

**JOINT RESEARCH PROJECT: Democracy in crisis? An analysis of various dimensions and sources of support for democracy**

**PAPER 03: Institutions, Crises and Political Confidence in Seven Contemporary Democracies: An Elite-Mass Analysis**

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## **Introduction**

All democratic governments need the support of the citizenry to make binding decisions regarding the delivery of public goods and the protection of political rights. In new democracies it is in the interest of the state to expand its autonomy and in old democracies the state must maintain their control over economic and social interactions to rely on the support of the public. To operate efficiently all democracies must possess a certain amount of institutional confidence. To put it more bluntly, it means that if political confidence or trust in government institutions are declining the survival of the governing elite and, at times, democratic regimes itself are at stake.

One of the important conclusions that a number of contributors in Norris (1999) reached was that over the last 20-30 years there has been a noticeable decline in support for regime institutions and in established democracies – indicating that in many cases there are deficits in political confidence. (See also Dalton, 2014: 255-276). Before this general decline in support, elaborated on by Dalton (2014: 255-276) it was clear that in most democracies political protests or unconventional forms of political participation are signs of oscillating confidence in the political system (see Barnes & Kaase, 1979:110). These protests, however, in very few instances, resulted in the overthrow of the government. If there is a chronic lack of confidence in government institutions the electoral outcomes will indicate that the incumbent political leaders will be replaced by a new set of leaders in parliament.

Concurring with Mcallister (in Norris, 1999:190) “support” and “confidence” are used interchangeably in this paper, “...since they convey a broad meaning concerning the links between popular beliefs about government and representative institutions”. Institutional confidence is an important element of legitimacy, but the latter is much more specific. Defined by Lipset (1960:4) legitimacy is “...the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate one for the society”. A continuous decline in confidence or institutional trust may thus threaten the legitimacy of state institutions. Fortunately, in democracies elections result in winning parties whose policies are more congruent with the majority’s policy choices. It is also true that “...there is little doubt that high reserves of mass support provide a valuable cushion that help democracies to prevent the emergence of crises, as well as to overcome critical moments as they arise” (Schedler, 2001:81).

Together with basic political rights and liberties, confidence in state institutions is considered to be a necessary condition for a strong civil society and political stability. It is commonly argued that "without institutional trust, free participation is non-existent and the free expression of minorities is uncertain. If these minorities fear repression, their involvement in the political system is unlikely. This can result in aggressive forms of political participation outside the system. In other words, without confidence, essentially based on trust in its institutions, a democratic system has little chance of survival." García-Rivero, Kotzé and Du Toit, 2002: 168; see also Gibson, 2001 and Vujcic, 1999). Arguably then, institutional trust in the state is considered a crucial element for the development of a strong civil society to counterbalance the excesses of the state.

The importance of institutional trust for democracy is undeniable. From the classic study by Almond and Verba (1960) to the influential works of Inglehart, (1990); Rose, (1994); Lagos, (1997); Putnam, (1993) and Rice and Feldman, (1997), all have regarded institutional trust as a crucial dimension in the link between political culture and democracy. Low levels of institutional trust render citizens 'more likely to reject the existing political system and support parties of the extreme Right or Left' (Inglehart 1988; Lagos 1997). Otherwise, the citizens may rely on civil society institutions to mobilise against state institutions.

There is thus ample consensus that institutional confidence by the public is needed in democracies and at the same time elites, particularly political elites, need to share this confidence in their guidance of state institutions, if political stability in established democracies and the consolidation of new democracies are desired.

Besides this general agreement about the need for mass and elite confidence in democratic institutions there is, however, little agreement about the basis of this confidence and what the democratic outcomes of government should be. Minimalist approaches are based on procedural outcomes expecting political rights and electoral process from democracy. Others go beyond and expect democracy to produce economic outcomes, reduce inequality and provide social and economic well-being.

New democracies have enjoyed decades of growth and prosperity leaving little room to value the impact of poverty on democratic health. However, this situation changed with the world financial crisis and the subsequent economic recession in 2008. This crisis forced many

countries to implement a series of tough austerity measures and programmes for structural reforms of the welfare state and labour market. To a large extent, these policies were explicitly imposed by external actors leaving national governments and parliaments little room to manoeuvre in national politics and the economy. It also left citizens without the capacity of autonomous decision making (Beckert and Streeck, 2012). Social unrest, upheaval and political instability have been the common response of the citizenry to these measures of austerity, all of which has left an impact on the level of legitimacy of the democratic regimes. The citizens and civil society organisations' acceptance of these measures was of little importance for the imposed structural, fiscal and social policies (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012). In some countries, like Spain, Greece and Italy, social unrest gave rise to new political parties who claimed to represent civil society and ordinary citizens, showing confrontation between the state and civil society.

In the first part of the analysis we deal with the question whether the massive interference with the capacity of the decision making of the political elite (exclusively parliamentarians) due to the 2008-2013 recession, eroded citizens and elite's confidence in state institutions and civil society. In this context, majority parties in parliaments have been forced to implement stringent economic policies that gave rise to riots and protest in many countries indicating a rejection of the measures that were implemented. The second question that arises, is whether there are any differences in the confidence levels in the regime between the public and political elites, i.e. a relatively large disconnection between voters and their representatives - with the expectation that members of opposition parties in parliament would have less confidence in state institutions than the members of the governing parties.

This article will, against this background, explore the level of institutional trust in seven countries at the mass and elite level. The research takes the form of a quantitative analysis based on the World Values Surveys and the elite surveys (parliamentarians) conducted in 2006 (before the financial crisis) and in 2012-2013 (post the crisis when apparently, the worst of the economic crunch had lessened up) in the seven countries selected. (For a technical overview of the elite surveys see Van Beek, 2010: 309-310; the same technique was used in 2013). This time span allows the analysis of the possible effect of the impact of the recession on attitudes of the public and political elite of the various countries. A second part of the article explores what lies at the base of political confidence in the selected countries. We

investigate whether it is more strongly based on political attitudes or more specifically influenced by economic attitudes.

Countries from different continents, South Africa (Africa); Chile (Latin America); Germany and Sweden (Western Europe); South Korea (Asia); Poland (Eastern Europe) and Turkey (Euro-Asia) were included in the analysis. The selection of countries is representative of a wide range of political, social and cultural diversity (They include Traditional African, Catholic, Protestant and Islamic; old and new democracies; presidential and parliamentary democracies). Initially, in 2006 the selection of countries, with the exclusion of Turkey and Sweden was based on the “most different cases, most similar outcomes” design (Van Beek, 2010:15). Based on the same format Sweden and Turkey were added in a second study (2013) undertaken by the research team of the Transformation Research Initiative which also included surveys among the parliamentarians of these countries. This selection included five “third wave democracies” and two established democracies in Sweden (in many instances a model democracy) and Germany. The data of the seven countries, on elite and mass level, was used for the 2013 comparison.

Next, the most relevant literature that serve as motivation for the use of elite attitudes in comparison with the public attitudes, will be briefly discussed, followed by a discussion of the methodology and data, and finally the analysis and conclusions will be presented.

### **Elites, citizens, and the basis of support for democracy. The debate**

The importance of elites has been thoroughly established in the study of democracy (See amongst others, Higley and Gunther, 1992; Highley and Burton, 2006). The so-called “elitist theory of democracy” or “democratic elitism” states that “support for democratic values is more focused on a particular segment of society: namely the elites” (Gibson and Duch, 1991: 192). In agreement with this argument, the elites have been described as the "guardians of democracy" (Prothro and Grigg, 1960:277; Fletcher, 1989: 225; and McClosky, 1956:362). Certainly, there is evidence that the elites show higher levels of support for democracy than the masses. One would therefore also expect that parliamentarians –especially those in the majority party - would show higher levels of confidence in state institutions because they are after all in charge of government officials heading these institutions.

Differences in the confidence in state institutions and those of civil society in democracies between the elites and the public should in particular be evident in relation to specific issues such as the limitation of rights or the exclusion of certain groups. Therefore, any study of democratic support needs to incorporate a comparison between citizens and elites, especially since the late 1980s, when, as never before, many authoritarian regimes collapsed and those countries took a more democratic direction (Doorenspleet, 2000; Huntington, 1991; Mair, 2008; Møller, 2007; Schmitter and Treschel, 2004; Zakaria, 1997).

Assuming that democracy as “government by the people” could only emerge, stabilised and consolidated if the majority of citizens and elites prefer such a system, early researchers of political culture have proposed that the high levels of support for democracy among the elite also gives rise to mass pressure for democratic reform (and vice versa) (Lasswell, 1951; Lipset, 1959; Eckstein, 1966)<sup>1</sup>.

Taking into account that the political attitudes of the masses affect the process of democratization, the question is which mass attitudes affect this process the most and in which direction. Historically, scholars have claimed that a stable democracy depends on the condition that the performance of democratic political institutions matches mass expectations - that is when the public is satisfied with the quality of government. (Almond and Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1966, 1998; Cleary and Stokes, 2006; Booth and Seligson, 2009; Gilley, 2009; Inglehart, 2003). Basically, it can be argued that democracy becomes stable and consolidated when citizen demands and institutional provision of democracy are balanced (Dalton and Shin, 2006; Grindle, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Mattes and Bratton, 2007; Rose *et al.*, 1998; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Welzel and Klingemann, 2008). In addition, there is also a longstanding debate about the impact of economic performance on political confidence with a varied range of outcomes that we should take note of. At the same time, this debate is expanded by the question whether elites’ institutional trust is driven by the same factors that stimulate mass confidence in the most important political and social institutions of a democracy.

Taking a substantial body of literature on democratisation into account, we should also keep in mind that economic development, linked with urbanization, growth of GDP, rising living

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<sup>1</sup> For more refined views on this proposition see also Booth and Seligson (2009); Bratton, *et al.*, (2004); Chu, *et al.*, (2008); Diamond and Plattner (2008); Gilley (2009); Rose (et al., 1998), to mention but a few.

standards, and the like, would enhance people's political expectations of the government towards greater accountability, transparency and democracy (Lipset, 1960). Similarly, the opposite trend, such as economic recession and its effects, for instance, a decline in income, increases the probability of failures of regimes, especially democracies (Przeworski et al. 2000; Diamond, 2011; Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Mishler and Rose, 2005; Pacek and Radcliff, 1995; Reich, 1999; Shin and McDonough, 1999). Actually, "[a]long with the studies of the importance of objective economic factors on democratic aspirations stated above, no less influential are a large body of literature on economic voting in which the importance of subjective economic evaluations on the satisfaction with and support for democracy is unravelled." (Lam, 2013: 215).<sup>2</sup>

To link confidence in political institutions with the overall level of support for democracy – or the legitimacy of the regime - in a particular country one should in addition take into account that citizens vary considerably in their understanding of the concept "democracy", when they affirm their levels of support for democracy (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007). It is clear that there are inconsistencies and conflicts in how people understand the concept of democracy (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Doherty and Mecellem, 2015; Kotzé and García-Rivero, 2006). Some individuals define democracy mainly in terms of the substantive outcomes (reduction of inequality and provision of basic economic goods and services), whereas others define democracy in terms of the procedures that researchers typically see as the basic characteristics of democracy, namely procedural aspects. If support for democracy rests mainly on expectations of substantial changes in redistributive policies or economic conditions, this support may falter if expectations are not met and democratic support will be affected negatively. According to Bratton and Mattes (2001:448), the issue is quite simple - if the nature of democratic support is *intrinsic*, it is based on political issues and values; whereas if it is *instrumental* it will be based on the improvement of living standards.

At a glance, it seems necessary for our analysis, then, to divide institutional trust based on regime performance into "distinct baskets of goods: an *economic* basket, that includes economic assets, jobs and an array of basic social services and a *political* basket, that encompass peace, civil liberties, political rights, human dignity and equality before the law"

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<sup>2</sup> See also Fiorina (1981); Lockerbie (1991); Colton (1996); Heslie and Bash-Kirova (2001); Wu and Chu (2007); Yap (2012); Anderson and O'Connor (2000); Gomez and Wilson (2006); Haggard and Kaufman (1997); Pacek and Radcliff (1995); Reich (1999); Shin and McDonough (1999).

(Bratton and Mattes 2001:448) In other words, there are two possibilities: One is the view that the content of the institutional trust is mainly based on how well state institutions perform with regards to characteristics of democracy such as safeguarding political rights and civil liberties and, two, that confidence is based on the economic outcomes state institutions effected such as providing shelter and income. This distinction may result in different outcomes; if the majority of the population have an intrinsic point of view, confidence in the state may not be substantially negatively influenced by events such as the economic crisis of 2008/9. On the other hand, when the majority have an instrumental view, economic crisis may impact more severely on levels of confidence. It seems that the “instrumental view” should be more prevalent in younger democracies.

Mcallister (in Norris, 1999:189) supports the importance of economic performance as an important element of “...how citizens evaluate their governments and, in turn, for how they rate their democratic institutions, especially in established democracies. In general, it is collective rather than individual judgments that have most weight in the popular economic calculus, and those judgments are usually (though not exclusively) retrospective rather than prospective”. He continues, “Considerable evidence suggests that voters believe it is a central responsibility of government to deliver high levels of economic performance”.

The financial crisis that started in 2008 and the concomitant recession in many countries provide us with a unique opportunity to analyse:

- 1) The disconnect (“gap”), if any, between the political elite (members of parliament) and the public with regards to their confidence in the state and in civil society before and after the recession;
- 2) The difference between parliamentarians and the public with regards to the role of economic and political expectations with reference to political confidence in institutions. In this analysis we used a “politics block” of items and an “economic block” of items.

To summarise: From the classic study by Almond and Verba (1960) to the influential works of Inglehart, (1990); Rose, (1994); Lagos, (1997); Putnam, (1993) and Rice and Feldman, (1997), all have regarded institutional trust as a crucial dimension in the link between political culture and democracy. Low levels of institutional trust render citizens ‘more likely to reject the existing political system and support parties of the extreme Right or Left’



(Inglehart 1988; Lagos 1997). Otherwise, citizens may rely on civil society institutions to mobilise them against state institutions.

Following this short summary of the importance of elites in the analysis of institutional trust and the “economic” and “political” content of support for democratic institutions the independent variables will be divided into two blocks, one incorporating political rights and, a second one which incorporates economic expectations as a possible explanation for high or low levels of trust. The operationalization of these variables is explained in the following methodology section.

### **Methodology, data and cases**

As we have indicated “democracy” is a contested concept with varied meanings for the public (Bratton 2010, 106). Therefore, people’s responses to general questions about the desirability of democracy might be understood quite differently across countries and cultures (Bratton 2010; Przeworski and Teune 1966; Tezcür *et al.*, 2012), particularly in countries with a short democratic history (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007). This should be taken into account in the analysis of support for democracy.

It is interesting that there is not really consensus on how to measure support for democracy. For example, several studies measure support for democracy by using the question “democracy is always preferable to any other form of government” or “for people like me, it is the same whether the government is democratic or not” (Lam, 2013) or “Do you think democracy is suitable for our country?” (Duch, 2001; Mattes and Bratton, 2007; Yap, 2012); “Democracy may have problems but is better” and the desire for “having a democratic political system” (Spierings, 2014).

Others operationalize support for democracy as positive attitudes toward a set of democratic norms and institutions (Almond and Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1971; Huntington, 1991; Gibson, 1995; Chen and Zhong, 2000). Armingeon and Kai (2014) have focused on the variable “satisfaction with the way democracy works”; Cho (2014) constructed an index including citizens’ preferences for a democratic regime, civilian dictatorship and military rule; and, the importance of living in a democratic society.

Being sensitive about this “content alternatives” for democracy, this study focuses on how much confidence the public and the elite have in state and civil society institutions and makes use of survey data<sup>3</sup> both at the mass and elite level. Consequently, a variable measuring the respondent’s support for democracy is selected as dependent variable and two sets of variables, one related to political issues and a second relating to economic issues as independent variables.

We constructed two variables using the respondents answer to the question: “I’m going to name a number of institutions. For each one could you please tell me how much confidence you have in the particular institution? Is it, “a great deal”, “quite a lot”, “not very much”, “or not at all”. Running a factor analysis resulted in two factors. (1) “**Confidence in the State**” which includes confidence in the following institutions: Armed Forces, Police, Parliament, Civil Services, Government and Courts. (2) “**Confidence in Civil Society**” which includes confidence in the following organisations: Churches, Press, Labour Unions and Major Companies. (Alpha Crombach in brackets)<sup>4</sup>. An index for the “State” and “Civil Society” variables were then composed.

The variable “**Gov/opp support**” for the elite is a variable measuring if the respondent belongs to pro-government group in parliament or to the one of the opposition groups. For the mass data this variable was based on the item indicating the voting intention of the respondent. In some countries the “government” consisted of a coalition.

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<sup>3</sup> The mass survey is part of the World Values Survey 2010-2013 available at the webpage of the World Value Survey group. Information about elite survey can be found in Van Beek, 2010.

<sup>4</sup> Confidence in state includes confidence in the following institutions: Armed Forces, Police, Parliament, Civil Services, Government and Courts. Confidence in Civil Society includes confidence in the following organisations: Churches, Press, Labour Unions and Major Companies. (Alpha Crombach in brackets): **First wave: Mass level: Chile** confidence in state (0,788); civil society (0,612); **Germany** confidence in state (0,809); civil society (0,507); **South Korea** state (0,775); civil society: (0,880); **Poland** state: (0,851); civil society: (0,880); **South Africa** state: (0,876); civil society: (0,833); **Sweden** state: (0,876); civil society: (0,737); **Turkey** state: (0,851); civil society: (0,793); **Elite level: Chile** state: (0,725); civil society: (0,595); **Germany** state: (0,693); civil society: (0,541); **Poland** state: (0,655); civil society: (0,465); **South Africa** state: (0,796); civil society: (0,593); **South Korea** state: (0,823); civil society (0,610); **Sweden** state: (0,618); civil society: (0,450); **Turkey** state: (0,684); civil society: (0,683) **Second wave: Mass level: Chile** confidence in state (0,828); civil society (0,645); **Germany** confidence in state (0,801); civil society (0,744); **South Korea** state (0,851); civil society: (0,880); **Poland** state: (0,805); civil society: (0,555); **South Africa** state: (0,825); civil society: (0,642); **Sweden** state: (0,814); civil society: (0,532); **Turkey** state: (0,849); civil society: (0,659); **Elite level: Chile** state: (0,725); civil society: (0,595); **Germany** state: (0,708); civil society: (0,591); **Poland** state: (0,783); civil society: (0,406); **South Africa** state: (0,836); civil society: (0,519); **South Korea** state: (0,832); (0,797); **Sweden** state: (0,618); civil society: (0,450); **Turkey** state: (0,821); civil society: (0,580)

- For Sweden, in 2006 and 2013, the parties included were the Moderates, Centre Party, Liberal People’s Party and Christian Democrats;
- For Germany, in 2006 and 2013, the parties were the Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union, and Social Democratic Party;
- For Chile, in 2006 and 2013, the parties were Party for Democracy, Christian Democratic Party, Socialist Party, and Social Democratic Radical Party;
- For South Korea there are no data available in 2006 data and the party included is the URI party;
- For Poland in 2006, parties included were the Law and Justice, Self-defense of the Republic of Poland, and League of Polish Families and for 2013 the Civic Platform and Polish People’s Party;
- For South Africa, in both 2006 and 2013, the African National Congress, and for
- Turkey, also both in 2006 and 2013, the Justice and Development Party.

The independent variable “**politics block**”, based on an intrinsic definition of democracy, is an index comprising the following two items: “Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections” and “Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty from state oppression”. Another independent variable, “**economics block**” consisted of the following items: “Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor”; “Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment” and, for the 2006 survey the variable “Democracy: Economy is prospering” and for the 2013 survey “evaluation of the current financial situation”. Although some researchers (Shafiq, 2009, Fattah 2006 or Ciftci, 2010, among others) have included a set of socio-demographic variables that generally includes gender, level of education or age of the respondent in our study socio-demographic variables have been excluded. The focus was exclusively on the *politics vs economics debate*. Besides, the low N of the elite survey would make its inclusion very complicated and previous tests have shown little or no impact of these variables.

To recap: The countries selected were Chile, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, South Korea, Turkey and Germany. The time span covered is from 2006 until 2013, therefore just prior to 2007 when the economic crisis started, to the period 2010 -2013 when the worst of the recession seems to have passed (Not all public surveys –WVS - were conducted in the same year. South Africa’s was the only one of the seven that took place in 2013. All elite surveys

were conducted the same year, respectively 2006 and 2013) Using this period allows us to measure whether the financial crisis factor has an impact on mass and elite attitudes and expectations from democracy.

## Analysis

We start with an analysis of the levels of disconnection, possibly induced as a result of the recession, between the public and their representatives in Parliament. Here we first present a table that gives us the pre-recession election date, the number of days before the recession peaked after the election and most importantly the cumulated output loss in GDP from the peak of the recession to the end of 2014 (Table in Van Beek, ed. 2016 forthcoming).

**Table 1: Economic Crisis: The Time Coordinates and Cumulated Output Loss**

Country ID and country name	Date of pre-recession election	Date of start of the recession (peak)	Time distance of pre-recession election to peak in days	Cumulated output loss in GDP start to 2014 end
97 Slovenia	21.09.2008	30.09.2008	9	
33 Spain	09.03.2008	31.03.2008	22	-14.6
<b>92 Poland</b>	<b>21.10.2007</b>	<b>31.03.2008</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>-6.3</b>
<b>113 South Korea</b>	<b>09.04.2008</b>	<b>30.09.2008</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>-13.1</b>
94 Russia	02.12.2007	30.06.2008	211	
13 Denmark	13.11.2007	30.06.2008	230	
15 Iceland	12.05.2007	31.12.2007	233	-20.7
<b>74 Turkey</b>	<b>22.07.2007</b>	<b>31.03.2008</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>-6,6</b>
43 Switzerland	21.07.2007	30.06.2008	253	
14 Finland	18.03.2007	31.12.2007	288	-20.6
31 France	10.06.2007	31.03.2008	295	
63 Australia	24.11.2007	30.09.2008	311	
21 Belgium	10.06.2007	30.06.2008	386	
<b>11 Sweden</b>	<b>17.09.2006</b>	<b>31.12.2007</b>	<b>470</b>	<b>-11.8</b>
83 Estonia	04.03.2007	30.06.2008	484	
22 Netherlands	22.11.2006	31.03.2008	495	
32 Italy	09/10.04.2006	30.09.2007	528	
42 Austria	01.10.2006	31.03.2008	547	
96 Slovakia	17.06.2006	31.12.2007	562	
62 Canada	23.01.2006	31.12.2007	707	
64 New Zealand	17.09.2005	30.09.2007	743	
86 Hungary	09/23.04.2006	30.06.2008	799	
12 Norway	11/12.09.2005	31.12.2007	840	
82 Czech Republic	02/03.06.2006	30.09.2008	850	
<b>41 Germany</b>	<b>18.09.2005</b>	<b>31.03.2008</b>	<b>925</b>	<b>-3.6</b>
<b>155 Chile</b>	<b>11.12.2005</b>	<b>30.09.2008</b>	<b>1024</b>	<b>-5.6</b>
35 Portugal	20.02.2005	31.12.2007	1044	
61 USA	02.11.2004	31.12.2007	1154	
51 Great Britain	05.05.2005	31.03.2008	1061	
<b>181 South Africa</b>	<b>14.04.2004</b>	<b>30.09.2008</b>	<b>1630</b>	<b>-4.6</b>

From this table it is clear that South Korea and Sweden had the highest GDP loss but this was not as high as Spain (-14.6) and Greece with -24.8 (not included in this table because there was no WVS data available). Spain and Greece in particular had a turbulent political experience during this time. (In Finland -20.6 and Iceland at -20.7 there were also substantial GDP losses).

To pursue the proposition that the recession may have resulted in a widening of the gap between the public and the parliamentarians with respect to their confidence in state institutions and civil society, we constructed tables comparing not only public confidence levels of 2006 with that of 2013, but also compared the public with parliamentarians and compared the responses of government and opposition supporters/representatives at the mass and elite level. Table 2 is the confidence levels in the state institutions and Table 3 that of civil society institutions. (For a description of the items selected through factor analysis and the construction of the indices, see footnote 4).

### **Tables 2 and 3 here**

Table 2 shows the means of confidence in state of elites and mass public in 2006 and 2013. In 2006, at mass level, South Africa and Sweden are above the average but Chile and Poland show the lowest levels of trust in their state. Elites in 2006 show higher levels of trust than the public in all countries except South Africa. This should be expected from those that are task to “steer the ship of the state”. Germans and Turkish parliamentarians show the highest levels of confidence in their state institutions. In 2013 public levels of confidence in state institutions notably increases in Germany while in the other countries it is more or less the same. Elites, however, in Sweden far outpace the public with reference to confidence in state institutions. It is also noteworthy that in Sweden and Turkey the members of the opposition have significantly more confidence in state institutions than government members. This may be the reflection of elections that took place, which resulted in a new set of parliamentarians.

Table 2 also shows the breakdown results by government/opposition support. The overall results indicate that those who support government show higher levels of confidence in the state. Analysed by country, the same result is evident. In 2006, noticeable differences are found in South Africa and Turkey where the differences between those who support government and those who support opposition are the highest. This applies to both elite and

mass levels. In 2013 with the exception of Chile at the mass level and elite levels, the results are similar. As expected opposition supporters show lower levels of confidence in state institutions than government supporters.

Table 3 shows the distributions of confidence in civil society which also includes a comparison of government/opposition supporters. Generally levels are lower than confidence in state at the mass level and at the elite level. Highest levels of mass confidence in civil society are found in South Africa and South Korea and the lowest in Germany. Elites also show higher levels of confidence in civil society than the public. Elites in Chile show the highest level of confidence. In 2013 figures for the public remain similar, with a slight decrease in South Africa and a small increase in Turkey. Overall figures remain similar to those in 2006. In 2013 figures remain similar for elites with minor increases in Chile and Sweden and a minor decrease in Poland.

Overall elites show higher levels of confidence in both state and civil society in 2006 and 2013. It seems that in contrast to the elite, the public perceived the recession as a much stronger “independent variable” with regards to confidence levels.

With no clear indication of what could be considered as a “large” disconnect or gap between the confidence levels of the public and parliamentarians, it is nevertheless, important to point to relatively large confidence gaps in some countries. Chile is the outlier with reference to confidence in state institutions, with a gap of 4 in 2006 and 5 in 2013 between the public and elites. A similar wide gap of 4.5 and 5.8 with regards to the public and elites were measured in 2006 and 2013 respectively for confidence in civil society. Sweden is the only other country where a relatively large gap exists between the public and elites with regards to civil society. In this case the public have a fairly low level of confidence in these institutions. Interestingly, the opposition among the elite has a significantly higher level of confidence in civil society than the governing elite. Against the fairly stable political situation during the “economic crisis” in countries with fairly large confidence gaps, it would be fairly safe to conclude that confidence gaps that developed during the recession did not endanger the legitimacy of any of these governments.

We now turn to an analysis of political and economic attitudes that form the basis for confidence in the state and civil society in the selected countries. Country by country analysis reveals the following findings.

#### **Table 4 and 5 here**

Table 4 presents results for Chile in 2006 and table 5 in 2013. We introduce political items/factors first. Confidence in civil society and respect for human rights clearly propel confidence in the state. The economic items/factors do not show any effect on institutional confidence. The last model introduces the possible effect of gov/opp support but no effect is detected. The elites show similar patterns than the public, with the focus exclusively on political issues.

In 2013 the situation seemed to change. Although political factors remained more important, than economic factors, they emerged as explanatory issues. This applies to elites also. The percentage on explained variance in the elite cases increase when economic issues are introduced most probably reflecting the impact of the economic crisis. The main difference however is that gov/opp support seems to boost confidence in state institutions. Those supporting government appear to show fairly higher levels of confidence in state institutions.

#### **Table 6 and 7 here**

Tables 6 and 7 explain the results for Germany. Similarly to Chile, political issues explained mainly confidence in state in 2006 for both mass and elites, outweighing economic factors. As was the case in Chile supporting government implies higher levels of confidence in state than supporting the opposition. In the case of elites, this variable has a higher impact in terms of explained variance.

In 2013, at the mass level, economic issues did not seem to play any role explaining confidence in state as only political issues played a role. The fact that the economic crisis did not hit the German economy as hard as some other countries in Europe may be a reason for this. Gov/opp variable remained significant. Together with political issues, economic factors remained significant but not government support.

### **Table 8 and 9 here**

Tables 8 and 9 present the results for South Korea in 2006 and in 2013. The patterns indicate that, again, political issues were the main factors steering confidence in state both at the mass and the elite levels. Interesting is that at the elite level, none of the economic issue were even significant in 2006. In 2013 the results seemed similar, although elites, as in previous the other countries analysed, tended to incorporate economic factors to explain confidence in the state. Nevertheless, political issues weight more than economic ones.

### **Table 10 and 11 here**

Tables 10 and 11 present the data for Poland. Results were similar in 2006 and in 2013 at mass level: political issues explained confidence in state. However, in the case of Poland, elites were already worried about the state's capacity in handling the economy in 2006. In 2013 results remained the same. Elites incorporated both political and economic issues when explaining confidence in state institutions whereas masses focused exclusively on political issues. At both elites and mass level, supporting government implies trusting institution more than trusting opposition (mass level only in 2013 data).

### **Table 12 and 13 here**

Tables 12 and 13 analyse the South Africa case. Again results are similar to previous cases. In 2006 the public were exclusively worried about political issues such as confidence in civil society and respect for human rights. Elites brought also economic issues into play but political factors weighed more. In 2013 the results remained the same for both elites and masses. In both 2006 and 2013, government supporters showed fairly higher levels of confidence in state institutions than those supporting the opposition.

### **Table 14 and 15 here**

Tables 14 and 15 explain the patterns for Sweden. In 2006 and in 2013 for both the public and elites, political factors were more important in explaining confidence in state. In any case, political issues were far more important than economic factors for both elites and public in 2006 and 2013. In 2013 however, economic issues appeared to affect confidence in state



institutions more than in 2006, especially at the public level. In 2006 and in 2013 at the elite, as well as the public level, government support affected confidence in state institutions strongly. This effect is especially strong at the elite level, in terms of explained variance.

### **Table 16 and 17 here**

Finally, tables 16 and 17 analyse the case of Turkey where results do not differ much from those presented previously. Although, economic issues were somewhat more significant for public and elites in 2006 but not in 2013; the percentage of explained variance was mostly due to political issues. Again as in previous countries, support for government boosts confidence in state institutions,

### **Conclusion**

At present there is no doubt that democracy is the most legitimate form of government of all. However, from North to South and East to West all types of regimes claim to be democratic. Furthermore, there is no consensus about what democracy should generate and what citizens should expect from democracy such as the need for trusted institutions and political rights. On the other hand, other approaches extend the focus and expect democracy to reduce inequalities and provide goods and shelter.

At the same time, there is also consensus that in all societies there is a small group of people that take decisions, namely the elites. In democracies elites and masses should more or less share the same values as the former represent the latter in decision-making bodies.

This paper has focussed on a comparative analysis at the elite and public levels comparing data from 2006 and 2013. We deliberately started before the beginning of the worst economic recession since World War II and compared attitudes measured in 2013, when the worst of the crisis—seems to have passed. This allowed us to do an evaluation of the impact of economic needs on democratic performance from the citizens' point of view.

After analysing the selected seven countries some basic conclusions have been reached:

- 1) Results are overall very similar in all the countries included in the analysis regardless of their cultural, political and historical differences.

- 2) Political factors explain a high level of mainly confidence in state institutions, with different percentages of explained variance among different countries.
- 3) Capacity of the state to deal with the economy seems to worry elites more than the public. It is most probably the impact of the global recession on the confidence that affected this difference.
- 4) Elites, especially those in government, have in general, a higher level of confidence in state institutions compared to the public. This result was expected from the “guardians” of democracy, South Africa in 2006 and Turkey in 2013 being the exception. It was also in these two countries where the public confidence in state institutions dropped significantly from 2006 to 2013.
- 5) Similarly, the elites also had a noticeable higher level of confidence in civil society than the public in 2006 and 2013 in the majority of the countries in the study.
- 6) Political issues surpass any possible effect of economic issues in the public and elites’ expectations of democracy.
- 7) Elites and public generally had the same expectations with regard to the responsibility of democracies in the countries analysed in this study.

According to results presented here, *those defending a procedural conception of democracy seems to be closer to citizens’ and elites’ visions of democracy*. It is a pity, however, that due to space limitations it is not possible to put these results in the context of a particular country. A much richer analysis could have been the result.

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## Appendices

**Table 2. Confidence in the State 2006-2013 (means)**

State	2006								2013							
	Mass				Elite				Mass				Elite			
	Mean	S.D.	Gv	Op	Mean	S.D.	Gv	Op	Mean	S.D.	Gv	Op	Mean	S.D.	Gv	Op
Chile	14,3	3,6	14,5	14,0	17,8	2,4	17,8	16,6	14,1	3,7	13,5	14,8	18,3	2,7	20,1	16,5
Germany	14,4	3,2	15,2	13,4	17,2	2,0	17,8	15,9	16,2	3,1	16,6	15,1	17,8	2,6	18,9	16,6
Poland	13,6	3,1	13,8	13,2	15,3	2,7	16,8	14,0	13,8	3,0	14,3	13,2	15,7	3,2	17,7	13,5
South Africa	16,9	3,9	17,5	14,6	16,0	3,3	17,7	13,8	14,6	4,5	15,2	14,2	15,5	3,8	18,0	13,5
South Korea	14,6	3,0	14,9	14,4	16,9	2,4	16,7	16,9	15,0	3,5	n.a.	n.a.	13,2	2,6	13,0	13,5
Sweden	16,1	2,7	15,6	16,6	18,4	2,4	19,5	17,5	16,5	3,0	17,4	15,7	19,4	2,2	20,4	18,3
Turkey	17,5	4,2	19,0	16,0	18,8	2,7	19,9	16,9	17,0	4,3	18,1	15,6	16,4	3,9	18,8	12,9
<b>Total</b>	<b>15,1</b>	<b>3,7</b>	<b>15,7</b>	<b>14,6</b>	<b>17,3</b>	<b>2,9</b>	<b>18,2</b>	<b>16,2</b>	<b>15,1</b>	<b>3,9</b>	<b>15,9</b>	<b>14,8</b>	<b>16,9</b>	<b>3,4</b>	<b>18,6</b>	<b>15,1</b>

**Table 3. Confidence in the Civil Society 2006-2013 (means)**

	2006								2013							
	Mass				Elite				Mass				Elite			
	Mean	S.D.	Gv	Op	Mean	S.D.	Gv	Op	Mean	S.D.	Gv	Op	Mean	S.D.	Gv	Op
Chile	9,9	2,4	9,9	9,9	14,1	2,2	14,2	13,9	9,7	2,4	9,7	9,8	15,4	2,0	16,0	14,7
Germany	8,9	1,9	9,1	8,2	12,6	2,0	12,5	12,8	9,2	2,0	9,4	8,6	12,6	2,2	11,7	13,4
Poland	9,9	2,0	10,1	9,6	11,4	2,2	11,0	11,7	9,4	2,0	9,3	9,4	10,7	2,1	10,3	11,0
South Africa	11,4	2,3	11,6	10,8	13,7	2,5	13,7	13,7	10,8	2,8	10,8	10,8	12,9	2,4	13,5	12,4
South Korea	10,0	1,8	10,2	9,9	13,5	1,9	13,4	13,5	10,0	2,1	n.a.	n.a.	16,2	1,9	16,3	16,1
Sweden	9,8	1,7	9,8	9,7	13,6	1,8	12,2	14,2	9,7	2,0	9,9	9,5	14,1	2,0	13,5	14,7
Turkey	9,6	2,4	10,0	9,2	13,5	2,4	13,3	14,0	10,1	2,6	10,5	9,7	13,2	2,2	13,0	13,3
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,8</b>	<b>2,2</b>	<b>10,1</b>	<b>9,6</b>	<b>13,3</b>	<b>2,3</b>	<b>12,9</b>	<b>13,2</b>	<b>9,8</b>	<b>2,3</b>	<b>9,9</b>	<b>9,6</b>	<b>13,0</b>	<b>2,5</b>	<b>12,9</b>	<b>13,1</b>

**Table 4. Confidence in State in Chile - 2006**

	Mass						Elite					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Confidence in Civil Society	,624***	,056	,620***	,056	,623***	,056	,604***	,094	,595***	,096	,597***	,097
Respect for Human Rights	,068*	,147	,066*	,153	,061	,153	,018	,317	,018	,328	,018	,363
Liberal conception of democracy	,007	,033	,033	,039	,030	,039	,089	,056	,040	,07	,041	,066
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor			,079	,065	-,082	,065			-,049	,094	-,045	,097
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment			,030	,048	,021	,049			,118	,123	,116	,121
(M) Evaluation of self economy/ (E) Democracy: Economy is prospering Gov/Opp			,027	,058	,023	,058			,049	,107	,049	,108
					-,065	,258					-,018	,483

	Mass			Elites		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
R	,636	,640	,643	,610	,616	,616
R2	,405	,409	,414	,372	,380	,380
Adj. R2	,401	,402	,404	,350	,345	,347

**Table 5. Confidence in State in Chile (2013)**

	Mass						Elite					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Confidence in Civil Society	,449***	,045	,446***	,044	,450***	,064	,513***	,099	,438***	,086	,379***	,087
Respect for Human Rights	,217***	,148	,203***	,147	,187***	,210	,429***	,369	,239***	,331	,210**	,323
Liberal conception of democracy	,004	,028	,012	,033	,002	,049	,014	,171	-,046	,147	-,033	,142
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor			,121*	,045	,103*	,065			,037	,118	,047	,114
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment			-,114*	,055	-,094	,079			-,191*	,136	-,190*	,131
Democracy: Economy is prospering Gov/Opp			,203***	,054	,193***	,078			,434***	,14	,306***	,163
					,140***	,311					,232**	,428



	Mass			Elites		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
R	,545	,590	,605	,684	,813	,830
R2	,297	,348	,348	,468	,661	,689
Adj. R2	,292	,338	,355	,452	,640	,666

**Table 6. Confidence in State in Germany (2006)**

	Mass						Elite					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Confidence in Civil Society	,556***	,05	,531***	,062	,513***	,062	,043	,095	,124	,096	,127	,091
Respect for Human Rights	,148***	,138	,146***	,138	,109**	,164	,525***	,299	,477***	,294	,369***	,298
Liberal conception of democracy	,034	,036	,032	,040	,036	,040	,208*	,267	,210*	,257	,193*	,243
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor			,024	,047	,027	,047			-,199*	,086	-,226*	,082
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment			-,031	,062	-,042	,062			-,144	,117	-,114	,111
Democracy: Economy is prospering			,139***	,053	,132***	,052			,069	,082	,034	,078
Gov/Opp					,121***	,255					,295**	,375

	Mass			Elites		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
R	,612	,627	,638	,559	,621	,678
R2	,374	,393	,406	,313	,386	,459
Adj. R2	,370	,386	,398	,289	,341	,412

**Table 7. Confidence in State in Germany (2013)**

	Mass						Elite					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Confidence in Civil Society	,562***	,049	,556***	,049	,541***	,049	,023	,101	,063	,097	,087	,102
Respect for Human Rights	,192***	,145	,158***	,145	-,180***	,145	,549***	,36	,396***	,369	,367***	,391
Liberal conception of democracy	-,029	,027	-,036	,030	-,035	,030	,006	,081	-,029	,079	-,032	,079
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor			,038	,041	,040	,041			-,032	,098	-,017	,099
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment			-,036	,048	-,036	,047			-,080	,109	-,077	,099
Democracy: Economy is			,056	,041	,056	,041			,363***	,160	,330***	,172

prospering Gov/Opp			,212**	,083				,101	,564
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	Mass			Elite		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
R	,628	,632	,637	,545	,649	,653
R2	,394	,399	,406	,297	,421	,426
Adj. R2	,392	,393	,399	,275	,382	,381

**Table 8. Confidence in State in South Korea (2006)**

	Mass						Elite					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Confidence in Civil Society	,565***	,042	,562***	,042	,560***	,043	,410***	,112	,454***	,116	,453***	,117
Respect for Human Rights	,130***	,134	,124***	,136	,123***	,136	-,346***	,467	-,282**	,494	-,286***	,507
Liberal conception of democracy	-,006	,020	-,012	,022	-,013	,022	-,178*	,096	-,22*	,114	-,271*	,116
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor			-,002	,034	,001	,034			-,174	,146	-,174	,146
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment			,009	,033	,009	,033			,063	,173	,068	,180
Democracy: Economy is prospering Gov/Opp			,056*	,039	,055*	,039			,135	,169	,129	,177
					,182	,023					-,018	,454

	Mass			Elite		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
R	,590	,593	,593	,541	,573	,573
R2	,348	,351	,352	,293	,328	,329
Adj. R2	,346	,347	,347	,271	,285	,277

**Table 9. Confidence in State in South Korea (2013)**

	Mass						Elite					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Confidence in Civil Society	,647***	,038	,652***	,045	n.a.	n.a.	,260**	,123	,319**	,133	,316**	,134
Respect for Human Rights	,124***	,141	,220***	,166	n.a.	n.a.	-,485***	,399	-,392***	,433	-,393**	,435
Liberal conception of democracy	,014	,023	,043*	,027	n.a.	n.a.	-,079	,113	-,012	,127	-,015	,128
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor			,049**	,087	n.a.	n.a.			-,199	,231	-,197	,232

Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment										
Democracy: Economy is prospering Gov/Opp										

	Mass			Elite		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
R	,707	,738	n.a.	,518	,564	,565
R2	,500	,508	n.a.	,268	,318	,319
Adj. R2	,498	,504	n.a.	,246	,274	,267

**Table 10. Confidence in State in Poland (2006)**

	Mass						Elite					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Confidence in Civil Society	,492***	,052	,485***	,073	,485***	,074	,358**	,153	,406***	,144	,520***	,130
Respect for Human Rights	,145***	,218	,139***	,223	,139**	,223	,189	,471	,182	,439	,004	,415
Liberal conception of democracy	,029	,039	,036	,043	,036	,043	,200	,095	,201	,097	,237*	,084
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor			,020	,054	,054	,020			,340*	,144	,170	,135
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment			-0,26	,060	-0,26	,060			,123	,145	,049	,128
Democracy: Economy is prospering Gov/Opp			,034	,059	,034	,059			-0,102	,135	-0,012	,120
					,001	,276					,500***	,673

	Mass			Elite		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
R	,542	,544	,544	,467	,604	,729
R2	,294	,296	,296	,218	,365	,531
Adj. R2	,289	,285	,284	,173	,287	,463

**Table 11. Confidence in State in Poland (2013)**

	Mass						Elite					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Confidence in Civil Society	,518***	,064	,518***	,064	,525***	,064	,134*	,105	,192**	,097	,251***	,088
Respect for Human Rights	,208***	,221	,208***	,221	,175***	,236	,535***	,339	,302***	,358	,155	,355

Liberal conception of democracy	-,003	,033	-,009	,036	,004	,036	-,047	,149	-,020	,136	-,005	,123
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor			-,051	,048	-,048	,048			-,080	,088	-,067	,079
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment			,028	,054	,019	,054			-,029	,100	-,052	,090
Democracy: Economy is prospering			-,004	,057	-,009	,057			,427***	,105	,110*	,196
Gov/Opp					,104*	,258					,493***	,531

	Mass			Elite		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
R	,578	,580	,580	,541	,666	,743
R2	,334	,336	,346	,293	,443	,553
Adj. R2	,329	,326	,334	,277	,417	,528

**Table 12. Confidence in State in South Africa (2006)**

	Mass						Elite					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Confidence in Civil Society	,563***	,055	,563***	,051	,534***	,053	,376***	,123	,377***	,122	,387***	,099
Respect for Human Rights	,250***	,137	,248***	,137	,223***	,133	-,301**	,414	-,296**	,411	-,172*	,343
Liberal conception of democracy	,017	,029	-,023	,043	-,001	,033	,060	,120	-,052	,129	,024	,105
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor			,062	,034	,029	,040			,142	,132	,020	,109
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment			,039	,057	,055	,021			,099	,142	,028	,116
Democracy: Economy is prospering			,043	,043	,042	-,027			,116	,185	,073	,150
Gov/Opp					,215***	,275					,533***	,528

	Mass			Elite		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
R	,661	,668	,699	,510	,569	,749
R2	,437	,446	,488	,260	,324	,562
Adj. R2	,435	,441	,483	,235	,276	,525

**Table 13. Confidence in State in South Africa (2013)**

	Mass			Elite		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3

	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Confidence in Civil Society	,752***	,040	,750***	,041	,753***	,041	,564***	,114	,541***	,115	,560***	,102
Respect for Human Rights	,102***	,127	,102***	,128	,091***	,129	-,29***	,385	-,241***	,392	-,116	,367
Liberal conception of democracy	,037	,025	,031	,041	,033***	,041	,050	,082	,089	,084	,128*	,074
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor			,048	,017	,015	,048			,102	,109	,034	,098
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment			-,004	,071	-,009	,071			,135*	,121	-,104	,107
Democracy: Economy is prospering			-,005	,048	-,001	,048			,097	,135	-,013	,124
Gov/Opp					,062*	,255					,408***	,575

	Mass			Elite		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
R	,783	,783	,785	,694	,719	,793
R2	,613	,613	,617	,482	,517	,626
Adj. R2	,611	,610	,613	,467	,510	,624

**Table 14. Confidence in State in Sweden (2006)**

	Mass						Elite					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Confidence in Civil Society	,537***	,052	,535***	,052	,531***	,051	,118	,119	,091	,120	,253**	,114
Respect for Human Rights	,130***	,149	,121***	,150	,125***	,147	,355***	,39	,366***	,388	,295***	,348
Liberal conception of democracy	,038	,062	,031	,062	,037	,061	,330***	,248	,333***	,248	,290***	,220
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor			,021	,038	-,007	,038			-,170	,099	-,055	,089
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment			,050	,038	,014	,037			,266*	,097	,223	,086
Democracy: Economy is prospering			,002	,039	,023	,039			,033	,096	,050	,085
Gov/Opp					,181***	,172					,464***	,432

	Mass			Elite		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
R	,570	,574	,599	,494	,535	,669
R2	,325	,329	,323	,244	,287	,448
Adj. R2	,322	,323	,351	,220	,240	,405

**Table 15. Confidence in State in Sweden (2013)**

	Mass						Elite					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Confidence in Civil Society	,581***	,046	,572***	,050	,565***	,050	,045	,11	,116	,122	,184	,114
Respect for Human Rights	,176***	,172	,146***	,170	,131***	,168	,378***	,367	,323***	,377	,203*	,368
Liberal conception of democracy	,057	,029	,067	,029	,063	,029	,080	,215	,080	,214	-,012	,206
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor			-,020	,040	,001	,039			-,215*	,089	-,156	,083
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment			-,102*	,042	-,088*	,042			,009	,085	,082	,080
Democracy: Economy is prospering			,137***	,042	,088*	,044			,072	,105	,135	,013
Gov/Opp					,148***	,204					,432***	,465

	Mass			Elite		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
R	,658	,681	,694	,379	,433	,555
R2	,433	,464	,482	,144	,188	,308
Adj. R2	,430	,458	,475	,188	,137	,258

**Table 16. Confidence in State in Turkey (2006)**

	Mass						Elite					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Confidence in Civil Society	,518***	,064	,524***	,064	,488***	,062	,358***	,081	,351***	,084	,412***	,074
Respect for Human Rights	,148***	,178	,137***	,179	,109	,173	,458***	,270	,432***	,278	,164*	,290
Liberal conception of democracy	,047	,044	,028	,053	,023	,051	,067	,082	,011	,090	-,017	,078
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor			,026	,055	,023	,052			,067	,077	,102	,067
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment			,023	,086	,026	,082			-,021	,117	,096	,105
Democracy: Economy is prospering			,073*	,071	,072	,068			,159*	,117	,133	,102
Gov/Opp					,244***	,294					,497***	,451

	Mass			Elite		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
R	,564	,570	,618	,618	,635	,743
R2	,318	,324	,381	,382	,404	,552
Adj. R2	,314	,316	,373	,367	,374	,526

**Table 17. Confidence in State in Turkey (2013)**

	Mass						Elite					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Confidence in Civil Society	,670***	,049	,670***	,049	,652***	,048	,161*	,111	,161*	,113	,226***	,104
Respect for Human Rights	,115***	,139	,114***	,141	,073*	,141	,680***	,219	,538***	,381	,166	,414
Liberal conception of democracy	,061*	,032	,074*	,039	,071	,038	,012	,122	,037	,125	,006	,112
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor			-,013	,051	-,016	,050			-,05	,092	-,042	,083
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment			-,016	,070	-,017	,069			-,081	,107	-,059	,096
Democracy: Economy is prospering			,012	,059	-,007	,057			,155	,158	-,164	,165
Gov/Opp					,171***	,254					,733***	1,020

  

	Mass			Elite		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
R	,692	,692	,712	,698	,710	,776
R2	,479	,479	,506	,487	,505	,602
Adj. R2	,476	,474	,501	,475	,482	,581