



**Emerging threats to the growing  
oil and gas industry off the  
eastern coast of Africa**

---

**Third International Conference  
on Strategic Theory**

# Introduction

- O&G offshore potential currently spans from Somalia to Mozambique
- How offshore O&G could shape future security paradigm off east Africa
- Future threat environment has largely been untested
- Explore potential impact of threats on commercial operations

# Three main threat areas


- Eastern Africa offshore environment & Somali pirates
- Land-based threats
- West Africa offshore O&G experience



# Eastern Africa offshore threat & Somali pirates

- Since 2006, to highest levels 2008-2011
- Armed assaults; Hijacking; Ransom demands for cargo & crew
- 2012 Piracy cost the global economy US\$18 billion a year






Source IMB 2012

- Pirates' catchment area has expanded significantly
- At its height, pirate incidents extended over approx. 2.5 million sq nautical miles

# Somalia Piracy Incidents map

Sept 2012-Sept 2013



Source Oceanview




# Counter-piracy measures

- International naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden & Indian Ocean
  - US-led Combined Task Force 151
  - EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta
  - NATO Operation Ocean Shield
  - Naval escorts



- Information-sharing centres established
- Best management practices (BMP4) guidelines
- Embarked armed security on board vessels
- Improvements to the legal systems and jurisdiction to prosecute suspected pirates





# Achievements

- No commercial vessel hijacked since May 2012 (*though fishing vessels have been hijacked subsequently*)
- No vessel with AST has been successfully hijacked
- Over 1100 pirates in prison in 21 countries on remand or serving sentences



- Vessels using self-protection measures (BMP4)
  - Use of citadels
  - Hardening measures (razor wire etc.)
- Piracy at lowest level since 2006
  - Only 8 armed assaults in 2013
  - No hijacks of commercial vessels in 2013



# Is Somali Piracy finished?

- Piracy threat only contained
- Pirate business model evolved and active
- Provide 'protection' schemes for illegal fishing
- Provide security to vessels engaged in smuggling and illegal regional trade
- Possibility of collaboration with al-Shabaab – overlap in bases, vessel hijack, land-based kidnap for ransom



# Potential Future Piracy Threat

- International counter-piracy presence post 2014?
- Possible resurgence of Somali piracy if maritime efforts reduced
- Pirates adapt to new business opportunities
- Pirate impact on O&G offshore as operations increase
- Vulnerable O&G offshore operational profile
  - Slow speed for seismic runs
  - Limited manoeuvrability
  - Numerous support vessels required
- Pirates adapt TTPs to similar model as West Africa counterparts?

# Land based threats

- East Africa littoral countries differ in context and security environments
- Many have functioning state institutions and a rule of law, but possible spoilers:
  - Political transition
  - Civil unrest
  - Secessionist movements
  - Terrorism
  - Kidnap for ransom

# Potential land-based threats

- On land transit / R&R for personnel and assets
- Operations at port or anchorages within a country
- Terrorists/ local rebel groups/ militias focus on strategic resources and assets





- Important to understand country and local area dynamics, and develop a robust security plan based on risk profile
- EA littoral states keen to build investment, companies develop good government relations



# Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea & impact on O&G operations



- Gulf of Guinea home to several oil producing nations
- About 10% of world's crude oil exports
- 40% Europe, almost 30% US imports of petroleum products travels through GoG each year
- 2012 more piracy attacks off West Africa than off Somalia
- Maritime security off West Africa and safe access to ports is critical for global energy production

# West Africa piracy

- Highest incidents Nigeria, Benin and Togo waters
- Incidents reported up to 150 nautical miles from the West Africa coast; use of mother ships



# West Africa Piracy TTPs

- Type of pirate incidents
  - Hijackings of tankers for theft of refined petroleum products
  - Robbery of crew and ship property
  - Kidnap for ransom
- Target
  - Tugs and supply vessels
  - Also increasing against merchant vessels – tankers and cargo - transiting and operating within region

- Mainly Nigeria-based pirate gangs, well-organised, local backing
- Usually a high-level of violence used
- Motivation of attacks tends to be theft of cargo rather than less common kidnapping, little concern for the welfare of crew







- Most attacks occur when vulnerable of being identified and boarded
  - Vessels moored
  - Carrying out ship to ship transfers at sea
- Cargo transferred to hijackers' smaller vessels and then sold on black market
- Pirate groups TTPs suggest knowledge of ships' locations, cargo and ability to operate specialised vessels



# Key security considerations to offshore O&G operations off east Africa



- Private security working with host nation navies
- Revised best management practices
- Focused reporting mechanisms
- Partnership with national governments

# Private security

- How address armed security in respective EA countries' EEZs?
- EA country naval capacity to service offshore contracts?
- Impact of AST on static or slow moving vessels?



# Private security

- AST or military escorts not a panacea, but one key element
- Private security companies operating in a non-armed capacity, support could
  - Develop of bespoke security plans
  - Undertake risk assessments of areas such as port facilities
  - Allocate ship security officers to advise on security protocols and undertake hardening activities
  - Advisory roles with host nation armed forces
  - Ensure adherence to VPSHR

# Best Management Practices

- Designed for vessels transiting not working in EA waters
- Self-protection measures more difficult
  - Exploration or drilling vessels slow moving or static
  - Commercial vessels stopping at ports along coast



- Can BMP be adapted for commercial offshore activity?
- Develop individuals security plans and SOPs based on offshore O&G operational profile



# Reporting mechanisms

- Only one third attacks in GoG reported (IMB)
  - Delay business, time-consuming
  - Unlikely to result in prosecution
- Build on Indian Ocean reporting systems and info sharing
- Poor reporting of attacks on fishing vessels
  - More efforts with local fishers
- Good maritime cooperation with international bodies and EA littoral countries






# Partnership with national governments

- O&G company friendly environment for operations
- EEZ territory defined, regulations
- EA country naval capacity? Ability to provide support to offshore operations without private sector involvement
- Liaison and training with host country security forces



# Summary

- Piracy has not gone away it has been contained up to now.....
- Oil and Gas operations will present slow and fixed targets some close to Somalia and more on land
- National and Coalition navies don't do have the resources.... scope for private sector engagement
- Good security will be critical to development and success of EA offshore oil and gas sector





**Hong Kong:** Newport Africa Limited, 1601-1603 Kinwick Centre,  
32 Hollywood Road, Central, Hong Kong S.A.R. **Tel:** +852 2542 1102

---

**Kenya Branch:** P.O. Box 24984, 00502 Nairobi, Kenya  
**24 hour support:** +254 707 998 956 **email:**  
[enquiries@newportafrica.com](mailto:enquiries@newportafrica.com)