the attacked vessel itself (sailing under the Danish flag) or to the crew (Danish nationals). If not, the case likely cannot be tried in Denmark.[402] The legal argument notwithstanding, it would be *politically* sensitive to prosecute pirates in Denmark, which makes it unlikely to happen. In the case of East Africa, due to legal complexity, as well as political sensitivities, several countries engaged in anti-piracy activities in the Western Indian Ocean[403] made agreements with the Seychelles to prosecute suspected pirates.[404] A necessary agreement would also have to be reached with (a) West African state(s) to enable effective prosecution. Of course, this may also require the domestication of anti-piracy laws in these states, which not all have done.[405] On the other hand, while anti-piracy legislation may not be in place, "[p]rosecutions could generally be carried out on the basis of other laws(…)" such as kidnapping or armed robbery.[406] Whether these laws would also universally apply to crimes in international waters – and whether the states would accept the transfer of suspects from foreign warships – remains unclear. In summary, unless an agreement is made with regards to handover and trial of suspected pirates,

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[400] Cold-Ravnkilde, S. & Jacobsen, K. (2020). p. 865; De Oliveira & Verhoeven. (2018).

[401] Emphasis added, Jacobsen & Larsen. (2019). p. 1 045.

[402] Feldtmann & Siig. (2009).

[403] See note 9.5.

[404] Kingdom of Denmark and Republic of Seychelles. (2011); Jensen. (2011); Danish Ministry of Defence. (2012); Mujuzi. (2020). p. 2; Muzaffer. (2014). p. 66. Also see note 9.6.

[405] Bisson. (2019); UNODC. (2019).

[406] Siebels, D. (2020). p. 83.

anti-piracy missions of non-regional navies will be less effective. This issue was recently clearly illustrated. In January 2022, little over six weeks after the firefight on the 24th of November 2021, only one of four detained suspects appeared before the court in Copenhagen, charged with attempted manslaughter of Danish soldiers. The rest of the suspects were released into a small boat in the Gulf of Guinea from where they could safely reach the shore, as the charges against them were withdrawn after Denmark failed to find a country that would take the four pirates.[407] The one suspect facing trial was brought to Denmark because he was wounded during the firefight and needed to have one leg amputated and could therefore not be released safely at sea.

Third, the political sensitivities regarding sovereignty can be a barrier to cooperation as well. The legal arguments notwithstanding, unless a *political* agreement has been reached it will negatively affect the possibility of such missions. This is due to the political significance attached to sovereignty.[408] Without a political agreement, it may become difficult for countries to work together on maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea, which was illustrated clearly both before and after the incident on the 24th of November 2021.[409] The same goes for regional states. For example, the significance of sovereignty increases when there are maritime border disputes, which has also been the case in the Gulf of Guinea to some extent, which can complicate cooperation within the region.[410] The importance of sovereignty in the Gulf of Guinea can also be seen in the YCC, especially in article 2.2 (respect for 'principles of sovereign equality' and 'non-intervention in domestic affairs') and 19a (YCC is not a binding agreement). In sum, the lack of a political agreement may inhibit maritime security cooperation – regional and non-regional alike.[411] Finally, and clearly related to the former points, the unilateral deployment of a naval vessel potentially raises sovereignty concerns more than other types of vessels or forms of interventions. For example, as discussed earlier in the chapter, a capacity-building mission would not face the same problems as the deployment of a frigate itself would.

The legal and political sovereignty consideration was a lesser concern in the successful anti-piracy efforts off the East African coast for three reasons. First, attacks mostly took place in international waters, because shipping generally passed through the area in international waters, making fewer port calls to East African states. Merchant vessels make relatively more port calls to West African states. Second, East Africa consists of relatively fewer countries with longer coastlines, compared to the Gulf of Guinea.[412] As the number of involved actors rises, the complexity of transnational cooperation also increases. Third, Somalia consented in the UNSC-resolution 1816 (2008), which allows "States cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia," to "[e]nter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing

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[407] Reuters. (2022).

[408] Till, G. (2018). p. 347.

[409] Safety4Seas. (2021); Bush. (2022); Peterside, D. (2021).

[410] Okafor-Yarwood, I. et al. (2020). p. 75; Till, J. (2018). p. 330.

[411] Hassan, D. & Hasan, S. (2017); Ukeje, C. & Ela, W.M. (2013); Jacobsen, K. & Nordby, J. (2015).

[412] Siebels, D. (2020); Okafor-Yarwood, I. et al. (2021).

acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea." Foreign naval entry into territorial waters of Somalia was therefore allowed, in contrast to states in West and Central Africa, which are generally hesitant to allow non-regional or even other YCC signatories to enter their territorial waters without special provisions. West African states "prefer to be supported so they can provide maritime security, rather than abrogate this responsibility to external parties."[413] There is also a substantial difference between the West and Central African littoral states vis-à-vis Somalia in 2008 with regards to state coherence and capacities, given the long absence of a functional government in Somalia.

In conclusion, the norm of sovereignty plays a crucial role in transnational cooperation on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. This is a condition that must be considered rather than a problem that must be solved. Without addressing these concerns, international cooperation will be unable to achieve sufficient political authorisation and support, without which it will remain "a mere expression of political intention."[414] A framework is therefore needed, which can facilitate transnational cooperation without infringement on the state's sovereignty (perceived or direct). YAMS has been commended for striking a balance between authority and sovereignty because it "is not binding but was agreed to by heads of state. In other words, the Yaoundé Code does not require governments to take additional steps in order for personnel at the working level to make things happen. (...) The international regime for maritime security is and will remain based on state sovereignty."[415] Could the YAMS thus be expanded to include non-African states in some way?

Sovereignty and cooperation
The author's previous paper, 'Sovereignty and Transnational Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea', describes the YAMS as a network consisting of several sovereign state actors along with institutions on several levels (zonal, regional, and interregional), which helps coordinate maritime security efforts.[416] This is noteworthy in the current context, because the network structure of YAMS could theoretically make it possible for non-regional navies to engage in the Gulf of Guinea. Describing YAMS as a network, contrasts with the implied hierarchical structure of the organisation often observed on organisational diagrams. This is not just a semantic dispute, as there are significant differences in the archetypical understanding of a hierarchy vis-à-vis a network. Based on Herrhausen and Yücel,[417] Table 1 describes some of the most significant differences. These relate to the nature of relationships within the organisation, modes of participation, and how coordination is achieved. Coordination is understood as the act of aligning participants towards the common goal (the *raison d'être* of the organisation), avoiding duplication (inefficiency), and "increasing the probability that all essential services are provided somewhere in the system."[418]

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[413] Okafor-Yarwood, I. et al. (2021).

[414] Ali, KD. (2014). p. 319.

[415] Okafor-Yarwood, I. et al. (2020). p. 86.

[416] Yücel, H. (2021).

[417] Herrhausen, A. (2007); Yücel, H. (2021).

[418] Provan, KG. & Milward, H. (1995); Herrhausen, A. (2007). p. 6.

Table 1: Select differences between hierarchies and networks

	Hierarchy	Network
Participants	One organisation with a set of principal-agent relationships.	Multiple independent, interdependent participants with repeated interactions over time.
Participation	Decided by principals.	Voluntary. Can be temporary or ad-hoc.
Mode of coordination	Coordination by command. Principals have the authority to align agents.	Coordination by the voluntary handover of (limited) authority to coordinating entities in the network.

An archetypical hierarchy consists of a single organisation containing a set of principal-agent relationships. The participants in the hierarchy are not autonomous but rather subordinate to the principals, who are the decision-makers with regards to who participates in the network and who coordinates the efforts of the organisation with the authority vested in them vis-à-vis the other participants. An archetypical network consists of multiple independent actors. They are *inter*dependent in the sense that they share an overall goal, which is obtainable through cooperation. The network develops through repeated interactions over time. Participation is voluntary and possibly ad hoc or temporary. To coordinate efforts, the network can delegate (limited) authority to coordinate institutions. Yücel[419] argues that YAMS resembles a network because it consists of sovereign states who have come together to achieve a common goal. The states are not forced to cooperate as they are sovereign but incentivised to do so due to the transnationality of threats, the characteristics of the maritime domain, along with (economic) benefits associated with maritime security. The YCC's legally unbinding nature and general respect of state sovereignty was a central principle. It was created to help overcome coordination problems, and its participating states voluntary handed over some limited authority to coordinating entities such as the MMCC on the 'zonal' level, the Regional Maritime Security Centres (CRESM) on the regional level, and the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) on the interregional level. YAMS aims to ensure coordination and facilitation between the signatories of the YCC, and in so doing, improve the general awareness of activities in the maritime domain and pool resources to increase effectiveness. While the YCC and YAMS should be commended for establishing a functioning network with information exchange and coordination of activities, it has not been completely implemented or funded due to insufficient political will.[420] Another significant problem is more conceptual problem relates to capacities.

Since YAMS is a network where ad-hoc or temporary participation is possible, it could enable cooperation between regional and non-regional states, as both share the same overall goal. Practically, it would be a way to address the capacity gap by linking regional capacities and structures with non-regional vessels and units. This would enable more robust and effective anti-piracy activities, and non-regional states could provide assets that regional states do not possess. Politically, it would

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[419] Yücel, H. (2021).

[420] Okafor-Yarwood, I. et al. (2020); Yücel, H. (2021).

provide legitimacy to non-regional navies in the Gulf of Guinea, given that non-regional deployments would play into the pre-existing regional efforts. In this way, the politically sensitive issue of sovereignty could be satisfied. This would make it possible for non-African states to support maritime security activities beyond capacity building. An outstanding issue pertains to how non-African states and navies could work with or in YAMS. A formal expansion of the YCC would entail a lengthy political process and it would only make the structure more complex, not to mention the controversy arising from including non-regional states. Instead, a more feasible way forward could either be the creation of a parallel structure closely linked to YAMS or the creation of an operational link between one of the already existing international forums and YAMS. A few international forums and institutions already exist on the maritime security situation in the Gulf of Guinea. The G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++ FoGG) is a forum supporting the YCC and YAMS,[421] while the EU has recently launched the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) project for the Gulf of Guinea.[422] With the deployment of the Danish Frigate, there have also been calls for other countries to join Denmark in the framework of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) although this has not borne fruit at this time.[423] These initiatives resemble similar measures that were created to combat piracy in East Africa, such as the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) mechanism that sought strategic and operational coordination between international actors in the Western Indian Ocean. An operational link to YAMS via an international forum could enable cooperation between regional and non-regional states without requiring lengthy and recurring political discussions. This could happen through the placement of relevant liaison officers in YAMS (which the Danish deployment may also do, according to the parliamentary proposal).

Interestingly, after the original draft of this chapter, the ICC and the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) announced the formation of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Collaboration Forum and Shared Awareness and Deconfliction mechanism (GOG-MCF/SHADE).[424] The forum "will focus on counter-piracy and armed robbery by bringing together regional, international, industry and NGO partners (…)"[425] and could thus serve as a nexus between non-regional navies and YAMS. The establishment of the MCF/SHADE could be the first step in addressing the legal and political challenges associated with non-regional naval deployments with anti-piracy mandates. It remains to be seen to what degree the new mechanism can facilitate the collaboration of regional and non-regional efforts. This initiative is launched amid an already crowded field of coordination initiatives, raising the question on whether yet another forum will provide added benefit to this endeavour.[426]

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[421] Représentation Permanente De La France Auprés de l'Union Européenne. (2019).

[422] *Council Conclusions Launching the Pilot Case of the Coordinated Maritime Presences Concept in the Gulf of Guinea.* (2021).

[423] Holmstad, D. (2021a).

[424] Maritimeafrica.com. (2021); Larsen. (2021); Kyanet. (2021).

[425] Maritimeafrica.com. (2021).

[426] MI News Network. (2021).

In addition, legal issues such as the entrance of foreign ships into territorial waters and the transfer of suspected pirates must be worked out bilaterally or multi-laterally, as not even YCC signatories can cross into other state's territorial waters without acceptance from said state. Expansion of the YCC mandate to allow foreign or regional naval vessels access to enter YCC-signatory's territorial sea or to provide a legal mechanism for the transfer of suspected pirates would probably be going too far in terms of striking a balance between sovereignty concerns and political authority. Whether these suggestions would be politically feasible is unclear but the central point stands – maritime security efforts in the Gulf of Guinea have much to win through greater coordination and cooperation, which must happen with due regard for state sovereignty.

Conclusion

In 2021 and on, maritime piracy has dropped sharply in the Gulf of Guinea. Some claim that regional (especially Nigerian) efforts have played a crucial role to this end,[427] while others emphasise non-regional naval presence and cooperation with and between regional authorities.[428] Needless to say, the increased attention on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea seems to have had a significant effect. This does not alter the fact that cooperation between states in and beyond the Gulf of Guinea is necessary for optimal maritime security governance. Sovereignty concerns are politically salient and need to be factored in when considering modes and areas of cooperation – especially when efforts to curb maritime crime may trigger political sensitivities. In this setting, the chapter has attempted to show a way forward to enable non-African participation in maritime security governance beyond the capacity-building framework. An equilibrium must be found if non-African states increasingly deploy military vessels to the Gulf of Guinea to take direct action against piracy. Such deployments arguably played an indispensable role to lower the threat of piracy on merchant shipping off the Horn of Africa while parties created the Djibouti Code of Conduct to bring littoral states into the fold. The potential for a similar effect also exists in the Gulf of Guinea if a balance can be found between competing perceptions of sovereignty.

Operational and strategic cooperation between international actors, and West and Central African states could be achieved through YAMS because it resembles a network and could allow sovereign actors to cooperate on an ad-hoc basis. This would be advantageous because YAMS represents a way to cooperate without triggering sovereignty concerns which may prove useful especially when maritime security efforts in the Gulf of Guinea needs more capacities. Such efforts are already underway (GOG-MCF/SHADE) but whether new initiatives will strike an effective and operable balance between cooperation and sovereignty considerations remains to be seen. One thing is certain: The region wide political commitment to these structures and their implementation remains essential.

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[427] Adesanya, A. (2021).

[428] Onyenucheya, A. (2022).

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
Governance and threat hybridisation in the Western Indian Ocean off Africa

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Introduction

Maritime security governance is critical to safeguarding the sea as a landscape that houses large socioeconomic, environmental and safety hubs that collectively underpin food and energy security, safe transport, productive coastal communities, commerce and industry and most important, a sustainable environment. If not well-governed, these hubs hold global, regional, and national security implications, should decision-makers allow threats to proliferate unchecked or to mutate.[429] While state attention to non-traditional maritime security sectors grew visibly during the 21st century, traditional maritime threats remained on the radar. The South China Sea region, for example, depicts how traditional and non-traditional security threats and responses co-exist with navies, coast guards and maritime militia cooperating to exercise or check freedom of navigation and territorial sovereignty in disputed maritime territories.[430] The contested territories overlap with access to resources and routes into international waters, but also house maritime operations to counter illegal fishing, armed robbery, and piracy. While Southeast Asia portrays enforcement agencies engaged in combatting maritime crime, actions in the South China Sea are more competitive and portray aggressive posturing by international navies as well.[431] However, this is not the only international maritime security flashpoint. Events in the Western Indian Ocean also attract international attention, with the potential to draw in navies alongside other maritime security agencies to contain a growing threat landscape.

Africa harbours clusters of non-traditional maritime security threats off its long coastline. Specific threats off the eastern African seaboard in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) progressively depict elements beginning to lean to more traditional security threats. One recent development is the escalation of the maritime boundary dispute between Kenya and Somalia as Kenya rejected the ruling of the International

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[429] Lutz, F. (2016). pp. 14–15.

[430] Hui, X. & Xianyu, C. (2016). pp. 344–345.

[431] Guilfoyle, D. (2019).

Court of a demarcation favouring Somalia.[432] This comes amidst existing tensions as both reside in the national security ambit of territorial sovereignty, critical economic resources, and possible military posturing at sea akin to developments in the South China Sea. In addition, possible hybrid threats in Yemen's western waters close to Africa, insecurity related to the ongoing armed insurgency in Somalia that threatens to destabilise governance and a radicalising insurgency in northern Mozambique in the Mozambique Channel, raise the national security-armed response banner. Collectively Kenya, Yemen, Somalia, and Mozambique bring military backed threats and naval responses into focus suggesting the need for maritime security governance frameworks that cater more cogently for national security, sea power and harder policing.

The following chapter argues that maritime security governance in the WIO must also account for the growing threat of insurgent and hybrid styled dangers from armed conflicts on land. The discussion commences by delineating and locating maritime security and hybrid threats before describing three approaches to describe maritime security threats along the African east coast. The three approaches entail the identification and listing of threats, indexing constituent elements of maritime security, and an interactive matrix that also accounts for the national security sea power field that includes the hybrid threat potential. The second focus area covers two threat landscapes: the Gulf of Aden (GOA) and events in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique, as examples in support of the argument of a possible terrorist or hybrid threat connection off north-eastern Africa and the insurgency connection in south-eastern Africa. The third focus entails a threat continuum for Africa's eastern littoral that includes the naval-hybrid threat profile of a growing naval presence in the GOA before concluding with a few observations.

Maritime security and hybrid warfare

Maritime insecurity presents as a wicked problem not easily amenable to contemporary thought and responses.[433] This difficulty highlights the need to refine explanations and ordering concepts to lower uncertainty and support decision-making for better governance through improved understanding. Although not new, maritime security remains intricate and efforts to mitigate the growing span of maritime threats in the 21st century flags the complexity. Progress to understand and respond resulted in different ways to group and describe threats, vulnerabilities, and responses. One approach pursued by analysts is to describe maritime security through narratives outlining its constituent elements. This descriptive approach continuous but often complicates, rather than simplifies understanding as matters, such as threat escalation, mutations, rise of the blue economy, and shifting ideas on oceans governance, keep definitions in flux.[434] Descriptive narratives also change regularly and escalate in number, as do their perceived constituent concepts, thus emphasising a drive for order and consistency to promote their utility for decision-making about programmes, policies, and resources.[435]

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[432] Dahir, AL. (2021).

[433] Kiourktoglou, G., Coutroubis, A. & Schwartz, J. (2013).

[434] Voyer, M et al. (2018). pp. 28–48.

[435] Bueger, C. (2015). pp. 159–164.

A more recent academic endeavour by Bueger and Edmunds (2017) frames maritime security as a matrix that brings armed conflict into focus alongside soft threats and vulnerabilities on national and human security, the blue economy, and the environment. Their matrix approach allows for change and facilitates expansion or contraction of the maritime security sectors they framed to direct or redirect attention, responses, decisions, and resources for executing maritime security governance.[436] Aforementioned approaches of describing threats and using a matrix to group, order and delimit, lack their own reliable data sets to underpin decisions. The Stable Seas Index (SSI) on Africa supports stakeholder decisions with data to inform maritime security governance planning for African coastal and island states.[437] The SSI unfortunately largely discounts the security-sea power-naval sectors, and this marginalises a threat sector regularly noted for its dangers, but too often not expanded upon. For the WIO bordering Africa the overall lower focus on harder threats despite armed conflicts on land, a growing maritime border dispute between Kenya and Somalia, a naval build-up around Yemen, Somalia and Djibouti and the radicalising insurgency in Mozambique raise red flags. The risk in part flows from an inclination to keep traditional and non-traditional maritime threats apart, and attending to sea power/naval power, naval warfare, and naval strategy separately. Hybrid warfare impacting maritime security, however, could well collapse elements of this hard divide, as does insurgency.

Employing warfare below the conventional level is a growing approach of how state and non-state actors pursue their interests. The sea also offers scope for states to leverage opportunities to operate below the level of conventional military operations to minimise destruction and disruption from interstate military confrontation.[438] Grey zone warfare finds expression at the level below regular military operations and entails the use of unconventional ways and means that ideally evades the saliency and critique of direct conventional military operations. In contrast, the hybrid option draws upon conventional military ways and means to augment unconventional methods, but in a covert way.[439] The conventional-unconventional merger of military actions also intersects with security threats embedded in criminality with the latter becoming a recognised component of hybrid threats in the conduct of armed conflict.[440] Hybrid threats with its oft found conventional military backdrop, merged with criminality and unconventional methods of fighting extend to ocean landscapes and adds another layer to the wickedness already muddling responses to uphold maritime insecurity.

The sea as an environment requires distinct governance programmes and when necessary, defence of national interests with naval ways and means. Responses must also contend with the sea as an environment and the land-sea interface.[441] What transpires on land impacts ocean landscapes and generates an interface that

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[436] Bueger, C & Edmunds, T. (2017). pp. 1 293–1 311.

[437] One Earth Future. Maritime security index 2019. Stable Seas Programme.

[438] Belo, D. (2020). pp. 73–91.

[439] Belo, D. (2020). p. 75.

[440] Hoffman, F. (2009). p. 35.

[441] Speller, I. (2016). pp. 160–162.

confounds good maritime security governance as a counter.[442] Some overspills call for enforcing rule of law and maintaining maritime domain awareness by way of policing agencies other than navies, naval forces playing their policing roles alongside other national, regional and international state and non-state actors.[443] In other instances, military threats and more coercive responses come into play once risks transcend policing agency responses to counter piracy, robbery, illegal fishing, and smuggling, and to intersect with grey areas and hybrid warfare. Their merger or proximity creates fertile ground for hybrid threats and even hybrid warfare to take shape and bring about a more dangerous maritime threat landscape.

As a phenomenon, Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud (2017) outline hybrid warfare as:[444]

> Designed to exploit national vulnerabilities across a broad spectrum. Uses coordinated instruments of power extending far beyond the military realm. It is synchronised and systematic and requires a matching response as a counter. It represents an international issue and thus a response on this level as well.

Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud's outline frames hybridisation, not as additional forms of warfare, but more as merging existing actors and their modes of operation that combine state and non-state actors and their respective utilities and skills in a hybrid campaign.[445]

Some state actors increasingly opt for hybrid forms of warfare and prefer to fuse this option with ongoing irregular armed conflicts, such as insurgencies and terrorism in order to use the untapped space between regular and irregular warfare while using irregulars' skills sets to pursue objectives.

Turning offshore, the confluence of ways and means from state and non-state actors with selected conventional military capabilities find expression in maritime security debates and actions at sea. Till (2013) outlines how threats from local wars, terrorism, piracy, and drug syndicates exist alongside naval warfare, while Shemella (2016) notes the persistent growth in dangerous non-state actors and their actions at sea within his typology of the maritime violence ecosystem.[446] Asal and Hastings add the terrorism-insurgency connection and index[447] and when read together, the traditional and non-traditional intersections of maritime security emerge, including their reciprocity and utility. Simultaneity, nearness, and the practice to reap opportunities from actors making up the maritime violence ecosystem and so employ their skills and threats that suit your strategy, all combine to fuel the rise of hybridisation at sea. As armed threats from organised crime and non-state actors at sea grow, difficulties arise to keep piracy, robbery, smuggling, attacks on offshore energy infrastructure, and insurgencies that exploit vulnerable oceans spaces from being harnessed and combined with drivers of hybrid warfare. Whether deliberately or not and perhaps more probable where armed conflicts persist on land, the latter

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[442] Bueger, C et al. (2020). pp. 228–24.

[443] Wilson, B. (2016). p. 153.

[444] Cullen, PJ. & Reichborn-Kjennerud, E. (2017). pp. 24–25.

[445] Dunn-Loban, A. (2016). p. 19.

[446] Shemella, P. (Ed.). (2016). p. 2.

[447] Asal, V. & Hastings, V. (2015). pp. 722–740.

dovetails with actions at sea through the deliberate fusion of the maritime violence ecosystem with hybridity. This confluence requires decision-makers not to consider hybridity as a peripheral threat.

Responding to maritime security threats and vulnerabilities comprises an input and an output. The outcome depends on ways and means that governments mobilise and contribute to using the oceans in a responsible manner while promoting conditions for good order at sea. The inputs and outputs are subject to positive or negative approaches to maritime security. The negative approach tends to merely problematise maritime security as an outcome of threats and vulnerabilities and results from work aimed at demarcating and describing threats, such as piracy, smuggling, maritime terrorism, illegal and unregulated fishing, and boundary conflicts for a geographic region. A positive approach promotes actionable understanding by highlighting the protection of maritime trade and fishing territories, securing offshore energy sites, promoting ocean governance through regional cooperation and private security contractors, as well as an awareness of upcoming maritime enterprises all of which eventually contribute to environmental protection and economic development.[448] The positivist approach also notes where threats originate and brings the land-sea liminality into sharper focus that inherently raises a greater interest in landward armed threats and their impact offshore.

One characteristic of maritime security is the interconnectedness of its constituent elements with liminality accentuating the land-sea connection. What transpires at sea frequently reflects conditions on land. While liminality speaks to how events on land connect to developments at sea, the suggested interconnectedness impacts several jurisdictions simultaneously as far as good governance goes.[449] Interconnectedness and liminality confound threats and responses that overlap with multiple security domains to underline the need for greater maritime domain awareness to direct responses. As an international and transnational problem and responsibility, improving maritime security depends on international and interagency responses to remain in step with the interconnectedness of responses and the complexity it brings about.[450] Somalia, for example, shows liminality in terms of piracy while the civil war in Yemen spilling into the GOA and the southern Red Sea illustrates its own version of liminality and interconnectedness in the armed attacks out at sea. Mozambique's radicalising insurgency displays how a radicalised armed insurgency on land heightens maritime threats in security perceptions in an adjacent resource rich ocean territory and sea lane as insurgents attack coastal settlements and maritime infrastructure.[451]

Threats from Yemen and Somalia connect to armed conflicts on land where non-state actors linked to transnational criminal entities and non-state insurgent and terrorist movements join up in loose alliances against government and multi-national military forces. Both cases portray how armed conflict and campaigns on land impact security in their respective maritime territories.[452] This display of liminality tends to converge in the GOA and highlights interconnectedness of threats and

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[448] Siebels, D. (2017). pp. 37–38.

[449] Bueger, C., Edmunds, T & Ryan, BJ. (2019). pp. 971–978.

[450] Bueger, C. & Stockbruegger, J. (2016). pp. 46–52.

[451] Decis, H. (2021).

[452] Shay, S. (2019). pp. 1-3.

complexity of responses, given the large number of players involved to promote maritime security governance in the GOA.[453] Threats are largely rooted in maritime crime and transnational networks that intersect with ongoing warfare, particularly in Yemen, which brings the hybrid argument to the fore. While Yemen and Somalia show how liminality and interconnectedness fuel insecurity in the GOA, insurgents in northern Mozambique fighting government forces, for example, overran and held the port of Mocimboa da Praia in March 2020 with simultaneous attacks from the sea and from land.[454] In addition, the insurgents also attacked a community on the neighbouring Quirimbas Archipelago by travelling with small boats to execute the attack.[455] Africa's eastern littoral is subjected to an assortment of maritime security threats with Yemen, Somalia and Mozambique harbouring elements with the potential to foster hybridity. Hybridisation features alongside criminality and neglect by state and non-state actors to reinforce the threat profile in these waters characterised by piracy, armed robbery, illegal fishing, environmental threats and smuggling of arms, and other illegal substances.[456]

Ordering maritime security off Eastern Africa: description, data and matrixes

Eastern Africa stretches from South Africa to Djibouti in the north, where the GOA meets the Red Sea at the Bab-El-Mandeb Strait. This distance of approximately 16 403 kilometres depicts a landward border with 6 million km2 exclusive economic zones for the six coastal and four island states making up the African community bordering the WIO.[457] Included are three regional economic communities (RECs) with African coastal and island states holding membership of one or more of these RECs. The South African Development Community (SADC) bordering the southwestern reaches of the WIO includes South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, Madagascar, Seychelles, Comoros, and Mauritius. Kenya and Tanzania (overlapping membership with SADC) belong to the East Africa Community (EAC), while IGAD includes Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia as coastal member states. Collectively these regions harbour a population of approximately 217 323 129 (2015)[458] and generate around USD176 billion of income per year.[459] Much of this income is maritime based with the oceans housing an output of goods and services totalling an estimated USD20.8 billion per annum and tied to the 60 million people deemed to live 100 kilometres from its shores.[460] Overall, the human, geographic and economic indicators point to a significant coastal and maritime landscape, but one also known for insecurity from threats, vulnerabilities and armed conflict.

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[453] Bueger, C. & Stockbruegger, J. (2016). p. 49.

[454] Fabricius, P. (2022).

[455] OP-ED. (2020).

[456] Bueger, C. & Stockbruegger, J. (2016). pp. 46–52.

[457] Anon. (n.d.).

[458] Answers Africa. (2020).

[459] Indian Ocean Commission. (2018).

[460] Hoegh-Guldberg, O. (2017).

Several accounts driving at ordering maritime security offer perspectives on Africa's eastern littoral. The first entails listing and describing maritime threats and vulnerabilities per country as noted in the negative perception framework outlined earlier. A second method follows a more positive perception and data-driven method reflected in the Stable Seas Index (SSI) for Africa.[461] The SSI houses a quantified index of maritime security sectors and indicators for African countries bordering the WIO but excludes armed conflict. The SSI includes collated data on maritime security threats and vulnerabilities for African coastal countries designed to support decision-making for security and capacity-building programmes. The third approach frames maritime security by way of a matrix developed under the Safe Seas Programme that includes traditional and non-traditional security sectors and caters more explicitly for the national interest-sea power-naval ambit of armed threats.[462]

Much of the work on maritime insecurity in the WIO follows a thematic approach with piracy and armed robbery topping discussions. Somalia initially attracted most attention given the explicit piracy connection, but insecurities other than piracy gradually gained traction. Two broad lines emerged over time. First, understanding and describing the growing span of security-related events at sea and secondly, more explanatory reasoning using aspects of governance as a lens to not only observe threats, but also gain a better understanding of responses with naval deployments and wider non-naval capacity building programmes as leading ways to address governance voids or weaknesses. Bueger also describes how decision-makers over time came to understand and respond to the piracy threat at its height.[463] He describes four perspectives, with each supposing a governance response from one or more agencies or government sectors harbouring responsibilities and skills to tackle the threat and its underlying vulnerability: (1) a threat understood as a crime to be dealt with through the legal domain; (2) an economic threat paradigm framing piracy as a business model that requires disruption; (3) as a developmental model that interprets piracy as a problem of structural root causes (mostly on land) embedded in society, and (4) a threat set within a humanitarian paradigm and labelled as the source of suffering for individuals.[464] Often termed the apex maritime threat, piracy remains one threat while liminality, interconnectedness, and interdependence compel a more nuanced grasp of maritime security given its deeply networked context to crime, and possible armed insurgency and terrorism.

Using description, the threat profile off the African east coast and Horn region closely replicates threat sectors as listed by scholars and analysts over time. To a certain extent, this practice of listing threats emerged from ordering the earlier rush of threats off East Africa to systemise the emerging threats and vulnerabilities in the northern parts of the WIO in particular. This method, displayed in Table 2, served to start populating the void of what transpired and for decision-makers to consider possible governance responses of which the naval deployments off Somalia circa 2010 to maintain good order at sea probably drawing most attention at the time.[465]

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[461] One Earth Future. (2019).

[462] Bueger, C & Edmunds, T. (2017). pp. 1 293–1 311.

[463] Bueger, C. (2013). pp. 86–93.

[464] Bueger, C. (2019). pp. 15–31.

[465] Murphy, M. (2016). pp. 219–220.

Table 2: Contextualising the formulation of maritime security

Chatterjee 2012[466]	Bateman[467]	Hamad[468]	Bueger and Stockbruegger[469]	Jacobsen and Hoy-Carrasco[470]
Maritime piracy	Inter and intrastate conflicts	Piracy	Piracy	Piracy
Maritime terrorism	Maritime terrorism	Armed robbery at sea	Illegal fishing	Human trafficking
Organised crime	Piracy	Maritime terrorism	Human and drug smuggling	Weapons smuggling
Human trafficking	IUU fishing	IUU fishing	Contested boundaries	IUU fishing
Arms smuggling	Climate change	Border disputes	Drug smuggling	Drugs smuggling
Drug trafficking	Marine natural hazards		Wildlife smuggling	Armed violence at sea
Climate change	Energy security		State fragility	
Threats to fish stocks	Human security		Maritime terrorism	

Strengthening listing and descriptions of maritime security threats and vulnerabilities with data that enables a graduated index of maritime security threats off the Eastern African littoral, one finds the Stable Seas Index (SSI). As opposed to merely listing phenomena, the SSI is a quantitative assessment of capabilities, vulnerabilities, and threats as interdependent indicators for considering risk mitigation. For selected countries bordering the WIO (including Yemen), Table 3 reflects recent SSI counts.[471]

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[466] Chatterjee, A. (2014). pp. 77–95.

[467] Bateman, S. (2016). pp. 5–23.

[468] Hamad, BH. (2016).

[469] Bueger, C. & Stockbruegger, J. (2016). pp. 46–52.

[470] Jacobsen, K.L. & Hoy-Carrasco, J. (2018). p. 33.

[471] See note 10.1.

Table 3: 2019 Maritime security counts for Eastern Africa (/100; Yemen included)

Country	Threats*	Vulnerabilities**	Response capacity***	Overall	Landward
Comoros	56	51.6	39	49	55
Djibouti	73	49	50	58	48
Kenya	52	47	35	56	55
Madagascar	67	48	48	54	55
Mauritius	77	65	66	69	81
Mozambique	57	47	62	57	54
Seychelles	71	65	69	69	74
Somalia	52	28	32	35	12 (-2.25)
South Africa	72	55	69	66	66
Tanzania	63	49	60	57	63
Yemen	64	57	35	52	-6.03[472]
Overall	703	323	566	617	
	63.9	29.3	51.4	56.0	

*Threats: Piracy, illegal mixed migration and illicit trades

** Sectors: Blue economy, fisheries, coastal welfare

***Response: International cooperation, rule of law and maritime enforcement

Table 3 highlights that piracy, illegal migration and illicit trades in Somalia, Mozambique and Yemen attract low counts and thus more spaces of vulnerability, although skewed by higher counts for the growing absence of piracy as the so-called apex threat. Regarding vulnerabilities on coastal welfare, the blue economy, and fisheries, several more countries attract lower counts. Djibouti, Kenya, Mozambique, Madagascar, Somalia, Tanzania, and Yemen feature below the 50% count with Yemen and Somalia receiving the lowest totals. Capabilities to mitigate threats preying on vulnerabilities from capacity deficits show that Comoros, Kenya, Somalia, and Yemen have few measures in place to engage in international cooperation, extend rule of law and maritime enforcement. The extent to which the landward indicators also show lower counts (Yemen, Mozambique and Somalia), the land-maritime interface (the liminality factor) potentially becomes mutually supportive for increasing weak security governance in maritime landscapes. Upon closer scrutiny, data sets in Table 3 for selected countries bordering the WIO reflect the maritime vulnerability clusters outlined in Table 4.

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[472]   See note 10.2.

Table 4: Country – vulnerability sectors (/100)

Comoros – Governance: Maritime enforcement (22)
Djibouti – Sector vulnerability: Fisheries (34)
Kenya – Sector vulnerability: Blue economy (29)
Madagascar – Governance: Maritime enforcement (28)
Mauritius – Governance: Maritime enforcement (52)
Mozambique – Threats: Illicit trades (25) (Enforcement 31)
Seychelles – Sector vulnerability: Coastal welfare (84)
Somalia – Governance: Maritime enforcement (8)
South Africa – Governance and threats: Blue economy and illicit trades (44 and 44)
Tanzania – Threats: Illicit trades (43)
Yemen – Governance: Maritime enforcement (10)

SSI data offers a mixed profile on maritime security governance for the selected countries bordering the WIO and this profile is presented in Table 4. Within the overall counts, Yemen and Somalia and Mozambique still record the lowest scores for protecting their vulnerable maritime sectors through international cooperation rule of law and maritime enforcement. Given the liminality principle that brings landward governance counts into the argument, Somalia features at the very bottom (54/54 African countries) and Mozambique (31/54), and continues to decline for general security and rule of law on land according to the 2018 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) on land. In addition, Yemen and Somalia also feature at the bottom of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) while Mozambique remains between the 30–40% count on the WGI.[473]

No country bordering the WIO and covered in the SSI, the IIAG and the WGI does well on all indicators related to threats, vulnerabilities, and capacity to respond. Each country has a threat, vulnerability, or capacity deficit in terms of their landward and maritime security profiles that shape decisions on priorities and allocation of resources to bolster governance at sea. Overall Somalia and Yemen harbour the most significant threats, vulnerabilities, and lack of capacity to respond with Mozambique not trailing far behind. Overall, the said three countries require serious landward and maritime governance redesigns and capacity building as indicated by the SSI (maritime) and then the IIAG and the WGI for the landward side.

The SSI augments the descriptive approaches to maritime security threats. It offers data to also address the 'why' and assists to compare African countries bordering the WIO on their capacity to better govern vulnerable maritime sectors by mitigating maritime security threats. The matrix approach contributes to addressing maritime security as a wicked problem by depicting maritime security not as a list of threats and vulnerabilities, but the interplay of four dynamic quadrants labelled national

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[473] See note 10.3.

security, the marine environment, economic development, and human security. These quadrants do not lock maritime security into hard domains as they account for interconnectedness, liminality, transnationality, and cross-jurisdictional aspects and so signify vibrancy in terms of prominence and exchanges.[474] Non-traditional maritime threats and vulnerabilities feature in the positive/negative views of maritime security as well as the SSI indicators presented in Tables 2–4 and both conform broadly to elements in Quadrants 1, 2 and 3 of the Maritime Security Matrix.[475] However, the marginalised province remains armed conflict and its hybrid setting. This void is framed in Quadrant 3 of Figure 4 and for the East African littoral bordering the WIO, framing maritime security and governance responses including capacity building, calls for more attention to threats, vulnerabilities and responses clustered in the national security quadrant.

MARINE ENVIRONMENT MARINE SAFETY 1 POLLUTION ACCIDENTS CLIMATE CHANGE	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BLUE ECONOMY 2 PIRACY SMUGGLING IUU FISHING
HYBRID THREATS *INSURGENCY* 3 TERRORIST ACTS INTERSTATE DISPUTES ARMS PROLIFERATION SEAPOWER NATIONAL SECURITY	HUMAN TRAFFICKING 4 RESILIENCE HUMAN SECURITY

Figure 3: Maritime security index (adapted for the WIO from the original matrix)

Figure 3 (Quadrant 3) accounts for maritime security influenced by armed and even naval competition, interstate conflicts (border disputes) and terrorism and insurgent/ hybrid threats as opposed to a more binary outlook keeping non-traditional and traditional military related threats separate. In their paper on blue crime, Bueger and Edmunds (2020) also suggest a disconnect of insurgent and terrorism threats from the organised crime category in their outline of maritime security threats.[476] This proposed disconnect risks leaving hybridity of threats, terrorism and insurgency in limbo or detached from their wider maritime implications due to their political objectives, but they remain an acute threat cluster with a maritime overspill. Given

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[474] Bueger, C & Edmunds, T. (2017). pp. 1 299–1301.

[475] Bueger, C., Edmunds, T. & McCabe, R. (2021). p. 6.

[476] Bueger, C. & Edmunds, T. (2020). p. 5.

the dynamic of the maritime security matrix in Figure 4, insurgency and terrorism as well as hybridisation fit in where Quadrant 3 begins to intersect with softer maritime security threats and vulnerabilities that in turn feed volatility, opportunities, skills, and know-how making up the architecture of hybridity and its modification for threatening maritime security. Quadrant 3 is also a function of and is expanded or contracted by how well non-traditional threats on land and at sea are mitigated in Quadrants 1, 2 and 4.

Hybrid warfare threats draw on military ways and means to reinforce non-traditional options to pursue political objectives. Naval competition, insurgency, terrorism, and hybridisation manifesting through navies, naval/maritime militias, maritime wings, and capabilities with political, rather than exclusive criminal/financial objectives are at play. This political-criminal interface harks back to interconnectedness and liminality, as well as transnationality, which help to explain how actors and the strategies they employ relate to, mutate, and even shape maritime security as an interwoven African security threat complex and not as dispersed islands of threats.[477] Confluence of traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats do take place in the WIO as military conflict and growing military footholds and intrusions escalate and collectively require for maritime security governance to be kept in step.

Hybrid threats in the Western Indian Ocean

Overlaps of regular and irregular warfare are spaces amenable to the intermediate level of war that governments exploit to carry out military-backed policies.[478] States employ hybridisation to take advantage of the ambiguities housed in the grey zone to reinforce unconventional operations and soft politics with military power in a way that limits attribution and promotes deniability. Yemen is a case in point where conventional forces, rebels, terrorist organisations and insurgent groups combine with state actors and their agendas to sustain the war, but with dangerous offshore spill overs.

Armed conflict erupted in Yemen and by 2015 it involved myriad state and non-state actors. A shifting Saudi-led military coalition of Arab states[479] allied with a ruling faction of the collapsed Yemeni government fighting the Houthi-led rebel movement. The Houthi movement in turn partnered with a breakaway faction of the collapsed Yemeni government with support from Iran. Iranian backing includes its proxy, Hezbollah, as intermediary and transferring military systems used to also threaten maritime security off Yemen.[480] Several non-state actors like Al-Qaeda, the Islamic state and secessionist movements in the southern coastal regions participate in or exploit the military contestation.[481] The resultant factional control and fighting extended to the Gulf of Aden and the southern entrance to the Red Sea where maritime security governance all but collapsed.[482] Weak governance off Yemen's south and west coasts depicted in the SSI intersect with the waters of the northern

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[477] Bueger, C & Edmunds, T. (2017). p. 1 299.

[478] Belo, D. (2020). p. 75.

[479] See note 10.4.

[480] Karakar, IA. (2018). pp. 121–149.

[481] Ibid. p. 124.

[482] Ardemagni, E. (2020).

WIO, which is known for its threat array to maritime security, triggered by Somalia's internal armed conflict and weak governance in general. This danger is reinforced by views from Asal and Hastings (2015)[483] – that territorial control, capacity and motivations to engage in acts of maritime terrorism are connected. War in Yemen intensifies the offshore threat profile, as it includes military attacks on shipping along its coast and close to African waters. The proximity of armed threats from Yemen to the Horn of Africa are facilitated by the geographic features of the GOA and Red Sea's southern entrance, demonstrating the role of liminality. Fighting on land for territorial control spills into the southern Red Sea, where the confined waters suit the tactical use of looted and foreign supplied conventional arms against maritime targets, such as commercial and military vessels.[484]

As armed factions in Yemen extend their operations offshore, they increase the risk of armed attacks on shipping alongside non-traditional threats that include piracy, robbery, smuggling of illicit goods, drugs, and weapons.[485] These military styled actions aim to destroy, not hijack or board and rob the vessels, and include attacks on naval vessels that invoke military countermeasures. Hastings and Asal[486] stress access to capabilities and state support as two catalysts that reinforce decisions of terrorist and insurgent movements to conduct attacks on maritime targets. Conventional weapons systems taken from Yemen's military arsenals include arms rarely found in the arsenals of irregular forces. In addition, Iran as the primary Houthi supporter through the Iranian-backed Hezbollah movement, supplies offensive hardware, intelligence, and a local capability to support and conduct hybrid warfare.[487] Arm transfers include drone boat and anti-ship missiles, resulting in at least 15 attacks at sea in the Bab-El-Mandeb, from Hodeida and Mocha Island since 2016. The attacks are indiscriminate and include aid vessels, as well as fishing boats. Attacks on shipping decreased in 2018 as coalition forces increased territorial control, but the laying of sea mines again raised the threat to shipping. Houthi-laid sea mines threaten a major international sea lane through the Bab-El-Mandeb and remains an indiscriminate naval warfare tactic further accentuating the presence of weapons unfamiliar to the arsenals of irregular forces.[488]

The use of remote-controlled boats supplements the threat of sea mines and missile attacks.[489] Vessels uncovered in Yemen show modified Iranian drone boats designed to ram ships. Their presence ties in with a 2019 report of eight attempted or successful attacks with remotely controlled platforms against vessels off Yemen.[490] Overall, this threat reflects hybridity that endangers maritime assets via a third proxy (Iran – Hezbollah – Houthi) with military systems and training more akin to conventional operations, but a union masking the state actor and shielding Iran from attribution and retribution. Three variables identified by Asal and Hastings

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[483] Asal, V. & Hastings, V. (2015). p. 727.

[484] Abdulla, KA. & Sidhu., JS. (2018). pp. 84–90.

[485] Ibid. p. 87.

[486] Asal, V. & Hastings, V. (2015). p. 727.

[487] Cordesman, AH. (2019). pp. 1–2.

[488] Weiss, C. (2019).

[489] Weiss, C. (2020).

[490] Shay, S. (2019). p. 58.

combine here to make the Houthi more dangerous as a maritime security threat: specific types of capabilities, control of territory, and being well-connected to other actors, where the Iran-Hezbollah nexus and cooperation with piracy/smuggling syndicates and networks play out.[491]

Table 5 reflects a selection of incidents demonstrating how the war on land includes military-styled threats from Yemen to shipping in the GOA and the southern entrances to the Red Sea. The use of sophisticated military hardware, improvised devices, as well as small arms play out. These attacks stem primarily from the range of Houthi factions supported by Iran through Hezbollah as a proxy, as well as insurgent and local militia groupings using the grey zone in an opportunistic way amidst the ongoing war in Yemen.[492] These predisposing conditions dovetail with looted and transferred military weapons systems in the Houthi arsenal to threaten and attack shipping off Yemen's coast as reflected in Table 5.

Table 5: Military styled attacks and threats to shipping off Yemen

Date	Location	Type of attack	Target vessels	Attackers
2016	West coast of Yemen	Anti-ship missile	UAE naval vessel	Houthis
2016	West coast of Yemen	Anti-ship missile	Two US navy vessels	Houthis
2016	Bab-El-Mandeb	Small arms and explosives	LNG	Unknown
2017	Bab-El-Mandeb	Small arms attack from the sea	Oil tanker	Houthis
2017	West coast of Yemen	Missile attack / suicide boat	Saudi naval vessel	Houthis
2017	Port of Al-Mocha	Remotely controlled boat	UAE naval vessel	Houthis
2017	Port of Al-Mocha / Yemen west coast	Sea mines	Fishing boat and Yemeni CG vessel	Houthis
2018	Hodeida	Small arms attack from the sea	UN chartered supply vessel	Houthis[493]
2019	Hodeida	Hijack and Robbery	Towing vessel	Unknown[494]

Events in Table 5 and vulnerabilities set out in Table 4 coincide with a growing militarisation of the WIO through international naval deployments in particular manifesting as strategic responses to other actors and part of wider geopolitical competition but using the WIO to posture and compete for influence and

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[491] Asal, V. & Hastings, V. (2015). p. 736.

[492] Shay, S. (2019). p. 36.

[493] Anon. (2018).

[494] Al Jazeera (2019).

interests.[495] For Africa this competition and its militarisation are most visible in the international military presence in Djibouti. The military build-up grows under the banner of protecting maritime interests in the region. Melvin lists several countries maintaining a military presence in Djibouti: China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and USA.[496] This international military presence unfolds amidst a second layer comprising competitors including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Iran and then Russia, and Israel on the periphery in Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan. This clustering of foreign military entities jockeying for position and influence heightens the threat of military confrontation at sea due to accidental or aggressive manoeuvrings amongst themselves or in support of their proxies in Yemen and Somalia, with India also raising its naval profile in the region in response to the growing Chinese presence.[497] In another way, this presence also creates scope for hybridity as several powers are in the position to use proxies in Yemen, Somalia, and even Eritrea and Sudan, in pursuit of objectives, making available their hardware, but remaining below the accountability radar.

Military assets in Djibouti belonging to foreign powers with competing interests overlay existing regional tensions as local and wider interests in the Middle East, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea play out.[498] The array of foreign countries have competing global interests (USA, China, Russia, India) and competing regional interests (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, UAE, and Israel) all operating in locations bordering the volatile GOA. Vital national interests are at stake with emerging and declining powers flexing their military (naval) muscle and using the mix of actors and their skills or popularity in hybrid ways to minimise direct military confrontation as they back their regional state and non-state proxies under the banner of development, peace support, maritime security, maritime trade protection and countering foreign aggression.

Off Mozambique, in the southwestern Indian Ocean, the threat is more that of managing risk perception given the limited maritime security arrangements to secure this southern tip of the WIO in the Mozambique Channel. In the face of insurgents threatening coastal towns close to the upcoming gas infrastructure and direct armed attacks on Palma (2021) and Mocimboa da Praia (2020), the maritime threat profile emerged. In the absence of any meaningful maritime response from Mozambique the insurgent threat remained on the radar although events on land draws most attention, responses, and resources.[499] The armed insurgency also initiated a military response with forces from Rwanda, SADC (South Africa, Botswana, Tanzania, Angola, Zimbabwe), insurgents, radical Islamic elements, and factions of the rebel RENAMO movement (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana), now all clustering in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique. In response, South Africa deployed (as part of the SADC intervention operation) an inshore

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[495] Bueger, C. & Stockbruegger, J. (2016). pp. 6–7.

[496] Melvin, N. (2019). p. 2.

[497] Ibid. pp. 7–8.

[498] Ibid. p. 26.

[499] DefenceWeb. (2021).

patrol vessel to help with patrolling off Cabo Delgado.[500] A small United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) training team arrived in Maputo to assist the maritime authorities with maritime capacity building and set up a protection force to attend to offshore threats in Cabo Delgado.[501] Overall, the maritime response is minimal, with only the UNODC engaged in the wider field of maritime security capacity building in support of a post-insurgency scenario to mitigate terrorism and violent extremism, crime (including transnational crime) and promote rule of law in an ongoing cooperative agreement under the 'Maputo Roadmap of UNODC engagement in Mozambique'.[502] As illustrated by the IIAG and the SSI the landward and maritime landscapes of Cabo Delgado remain weakly governed, creating facilitating conditions for insurgents and their attacks on vulnerable coastal settlements and infrastructure.

Although more perceptual, Mozambique is on the maritime security governance radar to track whether the insurgency is contained, or whether liminality and its accompanying effects of complexity and interconnectedness also begin to play out at sea. For Mozambique in particular some risks outlined by Asal and Hastings must be noted. First, religious-driven groups have a greater propensity to engage in maritime attacks. Two, networking into drug smuggling networks for money and skills' purposes represent areas insurgents use to extend operations out to sea. Third, territorial control that includes a coastline, as well as links with other terrorist organisations collectively heighten the maritime threat profile.[503] In combination, control over territory on the coast, resultant access to smuggling networks (the high-yielding drug trade in particular), and obtaining the material means to engage in maritime attacks serve as predisposing conditions to turn an insurgency and terrorist tactics offshore. An ungoverned space at sea heightens the attractiveness of insurgency moving offshore and in so doing present opportunities to interested actors to capitalise on the hybrid opportunities on offer in a new, energy-rich location coming onto line.

Conclusions

This chapter set out to address the rise in maritime security threats that hold a potential connection with insurgency, terrorism, and spill overs from wars on land. The arguments presented (1) recognise the prominence of non-traditional maritime security threats off Africa and (2) highlight how the national security connection with military threats that feed off elements of terrorism and insurgency are growing in the WIO off Africa's eastern littoral and (3) call for more clarity to encourage prevention and mitigation as important maritime security, capacity-building endeavours.

The convergence of different forms of warfare on land and a growing militarisation at sea through naval build-ups impact the WIO and underline the utility of the

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[500] Gibson, E. (2021).

[501] UN. (2021).

[502] Ibid.

[503] Asal, V. & Hastings, V. (2015). p. 376.

maritime security matrix that accounts more cogently for national security and sea power, as well as for military escalation. While the SSI, for example, highlights enforcement matters, the matrix accommodates traditional and non-traditional security threats by juxtaposing more traditional warfighting and sea power in support of national security alongside non-traditional maritime security clusters.

Off the eastern African littoral, attempts at leveraging hybrid warfare in pursuit of political objectives impact at sea as well. This development features alongside insurgent threats located at the interface of the national security-naval quadrant with the non-traditional maritime security quadrants of human security, blue economy, and the marine environment. This confluence brings into focus threats and responses in the military realm that highlight how the national security-naval interaction remains part of the dynamic of the matrix's quadrants as they grow and contract.

Asal and Hastings (2015) inject practical considerations on how insurgency, terrorism, and hybridity in the Western Indian Ocean come into play with elements found in Yemen and Mozambique to the likes of religion, networks, skills transfers and access to the right logistics and the sea. The overlap and merger of threats off Yemen, Somalia, and Mozambique, alongside the naval build-up in Eritrea suggest a rethink of security governance, capacity building for maritime security off Africa's eastern littoral and within the spaces offered by the SSI and the matrix approach. In this manner, Asal and Hastings help to indicate how terrorism, insurgency and hybridity come to threaten maritime assets on the coast and at sea and in turn how decision-makers could broaden governance and better focus mitigation programmes and measures.

Conclusion

Francois Vreÿ

Security governance as a concept and an activity offer one lens to view the state of security affairs on the African continent. The governance approach also allows for several sectors, agencies, government departments and non-governmental actors to be measured, criticised, and even recognised for their contributions, or lack thereof. Ultimately, governments, however constituted or having assumed power, allocate priorities and resources, and are held accountable for how they govern their national territories, and take care of their citizens. The upholding of the concept of a social contract between the people in power and the wider citizenry has often been a source of tension in fragile African states and beyond. The idea that both sides to the contract have both rights and duties as members of society is often quite different in reality. While the aforementioned outlook is starkly normative, it nonetheless represents a generally accepted practice within the domain of statecraft. In reality, security governance in many African countries is often ignored, weak or deliberately skewed in how governments can or prefer to execute their governance responsibilities. As a result, the security conditions that must underpin good governance in the interest of African citizens fail to deliver the rule of law foundations that stability and safety require. However, as indicated, this is not just a top-down relationship between states elites and citizenry but is characterised by a duality.

The respective chapters in this edited edition cover a range of theories, ways and means regarding how international, regional, state and even non-state actors enter the African security governance realm. The contributions depict the proliferation of security governance contributions from ideas to practices over time, on land and at sea off Africa. Security actor proliferation in Africa present opportunities and pitfalls while the global security ripples of the COVID-19 global pandemic and the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine merely add to extreme pressures on all African governments to extend good governance practices over their sovereign territories. Although external or even black swan events, the impact of COVID and the Russia-Ukraine War on African governance capacities remain. The mere fact that several African states are dependent on external supplies of grain and fertilisers

to ensure food security speaks directly to this lack of effective government and bad governance. The subsequent dilemma of taking care of national societies under unfavourable conditions inherently turns the attention to ways and means for improved governance resilience over the longer term. Bearing in mind that changes and improvements in security governance on the African continent are bound to be incremental rather than radical, chapters in this volume go some of the way to raise ideas and suggest contributions to improve or reconsider ways and means to address security governance voids.

Cassin and Zyla contribute by outlining international engagement in peace operations and sketch out how peace- and state-building governance evolved over time to assist with lowering the catalysts for and effects of state fragility upon countries and their societies. In 'Peace- and state-building governance' they trace the pathway from state fragility to liberal peacebuilding, hybridity and turning to local knowledge and institutional practices and structures to offset the critique heaped upon a skewed Western top-down approach. The dynamic or conceptual mobility they outline helped to set the scene for progress to overcome stasis in the evolving debates and practices. Progress towards sustainable and substantive peace and entrapments stemming from liberal peacebuilding effected a change of tack to also consider hybrid approaches to rope in local governance structures as catalysts to make interventions under the peace and state-building banner more legitimate and effective. The value of their contribution brings the reality of change to the fore and of particular importance, how different lessons and inputs based upon best practices from both worlds entered the governance and state-building mix. While not perfect and still subject to ongoing criticism, one can question how far alternative or competitive paradigms for state- and peacebuilding have progressed and the extent to which alternative models to the liberal and hybrid models are more attractive to African leaders, and especially the citizenry. Unfortunately, it competes directly and indirectly with the external and often unfamiliar if not offensive perception of imposed measures under the banner of 'this is better'.

African leaders have a dominant role to play in the extension of security governance, its quality and the partnerships and cooperation that evolve. Central to their leadership roles must be caring for their citizens, particularly those having to live in dangerous zones brought about by armed conflict and its instigators, which reflect badly on local as well as national leadership. In this regard, Velthuizen furthers the argument for alternative thinking to forge better security governance. 'From broken Athenian edifice to secure dwelling: Renewing the African peace and security architecture' is premised upon a much greater role, input and participation for Africa's people expected to even transcend the much-quoted African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) framework set up by the AU to mitigate threats, vulnerabilities, and the propensity for war. Chapter 2 aligns with the Introduction in that it argues for a further rethink of how security governance can address the interest of those most exposed to threats in conflict zones. Velthuizen puts much faith in knowledge and influences stemming from entities other than those of state – whether national or international – with local grass-roots knowledge and credibility as central tenets. This enters a dynamic not easily captured by impersonal and even clinical state mechanisms with faceless features alien to many local

communities, where change for the better is critical and even existential. In contrast, the argument for harnessing local knowledge and tradition finds more appeal, through familiarity and acceptability amongst local communities. Unfortunately, it competes directly and indirectly with the external and often unfamiliar if not offensive perceptions of imposed measures under the banner of this is better'. The way how the Velthuizen presents AKS under the 'ubuntu' banner as a competitive or alternative continental appeal to Africa's people posits an untapped source to augment ongoing thought and programmes that too often tether on the brink of failure. Military expenditures, coercion and the attraction of armed security remain high, albeit so that their utility is limited or fragmented in the asymmetrical spaces of weak security governance in Africa. In addition, Africa's rulers and ruling classes also fall out step with their communities. They fail to extend the expected public goods to all, while often representing the real threat, not the solution. Despite all the good intentions, governments, their institutions, and even continental security arrangements dominated by political heads, such as APSA and its regional iterations remain questionable. Alongside a semi-functional global architecture to promote peace in a convincing way and so aptly demonstrated by the Russian military attack on Ukraine, room is opened for more efficient peacebuilding pathways. For Africa, this serves as a renewed entry point to argue indigenous ways to reinforce the limited and oft criticised contributions of formalised African security arrangements. However, concepts and practices in the peace-making domain remain mixed and not always aligned with peace support operations remaining apex security activities on the African security governance landscape.

Mandrup's focus is on Somalia, where AMISOM illustrates how state-building initiatives aim to set in place and capacitate government institutions to extend quality public goods to citizens. He posits peace support operations (PSOs) as missions that contribute to the overall state-building process through the array of resources they bring into play. Of particular importance is how PSOs contribute conditions conducive to settling the overall problem of rebuilding societies by operationalising the concepts of 'clear, hold and rebuild'. Entering or expanding physical security spaces, promoting room for greater political will to enter and investing in longer-term commitments, promote prospects for constructive measures to play a greater role and reconnect communities with governments. The latter ties into the deliberate or implicit social contract collapse between local parties calling for a reconnect between main players (government and society) in the security governance sector. In addition, to play their roles and contribute in more convincing ways, more robust PSO mandates allow for external interventions to contain or blunt the roles of dangerous actors and more so if solid partnerships with regional actors are forged. Along these lines, PSOs in Africa (such as AMISOM in Somalia) unfold along a continuum or configuration of humanitarian interventions based on regional organisations, bringing their standby forces to bear, using UN-mandated PSO contingents operating in partnership with regional forces, bringing in a UN-based force to reinforce an existing PSO with a specific protection mission, and the UN operating alongside other non-UN missions towards a common goal. In combination, the different PSO partner configurations help to overcome the limitations of singular PSOs in Africa enslaved to a constrictive mandate as opposed

to mandate flexibility when working with partner missions. Along these lines, PSOs, as argued by Darkwa, serve as a mechanism to implement negotiated outcomes, reinforcing security governance and strengthen local institutions. Unfortunately, political elites remain the make-or-break actors as they gatekeep the entry of and the configuration of PSOs, as well as the mandates that expand or contract the quality of security governance required.

In Chapter 5, Murithi seeks tenable, but difficult answers that lay beyond the local/national landscapes and turns to the tough option of regional reconciliation as a route to address security deficits. As African conflicts rarely respect national boundaries and imperil regions and societies across national borders, national responses become marginal. As opposed to intervention, 'Regional Reconciliation in Africa's Ungoverned Spaces' opens a neglected aspect of mitigating the impact of weak or absent security governance. The regional argument is notoriously difficult, but Murithi outlines the challenges that tend to foster the neglect of the regional reconciliation route. A method embedded in truth recovery, justice, reparation, restoration of human dignity and re-establishing relationships underpins the process of regional reconciliation. While appearing simple, regional reconciliation implies that a host of parties must embrace and practise these principles alongside understanding the interdependence at play, genuine dialogue, develop a democratic inclusive attitude, and joint endeavours to address legacies brought about by multiple injustices. Such laudable principles and actions are, however, confronted by complex, messy repercussions with tentacles across oft-contested borders and conflict promoting on their own account. Volatile border landscapes compound the prevalence of African conflicts spilling into neighbouring countries while underpinned by historic and interconnected dynamics that intensify the difficulty of regional reconciliation. In turn, the drive to better account for complexity and operationalise the principles and commitments that parties to the conflict must heed, becomes more complex. The chapter calls for a more expansive and externally focused way of thinking as opposed to incremental inward ideas and actions that are utterly vulnerable to the regional dynamics at play. Operating with a regional mindset cognisant of the regional undercurrents, as well as differences from working at a national level is the primary imperative at play while the disruptive sovereignty argument again comes into play. Declaratory wise, African states are over-protective of their national borders and fiercely uphold sovereignty as a right. Regional reconciliation in turn operates better alongside softer sovereignty embedded in sovereignty as a responsibility. This promotes regional and continental integration, interdependence of trade, agriculture, resources, markets, transport infrastructure and ultimately security governance to solidify the regional imperative to deal with threats and vulnerabilities in dangerous border neigbourhoods. Toning down the sovereignty as right and state-centric moulds in favour of regional reconciliation unfortunately remains a difficult enterprise. Simultaneously, regional initiatives pursued to enhance security in troubled regions offer little in terms of success and further red flags the difficulties facing initiatives based on regional reconciliation for better security governance.

'Private military and security contractors in ungoverned spaces' links up with the debate on the role of non-traditional actors entering the African security governance

domain. Although not a recent phenomenon, Eeben Barlow raises several concerns of note. Although a topic reflecting strong lobbies, private contractors have become a persistent feature on the African security scene and one growing, rather than declining. One striking matter is how Barlow paints a migration profile of absent and weak governance, also finding expression in urban and semi-urban areas where the reach of state is limited, contested, or just absent. Alongside fractured government security policies and strategies, public resentment has fertile ground to grow, making governments desperate for answers to bolster security governance. While reasons for dissatisfaction are myriad, how private contractors play into the weakly or ungoverned security scenario is important, as they are double edged agents that could exacerbate or mitigate insecurity governance. Private contractors are not independent actors in this milieu and come into play when one or more pillars of state collapse or become dysfunctional and governments perceive a need for quick intervention. Governments thus turn to private contractors for several reasons that include, but are not confined to, the flexibility they offer and particularly their propensity to render quick results, but of a limited scope and most important – to operate in close conjunction with the official authorities. Furthermore, private contractors augment and do not replace government efforts as is often perceived wrongly. Private contractors bring force multiplier skills in complex security environments where governments are contested or merely weak. Professional private contracting companies can thus be a force for good, through the flexibility and multiple roles and skills base they offer to boost limited governance, but it is not all good news. Barlow is open about the negative side and the ethics of some companies that call their professionalism and ethics into question when they transgress national and international laws and follow self-serving agendas or break their contractual obligations. It is thus to be seen how the new wave of Russian and Chinese private security contractors entering the continent fare in some of Africa's spaces plagued by weak security governance such as Sudan, Mali, CAR, and Libya.

One of the difficulties for African governments to extend security governance is the growth in actor proliferation. Barlow addressed the entry of private security actors, but Henningsen broadens the disturbing reality of actor proliferation. While Barlow, as well as Darkwa point out limitations in what interventionist forces are capable of, 'The proliferation of security actors in the Sahel: the interplay between international regime complexity and local emergence' further flags the complexities brought about by international security providers alongside the simultaneous rise of local security providers. Although both clusters of players have roles, waves of mitigation and escalation of violence in the Sahel continue. The Sahel illustrates the balance between the two, and the reality of actor proliferation by way of external and local security providers. Proliferation also encouraged fragmentation and complexity to undermine the potential of structured security providers. The net effect eroded the impact of formal armed groups being a better answer, but left local communities exposed to violence from a host of rival, locally-armed assemblies. In addition, the official authorities of local states did not help much as they failed to enforce state authority, remained marginal in contested territories, and seemed helpless, which allowed for coups, and entry of more external security actors. The entry of the Russian Wagner Group in Mali best depicts the unravelling of the Western and

French presence in the Sahel alongside the collapse of the government, but it is debatable whether they can bring about order amidst the interlinked complexity reigning in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Time has shown that the situation is too unpredictable for any one security provider to control such unpredictability with the security governance deficit expected to persist. Returning to negotiations, peaceful conflict resolution and allowing local ways and means to play their roles might eventually bring about better security governance to what became essentially ungoverned spaces.

The above discussion contains a strong landward focus and portrays the intricacies facing those attempting to enhance security governance in neglected national and regional African landscapes. Simultaneously, security governance in Africa's extensive maritime landscapes remains a hotly debated and researched security field. Addressing maritime security governance off Africa is not vastly different from the tapestry of threats, vulnerabilities and desired architectures of responses found on land. Efforts to bring about security governance at sea is, however, difficult given the unique nature of the oceans as a security landscape. Ungoverned, or weakly governed maritime territories where rule of law is not enforced abound off Africa.

Two chapters addressed maritime security governance off Africa to bring together the interplay between security governance on land and at sea. Reviewing the Gulf of Guinea off West and Central Africa, Yücel outlines the connection between a maritime landscape shared by numerous states and the imperative of transnational cooperation. Offshore, African, and non-African state actors flourish and cooperate along lines of cooperation, coordination, and privatisation. No different than on land and as outlined by Henningsen, problems arise when numerous security providers enter the security governance cauldron. In furthering maritime security governance in the Gulf of Guinea, transnational cooperation remains the desired norm, but one holding its own difficulties. Yücel outlines these complexities that remain the focus of many research endeavours and programmes. He also maps out how capacity building, sovereignty, and direct-action interplay to enhance the much-desired maritime security governance as a conditionality to harness the potential of sovereign oceans territories in the national interests. Sovereignty, cooperation, and foreign actors remain a difficult mix that simultaneously help and hamper programmes and actions to turn the security governance tide in this region away from bad order at sea. Generally African countries do not have the ways and means to extend a credible level of maritime security governance alongside rule of law over their sovereign waters. In this vein, cooperation with foreign navies (irrespective of the sovereignty argument) remains a tenable way to assist with maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Even on an ad-hoc basis when required, and within the framework of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, more resources, better cooperation without intruding on sovereignty becomes possible. Yücel's premise recommends that regional maritime arrangements (such as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct) to address maritime security with a regional mechanism also presents a vehicle to lower sovereignty barriers and allow for international players and resources to enter the maritime security actor mix in a non-intrusive way.

Maritime security governance contestations, debates and programmes in the Western Indian Ocean are not dissimilar from those discussed for the Gulf of Guinea. African

countries bordering the Western Indian Ocean also face difficulties to extend rule of law over their ocean territories amidst indices of their governance capacities not showing encouraging profiles. In addition, the scope of maritime threats in WIO unfortunately also entered the hybrid realm with terrorism, insurgency and armed conflict escalating and spilling into the WIO off Mozambique, Somalia, and Yemen. These hard security threats stimulated militarisation as foreign powers extended their security responses with military bases and naval forces in the WIO. As a result, the African littoral bordering the Indian Ocean shows a full spectrum of maritime threats across the hard–soft security divide, which contest the capacity of African state actors to respond in kind. As a result, one finds an extensive array of responses to reinforce maritime security governance holding a very visible international profile to assist with governance. The response spectrum ranges from navies, multiple maritime security capacity building programmes with African countries and their governance agencies, including the multi-national and regionally focused Djibouti Code of Conduct to address piracy, terrorism, and dangerous crimes at sea. As in the case of the Gulf of Guinea, actor proliferation also emerged in the WIO. Proliferation applies to threats, as well as to actors opposing them and has become an indelible part of the maritime security dynamic in the WIO. Dealing with maritime security governance off the eastern seaboard of Africa does, however, have a more militarised and international profile as opposed to the Gulf of Guinea. As a result, the importance of recognising the prominence of non-traditional maritime security threat actors off Africa. They feed off elements of hybrid warfare, terrorism and insurgency and raise the actor spectrum of shaping and extending maritime security governance. The dangerous military profile growing off Africa's eastern littoral calls for more clarity to encourage prevention and mitigation as important maritime security capacity building endeavours African governments must consider.

The above overview of contributions allows for some concluding observations on security governance in weakly governed African spaces. First, the focus on security governance is part of a much larger debate encapsulated in how international and national ideas and programmes unfolded as missions in support of state building and stronger institutions. Both focus areas aimed to assist with limiting governance voids in African conflict theatres. Debilitating intricacies of external interventions premised upon doing good, but not accounting for the mismatch between external views and domestic realities of local sentiments became serious impediments. While accounting for this mismatch through adaptation, the prospects of doing better are not good. Better security governance through state and institution building thus holds some potential, but limitations remain.

Local realities such as knowledge and legitimising hubs along with political leadership continue to be critical, as in the debates on state- and institution building. One avenue suggested and increasingly recognised is to tie the value of local sentiments and functionality of cultural preferences housing broad appeal into security-building endeavours. Ubuntu as an African Knowledge System (AKS) and its general appeal at national and regional levels is one important way to soften the intrusive and perceived bluntness of external intervention. Although not new, one can argue that given the retreat of and growing doubts about external intervention underpinned by military-led programmes, something must give. Are governance

imperatives not advanced better by refining and integrating its 'local content' more rigorously alongside more resources? The drive for more local recognition remains an input to an overly-complex security cauldron, where it is seen to help alleviate incompatibilities. External interventions are after the debacle and defeat in Afghanistan increasingly a light footprint in nature, opening up for locally driven answers and solutions to difficult problems.

The one reality that permeates better security governance, whether on land or at sea, is the emphasis on cooperation. Security threats are too often wicked threats and thus require multi-party cooperation and incremental progress to prevent or mitigate. The wickedness and its surrounding dynamics of actor proliferation signifies that a weak government with limited capabilities to respond is not a tenable answer. It is also the scenario that stimulated the rise of peace support interventions to assist where governments cannot or even prefer not to deal with effects of weakly governed territories under their jurisdiction. Although the success of interventions in African conflicts is ambivalent at best, it remains the response of choice and one mutating into different models informed by the configuration of partnerships with other missions underpinned by the AU, regional arrangements, or even ad-hoc partnerships of coalitions of the willing and new partners.

Cooperation between state actors is the easier part of the collaborative mindset. Living up to the regionalism imperative is more difficult, but objectively a plausible alternative to consider. Few, if any, of the African cases where governance collapse gives rise to armed violence have only local origins and are not also fueled by trans-border skirmishes with historic roots. Argued as a more convincing and inclusive route to address the effects of governance voids and these being exploited by opportunistic and often criminal actors, regionalism holds its own appeal. Difficulties also abound to overcome hard borders, entrenched sovereignty as a shield to ward off real or perceived intrusions and overcoming regional actor proliferation, with each bringing their own agendas to an already overcrowded security setting.

Private security and military contractors are emblematic of non-state security providers bringing much-needed skills to assist governments, but too often tainted by legitimate or fabricated accusations of spoilers. However perceived, private contractors remain in the security actor mix with a renewed impetus as larger numbers of Russian and Chinese contractors increasingly enter weakly governed African spaces and its insecurity ramifications. The Sahel portrays an archetypical case of actor proliferation amid weak security governance and interventions. Here the entry of private contractors alongside myriad local actors with constructive and destructive or disruptive agendas flourish, but the benefits are difficult to isolate from the insecurity clutter. The chapter on the Sahel's outline of proliferation and the tensions between international regime complexity and local emergence of players typifies the dilemmas and complexity of how the debates on, configuration and reconfiguration of responses, and the parties involved keep on mutating to confound the logic or rationality of keeping in step with a shifting actor and security landscape. At present, the Sahel also portrays how traditional international actors and practices are rotating out of theatres and a new array of actors are entering, leaving more questions than answers. The dynamics and policy answers seem to be

changing, even though the toolbox often remains the same. New answers to the wicked problems facing the Sahel have seemingly not come to the fore.

Turning offshore, similarities on maritime security governance and its landward iteration coincide. In both cases presented covering the Gulf of Guinea and the WIO, the security governance deficit at sea is linked to a deficit on land and thus stressing the notion of liminality: weak security governance on land has a maritime spillover. At sea, cooperation is the common operative term, as African littoral countries appear to have even less capacity to extend rule of law over their sovereign maritime territories compared to land. This was something the editors of this book already highlighted in a previous edited volume on 'Good Order at Sea in East Africa' and is therefore not a new finding. However, it does stress the need for a comprehensive approach to governance challenges, both maritime and land based. They should not be considered separate issues. This capacity deficit not only starkly emphasizes state-to-state cooperation, but also the regional dimension to account for the geographic ambit of insecurity that arises from an ever-growing array of threats preying on African maritime vulnerabilities. In the Gulf of Guinea, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct shows that African countries have done well to bring a regional architecture into play to respond to maritime threats by thrashing out a security governance network that includes most littoral countries.

In the Western Indian Ocean, the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC), and its Jedda Amendment (with considerable international support and participation) tie in African littoral countries to help address maritime threats off the continent's eastern littoral. As a regional mechanism, the DCoC operates alongside regional and national attempts to counter maritime security threats, albeit that these programmes are more limited in kind. Security governance in Africa with its initial landward focus also finds expression on the continent's ocean landscapes raising new, but also remarkably similar concerns and difficulties found on land. The overall question of ungoverned spaces and its numerous ordeals oft labeled wicked in character on both land and sea thus face already overburdened African governments with a dual security governance dilemma.

Criticism and even cynicism are often heaped upon the array of ways and means developed and still evolving to help African governments beat back the scourge of absent or weak governance to counter the escalation of violent actors on their territories. In response, this publication maps out the inherent difficulties, progression and also regression embedded or hidden in ongoing attempts to work with and help African governments to overcome the governance deficit. Evolving along a pathway broadly marked out by the governance, state- and institution building approach, each chapter is characterised by its attention to contributions, limitations, and adjustments to come to terms with the complexity of responding to the threats and vulnerabilities at play. More space for local and established practices, employing a traditional concept and practice, such as (for example) ubuntu, which better resonates with African audiences is one approach. In addition, refining peace operations, and mastering the regional imperative over the national, more piece-meal approach is suggested as well.

In addition, harnessing specific skills of private contractors in legitimate ways to overcome their demonisation, and orchestrating responses to actor proliferation and threat cycles in the Sahel all contribute by framing threats and workable solutions. At sea, a parallel security governance threat landscape requires of African institutions to be Janus – faced and confront their maritime threats and landward dangers simultaneously – a matter bound to pressure most countries and their limited resources to extend governance over this dualistic sovereign responsibility. Both domains nonetheless demand actions, programmes, capacity, cooperation, disentangling good from bad partnerships, and determine priorities. These incredibly challenging trade-offs govern the allocation of financial and human resources, as well as other means to execute national, regional, cooperative, and more independent programmes to deliver quality public goods. In an extremely competitive environment characterised by constant trade-offs, this publication highlights security governance actors, platforms, and services as a triad for successful programmes of governance embedded in justice for all, quality political goods, economic progress, and social services. These are all underpinned by the cooperation imperative as the golden thread linking land and sea, as well as the ambit of topics covered in the chapters presented.

Notes and references

Notes

Chapter 1

1.1 One way to view the 'how well' qualification is in the IIAG, with an explicit focus on Africa. See 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Key Findings | Mo Ibrahim Foundation.

Chapter 2

2.1 Benjamin Zyla is full professor in the School of International Development and Global Studies at the University of Ottawa, Canada where he directs the Peacebuilding and Local Knowledge Network (PLKN), as well as the Fragile States Research Network (as co-Director). Katelyn Cassin is a postdoctoral fellow in the same School.

2.2 Oliver Richmond refers to hybrid peacebuilding as 'post-liberal peacebuilding', noting that a hybrid approach constitutes a more "plausible approach for the development of peacebuilding than the mere modification of liberalism, or the wholesale dismantling of the liberal peacebuilding system" (2010: 31).

2.3 Call (2008) defines six problems associated with the definition 'failed state', including excessive aggregation of diverse states, cookie-cutter policies for stronger states, dodging proper democratisation, conflation of peacebuilding and state-building, Western bias over traditional states, and hiding the West's role in failure (for the latter two see also (Bøås and Jennings, 2007) who point out that the label 'fragile state' is mostly applied when Western interests are at stake; it was not applied to either Nigeria or Sudan). Call proposes that instead of using the term 'failed state' the literature should differentiate between collapsed states like Somalia, war-torn states like Afghanistan, and authoritarian states like North Korea, etc. For a similar disagreement, see (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982; Manjinkian, 2008; Ayers, 2012). However, (Goldstone, 2008) disagrees by noting that there is no universal definition of fragile or failed states (see also Nay, 2013). Lemay- Hébert (2009: 22) points out that the concept of state collapse is generally recognised as straightforward, but "the proliferation of terminologies" concerning the phenomenon of state collapse (collapsed state, failed state, fragile state, shadow state, weak state, quasi-state) and the process of addressing this issue of collapse (through peace-keeping, peacebuilding, state-building, nation-building) is evidence of conceptual ambiguity. In a similar vein, Milliken and Krause state the need to "develop more precise and nuanced concepts of state failure and state collapse" (2002: 754; see also Goldstone, 2008).

2.4 There is a significant debate in the literature on determining the exact characteristics of fragile and failed states. For our discussions here it is sufficient to note that, generally speaking, these states experience the loss of monopoly of violence (following a Weberian view of the state; see Suhrke, 2007), an inability of the state to provide citizens with basic

public goods (following a Durkheimian/Hobbesian social contract view of the state), and a breakdown of economic institutions (an argument often used by economists).

2.5 Inspired by Max Weber (1919) Ghani and Lockhart (2008) identify several functions that a state must have: monopoly on the use of force; administrative control over laws and regulations; control of public finances; ability to delineate citizenship rights and duties; providing basic public infrastructure and services; ability to regulate markets; manage collective assets (e.g. natural resources); conduct international relations; and implement the rule of law.

2.6 The social contract theory goes back to British philosopher Thomas Hobbes who argued in Leviathan that citizens would agree to submit to governmental authority as long as the government provides them with security.

2.7 There are four main sources of legitimacy: first is the input (process) legitimacy (e.g., through constitution); output (performance) legitimacy, which depends on perceptions about state performance, and the effectiveness and quality of the public goods and services states deliver; shared beliefs about what public authority should be; and international legitimacy, which derives from the recognition of state sovereignty by external actors (Milliken & Krause, 2002).

2.8 Several other scholars join Collier and Hoeffler in correlating primary commodities with civil war, nuancing this generalisation to attribute correlation only to fossil fuels (Fearon & Laitin, 2003), gemstones and narcotics (Ross, 2004), or all three (Ross, 2004). The mechanisms through which primary commodities increase the likelihood of civil war include the availability of finance for rebellion through extortion (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004); the opportunities for financing through the sale of future rights to resource extraction (Ross, 2004); as well as the impact of state predation of profits from such resources at the expense of public revenue generation (Goldstone, 2008). Ross (2004) attributed the longer duration of civil war in the presence of primary commodities, in part to the role of resources in encouraging foreign intervention to gain access, which prolongs conflict according to the findings of his study.

2.9 The following sentences are taken from Grant and Zyla (2021). Collier and Hoeffler nuance this correlation, however, arguing that it is not ethnic diversity or ethnic polarisation that increases the likelihood of civil war, but 'ethnic dominance', wherein one ethnic group is in the majority in a nation (2004: 588). Fearon and Laitin, however, contradict these findings noting that "after controlling for per capita income, more ethnically or religiously diverse countries have been no more likely to experience significant civil violence" (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 75).

2.10 Collier and Hoeffler present an analysis that simultaneously confirms and challenges the correlation between a weak or absent social contract and the risk of intrastate violence. Their study finds that the "grievance motivation" only positively correlates to the incidence of war in the case of "perceived grievances", which are often exaggerated, and "may be substantially disconnected from the large social concerns of inequality, political rights, and ethnic or religious identity" (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004: 589). Furthermore, they disprove a connection between objective grievance and the likelihood of civil war. These findings ultimately align with those of other scholars, which connects the absence of a functioning and inclusive social contract to the weakened legitimacy of the state. Whether or not the grievance is an objective reality, if it is experienced, then the legitimacy of the state is weakened in the eyes of those who perceive those grievances.

2.11 These last two sentences were taken from Grant and Zyla (2021), as well as the next two paragraphs that follow.

2.12 Fukuyama (2004) and von Einsiedel (2005) attribute the effectiveness of a state to its ability to "execute policies and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently – what is now commonly referred to as state or institutional capacity" (Fukuyama as quoted in Lemay-Hébert, 2009: 23).

2.13 Driven by a focus on state-society relations, the OECD (2008; 2009; 2012) considers state-building as an "endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations" (OECD, 2011: 20). By contrast, Barnett (2006) argues that peacebuilding essentially is state-building. The OECD disagrees and finds that "[...] peacebuilding is primarily associated with post-conflict environments, and state building is likely to be a central element of it [...]" (2008: 13).

2.14 This paragraph and the next draw heavily from Grant and Zyla (2021). Resilience is defined as "the ability to cope with changes in capacity, effectiveness or legitimacy" (OECD, 2008: 19). The majority of the literature has considered fragility and state failure as the opposite of resilience (s.f. OECD, 2009). Moreover, it has been linked to capacity and outcome whereby the former represents the ability to adapt to disturbances, stress and adversity, and the latter signifies a return to a stable position. For example, the United Nations characterises resilience as having "the capacity to withstand or absorb the impact of a hazard [whether natural or man-made] through resistance or adaptation, which enables [...] certain basic functions and structures during a crisis, and bounce back or recover from an event" (UNISDR, 2012: 11).

2.15 The UN identifies four pillars of state-building as essential: constitution making – that is developing a constitution in a fragile or failed state in the aftermath of conflict; reintegration of combatants into society and reconciliation of the conflict parties; electoral processes – that is running elections at various political levels; and the rule of law (Brahimi, 2004).

2.16 The security-development nexus as a concept and policy orientation has substantially developed and evolved in the post-9/11 context. This type of policy coherence and coordination has been articulated through calls for a comprehensive approach (OECD, 2004), a whole of government approach (OECD, 2007b), harmonisation (OECD, 2005b) and partnership with the non-governmental sector and national and local partners (OECD, 2008; OECD, 2012; World Bank, 2011; UNDP, 2012). Despite pervasive calls for a "coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding" (UN, 2005) caution must be applied to preserve humanitarian space, a lesson that emerges from operations in Afghanistan particularly, reflecting an important challenge of peace operations that intersect with counterinsurgency efforts through security-development nexus frameworks (Shirzay, 2012).

2.17 Post-colonial critics of the state-building enterprise, observe the perpetuation of global systemic inequalities inherent to the liberal institutionalist approach. To become 'developed' in this world order, countries must achieve self-reliance in a global system of trade, capitalism, international governance and humanitarian and development aid that effectively makes self-reliance unachievable (Duffield, 2007). In this humanitarian system of trusteeship, where self-reliance is largely broken down, 'anomie' and 'political extremism' become increasingly prevalent, thus further necessitating external governance of deviance through betterment (Duffield, 2007: 19). This produces a world 'system of de facto inequality', wherein migrant populations, deviant political voices, and ineffective states are funnelled into 'multi-agency programmes' of reconstruction and enduring political relationships (Ibid.: 222–223).

2.18 In presenting her argument for the attainment of security prior to promoting democracy, Anna K. Jarstad makes note of four 'dilemmas' that exist when pursuing peace and democracy. She describes the four dilemmas as, "the horizontal dilemma (i.e., inclusion

versus exclusion), the vertical dilemma (i.e., legitimacy versus efficacy), the systemic dilemma (i.e., local versus international ownership of the processes), and the temporal dilemma (i.e., long-term versus short-term efforts)" (Jarstad, 2008: 18). Arising from these dilemmas, her conclusion is that "when the choice is between securing the peace and promoting democracy, peace should be given priority" (Jarstad, 2008: 18).

2.19 Kant identifies the following principles as necessary for perpetual peace. He calls for good faith in the formation of peace agreements; for self-determination to underpin such agreements; for the dissolution of standing armies to remove the temptation of states to meet challenge with violence; the constraint on financial resources lent to the state so that the costs of war may serve to dissuade the incidence of war; the maintenance of sovereignty so that territorial acquisition did not temp nations to violence; and adherence to normative behavioural constraints on states in times of war so that unforgivable crimes do not come to pass (Kant, 1795).

2.20 The remainder of this paragraph draws heavily from Grant and Zyla (2021). Yoo (2011), however, points out that simply building state institutions will not solve state fragility, and that power-sharing arrangements must be devised among existing social blocs. That suggestion is similar to Malejacq's proposal for working with warlords on the basis that they will continue to exert an influence regardless. Barnett's republican peacebuilding is based on republican principles of deliberation, constitutionalism, and representation to help states recovering from war (Barnett, 2006).

2.21 This paragraph draws in part on Grant and Zyla (2021). The accepted formula was first deploying external peacekeepers to provide security as emergency relief, followed by disarmament, and the establishment of transitional governments (which have been found disappointing by (Caplan, 2005; Chesterman, 2004). Second, elections must be held, and new constitutions be drafted and ratified by elected parliamentarians. In the third phase, the international community continues its presence and assists with rooting out the causes of conflict, for example through economic development and further democratisation (Dobbins et al., 2005).

2.22 As Ayoob argues, historically state formation required "a relatively free hand to persuade, cajole, and coerce the disparate populations under their nominal rule" (2001: 130).

2.23 The term 'intervention' as well as its sister term 'humanitarian intervention' are highly debated in the literature (e.g., Hehir, 2010; MacFarlane, 2002). Over the years, a number of definitions have emerged. Vincent, for example, notes that an intervention is an, "activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states or an international organisation that interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state. It is a discrete event having a beginning and an end, and it is aimed at the authority structure of the target state (Vincent, 1974: 13). This represents the so-called traditional view of interventions. Recent scholarship has built on this definition and notes that there is a whole spectrum of an intervention (MacFarlane, 2002) ranging from minimum coercive means (e.g., diplomatic visits, public speeches in foreign country) to absolute coercive means (e.g., military engagements) (see also Annan, 1999; Bellamy, 2010; Hehir, 2010).

2.24 Fortna finds that peacekeeping after civil war "does tend to make peace more likely to last, and to last longer" (2004: 288). Goodman argues in favour of humanitarian intervention, advancing the thesis that "encouraging aggressively minded states to justify force as an exercise of humanitarian intervention can facilitate conditions for peace," specifically by placing constraints on their subsequent action (2006: 116). Both Helman and Ratner, as well as Von der Schulenburg (2014) call for more intrusive and comprehensive interventions. Helman and Ratner present a case for "conservatorship" or trusteeship (1992–1993: 12),

while Von der Schulenburg presents an argument for a "comprehensive peacebuilding approach" that leaves behind the three principles of peacekeeping (consent, impartiality and non-violence except in self-defense), in favour of a more "pro-active value-based" approach to peacebuilding (2014: 2, 8). However, an equally substantial body of scholarship presents arguments and evidence to the contrary (Regan, 2002; Grieg & Diehl, 2005; Chandler 2004).

2.25 Peacekeeping speaks more to the post-conflict settlement process, in which negotiations between former combatants (Regan, 2002) are facilitated by a third party as a means to maintain the absence of violence (Gawer, 2006).

2.26 Berdal and Ucko (2015) note that though the An Agenda for Peace constitutes an ambitious agenda with respect to expanding the UN's military capabilities in peace operations, the operations of the early 1990s generated doubts with respect to this subject, as noted in the 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace. This document notes that, "Nothing is more dangerous for a peacekeeping operation [...] than to ask it to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistical support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so" (as quoted in Berdal and Ucko, 2015: 7). Rather than a call for enhanced capabilities or a return to traditional peacekeeping, this statement constitutes an admission of limited capabilities (ibid. 7).

2.27 The profound lessons of Rwanda and Bosnia inspired the creation of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, which abandons previous notions of absolute and inviolable sovereignty, instead binding the right to sovereignty to a state's responsibility "for the protection of its people" (ICISS, 2001: xi). In practice, the Responsibility to Protect has not been able to overcome the challenges posed by Security Council members with veto power, as seen in the case of Darfur (Deng, 2010). This challenge is reflected in numerous calls for Security Council reform (UN, 2000; UN, 2005).

2.28 The UN has reminded its members on several occasions of a need to improve the UN's operational coherence to crisis management, namely that "(...) peace requires a comprehensive, concerted and determined approach that addresses the root causes of conflicts, including their economic and social dimensions (...) [that] must involve all the relevant actors in this field (...)" (UNSC, 2001).

2.29 Richmond argues that while the emphasis on local ownership in policy is significant, the persistence of "liberal peace and neo-liberal lenses" in peace operations undermines its transformative potential (2012: 357). In practice, the maintenance of liberal approaches to peacebuilding, or at least the salience of liberal democratic values among third-party interveners, alongside the promotion of local participation and ownership, has produced hybrid discourses around peacebuilding, wherein "local participation rapidly became a compromise between international aspirations for good governance and local right(s) of self-determination" (Richmond, 2012: 260).

2.30 For donors, this requires taking a "non-directive" approach to peacebuilding, enabling the pursuit and discovery of new and innovative conflict resolution strategies (Cohen, 2014: 78; see also Cassin & Zyla, 2021).

2.31 In this vein, a small handful of scholars have begun to challenge the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the dominant paradigm, questioning the utility of present-day political organisation. Brooks challenges the notion of the 'state' as an effective entity of political organisation, proposing the need to develop "alternatives to the state, alternatives that can be respectful of human rights and democratic imperatives, but not paralyzed by the need to mimic state structures that have little or no independent value" (2005: 1 191). Though less radical, Nay also calls for the need to seek context-based solutions to conflict and fragility outside of "state-centric interpretations mainly reflecting Western powers' policy

concerns" (2013: 328). If the 'state' itself is the problem, rather than its fragility or failure, then the solution may be altogether apart from the state-building enterprise.

Chapter 4

4.1 Thomas Mandrup is an Associate Professor at the Centre for Stabilisation Operations, the Royal Danish Defence College and an Extraordinary Associate Professor at SIGLA, Stellenbosch University.

4.2 On 7 October 2021 the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) announced in Press Communique 1037 that the PSC had decided to transform the mission into a UN stabilisation mission, operating under the Chapter VII mandate of the UN Charter. However, it was only later, in early 2022, that it was clear what the tasks of ATMIS and its international partners would be. Much depended on the settling of the political deadlock in Somalia, which was solved late February 2022.

4.3 This article focuses on the AMISOM AOR and will not include the situation in autonomous Puntland and independent Somaliland.

4.4 For a more detailed and recent study on the nature and dynamics of the conflict in Somalia, see 'Assessing the Effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia' / AMISOM, REPORT 1/2018.

4.5 Briefing from AMISOM HQ December 2018.

4.6 This number is debated and is only a qualified estimate done by Paul D. Williams after years of study. The TCCs deployed additional forces, above the ceiling. This makes the possible number of casualties higher than reported.

4.7 It should be noted, however, that the police contingents operated in a more coordinated fashion. The police elements use a unified training model and is not so directly involved in day-to-day operation as is the military contingents, which makes training and reform easier.

Chapter 5

5.1. The legislative constraints of the United Nations rooted into theatres with no peace to keep (particularly relating to deployments), the UN usually deploys after a regional or a continental deployment has created an environment with a minimum assurance of security and guarantees of host state consent. In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the United Nations took over following a fairly successful deployment by the Economic Community of West Africa's Monitoring Group in both countries. In Mali, the United Nations deployed after the African Union-ECOWAS deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali. Similar to Mali, the UN deployed in the Central Africa Republic after the African-led international Support Mission to CAR.

5.2. In Somalia, the Somalia End of Transition Roadmap, which was developed almost five years after the deployment of the African Union Mission to Somalia, set out clear priorities for establishing the framework for rebuilding the state. In the Lake Chad Basin Region, the Regional Stabilisation Strategy provides a framework for rebuilding the affected areas. These frameworks are referenced in the mandates of the peace operations deployed to those areas.

5.3 Contemporary peace support operations emphasise the need for a comprehensive security approach that combines military, stabilisation, governance and state-building efforts. Somalia's National Security and Stabilization Plan (2011) Security Pact (2017), Transition Plan (February 2018) among others, stressed the need for a comprehensive approach that includes support to state building interventions and processes. In an interview with the Senior Mission Leadership of the African Union Mission to Somalia, the Special

Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission stated, "AMISOM is here to help build the state of Somalia; help Somalia stand on its feet and build its economy; to become a robust state in the AU ... Power sharing, resource sharing and a common vision are all outstanding challenges but the state-building process is still ongoing," Interview, 23 June 2018. See also Lotze, W. & Williams, PD (2016). 'From war – fighting to stabilization: the AMISOM Approach'. The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia, International Peace Institute. pp. 2–9. Available online: http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09569.6. [Accessed on: 18 April 2022]; Williams, PD et al. (2018). 'Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM)'. p. 37. In addition, all the mandates for the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Mali have had elements for state-building.

5.4 In Somalia, the United Nations Security Council authorised the use of force by the African Union for the performance of a range of tasks geared at stabilisation and state-building. These included support to dialogue and reconciliation efforts, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions (in the early stages) to enable the performance of governance and security functions and to create a conducive environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance. Notwithstanding the different iterations, the use of force for establishing state authority remained a key aspect of all the mandates. In 2012, the Security Council explicitly authorised AMISOM to "to take all necessary measures as appropriate in those sectors in coordination with the Somali security forces to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia." See United Nations Security Council Resolution 2026 (2012). Available online: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2036. Accessed on:18 April 2022]. In Mali, the United Nations supported the use of force by French Forces to create an enabling environment for its mission to be able to perform its mandate of supporting among others, the political process in the country. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) 25 April 2013. Available online: https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/mali_2100_e_.pdf. [Accessed on: 18 April 2022].

5.5 In Somalia, training and mentoring of the Somali National Army, including through joint operations against al-Shabaab, has helped in large part, to develop the capabilities of the Somalia Police Force. A unique model of enhancing the capacity of local police forces for the maintenance of law and order has been developed between the AU and UN, through which joint and coordinated support has been provided to both federal and state police forces. Similarly, support to the Police Nationale du Mali (the National Police Force) has enabled the police to enhance its presence in the country generally. The inclusion of policing roles in PSO mandates has been instrumental in the holding phase of engagement as it has made it possible to limit the territorial control of armed groups and thereby reduce the threat posed to civilians and helps rebuild the confidence of the people in the state.

5.6 In 2013, the Security Council noted that peacekeeping operations may coordinate and cooperate with other United Nations funds and agencies, to support host governments in the development of socioeconomic and poverty alleviation policies, as well as support efforts at enhancing governance and rule of law. See United Nations Security Council 2086 (2013), S/Res/2086 (2013). For example, in Mali, the Civil Affairs Unit of MINUSMA was responsible for, among others, the provision of assistance and monitoring of the deployment of appointed officials and capacity building of appointed state officials on the development of action plans, accessing budgets. Interview with MINUSMA official Bamako, September 7, 2018. In Somalia, the creation of a conducive environment by AMISOM enabled the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia to provide among others, policy advice on state-building to the government of Somalia. See United Nations Assistance Mission to Somalia. 'Somalia boosts peacebuilding efforts with focus on state-building

priorities', 18 February 2019. Available online: https://unsom.unmissions.org/somalia-boosts-peacebuilding-efforts-focus-state-building-priorities. Accessed on 18 April 2022.

Chapter 6

6.1 This paper draws upon and further develops some of the initial ideas discussed in Tim Murithi and Lindsay Lindsay McClain Opiyo's, 'Regional Reconciliation in Africa: Policy Recommendations for Cross-border Transitional Justice', Policy Brief No. 14, April 2014, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), Cape Town, www.ijr.org.za.

Chapter 7

7.1 State-owned defence and security manufacturers are likewise finding themselves in a deep financial hole, impacting on the design, development, and manufacture of defence and security-related equipment and products. Here too, PMSCs can contribute significantly to contributing experience and assist with marketing of requisite equipment or products in ungoverned spaces.

Chapter 9

9.1 Underreporting is also an issue when it comes to other types of maritime crime – such as Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing (Okafor-Yarwood, I., 2019). Goal 14 of the SDGs highlights the need to conserve the ocean, seas and marine resources and, as such, is a significant contributor to the achievement of other SDGs. Goals 1 and 2 are aimed at bringing an end to poverty and hunger of which a plentiful supply of fish is an important means to their realisation. Fisheries also make a substantial contribution to the revenue of many developing countries, thereby assisting the attainment of Goal 8 which seeks to ensure sustainable economic growth. However, the pervasiveness of unsustainable practices that are harmful to the marine environment, such as pollution, overfishing and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU).

9.2 The announcement was made before the BIMCO-led declaration was made public.

9.3 For examples, see Manaranche, M. (2020); Safety4Seas (2019); TPN/Lusa (2019).

9.4 The author works with maritime security and cooperation projects in the Gulf of Guinea through the Danish Maritime Security Programme for the Gulf of Guinea.

9.5 Denmark, Australia, China, the European Union, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Japan.

9.6 It should also be noted that a substantial part of apprehended suspects was released onshore, for example because the evidence against them was insufficient.

Chapter 10

10.1 Yemen is included as the armed conflict and general instability have a direct bearing on maritime security in the Gulf of Aden.

10.2 The Mo Ibrahim Index for Africa (IIAG) does not include Yemen. This count for Yemen is calculated from the World Governance Indicators of the World Bank (2018 counts for political stability and violence, rule of law and government effectiveness). The corresponding count for Somalia is –2.25.

10.3 See the World Bank data for 2020 available at WGI 2021 Interactive > Interactive Data Access (worldbank.org) (Accessed: 12 October 2021).

10.4 The members fluctuate, but Bahrain, Egypt, Eritrea, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates and – although it withdrew – Qatar, made up the initial coalition.

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In academic circles, the concept of security governance has long been a topical issue and a concept used to broadly describe the vast areas of territories perceived beyond formal control. This is especially the case when focusing on the continent of Africa. African state fragility is often tied to the concept of ungoverned spaces in an attempt to depict these spaces and design tools to effectively deal with the security challenges that these so-called ungoverned spaces are believed to constitute. However, are these spaces ungoverned, what characterises these spaces and how have national and international organisations tried to address these issues? These and other matters of concern are addressed in this volume, where a broad range of international and African scholars try to address the concepts of security governance, ungoverned spaces, fragility and the international and continental responses to these challenges. Thematically, the chapters move from the conceptual to the more practical to reflect the development of approaches, some case studies, as well as contributions that bring suggested approaches to help contain, structure, and address the many actors, threats, vulnerabilities, and related intricacies making up the dynamics of African security governance. This is a complex tapestry of players, spoilers, indicators, and narratives. The book offers case studies ranging from Mali to Somalia and studies focusing on peace-mission and state-building, all trying, albeit from different angles, to address and portray how security governance and ungoverned or weakly governed spaces are perceived in different geographical spaces, both land and maritime. This book constitutes a seminal contribution to the literature dealing with security governance in Africa and the impact of these understandings. The project was made possible with the support from Australian Aid through the Australian High Commission to South Africa and the Danish Foreign Ministry through the Embassy in South Africa.

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