

NAVY NEWS WEEK 3-3

15 January 2019

Keel Laid for Canada's Third Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship

The keel has been laid for the future **HMCS Max Bernays** at Halifax Shipyard, Canada. Welder Vicki Berg laid a coin on the keel signifying the start of full production of the Royal Canadian Navy's third Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship. Chief Petty Officer Max Leopold Bernays is a Canadian naval hero who served as the Coxswain of His Majesty's Canadian Ship **Assiniboine** during the Battle of the Atlantic. The coin placed was the fifth in the Canadian Mint Second World War Battlefield series, designed to capture the intensity of the Battle of the Atlantic, the time at which Bernays performed the actions that earned him honors. On August 6, 1942, in an intense surface gun action against the German submarine U-210, **HMCS Assiniboine** maneuvered in and out of fog attempting to ram and sink the enemy submarine. Both vessels were firing high explosive shells at very close range, causing a fire which engulfed the bridge and wheelhouse of **Assiniboine**. Surrounded by smoke and flames, while steering the ship, Bernays ordered the two junior sailors to get clear, leaving him alone at the helm and trapped by the blaze. Besieged by flames, he executed all the helm orders as **Assiniboine** maneuvered for position against the U-boat and did the work of the two telegraphmen, dispatching over 130 telegraph orders to the engine room. Several bullets and shells penetrated the wheelhouse as the enemy concentrated their machine-gun and cannon fire on the bridge. Eventually **Assiniboine** rammed and sank U-210 in what was considered to be an extremely hard-fought action, during which the Canadians suffered one fatality and 13 wounded. Bernays was awarded the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal for his valor and dauntless devotion to duty during the action. Post-war he stayed in the RCN and retired as a Chief Petty Officer on February 20, 1960. He died in North Vancouver, BC on March 30, 1974. The Harry DeWolf-class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships under construction at the Halifax Shipyard are the first class of Royal Canadian Navy ships named after Canadian war heroes. Once complete, and turned over to the Royal Canadian Navy, the future **HMCS Max Bernays** will be the first Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship to join Maritime Forces Pacific. The Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships will patrol Canada's oceans, including the Arctic, and are suited for missions abroad to support international partners, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, search and rescue and drug interdiction. The lead ship in the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship program, the future **HMCS Harry DeWolf**, is now pier side at Halifax Shipyard and is scheduled to be turned over to the Royal Canadian Navy in summer 2019. At 103 meters (338 feet) and 6,615 tons, **Harry DeWolf** is the largest Royal Canadian Navy ship built in Canada in 50 years. Construction of the second ship, the future **HMCS Margaret Brooke**, is underway at Halifax Shipyard. The first two major sections of the future **HMCS Margaret Brooke**, the center and stern mega-blocks, are assembled at land level and the bow section is under construction. In November, the Government of Canada announced a sixth Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship will be built by Halifax Shipyard. **Source: MAREX**



PACIFIC OCEAN (Dec. 05, 2018) The guided missile destroyer **USS Pinckney (DDG 91)**, launches an Anti-Submarine Rocket (ASROC) MK 46 exercise torpedo during a live fire exercise. **Pinckney** is underway conducting routine operations in the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Madysson Anne Ritter/Released)

Ship owners to pay U.S. government for Fitzgerald collision

By: [Geoff Ziezulewicz](#)
12 Jan 2019

The owners of a massive merchant vessel that collided with the warship **Fitzgerald** in 2017, drowning seven sailors, have agreed to pay the U.S. government nearly \$27 million as part of a settlement agreement. The two-page deal, obtained by

Navy Times, states that it's governed by Japanese law. Both the **Fitzgerald** and the Philippine-flagged **ACX Crystal** were transiting busy sea lanes off Japan before the 1:30 a.m. collision on June 17, 2017, when the container vessel struck the guided-missile destroyer's starboard side.



The guided-missile destroyer **Fitzgerald** was heavily damaged during a 2017 collision with a merchant vessel. (Navy)

The agreement states that the owners, Olympic Steamship Company, S.A., Panama, will pay about 2.9 billion Japanese yen to the U.S. government to settle potential claims because of their role in the maritime disaster.

That translates to roughly \$26.7 million. As is common in these agreements, the settlement notes that the deal is not an admission of "any liability, negligence, breach of duty, or wrongdoing" by the parties. Navy officials declined comment on the settlement, referring questions to the U.S. Justice Department, which signed the agreement. Justice officials did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Attorneys with the Japan-based law firm [Yoshida and Partners](#), which signed the agreement on behalf of the Crystal's owners, did not respond to requests for comment Friday. The Navy has largely stayed quiet in its publicly released reports and statements when it comes to the Crystal's culpability in the collision. But in a [November 2017 official account](#) of the collision, a Navy report states during the 30 minutes before the crash, "neither **Fitzgerald** nor **Crystal** took such action to reduce the risk of collision until approximately one minute prior to the collision." "Collisions at sea are rare and the relative performance and fault of the vessels involved is an open admiralty law issue," that report states. "The Navy is not concerned about the mistakes made by **Crystal**. Instead, the Navy is focused on the performance of its ships and what we could have done differently to avoid these mishaps." An internal Navy investigation into the collision, known as a "dual-purpose investigation," has not been made public because Navy officials say it was created in part to prepare for potential litigation. But that probe cites failures by the Crystal's second officer as one of the root causes of the collision. The merchant vessel was on autopilot "until just prior to impact," the report states, and the **Crystal** did not sound at least five short blasts or make any attempt to hail the warship via radio. "Prior to the collision, **Crystal** watchstanders came out of autopilot and initiated a turn to starboard, too late to have adequate effect," the report states. "Audio recordings from **Crystal**'s Bridge reveal what is most likely the sound of a signal light being used to get FTZ' attention just minutes before the collision. FTZ watchstanders did not recall seeing this signal light." The unidentified second officer "failed to maintain a proper lookout so as to make a full appraisal of the risk of collision" with the **Fitzgerald**, according to the report. The **Crystal** officer "failed to determine if a risk of collision with FTZ existed by using all available means," according to the report, and "he failed to appreciate, by radar or visual observation, that FTZ was on a constant bearing with a decreasing range, which observation would have led him to deem risk of collision to exist." It also states the officer "failed to take action to avoid collision once it became apparent that action by FTZ alone would not avoid the collision." "In addition, the Second Officer failed to follow **Crystal**'s Standing Orders by failing to call the Master when FTZ's CPA was within one nautical mile and failing to take frequent and accurate compass bearings of FTZ to detect the risk of collision," according to the internal Navy investigation. Whether the settlement money will actually go to Fitz repairs remains unclear but it's a small sum compared to what the Navy is paying to mend the 25-year-old warship. The Navy has awarded roughly \$533 million in contracts and modifications for repair and modernization of the ship since September 2017, according to [Pentagon contract listings](#). "That's a lot of money and it's not a lot of money," [Lawrence Brennan](#), a retired Navy captain and attorney who teaches admiralty and maritime law at Fordham Law School, said of the settlement amount. "The really tough questions are the injury and death claims being asserted against **Crystal** by the deceased and survivors," he said. It remains unclear whether any claims have been filed by the families of the seven sailors who drowned in the collision. [Darrold Martin](#), the father of Xavier Martin, one of the sailors who died, said Friday he had been in touch with an attorney but was not sure if any litigation had been filed on the behalf of the families. An attorney representing Fitz victims and their families, David M. Schloss — a partner in the Washington, D.C. firm of [Koonz, McKenney, Johnson, DePaolis and Lightfoot](#) — told Navy Times that he's pleased the vessel's owner and charterer "recognized their obligation to compensate the Navy for the property damage they caused." "While no amount of money is sufficient to compensate the families of the seven brave sailors who gave their lives in the service of their country, or those Fitzgerald crewmen who continue to suffer from the devastating physical and emotional injuries associated with this collision, we are nevertheless hopeful that this settlement indicates that those same parties, along with the time charterer, NYK (Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha), will see fit to live up to their legal and moral obligations to fully compensate those whose lives have been so tragically impacted," said Schloss in a written statement. "Plain and simple, this collision was a preventable tragedy, and we intend to pursue all

legal remedies both in Japan and here in the United States against the three parties responsible for the negligent conduct of the *Crystal*." Source: <https://www.navytimes.com>

US Navy Probe Into Deadly 2017 Crash Found 'Numerous, Almost Routine' Violations

[Military & Intelligence](#)

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The US Navy's internal probe of the June 2017 crash between the destroyer **USS Fitzgerald** and a civilian container cargo vessel near Japan that killed seven

sailors found "routine, almost casual, violations of standing orders" by bridge crew who failed "rules of the road" tests given by investigators, a Navy Times exclusive has revealed. In the waters off Yokosuka, Japan, on the night of June 17, 2017, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer **USS Fitzgerald** collided with the container vessel **ACX Crystal**, which flew under a Filipino flag, and seven US sailors died. While public statements by the Navy have subsequently confirmed that the destroyer crew was at fault and that the crew was remarkably unqualified for its tasks, the service's internal probe was all the more scathing, reported the Navy Times, which obtained a copy of the report for a Sunday article. The report was completed 11 days after the accident and was overseen by Rear Adm. Brian Fort, but was kept secret at the time to protect the service from lawsuits, the publication noted. Fort's investigation describes a nightmare scenario: unqualified, understaffed crew performing dangerous transits of busy waterways unsupervised, often using defective equipment — and that's when they knew how to use it, which wasn't often the case. Not only were skippers and executive officers often absent from the bridge during dangerous voyages, the ship lacked a quartermaster chief petty officer, who the Times notes is a "crucial leader who helps safely navigate a warship and train its sailors." Junior officers were found to be in the habit of not reporting or notifying superiors of dangerous instances, such as near-misses with other ships. **What's worse, the Navy knew about all of this.** Fort's report also underscores the failure of the **Fitzgerald's** crew to learn valuable lessons from both their own near-misses at sea prior to the June 2017 accident as well as other similar incidents elsewhere in the Navy. Just weeks earlier, the **Fitzgerald** was involved in an incident near the Japanese city of Sasebo in which a junior officer "became confused by the surface contact picture" of ships near the **Fitzgerald**, requesting help from the destroyer's then-commanding officer, Cmdr. Robert Shu, who was absent from the bridge at the time, the report notes. After setting a correct course for the ship to sail behind a vessel in front of the **Fitzgerald**, Shu then left the bridge, and moments later, a brand new crisis revealed itself: another ship was immediately in front of the destroyer, just on the other side of the first ship! Fortunately the **Fitzgerald** avoided that collision, although it took throwing the engines into full reverse and sounding the nautical danger signal — five short blasts on the horn — in order to escape the situation. "[**Fitzgerald's**] command leadership was unaware of just how far below standards their command had drifted," Fort's report said. "Had the [commanding officer] and [executive officer] critiqued the near-collision, they may have identified the root causes uncovered by this investigation." Instead, on the fateful June night five weeks later, the **Fitzgerald** made no attempt to avoid the collision at all, Sputnik [reported](#). A frightfully similar situation was at hand: a junior officer commanded the ship, her superiors distracted by paperwork and failing to oversee the inept crew's transiting of a very dangerous waterway. That officer, Lt. junior-grade Sarah Coppock, pleaded guilty to a dereliction of duty charge at court-martial last year. The ship's commanding officer, Cmdr. Bryce Benson, and Lt. Natalie Combs, who ran the combat information center (CIC) on the ship's bridge, are fighting similar charges. The CIC was a mess, Fort's report notes. He describes kettlebells on the floor and bottles filled with urine, noting some radar controls that didn't work and crew members who didn't know how to use them even if they did. "Procedural compliance by Bridge watchstanders is not the norm onboard [**the Fitzgerald**], as evidenced by numerous, almost routine, violations of the [commanding officer's] standing orders," not to mention radio transmissions laced with profanity and "unprofessional humor," Fort's report found. A test administered to the crew by Fort's team about three weeks after the disaster on "rules of the road" for sailing found an average score of 59 percent among the crew, and only three of the ship's 22 officers scored over 80 percent; seven scored below 50 percent. Further, Sputnik [reported](#) that 15 of the **Fitzgerald's** 22 certifications had expired by the time of collision, with some of its qualifications not having being renewed for almost a year. Source: <https://sputniknews.com>

My only two reactions to this report are Wow and Unbelievable.

Should the U.S. Navy Turn Merchant Ships into Floating Missile Magazines?

The concept could flood battle zones with hundreds of missiles, but it's not without disadvantages.

By [Kyle Mizokami](#)

Jan 10, 2019



Getty Images/Scott Eisen

The U.S. Navy could buy older civilian merchant ships on the cheap and convert them into floating arsenals. The concept, outlined in the U.S. Naval Institute, envisions adding dozens—if not hundreds—of

multiuse missile silos to the ships to provide additional firepower to the Navy while it struggles to reach its 355-ship goal. The idea is an attractive one but has a number of issues under the surface. The heart of today's U.S. Navy's surface ship firepower, which lives on destroyers and cruisers, is the armored missile silo. The [Arleigh Burke](#)-class guided missile destroyers each carry 90-96 [Mk. 41 vertical launch silos](#), the [Ticonderoga](#)-class guided missile cruisers carry 122 Mk. 41 silos, and the [Zumwalt](#) class carries 80 Mk. 57 silos. Each of these silos can carry one long-range anti-ballistic missile interceptor, surface-to-air missile, land attack cruise missile, anti-submarine rocket torpedo, or anti-ship missile each, or even up to four smaller short range air defense missiles. This versatility makes the fleet endlessly adaptable. A destroyer can carry all surface-to-air missiles, all anti-ship missiles, or a mix of all types. There are a few catches. These silos are enormously expensive to add to the fleet: [Arleigh Burke](#)-class destroyers cost somewhere in the neighborhood of \$1.5 billion each, meaning each silo costs about \$15 million each to put to sea, missile not included. Also, once a silo is loaded in port the missiles can't be swapped out at sea. A destroyer that inadvertently brings a belly full of anti-ship missiles to a submarine hunt must go back to a friendly port and swap missiles. An article from the U.S. Naval Institute [discusses one possible relief to the silo problem](#). One of the main barriers is hull cost. Why not buy secondhand commercial tanker hulls for \$25 to \$50 million each (as opposed to \$1.5 billion for a brand new destroyer) and then strap missile silos to the deck? These silos could then be datalinked to the rest of the fleet, providing firepower on demand for the real warships. The article makes the case that 30 to 50 missile silos per ship is a good number, and that "[converting] 10 to 15 cargo ships would give

the fleet between 300 and 750 missile cells at a fraction of the cost and time for new-build surface combatants."



Vertical launch silos on the destroyer **USS Benfold**. Silos such as these could easily be refitted to commercial ships. U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Jason Amadi

Civilian ships have long served in the Navy, often as auxiliary, second-line ships meant to free up warships for more vital missions. Now, technology could allow civilian ships to be fitted with the latest technology to engage adversaries from up

to hundreds of miles away. The Navy already has ships in the fleet that are former merchantmen. The hospital ships [Mercy and Comfort](#) are ex-oil tankers fitted to provide medical services for up to 500 personnel. Hospital ships are not warships, however, and the "commercial ship turned warship" concept could have complications. Warships are built to a very high standard, designed to take physical punishment and continue fighting. Civilian ships aren't meant to fight and are built to a less rigorous standard. In 2016, the aluminum-hulled high-speed trimaran [Swift](#) was [heavily damaged](#) while supporting UAE forces involved in the war in Yemen. As a civilian ship pressed into military duties, [Swift](#) likely did not have the built-in resilience of purpose-built warships and a dedicated damage control party to limit the spread of damage. Commercial ships

are also slower than warships, which would drag down the fleet's effective top speed, limiting its ability to respond to situations. Older commercial ships could have less reliable propulsion and other systems. Finally, their resemblance to ships in civilian service could make those civilian ships targets, as an adversary tries to hunt down and eliminate these heavily armed ships. Still, if the Navy can accept or mitigate these issues without the need for expensive, bureaucratic, time-consuming fixes, it can vastly increase its floating firepower. For the price of one new destroyer with 96 missile silos it could easily have up to 30 ex-commercial vessels with 50 missiles each. One destroyer can only be in one place at a time, but 30 ex-commercial vessels could be in 30 different places all over the globe. Is that an acceptable trade-off? That's for the Navy to decide.

Source: <https://www.popularmechanics.com>

China can't afford to attack an American aircraft carrier

Jazz Shaw Posted at 8:01 am
on January 14, 2019



Shortly after the year began [we looked at](#) a report out of China where one of their very anti-American admirals had said that China might need to sink a couple of our aircraft carriers just to put us in our place. The guy is known for his hawkish hyperbole, so it didn't seem that our government was taking him too seriously. But at the same time, the Chinese government didn't exactly move to disavow his comments either. They're referring to it as a "bloody nose" strategy, suggesting that if they hit us hard enough on the first shot we'll turn tail and run. No

credible experts seem to expect it to happen, but it was a situation worth monitoring at least. We weren't the only ones who noticed the admiral's remarks. Some other experts in military affairs have begun weighing in on the subject. The majority of observers thus far appear to agree that a massive missile strike on an American carrier group in the South China Sea actually *might* be able to sink (or at least severely damage) one of our bird farms. But that hypothetical exchange [has an end result that the Chinese won't like at all](#). (Business Insider) "The decision to go after an aircraft carrier, short of the deployment of nuclear weapons, is the decision that a foreign power would take with the most reticence," Bryan McGrath, founding managing director of The FerryBridge Group LLC, a naval consultancy, told Business Insider. "The other guy knows that if that is their target, the wrath of god will come down on them." McGrath emphasized that threats to US carriers are old news, but that the ships, despite struggling to address the threat from China's new missiles, still had merit. "I would have been more surprised if we had seen former Chinese rear admiral say, 'The fact that we're building aircraft carriers is one of the dumbest moves of the 21st century given the Americans will wax them in the first three days of combat,'" said McGrath, dismissing Luo's comments as bogus scare tactics. The short version of this tale is that if the Chinese actually did decide to open fire on one of our carriers, they might succeed in a surprise attack. But we would be able to decimate all of the useful and powerful elements of their navy in short order. We could also put quite a pounding to Beijing if we were so inclined. And by sinking one of our ships, the Chinese would have committed an act of war anyway so there would be nothing stopping us. Short of going to tactical weapons and given the massive logistical hurdles involved in shipping any significant number of their soldiers anywhere near our mainland, we could probably handle them. That's an encouraging analysis, but the news isn't all good. This story was breaking at virtually the same moment that the Pentagon said our military's logistics systems for moving and deploying both troops and equipment [has "decayed" severely in the past decade](#) and we're not actually ready for a war with either China or Russia. The strategic American military system for moving troops, weapons, and supplies over long distances has decayed significantly and needs rapid upgrading to be ready for any future war with China or Russia, according to a report by the Pentagon's Defense Science Board. A special task force on survivable logistics evaluated the military's current airlift, sealift, and prepositioned equipment and supplies and found major problems with supporting forces during a "high-end" conflict. "Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not fought an adversary capable of the catastrophic disruption of military supply chains and deployment of personnel and materiel," an unclassified summary of the report states. That's worrisome, but not an immediate threat to our security. The fact is that we haven't been in a war with an actual superpower that would be capable of hitting us back, attacking us on our own soil and possibly defeating us in well over half a century. It's not hard to believe that some of our capabilities in those specialized areas of warfare have atrophied a bit. I assume the military is already getting started on addressing these shortcomings, providing Congress gives them the money to do so. In the meantime, the threat of an attack from the Chinese with their "bloody nose" strategy remains thankfully remote. At least for now.

Source: <https://hotair.com>

Indian Navy's anti-piracy patrol seizes arms and ammunition off Somalia coast from a vessel

The Indian Navy has been deploying one ship in the Gulf of Aden on anti-piracy patrol since October 2008.



In an effort to keep its the commitment of the towards ensuring safe seas for Indian, as well as international, seafarers in the Indian Ocean region, particularly the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, **INS Sunayana** has been deployed on anti piracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden since Oct 6. The Indian Navy has been deploying one ship in the Gulf of Aden on anti-piracy patrol since October 2008. The IN ships escort merchant ships through the 490 nautical mile long Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). On Friday, last week, the ship detected a suspicious fishing vessel, approximately 25 nm off the coast of Somalia, in the vicinity of Socotra Island. According to the Indian Navy spokesperson

Capt DK Sharma, when search started on the ship, it was found that the vessel was engaged in illegal fishing in the area and was also in possession of four high caliber AK-47s and one Light Machine Gun, along with ammunition for these weapons. The complex relationship between Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and piracy has been acknowledged in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2383 (2017) and warships deployed in the area are always on the lookout for such illegal activities. **INS Sunayana** seized the arms and ammunition from the vessel, under the authority accorded by UNSCR 2383 (2017). The vessel was thoroughly searched and allowed to proceed, after confiscation of the arms and ammunition, to prevent their illegal use later by the crew for piracy related activities With an aim to monitor and conduct maritime domain surveillance in primary areas of interest, Indian Navy deploys its ships for Presence cum Surveillance Mission (PSM) the waters. Earlier this year in April, Indian Navy's stealth frigate **INS Trishul** had foiled a piracy attempt against an Indian bulk carrier in the Gulf of Aden. The piracy attempt was made on the Indian ship **MV Jag Amar** and the **INS Trishul**, which was on an anti- piracy deployment in the region had responded immediately and had carried out swift operations to rescue the crew.

Source: Maasmond Maritime



The Finnish Navy Rauma-class missile boat (**Naantali (73)**) departing Turku. **Photo: Risto Brzoza**

World War I Taught the U.S. Navy How to Fight Submarines

The hard way.

by [Sebastien Roblin](#)

December 9, 2018

When Congress voted on April 6, 1917 to declare war on Imperial Germany, the task before the U.S. Navy was clear: it needed to transport and supply over a million men across the Atlantic despite the Imperial German Navy's ferocious U-Boat campaign, which reached its peak that month, sinking over 874,000 tons of shipping. Indeed, Germany's decision to recommence unrestricted submarine warfare in February was one of the decisive factors driving the United States, and later Brazil, into finally joining "the war to end all wars." While World War I submarines could only remain submerged for brief periods, they were highly successful at picking off unescorted merchants ship in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Neither

active sonar nor radar yet existed with which to track submarines, though the British had begun using hydrophones to listen for the noise of a submarine's diesel engine. The most successful anti-submarine ships were agile "*torpedo-boat destroyers*," which sank U-Boats using deck guns and even ramming. Starting in 1916, Royal Navy vessels carried depth charge designed to detonate underwater, rupturing a submarine's hull. These proved effective *if* the ship captains could guess the sub's position. Statistically, naval mines proved deadliest, accounting for one-third of U-Boat losses. For years, the Royal Navy resisted instituting a convoy system to guard merchant ships, preferring not to divert warships from offensive missions and believing the decrease in throughput from adhering to a convoy schedule would prove worse than the losses inflicted by U-Boats. But that April, U-Boats had sunk one-quarter of all merchant ships bound for the UK, leaving it with just six week's grain supply. Threatened with economic collapse, the Royal Navy finally instituted the convoy system. But the Brits had a problem: they could divert only forty-three out of the seventy-five destroyers required to escort convoys. Naval liaison Rear Admiral William Sims convinced the navy to dispatch thirty-five U.S. destroyers to bases at Queenstown (modern-day Cobh), Ireland to fill in the gap. These began escorting convoys on May 24, usually supported by navy cruisers. In 1918, an even larger escort flotilla began operating out of Brest, France. The U.S. Navy itself began the war with only fifty-one destroyers. It immediately faced a classic military procurement problem: politicians and admirals wanted to build more expensive battleships and battlecruisers, construction of sixteen of which had been authorized by the Naval Act of 1916. But the Royal Navy already had the German High Seas fleet effectively bottled up in port with its larger force. While five coal-burning and three oil-burning U.S. battleships did join the blockade in 1918, they never saw action. Common sense prevailed, and battleship construction was halted in favor of building 266 destroyers. More rapidly, the Navy commissioned hundreds of small 70-ton wooden-hulled "*sub-chasers*" equipped with hydrophones, 3" deck guns and depth charges. Civilian yachts were similarly converted. The Navy's eleven *L*-class and *K*-class submarines were also deployed to Berehaven (now Castletownbere), Ireland and the Azores respectively to hunt (surfaced) U-Boats, but none encountered enemy forces during the war. Hundreds of twin-engine HS maritime patrol planes were also procured to scour the seas for submarines. Though the seaplanes sank few if any submarines, they disrupted numerous attacks by forcing U-Boats to dive and abort their torpedo runs. The convoy system proved a dramatic success, cutting shipping losses to less than half their peak. U-Boats simply lacked unprotected targets and were more likely to be lost combating escorts. Shipping losses gradually fell to roughly 300,000 tons per month, while U-Boat losses increased from three per month to between five and ten. However, submariner-hunting remained a dangerous business in which a hunter could swiftly become hunted. On Nov. 17, 1917, the destroyer **USS Cassin** was pursuing **U-61** near Ireland when the U-Boat counterattacked. Spotting a torpedo rushing towards the depth-charge launcher on the ship's stern, Gunner's Mate Osmond Ingram lunged forth to jettison the explosive charges but was caught in the blast that tore away the destroyer's rudder. The **Cassin** remained afloat and shelled **U-61's** conning tower, causing her to disengage. Ingram was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. The destroyer **Jacob Jones** was not so fortunate when she was struck in the rudder by a torpedo fired by **U-353** near Brest on December 6. Sixty-six crew perished abandoning ship as her depth charges detonated. Gallantly, U-Boat captain Karl Rose rescued two of the crew and radioed the position of the other survivors. U.S. sub-hunters did score some successes. On November 17, the destroyers **Fanning** and **Nicholson** forced **U-58** to the surface with depth charges, then engaged her with deck guns until her crew scuttled her. The converted yacht **Christabel** crippled a U-Boat with depth charges in May 1918 off the coast of Spain. That month, the Imperial Navy began dispatching long-range U-Boat "*cruisers*" with huge 150-millimeter deck guns to maraud the U.S. coast. These sank ninety-three vessels, mostly small civilian fishing boats. The Germans hoped this would spread panic, causing the Americans to withdraw assets in Europe for home defense. Notably, on July 18 the boat **U-156** surfaced off the coastal town of Orleans on Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and proceeded to destroy a tugboat, four barges and the nearby shoreline with its cannons. Nine Coast Guard HS and Model R-9 seaplane bombers scrambled from NAS Chatham and peppered the withdrawing U-boat with bombs—none of which exploded. The following day, the armored cruiser **USS San Diego** struck a mine probably laid by **U-156** south of Long Island. The explosion flooded her engine room, causing the cruiser to sink with the loss of six hands—becoming the only capital ship lost by the navy. **U-156** proceeded to sink twenty-one fishing boats in the Gulf of Maine, and even commandeered a trawler to assist in its rampage. But though the navy instituted coastal convoys, it didn't withdraw ships from Europe. U-Boats were also active in the Mediterranean, and Gibraltar-based American subchasers—often little more than civilian yachts fitted with 3" guns and depth charges—twice clashed with them, sinking at least one. Perhaps the Navy's most swashbuckling episode of the war occurred on October 2, 1918, when twelve U.S. subchasers covered an Italian and British surface force raiding the Albanian port of Durazzo. Dodging shells from shore batteries, the subchasers cleared a path through the defensive minefield for the accompanying capital ships. They then hounded away the submarines **U-29** and **U-31**, heavily damaging both. The navy's deadliest anti-submarine measure was the North Sea Mine Barrage, a 230-mile-long chain of 100,000 naval mines between the Orkney islands and Norway. U-Boats seeking passage to the Atlantic had to wend through eighteen rows of Mark 6 mines concealed at depths of twenty-four, forty-nine and seventy-three meters deep, strung together with piano wire. Each of the horned steel spheres contained three hundred pounds of TNT. The barrage cost \$40 million (\$722 million in 2018 dollars) and required the deployment of eight large steamships. However, it sank between four and eight U-Boats—including the infamous **U-156**—and damaged another eight. Ultimately, 178 out of 360 operational U-Boats were sunk during World War I. In return, the German subs sank 5,000 merchant ships totaling 12.8 million tons, killing 15,000 mariners. The U.S. Navy lost 431 personnel and five ships—its worst loss occurred when the collier **USS Cyclops** vanished with 306 crew in the Bermuda Triangle. Despite its unglamorous duties, the U.S. Navy learned valuable lessons in the Great War about

employing convoys, smaller submarine-hunters and maritime patrol planes that would save many lives in the even more destructive conflict that followed two decades later.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master's degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

Source: <https://nationalinterest.org>



ATLANTIC OCEAN (Dec. 6, 2018) The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier **USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72)** launches a Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) during combat system ship qualification trials. (U.S. Navy photo/Released)

Japan's Navy Seeks Female Sailors for its Submarines

Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is making plans to begin recruiting female service members for its submarine force in order to fill gaps in staffing. According to NHK, the service will begin shipyard work to add separate female-only crew quarters compartments to three submarines sometime next year. Ultimately it aims to have 10 percent of each sub crew filled by female sailors by 2023. In recent years, Japan's military - technically named the Self-Defense Force (SDF), as Japan's post-WWII constitution prohibits a war-capable standing army - has had difficulty recruiting enough personnel. Japan's birth-rate is below replacement: last year it shed about 300,000 out of a total of about 127 million inhabitants. One



quarter of the populace is above the age of 65.

JS Mochisio departs Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam for the **RIMPAC 2010** exercises. Photo: US Navy

This demographic shift means a declining number of qualified applicants for military service. In 1994, there were about 17 million individuals in the potential recruitment pool of 18-to-26-year-olds. Today, that number has fallen to about 11 million, and it is forecast to decline to 8 million by mid-century, according to Reuters. An improving economy with a 2.5 percent unemployment rate also means that more potential recruits are staying in civilian careers - even if for many this means piecing together multiple part-time jobs to make a living. In response to the population crunch, the SDF has raised the age limit for new recruits to 32 years, up from 26, in hopes of attracting more applicants for enlisted ranks. The service as a whole wants to boost female recruitment by about three percentage points, to bring the fraction of female service members closer to the levels found in other allied military services.

Source: MarEx



Canadian Navy frigate 340 **HMCS St. John's** steaming into Halifax Harbour photo: René Serrao ©

HMCS St. John's is a Halifax-class frigate that has served in the Canadian Forces and the Royal Canadian Navy since her commissioning in 1996. She is the eleventh of twelve ships in her class which is based on the Canadian Patrol Frigate Project. St. John's is named after the city of St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, a port city associated with Canadian naval history and heritage, and is the first ship in the Royal Canadian Navy to bear the name. St. John's serves on Canadian Armed Forces missions protecting Canada's sovereignty in the Atlantic Ocean and enforcing Canadian laws in its territorial sea and exclusive economic zone. **HMCS St. John's** has been deployed on missions throughout the Atlantic Ocean, to the Indian Ocean; specifically the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea on anti-terrorism operations, to the north as far as Grise Fjord and to the Caribbean where she played a role in helping to stop the flow of illicit drugs to North America. She is assigned to Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT) and her homeport is in Halifax, Nova Scotia. **Source: Maasmond Maritime**

Stop the boats: Email exposes Border Force plans to save money by halting ocean patrols

By Nicole Hasham



The Australian Border Force plans to save money on fuel by pulling ships from ocean patrols, amid a high-stakes political fight between the Morrison government and Labor over border security policy. The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age has sighted an internal Border Force email stating that "operational limitations" will be imposed to achieve a saving in the annual fuel budget and "ships will cease active patrolling to achieve this fuel saving". It also explains the move is in line with budget control measures, which are in force until the end of the financial year to rein in a purported multimillion-dollar

blowout. The email also notes the ships will only patrol or respond in specific circumstances Border Force vessels conduct patrols to identify and intercept threats at sea such as unauthorised boat arrivals, smuggling and illegal fishing. Patrols can last weeks and fuel costs are a significant expense. Several Border Force insiders confirmed the cost-cutting measure had been ordered, however the office of Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton said the claims were "inaccurate". "Given the dangerous policy announcement by Labor to effectively abolish offshore processing, which will be welcomed by people smugglers, the government has not reduced our on-water efforts and won't," she said. After being alerted to the existence of the email, the spokeswoman said the response remained unchanged. In a statement, the Australian Border Force did not deny the fuel-saving measure, but said "our maritime posture is regularly adjusted to remain agile, flexible and responsive to the changing operational environment". "Vessels will continue to actively patrol Australian waters ... the ABF does not comment on where or how resources are deployed, but can confirm we maintain a strong operational response capability. The government sought to gain the upper hand on national security in the fraught, final sitting of Parliament last week, claiming Labor's support for easier medical evacuations from Nauru and Manus Island would benefit people-smugglers. The fuel development raises fears that remote Australian waters will be left unguarded, and follows revelations by the Sydney Morning Herald and The Age that the Border Force has suspended a fleet of fast-response patrol boats protecting the Torres Strait. The numbers of casual airport staff processing passengers and luggage will also be slashed by up to two-thirds over the busy Christmas period as the organisation struggles to meet budget cuts, and claims of harassment and bullying are rife. It is understood the fuel-saving measure would apply to about a dozen Cape and Bay class vessels that patrol Australia's offshore waters - especially the north-west coast, which is particularly vulnerable to maritime approaches. Border Force's flagship Ocean Shield vessel is expected to maintain its position at sea but not conduct patrols. Australia has a 36,000-kilometre coastline and an offshore maritime area of almost 13 million square kilometres. On-water patrol and

response is a primary method of detecting illegal activity and enforcing maritime security. Border Force and the Australian Defence Force combine personnel and assets under the Maritime Border Command to safeguard the nation's coasts. Comment has been sought from Defence on whether it was aware of the Border Force directive and whether it would supply crews and vessels to make up any shortfall. The Department of Home Affairs has previously confirmed that Border Force began implementing "a range of significant budget control measures" in November. Border Force insiders are concerned that pulling boats from active patrol will damage maritime security capacity. There are also reports that scores of officers have left the maritime unit in recent months in response to poor working conditions and cutbacks. Labor's immigration and border protection spokesman Shayne Neumann said the department's budget cutbacks were jeopardising Australia's border security. A spokesman from the Community and Public Sector Union said it was not aware of instructions to cease active patrols. He confirmed the maritime unit was suffering low morale, officers were frustrated and there had been a "high than normal turnover" of staff in the past year.

Source : Sydney Morning Herald



The Roter Sand lighthouse located in the Weser Estuary

Photo : Flying Focus Aerial Photography www.flyingfocus.nl ©

Workhorses of the sea



The *Normand Cutter* outbound from Rotterdam

Photo : Willem Holtkamp - <http://fotomaker.jalbum.net/FOTOMAKER/> ©