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Emerging threats to the growing oil and gas industry off the eastern coast of Africa

Third International Conference on Strategic Theory



Introduction

- O&G offshore potential currently spans from Somalia to Mozambique
- How offshore O&G could shape future security paradigm off east Africa
- Future threat environment has largely been untested
- Explore potential impact of threats on commercial operations



Three main threat areas

- Eastern Africa offshore environment & Somali pirates
- Land-based threats
- West Africa offshore O&G experience




Eastern Africa offshore threat & Somali pirates



- Since 2006, to highest levels 2008-2011
- Armed assaults; Hijacking; Ransom demands for cargo & crew
- 2012 Piracy cost the global economy US\$18 billion a year








Source IMB 2012

- Pirates' catchment area has expanded significantly
- At its height, pirate incidents extended over approx. 2.5 million sq nautical miles



Somalia Piracy Incidents map



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Counter-piracy measures


- International naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden & Indian Ocean
 - US-led Combined Task Force 151
 - EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta
 - NATO Operation Ocean Shield
 - Naval escorts







- Information-sharing centres established
- Best management practices (BMP4) guidelines
- Embarked armed security on board vessels
- Improvements to the legal systems and jurisdiction to prosecute suspected pirates





Achievements

- No commercial vessel hijacked since May 2012 (though fishing vessels have been hijacked subsequently)
- No vessel with AST has been successfully hijacked
- Over 1100 pirates in prison in 21 countries on remand or serving sentences





- Vessels using selfprotection measures (BMP4)
 - Use of citadels
 - Hardening measures (razor wire etc.)
- Piracy at lowest level since 2006
 - Only 8 armed assaults in 2013
 - No hijacks of commercial vessels in 2013





Is Somali Piracy finished?

- Piracy threat only contained
- Pirate business model evolved and active
- Provide 'protection' schemes for illegal fishing
- Provide security to vessels engaged in smuggling and illegal regional trade
- Possibility of collaboration with al-Shabaab – overlap in bases, vessel hijack, landbased kidnap for ransom





Potential Future Piracy Threat

- International counter-piracy presence post 2014?
- Possible resurgence of Somali piracy if maritime efforts reduced
- Pirates adapt to new business opportunities
- Pirate impact on O&G offshore as operations increase
- Vulnerable O&G offshore operational profile
 - Slow speed for seismic runs
 - Limited manoeuvrability
 - Numerous support vessels required
- Pirates adapt TTPs to similar model as West Africa counterparts?



Land based threats

- East Africa littoral countries differ in context and security environments
- Many have functioning state institutions and a rule of law, but possible spoilers:
 - Political transition
 - Civil unrest
 - Secessionist movements
 - Terrorism
 - Kidnap for ransom



Potential land-based threats

- On land transit / R&R for personnel and assets
- Operations at port or anchorages within a country
- Terrorists/ local rebel groups/ militias focus on strategic resources and assets





- Important to understand country and local area dynamics, and develop a robust security plan based on risk profile
- EA littoral states keen to build investment, companies develop good government relations





Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea & impact on O&G operations

- Gulf of Guinea home to several oil producing nations
- About 10% of world's crude oil exports
- 40% Europe, almost 30% US imports of petroleum products travels through GoG each year
- 2012 more piracy attacks off West Africa than off Somalia
- Maritime security off West Africa and safe access to ports is critical for global energy production



West Africa piracy

- Highest incidents Nigeria, Benin and Togo waters
- Incidents reported up to 150 nautical miles from the West Africa coast; use of mother ships





West Africa Piracy TTPs

- Type of pirate incidents
 - Hijackings of tankers for theft of refined petroleum products
 - Robbery of crew and ship property
 - Kidnap for ransom
- Target
 - Tugs and supply vessels
 - Also increasing against merchant vessels tankers and cargo - transiting and operating within region



- Mainly Nigeria-based pirate gangs, well-organised, local backing
- Usually a high-level of violence used
- Motivation of attacks tends to be theft of cargo rather than less common kidnapping, little concern for the welfare of crew



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- Most attacks occur when vulnerable of being identified and boarded
 - Vessels moored
 - Carrying out ship to ship transfers at sea
- Cargo transferred to hijackers' smaller vessels and then sold on black market
- Pirate groups TTPs suggest knowledge of ships' locations, cargo and ability to operate specialised vessels



Key security considerations to offshore O&G operations off east Africa

- Private security working with host nation navies ullet
- **Revised best management practices** ullet
- Focused reporting mechanisms ullet
- Partnership with national governments ullet



Private security

- How address armed security in respective EA countries' EEZs?
- EA country naval capacity to service offshore contracts?
- Impact of AST on static or slow moving vessels?





Private security

- AST or military escorts not a panacea, but one key element
- Private security companies operating in a non-armed capacity, support could
 - Develop of bespoke security plans
 - Undertake risk assessments of areas such as port facilities
 - Allocate ship security officers to advise on security protocols and undertake hardening activities
 - Advisory roles with host nation armed forces
 - Ensure adherence to VPSHR



Best Management Practices

- Designed for vessels transiting not working in EA waters
- Self-protection measures more difficult
 - Exploration or drilling vessels slow moving or static
 - Commercial vessels stopping at ports along coast





- Can BMP be adapted for commercial offshore activity?
- Develop individuals security plans and SOPs based on offshore O&G operational profile






Reporting mechanisms

- Only one third attacks in GoG reported (IMB)
 - Delay business, time-consuming
 - Unlikely to result in prosecution
- Build on Indian Ocean reporting systems and info sharing
- Poor reporting of attacks on fishing vessels
 - More efforts with local fishers
- Good maritime cooperation with international bodies and EA littoral countries



Partnership with national governments



- EEZ territory defined, regulations
- EA country naval capacity? Ability to provide support to offshore operations without private sector involvement
- Liaison and training with host country security forces



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Summary

- Piracy has not gone away it has been contained up to now......
- Oil and Gas operations will present slow and fixed targets some close to Somalia and more on land
- National and Coalition navies don't do have the resources.... scope for private sector engagement
- Good security will be critical to development and success of EA offshore oil and gas sector





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