

INTO THE FUTURE

LEADERSHIP FOR AFRICA

Series Editor: Ian Liebenberg

SECURITY INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP

INTO THE FUTURE

Leadership for Africa

SIGLA Occasional Papers

Series Editor: Ian Liebenberg

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Foreword and Acknowledgments

Stellenbosch University has established itself as one of the leading institutions in Africa and is among the best in the world. As a research-driven institution, we pursue excellence with a firm grasp of society's needs in the twenty-first century. In this endeavour, we realise the importance of a stable and secure environment for carrying out our core academic functions – research, teaching and learning, and community interaction – and for contributing to the development of society.

Driven by the vision of HOPE for Africa, Stellenbosch University established the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA) under the patronage of former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano, recipient of the Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership and the current chair of The Forum for Former African Heads of State and Government, the Africa Forum. Institutionally, SIGLA is affiliated to the University's School of Public Leadership (SPL) and has strong links with the University's Faculty of Military Science. This allows it to draw the skills, knowledge and competencies required to build sustainable African societies from a pool of multi-disciplinary expertise.

Over the past decades, a holistic approach to development stresses a linkage between security, good governance and economic development, and progressively integrates the governance and security elements. Peace and political stability are stated to be important tools for Africa's developmental needs by the Economic Commission for Africa in its Economic Report of 2011. The rest of the world is interested in Africa's security as Africa is strategic for the world's economies, given its natural resources and raw materials. The basis of thinking in SIGLA is that development can be enhanced and achieved in a secure and democratic environment; one which is conducive to long-term investments.

Africa's struggle for liberation and independence from colonial powers forms an integral part of its history, which is now over, and at the dawn of the twenty-first century the continent is faced with a different set of challenges, among which are social unrest, poverty and economic stagnation, peace and

security threats including maritime security and piracy, cyber and technology-driven threats, trans-border crimes and migration-related security threats – to mention but a few. For policy makers and involved stakeholders to respond adequately to these challenges, evidence through research knowledge is needed by those who make decisions when addressing such issues. This is the motivation and focus that drives SIGLA's various partnerships – to develop research and training programmes related to security, governance and leadership in Africa, and thus contribute to knowledge production in these fields.

Although Africa's challenges to some may paint a black picture of the continent, SIGLA's contribution to Africa's development is that of HOPE in helping to change the face of Africa from one of strife and unrest, to one of peace, good governance and a secured environment. SIGLA chooses to join its patron, President Chissano, in his hope for a better future for our continent as stated in a lecture recently delivered at our institution.

Africa has great potential for economic growth, with young people of less than 24 years old comprising more than 60 per cent of its population. The continent is part of the new global economy of emerging markets, and South Africa is a partner in BRICS, which in turn has a direct bearing on the rest of the continent. If Africa is to take part in this great opportunity and deliver on its expected mandate, it needs leaders with sound and balanced skills to govern and steer the continent towards this better future. We believe that our institute and this generation hold the key for a positive contribution to such a future. The commitment of Africa's people to do their best today and to strengthen Africa's leadership capacity and capabilities will also ensure this future.

It is also of note that we would like to promote the participation and the role of women in building the future we envisage for Africa. Across African societies, women have traditionally always been at the centre of building and keeping communities together, given their ethnic nature rooted in their motherhood, which is viewed as tolerant of differences, collaborative and non-violent. However, even though women have such attributes, they have previously often been marginalised socially, economically and politically. We

believe that women have the potential to transform communities, societies and the politics of our continent, given an opportunity and platform to actively take part.

This first edition of SIGLA's Occasional Papers is the result of the dedicated work of many people who share the vision of HOPE for Africa and thus have partnered with us in this endeavour.

First of all, we thank President Chissano, patron of SIGLA, for his keynote address on hope for Africa which constitutes a contribution to this publication.

Secondly, Prof Ian Liebenberg, Dr Godwin Murunga and Melanie Burke, the other authors contributing to this publication, who have shared their vast experience and knowledge with us all and continue to do so.

Thirdly, Betty Russel-Smith and the rest of the editorial team who have ensured language and grammar editing for this publication, their sharp attention to detail as well as their competence is appreciated.

Fourthly, SIGLA's Management Committee and the rest of my colleagues at SIGLA, who, by their invaluable work and support have ensured the success of this project.

And last, but not least, I want to thank SIGLA's board under the leadership of Dr John Tesha – the Executive Secretary of The Forum for Former African Heads of State and Government (Africa Forum).

Siphokazi Ndudane
Director- SIGLA@Stellenbosch
Cape Town, November 2012

Africa's Hope for Security and Development in the Twenty-First Century[1]

Joaquim Chissano

In my view, there is no doubt that Africa and its leaders consider security and development to be a priority on the agenda for the continent at national, sub-regional and regional levels. It is also my considered view that the pursuit of this security and development agenda has had a major influence on changing the political and economic landscape in Africa.

Three contemporary trends are discernible from Africa's security and development agenda:

The first trend is the end of the boundary disputes that impacted negatively on Africa's development efforts in the post-independent era. This period may also be characterised as the period of inter-state conflicts in Africa, but that is now best left to history and historians.

The second trend relates to the period of military coup d'état in Africa and the preponderance of intra-state conflicts or conflict within states. This was also the period of one-party states without any rotation in leadership. Life-presidency was a common phenomenon during this period, which has also ended.

The third trend is characterised by the emergence of a multi-party system of democracy and the introduction of limited terms of presidential office. I refer to this period as the period of further democratisation of the continent and the consolidation of peace and security as the pre-requisite for social and economic development and transformation.

I would like to suggest that it is on the basis of this changing political and economic landscape in Africa that we can explore Africa's hope for security and development in the twenty-first century. In this context African leaders have always recognised the intrinsic link between security and development. It was precisely within this understanding that on 11 July 1990, the Assembly

of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Union (OAU), the organisation that preceded the establishment of the African Union (AU), adopted the Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa, which acknowledged the situation in Africa and the fundamental changes taking place in the world. The 1990 Declaration was adopted following a critical review of the political, social and economic situation of the continent in the light of the rapid changes that were taking place in the world and their impact on Africa. This was at the end of the Cold War which brought major changes in East-West relations.

The 1990 Declaration provided the opportunity and framework for serious discussion on the security-development nexus in Africa. In fact, in adopting the Declaration, the African leaders were fully aware that in order to facilitate the process of socio-economic transformation and integration, it was necessary to promote democracy and the participation of the people in the processes of governance and development. In their view, a political environment which guarantees human rights and the observance of the rule of law would assure a high standard of probity and accountability on the part of those who hold public office. In addition, popular-based political processes would ensure the involvement of all, including in particular women and the youth, in the development efforts. This led to the elaboration of the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation in Arusha, Tanzania on 16 February 1990.

I should like to emphasise that in the 1990 Declaration on Fundamental Changes the leaders committed themselves to further democratisation of societies and to the consolidation of democratic institutions in their respective countries. However, the leaders reaffirmed the right of their countries to determine, in all sovereignty, their system of democracy on the basis of their socio-economic values, taking into account the realities of each of their countries and the necessity to ensure development and satisfy the basic needs of the people. To this end, they asserted that democracy and development should go together and should be mutually reinforcing.

I would like to submit that it was in recognition of the security-development nexus that the 1990 Declaration warned that the possibility of achieving

sustainable development would be constrained as along as an atmosphere of lasting peace and stability did not prevail in Africa. With this understanding, the African leaders therefore renewed their determination to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all conflicts on the continent. It was their considered view that the resolution of conflicts would be conducive to the creation of peace and security on the continent. It would also have the effect of reducing expenditures on defence and security, thus releasing additional resources for socio-economic development. It was also within this understanding that on 29 June 1993, the Heads of State and Government of the OAU adopted the Declaration on Establishing a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (the Cairo Declaration).

I have spent some time providing Africa's appreciation and understanding of the security-development nexus. I stated the obvious by making the argument that there is an intrinsic link between security and development. I know there are those who would argue that there is not necessarily a correlation between security and development. Let me state here categorically that after the protracted war of destabilisation in Mozambique, we have a very clear appreciation of the place of peace and security in development. The war of destabilisation in Mozambique placed a lot of pressure on the economy and reduced the capacity of the government to effectively address the basic needs of the people. There were about three million refugees in the neighbouring countries (Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania and Swaziland) and about one million who were internally displaced. This situation required the undertaking of a strong mobilisation of external and internal resources in order to care for the dislocated people's food, shelter, clothing and health care as well as education for their children. It destroyed the country's economic infrastructure and other basic facilities. The killing, abduction and displacement of people tore apart the social tissue of the country. The cost of post-conflict reconstruction was extremely high.

Against this background, and in order to bring further clarity to the nexus between security and development, let me suggest that from the various experiences of sources of conflict in Africa the concept of security must be given a broader definition.

Security should be redefined to encompass not merely the security of the state, but also the security of people. In this regard, it is important to define security concerns much more broadly than merely the threat of violence, and to include economic and social concerns such as welfare, including access to land, employment and social services, namely, education, health and equitable distribution of national wealth. The definition should also encompass the broader and non-military nature of security concerns including human rights, good governance, access to education and health care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities to fulfil his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict.

From the experiences of the Arab spring which started in 2010 in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, and the recent events in Cote d'Ivoire, Mali and Guinea-Bissau, it is abundantly clear that in order to avoid the recurrence of conflict and to prepare for sustainable development, governments are increasingly required to demonstrate their commitment to democratic governance, transparency, accountability, poverty reduction and equal distribution of their nation's wealth with a view to avoiding the marginalisation of some sections of society. These are essentially the perimeters of a broader definition of security. To this end, it is also generally agreed that it is necessary for development policies to emphasise the need for reducing conflict and improving governance, investing in people, increasing competitiveness and diversification, improving aid effectiveness and reducing the dependence of Africa on external aid. In my view, this defines the nexus between security and development. This is critical in the process of guaranteeing Africa's continued security and sustainable development in the twenty-first century.

At this juncture, I would like to suggest that Africa has put in place sufficient mechanisms and measures to promote peace and security on the continent. Based on the experiences on the continent, Africa has moved away from the traditional definition of security as the protection of territorial integrity, stability, and vital interests of states through the use of political, legal or coercive instruments at the state or international level. Within the continent it is now clear that security includes non-military threats that lead to violent conflicts and affect the security of individuals, communities and states. Such

threats range from popular discontent expressed in mass demonstrations, civil wars and resource conflicts, to transnational crime and population movements. Security, therefore, refers to the search to avoid, prevent, reduce or resolve violent conflicts, whether the threat originates from other states, non-state actors, or structural socio-economic conditions. On this basis I would suggest that Africa has the potential to address its security concerns and build the necessary environment for faster growth and development in the twenty-first century.

I should like to turn my reflections to the prospects for Africa's development. For me it is encouraging to note that the World Bank has recently indicated that sub-Saharan Africa grew faster than both Brazil and India during the first decade of this century, and will continue to grow faster than Brazil during the first half of the second decade. According to the World Bank, given the need for fiscal retrenchment in the industrial countries of the world, African countries can benefit from the rebalancing of economies and serve as a new source of global demand. According to the World Bank many African countries have made important economic reforms by improving macro-economic management, liberalising markets and trade and widening the space for private sector activities.

Another positive sign of Africa's hope for security and development in the twenty-first century is that currently several African countries are usually listed among the world's frontier emerging markets. They include Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimates that the land area for rain-fed crops could be increased from 15 per cent to 70 per cent per region, with a potential for the whole continent of 300 million hectares. Africa has a 60 per cent share of the world's total amount of uncultivated arable land and with its enormous potential for agriculture, has attracted large investments. It is estimated that up to 50 million hectares of African farmland has been acquired by foreign investors. The continent is experiencing what is commonly referred to as the second scramble for Africa. Access to Africa's mineral and agriculture resources is becoming increasingly essential for

Europe, North America and Asia.

A report by the McKinsey Global Institute, entitled Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies, suggests that many of the 54 African economies face serious challenges including poverty, disease and high infant mortality; yet Africa's collective GDP at $1,6 trillion in 2008 is now roughly equal to Brazil and Russia and the continent is among the world's most rapidly growing regions. The report also suggests that Africa's growth acceleration resulted from more than a resource boom. According to the report, it was also the result of government action to end political conflicts, improve macro-economic conditions and create a better business climate, which enabled growth to accelerate broadly across countries and sectors.

There is no doubt that the key reasons behind Africa's growth surge were improved political and macro-economic conditions, as well as macro-economic reforms. It has been correctly suggested that the end of conflict in most African countries created the political stability necessary for faster economic growth. I share the view that Africa's economies grew healthier as governments lowered inflation, trimmed their foreign debt and shrunk their budget deficits. Finally, African governments adopted policies to energise markets. They privatised state-owned companies, reduced trade barriers, cut corporate taxes and strengthened regulatory and legal frameworks. These, in my view, also created a better investment climate in Africa and provide additional reasons for Africa's hope for security and development in the twenty-first century.

I also share the view that Africa will continue to profit from rising global demand for oil, natural gas, minerals, food, and other natural resources. It is generally agreed that Africa's resource endowment includes 10 per cent of the world's reserves of oil, 40 per cent of its gold, and 80-90 per cent of the chromium and platinum group metals. There is no doubt that the demand for raw material is growing fast in the world's emerging economies. The report prepared by McKinsey Global Institute presents interesting statistics on Africa's future development trajectory and corroborates the reference I made earlier regarding the projections of the World Bank on Africa. The report suggests that in 2020 Africa's collective GDP will be $2,6 trillion. Africa's

combined consumer spending in 2008 was $860 billion but in 2020 it will rise to $1,4 trillion.

According to the report 316 million new mobile phone subscribers have signed up in Africa since 2000. Significantly, Africa has 52 cities with more than 1 million people each. Additionally, there are 20 African companies with revenue of at least $3 billion, while the number of people of working age in 2040 will be 1,1 billion. In 2020 the number of African households with discretionary income will be 128 million and the portion of Africans living in cities in 2030 will be 50 per cent. These statistics most certainly provide a source of encouragement for Africa's hope for security and development in the twenty-first century.

In conclusion, I argue that Africa over the decades has deployed efforts to address issues of peace and security as a precondition for social and economic development. Significant progress has been made in addressing the security concerns of the continent and in creating a secure and stable environment for social and economic development. There has been a better appreciation of the nexus between security and development. This is essentially because the costs and consequences of violence, conflict and insecurity on development outcomes have become apparent. At the same time, African leaders have put in place mechanisms and measures to address the scourge of conflicts and to mitigate the devastating effects of these conflicts on economies and infrastructure. Africa has developed a better understanding of the correlation between low levels of economic development and the propensity for conflicts. There is no doubt that poor economic performance and social disparities often become a major source of conflict. In most cases, the countries that are at the bottom of the human development index also tend to be countries that face persistent violence, conflict and human security challenges. Poverty is indeed the major source of insecurity in Africa.

It is precisely for this reason that Africa must deploy greater efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). There is therefore a strong need to ensure that development policies are also designed to address basic human security issues. Africa has already adopted specific mechanisms and measures to advance the cause of larger freedom – by ensuring freedom from want,

freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. There is a greater realisation within the continent that in an increasingly interconnected world, progress in the areas of development, security and human rights must go hand in hand. The 1990 Declaration clearly spells out that there will be no development without security and no security without development. And both development and security also depend on respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Africa recognises that in order to sustain the level of economic performance, competitiveness and growth, there is an imperative to consolidate democracy and to promote popular participation in development. Against this background and committed to the implementation of the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (Arusha 1990) the Member States of the AU adopted the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance on 30 January 2007. In adopting the Charter, the African leaders were inspired by the objectives and principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, particularly Articles 3 and 4, which emphasise the significance of good governance, popular participation, the rule of law and human rights. Additionally, African leaders were guided by a common vision to strengthen and consolidate institutions for good governance, continental unity and solidarity. They made a strong commitment to promote the universal values and principles of democracy, good governance, human rights and the right to development. These are essential measures as they provide the enabling environment for security and development and therefore the basis for Africa's hope for security and development in the twenty-first century.

Africa recognises that security, democracy and leadership are essential in Africa's development. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance was expected to enhance the relevant Declarations and Decisions of the OAU/AU aimed at promoting peace and security as a condition for social and economic development. The Charter included the 1990 Declaration on the political and socio-economic situation in Africa and the fundamental changes taking place in the world and the 1995 Cairo Agenda for the Re-launch of Africa's Economic and Social Development. Other Declarations included the 1999 Algiers Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of

Government, the 2000 Lomé Declaration for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, the 2002 OAU/AU Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa and the 2003 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU.

I would like to emphasise that these declarations constitute a major source of inspiration for Africa's hope for security and development in the twenty-first century.

In my view, there is no doubt that Africa is well prepared to make full use of the global opportunities available in the twenty-first century. Africa's strategic importance in the world will remain high given its level of resource endowment and the corresponding global demand for mineral resources. It is important to note that even though the global economic crisis crippled economies across the planet, and even caused a dip in commodity prices and timidity in investment that slowed African economic growth, the continent has survived and has bright prospects for the future.

I wish to reiterate that it has been generally acknowledged that sub-Saharan Africa grew faster than both Brazil and India during the first decade of this century and will continue to grow faster than Brazil during the first half of the second decade of the twenty-first century. I should like to conclude by stating categorically that this trend provides a very firm basis for Africa's hope for security and development in the twenty-first century.

Endnote

[1] This is an edited version of a keynote address to The Forum for Former African Heads of State and Government delivered by His Excellency Joaquim Alberto Chissano, former president of the Republic of Mozambique and Chairperson of the Africa Forum at Stellenbosch University's Security Institute for Governance and Leadership (SIGLA) at STIAS, 06 August 2012.

Africa beyond the Abyss: Community, Democracy, Peace and being a Leader

Ian Liebenberg

Introduction

Numerous observers have despaired, talked disdainfully about – even rejoiced at Africa's pain, helplessness, real and perceived failures. As Africans we frequently lived up to that stereotypical image and hopelessness. Through our own actions, borne out of perceived shackles or selfishness, we confirmed such images. We imposed past colonial racist limits upon our thinking and internalised these attitudes because of history or mere short-sightedness. We got hamstrung by the notion that the burden of the present is inescapable or worse; that because of historical experiences we cannot break into a new future. We talk about Africans with white minds, the black skin with a white mentality and contemplate the "problem" of a whitish skin with an African mind and how to deal with such a thing. Some of us even doubt against all evidence that there can be white or light-skinned Africans. We intentionally or habitually forget that by the natural arrangement of geography and genetics Africans over the ages have had skins from pitch black to near (if not) European-like white and all shades in between – this variety is also evident in the shapes of our cheeks, lips and noses, type of hair, and the appearance of our eyes. We inculcated religious one-sidedness as if such outside-this-worldliness and self-righteousness could provide security for being a human within a collective. We got hooked on notions of static culture, as if culture is as unchangeable as a rock and not dynamic and forever transforming. We keep forgetting that there is only one culture: the common culture of humanity. And the more we talk about race, tribe and religion, the more we forget the common core of humanity and wipe future positive action into the dustbin of history or simple complacent (in)action.

Such thoughts and actions flowed from imposed historical prisons – or rather we enfolded ourselves, blanketed our minds in these historical prisons. History, through our interpretation of our past experiences, we believe, has imposed these cages on us, cages that we alone can break open; no one can do

it on our behalf. Some started doing so long ago, despite what the world said or thought. Examples on the continent are such people as Kwame Nkrumah, Kenneth Kaunda, Leopold Senghor, Sir Seretsi Khama, Julius Nyerere, Chief Albert Luthuli, Steven Bantu Biko, Thomas Sankara, Samora Machel, Nelson Mandela. Or think in South Africa about Mamphela Ramphele, Bernadette Mosala, Sister Ncube, Aggrey Klaaste, Albertina Sisulu, Neville Alexander, Bishop Desmond Tutu, Graca Machel, Helen Joseph, Beyers Naudé and many, many more.

There is no reason why Africa cannot become what we dream about. In order to make the dream come true we will have to outperform ourselves on all levels – social, economic, political and cultural. We will have to step beyond the confines of past memories, short-sightedness, race, religious bigotry and its stereotypes, ethnic thinking, economic inequality, structural poverty and simplistic economic models that are based on the idea that economic freedom can only come from the West – or for that matter the East. If all roads led to an ancient Rome, many pathways will lead to a new Africa.

Democracy

A vast array of scholarly literature on democracy on our continent and outside it is available. Endless books – at least for the hapless political science student – debate models of democracy, the exact definition of democracy, limits to democracy, the waves of democracy bestowed on the world from the angular optic of Western experts and/or the limits of democracy. Some analysts spend a multitude of hours trying to quantify "good democracy" according to the formal accepted recipes found in dominant literature. This is good, but to relate exclusively to such mental exercises and verbal actions imposes limitations. Action and theory, if taken seriously by human beings, also imply interactive communication and this includes breaking out of conceptually and hierarchically imposed prisons and starkly defined definitions. Humans are historical agents; even better if we can add morality and people-centredness to this. When we talk about democracy and democracy in action we need to link thought and action, intentions and outcomes, visions and constructs; while remembering that it is all about people.

Democracy, ever since we were told that the Greek city states invented it, has been a contested term. Perhaps it should be so. Democracy is couched in human language and in this sense each and every term we use in (an attempted) democratic discourse should be negotiated to ensure its widest and most human application; and to limit the abuse of power by political, military or religious leaders or majorities and minorities with an asymmetrical access to the levers of power. On a critical note one should be aware that democracy is not an ancient phenomenon as Alf Stadler pointed out. In many respects European democracies and that of the USA are not even a century old.[1]

Needless to say, the term democracy can be abused. State leaders use the term glibly, yet suppress their own people and resistant communities. Powerful states claim that they want to spread democracy and then do so by using the mass projection of military power. Think about the ways used to spread "(liberal) democracy" to North Korea, Vietnam, Angola, Cuba, Iraq, Afghanistan and many, many other cases. More recently attempts to spread democracy and protect human rights have caused aggression against an African state, Libya, by abusing two United Nations' Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Resolutions (1970 and 1973). The result is a Libya still in conflict, with a weakened economy and no end in sight. In fact, in all likelihood it will get worse in Libya. A situation was intentionally abused to spread the influence of core states despite the proposals of an African Pathway to Peace. Libya had an opportunity to negotiate a transition to democracy if the African Pathway to Peace had not been cynically side-lined by NATO. Instead Libya was pushed into the abyss and moved violently from an independent state to a debt-ridden and weak state with lingering conflict and violence. Libya is one example of how not to impose democracy, and perhaps a harbinger of what we can expect in the future unless we, as Africans, take our future into our own hands. Obviously Gadaffi suffered from a grave delusion; no one should rule for ever (whether that gives foreign powers the right to arrange for his execution is, however, a different matter). One may ask the critical question: if Muammar Gadaffi had allowed his system of "authority of the people" through popular conferences, people's committees for health, education, agriculture, housing and general people committees to remain participatory, would there eventually have been dissent? And if, at some point in this process, Gadaffi had

found himself outvoted, would he have allowed space for a new leader within such a system of "people's authority"?

But, let us get back to the notion of democracy. At the very least democracy is understood as the right to human safety, control over own resources, participatory attitudes and structures, and economic equality in whatever form this manifests as a human interactive enterprise. The glib mantras about regular elections, "responsible" political leaders and the market as a "natural balance" to ensure liberty and democracy have proved a dangerous – and callous – myth. In economy classes students are still told that the "invisible hand" of the free market builds progress and democracy. Quite the opposite: the hidden or invisible hand in the free market is by its very constitution a selfish, grabbing, exploitative hand with very little to offer as a possible pointer towards democracy and principled equality or non-racialism. The very same students spoon-fed on such ideas are likely to believe that Francis Fukuyama really understood and announced "The end of history" which was, after all, but a slick confidence trick of some magnitude. The very same students and their professors probably think that globalisation is good and that the "New World Order", despite its violent outcomes, is the way to go; and in so believing get entangled in the simplicity of "there is no alternative" (TINA).

Students in South Africa, and I guess elsewhere, were, and in cases still are, spoon-fed on notions such as "political order in changing societies", the "trickle-down effect" of modernisation and the inevitability of "a clash of civilizations". Ask any student at any Western-oriented university who wrote *The Clash of Civilizations* and they will pronounce in unison the name Samuel Huntington. Ask them when a UN General Assembly Resolution that pleaded for a dialogue of civilizations was accepted? In fact, one may ask their learned lecturers and professors (or the generals directing operations against "terrorists"), and very likely only few will be able to answer that it was UN General Assembly Resolution 53/22 adopted on 4 November 1998 and that UNGA Resolutions 54/113 and 55/23 of 2000 are also relevant to the discussion. Here lies a supreme irony: through selective education notions such as a clash of civilizations have all the potential to become self-fulfilling prophesies, while real-life alternatives such as a dialogue between civilizations

are wilfully side-lined.

The importance of a democratic attitude and structures cannot be denied – instead they should be actively lived and advocated for the sake of humanhood, even in the face of the danger of becoming unpopular or eliminated. We debate democracy as a social and human need, or what the best form of it is, or should be. Unfortunately, one question that we seldom investigate is whether democracy can evolve in different forms. This happens because our selective sources have become recipe-like mantras and have thereby restricted attitudes, thinking and structures (and perhaps feelings too).

Democracy is, I contend, not about format, but content and quality. Moreover, the notion should be flexible in order to fit the context and the specific permutation of culture(s). Trying to force the term into a strictly regimented form in all likelihood will undermine the creation, nurturing and deepening of democracy in state, community and society. Jaques Barzun aptly asked the not-so-new, but recurring critical question "Is democratic theory for export?" He cautions that great care should be taken when assuming that certain models can be glibly transplanted into (enforced on?) other societies. He motivates his reservations: (1) Democracy has no theory to export, because it is not (should not be?) "an ideology, but a wayward historical development"; (2) The "historical development of democracy has taken many forms and used many devices to reach the goal of human freedom"; and (3) Forms of democracy in existence today are in consistent flux as the theorem in adapted formats still holds, but the quality thereof changes in nature from context to context.[2] Barzun's critical reflections lead to other questions: One could, for example, question whether a two-party democracy is really a democracy and not elite consensus through limited representation (or what Robert Dahl called poligarchy). Or one can ask (say in the case of South Africa) whether proportional representation is a suitable system and why it cannot be replaced by other forms of representation and participation? Or one can ask whether rule by the richest of the rich in self-funded elections really amounts to democracy? Or we can ask if democracy can be established by bombing people and structures into smithereens and enforcing simplistic regime change? We may ask the critical question of whether there are any differences between

Western cleptocracy, African cleptocracy and Eastern cleptocracy – apart from the format thereof and the geographical space between the people so focused on wealth and greed, despite dire poverty outside their walled complexes.

We are told that the "world" (in a Western interpretation) has seen three democratic revolutions. I say "Western interpretation" as those expounding these "waves" usually start their discussions on democracy by referring to the Greek city states. They comment on Latin American countries, people's democracies (even if flawed as under the Boer Republics in South Africa or the Soviet Union), community driven democracies such as the Paris Commune, the short-lived Spanish Republic before Francisco Franco came to power, and much earlier African communities where the *kgotla* or *gacaca* played a role. And then there is India, a "Third World" democracy since 1948, again not fitting glib patterns or rigid classification. It is here that terminology such as "waves" of democracy becomes somewhat murky. At the danger of making a hyperbolic statement, the classification of waves of democracy is rather general, uncritical and attempts to describe multi-layered processes with broad strokes on a large and intricate social canvas.

Presumably the first wave that we are told about started with the French Revolution which aimed for principled equality, individual rights and the abolition of top-down structures such as the monarchy and imperious religious impositions. The writing of the North American Constitution (today the USA) and its adaptations, partly enabled through a war of independence and then a civil war, also fits in here. The Russian Revolution (even if it went wrong) was built on the wish to achieve fundamental economic equality. Perhaps the return of democracy, with some qualifications added, to Germany and Italy after the Second World War can be seen as part of the second wave.

The third wave, we are led to believe, came about when states such as Greece, Spain and Portugal moved away from authoritarian rule to social democracy or socialist rule (in these cases multi-party democracies). Later Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay and other Latin American countries followed. Authoritarian military regimes ruled by juntas thankfully eventually made way for democracies in Latin America.

During the 1990s African states followed and perhaps some may wish to refer to such instances as a "fourth wave" of democracy. Think about coup-ridden states such as Ghana and Nigeria or states ruled by autocrats such as Hastings Banda of Malawi. Or think about states that were under white minority rule such as Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) or think about a praetorian regime of a special type where a minority invited the military in to uphold the state such as South Africa under apartheid (the reformist version under PW Botha included). Or think about an occupied territory such as Namibia that, after a long struggle for liberation, became a multi-party, albeit dominant-party democracy in 1990. In South Africa, for example, an authoritarian state upheld with military support made way for a negotiated settlement between 1990 and 1994, and a democratic constitution was inaugurated in 1996[3]. Other cases are less successful. In Zaire Mobutu SeSeseko's cleptocratic authoritarian regime fell away, but the Democratic Republic of the Congo is still embroiled in internal and regional conflict and its economic woes and structural challenges are far from solved. In Zimbabwe any experiments with a multi-party democracy were precluded after Joshua Nkomo and his supporters were forcefully neutralised by Mugabe, and currently Zimbabwe hovers on the edge of an abyss.

Where democracies arose, they did not appear *de novo*. They were not miracles. They demanded long and hard work, suffering, and in many cases democracy was achieved over bleeding bodies. The rule is simple: Where securocrats rule, participative social action and human rights decline. To retain (or regain) such rights frequently cannot be achieved by waiting amidst suppression, but rather by having a vision and enacting it with integrity and, dare I say, compassion. Even worse than achieving democracy by violence, is when countries that perceive themselves as superior democracies fall into the trap (or rather habit) of exporting their version of democracy over dead bodies; such countries thus move up on the dangerous political scale from world policemen to dangerous international rogues.

Attempts at democracy can fail. Even established democracies can regress. It is worthwhile to remind ourselves about failures and regression when it comes to democracy; to remind ourselves that a nation or state can preach democracy

internally or to the outside world and simultaneously deny other peoples their rights – or worse – export double standards, oppression, war and terror to others. It is also possible that a state can see the quality of its democracy stealthily undermined by a subtly growing garrison mentality that focuses exclusively on "homeland protection". Frequently such regression is not noticeable to people/civil society in such a country, while for outside observers the evolution towards such a mentality and its foreseeable negative consequences is easier to observe.

Some attempts at democracy and the achievement of fundamental equality failed, but left some legacy of lessons learnt and, perhaps, just perhaps, a vision of what is to be striven for, minus the errors and negative permutations. We forget to remind ourselves frequently enough about attempts to democracy that failed (perhaps only temporarily and at a great loss of life and dignity) but that such attempts introduced fundamental issues pertinent to a just and equal society. Consider the French Revolution for equality and humanhood and the Russian revolution aimed at principled socio-economic equality. While these revolutions may have strayed, even faltered or become undermined by a selfish leadership, the values they strived for still remain important. In our context *ujamaa*, *ubuntu* and humanism in Africa can neither be denied nor written off. If they are, it is at our (and others') own peril.

Assuming second, third and fourth waves of democracy and the differences between them, there is still space to argue for democracy, not based on a rigid format but rather on context, content and quality. Achieving this implies leadership, but above all the consistence of communities-in-action, *ubuntu*, participatory decision making and the maintenance of peace and human security. Doing so implies thinking anew about what we see and enact as democracy. It may even imply that where a system or policy does not work, we have to redesign it from scratch. It is here that the interaction and mutual inter-linkage between civil communities and (political) leadership becomes relevant to the discussion.

Leadership

Leadership can be top-down. Or it can be bottom-up. The more cynical, such

as Murray Edelman, argue that frequently political leaders are simply the scum drifting to the top from an otherwise healthy society, or that self-inflated personality types through choice or short-mindedness, or as puppets of conglomerate interests or mindless ideologies, end up on top by conniving, corruption and back-stabbing. In numerous cases this is true. It is exactly at this point that the role of civil communities as pointers and guiders towards participation and human dignity become important; and civil communities have the obligation to act as educators to political leadership. Where civil communities do not act (in cases react) or pro-actively guard and nurture humane communities, both society and individuals suffer or remain poor.

The late 1980s saw a lot of discussion about leadership and what leadership implies in a political context. In Africa lawyers and civil society joined to push for the simple notion that in one-party states communities and people had the right to be human and to be protected. In the Western context people like Michael Keren, Jerzy Wiatr, Yzek Dror and Joel Migdal made contributions to this debate. In South Africa the early 1990s and the dawn of a negotiated settlement also saw various contributions on what type and style of leadership is needed in South Africa. South Africa was at a political stalemate. Neither the incumbents nor the contenders could attain outright victory over the other, at least not without severe losses. The country was caught up in a low-level insurgency war, in many respects a civil war and a judicious mix of reform and repression marked the political landscape. In such conditions a specific sort of leadership was called for. I remember that H.W. van der Merwe and various others at the time asked the question about what type of leadership was needed for a successful transition. H.W. opted for leadership that acted in support of the weaker parties (i.e. the oppressed or the disadvantaged) and that practised socio-politics in a time when the need for negotiation arises. His approach was one of flexible neutrality, yet solidarity with the weak. It was a principled approach fluid enough to understand that when the scales changed the leader, negotiator or diplomat needs to change position, but remain firmly anchored in the principles of justice and equality (not the vague liberal notion of equity). Johan Degenaar cautioned citizens and leadership alike that key political concepts in the South African environment were controversial, and that negotiations also involved the need to arrive at agreement on the interpretation of the most basic concepts used in

the process of negotiation and transition. June van der Lingen, in an overview in *Business Alert*, pointed out how several speakers at a workshop emphasised honesty and integrity as crucial to any process if one wanted the process and its final arrangements (i.e. a constitution) to last. Van der Merwe, Van der Lingen and Degenaar's views have a broader application in our time and context on the continent, and are worth reflecting and acting on in conjunction with and corollary to others mentioned in this text.

Taking a cue from various authors[4] and personal reflections over the past years, I will discuss leadership in some more detail here. One cannot claim to know everything about leadership and the gods forbid that I write a treatise here with endless quotations, endnotes and source lists. Rather let me share some reflected-upon pointers to good leadership and its value for our continent.

The role of leadership is as crucial as that of communities-in-action. For the purposes here I make a distinction between (1) visionary leadership, (2) transformational leadership (3) contractual and/or pacting-oriented leadership and (4) realistic leadership. I then argue for the value of these leadership types in our African context as reflected upon since 1983. I am not claiming that these thoughts are unique; at most they can be of value to people and communities and serve as pointers towards more discerning leadership on our continent.

Visionary leadership

The first type of leadership I discuss is visionary leadership. I do it within the context of the need to link vision to reality. If the link is not made, the consequences may be dire. If we get caught up in the fear of challenges (some of them immense obstacles) it is unlikely that we will advance any further. Achieving goals needs a vision. One can argue that very little of value can be built if it is not driven by a vision. To be visionary ought to be part of leadership. Vision also requires passion and commitment. One may argue that if it was not for the vision of Ghandi for a united nation with inclusive political structures, India, as the world's largest democracy, would look very different today. Even its foreign policy may have looked different. India is a

regional hegemon, and a world power to a large extent, yet as Shrikant Paranjpe observes, India acts as an apologetic hegemon and stabiliser and not a warmonger. In many ways a visionary leader can have a positive effect on attitudes, structures, internal policies; even the foreign policy of an international power decades afterwards.

The possible downside of visionary leadership is that the vision can be unrealistic, exclusive and dehumanising. Un-reflected-upon visions can also lead to unintended consequences, and for some or other reason, unintended consequences usually tend to be negative rather than positive. Think about how the vision of creating numerous (artificial) nationalisms in apartheid South Africa had both intended and unintended consequences – in this case it led to social dislocation, exclusion and alienation, and eventually to spiralling violence (and to add to this; the inculcated intolerances of that time that exist even today and have poisonous effects in South African society). From social alienation and the social manifestations of violent conflict, it is but a small step to drawn-out conflict and what Dom Helder Camara called the cycle of violence, which comes with serious consequences. Visions that are excluding can invoke an eye-for-an-eye approach with little possibility of long-term peace and social accommodation. Think for a moment how the vision of a free Israel following the holocaust brought about problematic consequences. The Israeli state was born in terrorism and hard-handed goal achievement. Violence begot violence with no end in sight. In a perpetual slow-motion scene the holocaust is re-enacted on a day-to-day basis on others by those who escaped the horrors of the concentration and extermination camps. The Israeli-Palestinian issue has bred cycles of violence and social alienation that may haunt the region for years to come. In fact, because of excluding visions avenues for political and social settlements were precluded even before they could be discussed. In all likelihood, because of contrasting and mutually exclusive visions, the Middle East is likely to see more violence and destruction in the short- and medium-term. Needless to say that foreign interference will worsen the situation. Those who envisage getting involved from afar in the Middle East should perhaps deeply reflect on whether their involvement (and resultant concomitant projection of military power) has in the past led, and in the future will lead, to inclusion and tolerance, possible peace and reconstruction, rather than deepening the nature of the conflict. In

the Middle East, myopic visions armed with steel and bombs have, since the creation of the state of Israel, starkly demonstrated Ghandi's remark that an eye-for-an-eye leads to blinded communities fighting in bloody trenches – perhaps even long after the original visions are forgotten or exhausted.

Visionary leaders are necessary, but they should consistently ask whether a vision is exclusive or inclusive, top-down or human-oriented. Secondly visionary leaders in a self-critical assessment need to take a regular audit of whether ideas put into practice (i.e. internal or foreign policy) are not bringing about unintended negative consequences. Moreover, taking an insight from Karl Popper, visionary leaders should interrogate their own actions and ask the question: Does this action lead to the minimising of pain or discomfort, or does it increase pain and suffering at community and individual levels? In short the vision has to be checked, rechecked (call it a socio-political and economic audit if you like) to ensure a better society.

Not doing so, will border on callousness, if not criminality.

Transformational leadership

In a society that is deeply divided and in need of fundamental change (call it radical socio-economic reconstruction if you wish) the notion of transformational leadership is of importance. This is what one may call the immediate leadership reality challenge of a situation – and such realities may differ from context to context. In the midst of war one will make different choices from when one is in a phase of building a strong and stable economy and society in a stable state. Or when one is faced with a recession or economic crisis, one may take a different approach from when an economy is well functioning. Or when one becomes aware of the negative – and frequently unintended –consequences of internal policies or foreign policy projections one may choose to harden or soften one's approach; the latter more likely than the first to restore a more amicable relationship with others.

I remember that Clarence Stone in the early 1990s referred in a paper to transforming leadership. The notion of transformational leadership apparently is relevant in our context.

We have a special kind of leadership here, aiming at the end goal and during the process retaining an inclusive approach to the greatest possible extent. Transformation, if reflected upon, is never a narrow concept or for that matter a narrow life-attitude. Transformation does not mean mere change (or simply the replacement of one set of political and economic elite with another). Change is not transformation; less so when driven by short-term views and selfish goals.

Transformation in its broadest sense is multi-layered, people-sensitive and inclusive. It is about life, attitudes and structures and at base is aimed at inclusion and principled equality. When racial mentalities, before or after political transition, are at stake it also requires principled non-racialism. If not, the "transformation" so glibly paid lip service is change merely for the public eye and shifting power relations to the benefit of some minorities or economic and political elite versus the quality of life for those that are excluded.

For these reasons real transformational leaders are needed and they are a potential moral force. But they should have a wide eye for transformation and not narrow (greedy, short-term) eyes. What distinguishes real transformational leaders from change mongers is their long-term orientation, the courage to equalise and include and the will to do so consistently, despite criticism from the short-term change-talking type of leader.

Contractual/Transactional and/or pacting-oriented leadership

Others may choose to discuss the concepts that I have compacted here as three clearly demarcated entities. I choose to discuss them as one category because of the close relationship between (1) making and maintaining a social, economic or political contract; (2) entering a transaction with consistency and mutual accommodation; and (3) entering a pact for the purposes of making the world – or just one small community – a better one. For me these elements dovetail to such an extent that I chose to discuss them under one heading.

Leaders in this category need to have a keen awareness of what divides a people and what unites them. They have to have an awareness of sectional interests and how these intersect or clash. If not, leaders end up with audiences (not an audience) misread and the (predictable) rising likelihood of alienation, antagonism and eventually violence.

There is a need for an open-eyed astuteness and a deeper awareness (in Japanese one may say *mushin*), an all-round practised feeling for both the environment and the humans as historical agents in it.

It is exactly for this reason that transactional leadership – which, by the way, includes process-driven attitudes and a focus on inclusive transformation – may benefit communities or a nation of citizens. Transactional or contractual leadership does not mean absorption or demolition of communities and minorities against the will of these interest groups; it does not mean superficial consultation, but process-driven mutual dialogue to ensure a win-win situation. Even more important in agreeing to contractual leadership, the leaders should be acutely aware that they are servants of the people for whom they enter the transaction in terms of mutual agreements. And leaders should know that they have to adapt if the wishes of their followers change or evolve. Transactional leaders should also know that there are times to step aside when others are doing a better job. Needless to say that to do so implies courage and maturity simultaneously. Rather than an Edmund Burkian notion of a well-governed society where everyone knows his or her place, the transactional leader should have a keen awareness that society is fluid and that places are to be negotiated mutually. Transactional leaders who lack such flexibility will cause more harm than good.

Transactional leaders or those entering pacts should also show an awareness that pacts can be goal driven (i.e. to eliminate poverty, or rebuild imploded health systems or revitalise a dysfunctional judicial system) and therefore temporary. When pacting or transactional approaches are at stake, leaders should have an awareness of whether the pact is still achieving what it set out do and the wisdom to prevent a pact from becoming a crushing embrace or a prison of platitudes. There may come a time when transactions have to be evaluated, re-evaluated, assessed (call it audited) to ensure that they still

deliver added value and contribute to a better state, society and system of governance. There may come a time when pact partners or others observing them have to ask: "Has this pact or transaction not become a corrupt one?" And if so; then the leaders should have the courage to step out of the pact for the greater good.

Think about, for example, a case where a political party and trade unions made a pact; thus they transacted to build a society together. But let us say the macro-economic policy changed, or the government became corrupt, or centralised power or undermined transparency, can the trade unions still remain in a pact with such a government without being tarred with the same brush? Moreover the fundamental self-critical question is: Is the pact still adding value to good governance, accountability and the quality of life for the populace? If not, is it not time to exit the pact, enter other pacts, or redesign the mode of pacting altogether?

The above has special relevance in societies that have attained a (young/emerging) democracy and negotiated constitution. It is, however, also relevant for societies trying to break out of oppression, societies intent on breaking a cycle of violence or societies in transition.

Realistic leadership

Realistic leadership should not be confused with glib pragmatism. Pragmatism can lack a realistic assessment of the concrete challenges. Pragmatism can be selfish or opportunistic and short-term oriented. Pragmatism can favour minorities, majorities or financial or sectional interests while wilfully (occasionally unconsciously) excluding others. One may refer to such a form of leadership as "pragmatism without principles".

The realistic leader takes a reflective look at the situation, the strengths and weaknesses of the available material and human capacity (even the prevalent emotions) before making choices or implementing policy. The realistic leader will regularly check on the effect and outcomes of the policies made. And on receiving feedback on the impact and consequences of policies, may re-evaluate, streamline or change them and in some cases scrap policies if they

are not for the good of people and the environment. But this calls for steel in the soul, one has to add …

Realistic leadership, like transformational leadership, needs courage and the ability to accept the consequences of decisions taken. Courage here may imply to include fearlessly, rather than exclude; to self-critically challenge one's own policies; and to be able to listen to one's harshest critics and reflect on their comments.

Peace

Let me share a few words on peace here. Peace can be artificial or it can be of a deeper social nature, i.e. the absence of fear, to not suffer from a lack of food, housing and services, to have the ability to influence your socio-political and economic environment. It is more than the absence of violence and conflict, whether between individuals, groups, states or nations or even intra-state. It may be more than simplistic election politics. It is also more than reacting to conflict. It is about identifying sources of conflict and resolving them. It is about peace-building, not belated peace enforcement.

In a political sense it is more than the simplistic understanding of creating order in an anarchic world of power clashes. At base peace is to understand that we need not find ourselves in a world of power driven by regimental systems; peace is understanding, feeling and acting within a community of nations, groups, regions. But to do this means a mind-shift and an attitude change, knowing full well that structures may well also change.

On this level peace is a continuous courageous commitment. A never-ending task.

But interests are at stake – they can even become a painful stake. Humans are selfish and in some cases the human animal seems (at least to me) naturally inclined to violence (after all, the human animal is the only species that in an organised and planned way kills intentionally *en masse*). As a counterbalance to instinctive violence and selfish ends, let me suggest that one asks a few questions when the notion of peace is at stake. These questions among others

are:

Whose peace?

Whose law?

Who will benefit or lose?

And lastly ask; at what price?

By asking and reflecting on such questions leaders on all levels can make a human calculation on possible benefits and harm. By consulting and dialoguing on such questions the attainment of the greater good, whether it be for small rural communities, small municipalities, provinces, countries, nations or continental bodies such as the African Union and the African Parliament or security arrangements on a continent, can be achieved. If the peace, the laws, the benefits and the costs thereof are not contributing to making the community or continent under discussion somewhere somehow a better place, then choose not to embark on ill-reflected action or policies.

For civil communities and political leadership asking these questions may bring up more questions, but in all likelihood can assist in making more informed choices if the focus remains human-oriented and on bettering the quality of human life.[5]

Conclusion

In this contribution I have touched on questions of democracy, its format and quality. I suggested that the uncritical export of democracy suitable to one situation can be problematic, even destructive to another.

I suggested that communities-in-action and the right kind of leadership can build better, more participative, more human communities. I warned against uncritical leadership and followers. I discussed forms of leadership that may add value, not only to the continent and region, but also to smaller communities. I hinted at the need to step out of historical prisons and to act as

human agents in order to facilitate a better Africa.

I can add little more; but trust that we will have the courage to live up to these ideals.[6]

Endnotes

[1] Democracy is young. Stadler points out that Britain only achieved full democracy in 1928, Austria, Finland and Sweden only at the end of the First World War, France, Belgium and Italy only after the Second World War, Japan only in 1952 and the United States only in 1970 when native Americans became equals in the land of their birth. Spain and Portugal only achieved democracy in the 1970s. Eastern Europe followed twenty years later with the quality of democracy in some of these countries of a dubious nature (Stadler, Alf. 2002, Democracy born out of upheaval, *The Citizen*, 12 March).

[2] Barzun, Jaques. 1987. Is democratic theory for export? *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol. 1: 53-71.

[3] In the case of South Africa under apartheid rule, unlike Latin American states, one cannot talk about praetorian rule or military rule per se during the last phases of the modernisation of apartheid, since the apartheid military, albeit loyal and in cases enthusiastic about their role, did not take state power but were invited into parallel government structures to assist in the upholding of the minority state.

[4] See among others the source list provided here.

[5] In writing this sentence I was reminded about a speech delivered to the UN General Assembly on the 12th of October 1979. The speaker said among other things: "The sounds of weapons, of threatening language, and of pre-potent behaviour on the international arena must cease. (It is) enough of the illusion that the problems of the world can be solved by nuclear weapons [or a war on terror – my insertion]. Bombs may kill the hungry, the sick, and the ignorant; but they cannot kill hunger, disease and ignorance … let us in a civilized (read: human and humane) manner dedicate ourselves to the most pressing problems of our times. This is the responsibility, the most sacred duty (for leaders) and the basic premise for human survival." (Castro, F. and De la Santana, G. 1992. *To Speak the Truth*. Montreal: Pathfinder Press: 198). Since then I have contemplated numerous times how much different our world and continent would have been if this advice was heeded by political and socio-economic leaders and their followers alike …

[6] The following sources touch on leadership and qualities of leadership and make for interesting reading: Le Maitre, Alfred and Savage, Michael (eds.). *Van Zyl Slabbert – The Passion for Reason (Essays in honour of an Afrikaner African*. Cape Town: Jonathan Ball; Stubbs, Aelred (ed.). 1988. *Steve Biko: I write what I like.* London: Penguin Books; Tambo, Oliver.1989.*Onze Vrijheid moet bevochten worden*. Houten: Het Wereldvenster/Epo; Tutu, Desmond. 1999. *No Future without Forgiveness*. London: Ryder Publishers; Adair, John. 1986. *Doeltreffend leiding geven*. Culemborg: Het Spektrum; De Dalai Lama.1995. *De kracht van het mededogen: Een nieuwe kijk op het leven*. Amsterdam: Rainbow Boeken; Ubuntu. 2007. *Dream: The Words and Inspiration of Martin Luther King, Jr*. Johannesburg: Wild Dog Press; Anderson, Samantha (translator). 1989. *Thomas Sankara Speaks*. Sydney: Pathfinder Press; Kaunda, Kenneth. 1982. *Kaunda over Geweld*. 's Heroginbosch: Bijeen Publicaties.

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Leadership in Africa: Priorities for Leadership Training[1]

Godwin R. Murunga

Introduction

There is no doubt that we stand at a historical moment in Africa's history and much will depend on how we deal with the socio-economic and political challenges that confront us. Not only society and communities play a role in enabling a new century for Africa; leadership and the quality of leadership are crucial.

When leadership and the need for a leadership capability that can take us into the future in Africa is at stake, there are three areas of great importance and where, I believe, much value can be added to the quality of current and future leaders. These are:

1. the importance of intellectual/academic excellence;
2. the central place of core values; and
3. the pan-African context that informs new African leadership.

For me, these three elements constitute indispensable pillars for any programme of training on leadership in Africa. Educational programmes distinguish themselves based on how well they combine these three pillars. We need to understand the importance of these pillars and, I trust, will commit ourselves to spreading the dialogue on these three elements to the wider society in Africa and beyond. In doing so, we will add immense value to our socio-political environment, communities and politico-economic structures.

Intellectual excellence

In the last decade or so, there have been many programmes, centres, institutes, and academies explicitly dedicating themselves to one element or another of leadership training. This is a positive development. We know that there is space for many more similar initiatives in Africa. We need to encourage the growth of more centres and institutions that focus on leadership issues and

qualities. We cannot deny that as a continent we have a disproportionate share of challenges, many of which, Yoweri Museveni told us more than a decade ago, are related in some way to poor or bad leadership.[2]

In most training programmes, however, the importance of knowledge and the value of being knowledgeable are often underestimated. As a continent, we have a lukewarm relationship with knowledge. We do not see the essential connection between leadership and knowledge as a crucial precondition for growth, reconstruction and excellence. Indeed, knowledge and knowledge institutions are too seldom our core priority. We hardly invest adequately in knowledge. Our higher education institutions on the continent are collapsing because of neglect. Our intellectual communities are fragmented, disconnected from each other, dispersed, not just abroad but also within the continent, and often ridiculed. The knowledge they produce is atomised into distinct and almost unconnected locations; our big names and their ground-breaking research are rarely canonised. There are few solid initiatives to harness available energies and intellectual productions and channel them into developing the community on the continent.

As a result, generated knowledge cannot occupy its rightful place in the libraries or in the policy domains where it is urgently and seriously needed. As a continent, we seem keen to confirm the World Bank injunction hinted at in a meeting of vice-chancellors of African universities in Harare in 1985: that Africa does not need her universities.[3] Further, the relevance of our policy is whittled down every day by the dominance of external actors in our politics and the irrelevance African governments assign our institutions of knowledge production. The policies that inform our leadership's choices are rarely the product of research, or informed by research. When research is needed, it is research that is predetermined by already identified policy outcomes. What comes through at the end is not policy driven by research, but rather policy driven evidence and justification for decisions already made.

The excuse for marginalising knowledge and knowledgeable leadership tends to be that intellectual activity ought to be easily accessible to the masses and, it is claimed, our knowledge institutions have failed to provide publicly usable knowledge. Further, there are those who think that knowledge for its own

sake is a total waste of resources. As a consequence, the impression that goes out is that Africa does not need sufficiently schooled leaders. This assumption was at the heart of a segment of South African thinking sometime after Polokwane in 2007. As a distant observer, I found the argument very confounding: some said that educated leadership was despised for being out of touch with the common person; others that it was distrusted because educated leaders can be too clever. Recently in Kenya, we faced a variant of the same debate when parliament passed the Miscellaneous Amendments Bill 2012 which, in part, required that aspiring parliamentarians and senators must possess at least an undergraduate degree. Many protested at this provision, terming it a discriminatory act. Indeed, the president refused to sign the bill until this provision was removed. But in doing this, Kenya suggested that it does not need highly educated leaders.

The dangers of limited or lack of leadership education are obvious. We should not be having long debates about it. By now, Africa should have noted the deadly buffoonery of Idi Amin, the murderous idiosyncrasies of Jean Bédel Bokassa, and the laughable but criminal antics of Mobutu Sese Seko; all of whom came through colonial military training to hold their nations at ransom for years, diverting state resources into private pockets and presiding over murderous orgies that defy any rational explanation. Of course, there are African leaders who are properly educated but who have miserably failed the test of leadership. In Zimbabwe, for example, we have witnessed the deficits of such leadership. But these are the exception rather than the rule in Africa.

Serious intellectual engagement is critical for any leadership training programme that we may consider – and indeed these educational programmes are imperative. The love of books, the desire to know the many facets of our realities, the fascination with ideas, as Ali Mazrui aptly defined an intellectual, should be critical to any leadership training.[4] But the ultimate aim must not only be a fascination with ideas, but also to develop the capacity of our leaders to handle ideas effectively – this is essential in the contemporary global context. Where they cannot handle ideas, they should be backed up by a battalion of effective thinkers and policy handlers. The demands in our context are many and the abilities required for leadership demand that a leader be able to distil core messages and policies from complex realities and

make judgements judiciously. Intellectual activity makes this task less daunting.

The core values and their historiographic challenge

The dominant programmes for leadership training do not only impart knowledge, they also impart values. Knowledge and values are inextricably intertwined. In some cases, the values are stated explicitly. In such cases, students enrol with an understanding of what you are signing up for. But in many other cases, the values are implicit. They are presented as neutral and universal, containing the same heuristic values for all people in different contexts and times. Values originate from specific contexts; they carry specific meanings derived from those contexts. In recent times, the values of efficiency, frugality, thrift and corporate social responsibility (CSR) have been thrust upon us. Never mind that some, like thrift, frugality, efficiency and profit were the stuff of Max Weber's work on the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. We must recognise these values in their context. Under neo-liberalism, which mobilises efficiency in service of maximising profits, and CSR as a palliative that temporarily minimises the pain without telling you the source of the pain in the first instance, the assumption of value-free knowledge is suspect. Such arguments and values are in need of serious critical reflection by leadership and citizenry alike.

In Africa, our idea of leadership must be rescued from neo-liberal values. We need to reconceptualise leadership and cast it as a worthy topic of scientific study with applied value. This will, of course, help leadership training in Africa and differentiate it from a technocratic notion of management. Leadership must be understood as an all-encompassing act that includes, but is not only restricted to, management. Management denotes the act of controlling things or people. It is often used in a technocratic sense that refers to particular skills that specific people learn and can use to manage institutions, businesses and organisations. Training within such a technocratic vision of leadership of course ends up minimising and restricting leadership to mere management. In a neo-liberal context in which the market looms large and the profit motive is religiously celebrated, a management-heavy notion of leadership can be celebrated. But the consequence of this

context is that the ideals of corporate management predominate and skills in management training are geared towards achieving efficiency; but it is efficiency in service of the elite, seeking to maximise profits whether through politics or the market.

Emerging leadership programmes can acknowledge the importance of this notion of corporate governance. But they have to critically challenge the dominance and pervasiveness of such a managerial technocratic mentality. New approaches should actively seek to reach out to society where the majority of African citizens live and where the impact of current leadership is experienced in negative ways as alienating and oppressive. There is no better example than the recent economic meltdown on Wall Street, in which savvy managers with privileged notions of management failed to anticipate and prevent the financial meltdown. In fact, evidence seems to confirm managers and the financial elite's active connivance in generating or exacerbating the meltdown, suggesting that there is a crisis of moral values within this pervasive notion (perhaps we should refer to a paradigm or a mentality) of management. Corporate notions of management have a cosmetic appreciation of the larger society expressed through meek notions of CSR. These are weak and limited concepts whose value can only be enriched through a socially contextualised understanding of leadership.

We need to bring back into discussion basic values that humanise our conception of leadership and ensure that training in leadership is relevant to the African context. These values include the pursuit of excellence; appreciation of African-led ideas and processes of change, respect for diversity in terms of gender, region, class and beliefs; promotion of independent thinking and recognition of youth agency. We need to emphasise, inculcate and nurture these values. This because we expect our leaders to have an idea of the change they want to make in society. We must seek consciously for, and educate a generation of leaders who are not limited by personal insecurities relating to their race, geography, gender, religion or age.

To achieve this goal, two requirements are essential: first, we need to get the right people into training programmes; and second, we should train them purposefully. At institutions of learning we have to pay attention to the

recruitment process and to the mentoring programmes. Recruitment into the programmes should pay significant and continuous attention to getting the right people. As Katherine Namuddu, the Uganda educator and evaluator, puts it: "the essence of the recruitment process is its attention to the personality, attitudes, perceptions, interactive dynamics and the articulation of why the applicant wants to become a next generation academic".[5]

There is a major historiographic challenge on our continent that one should take account of: The literature on leadership in Africa is cast in pejorative anthropological terminology. Knowledge creation and dissemination related to leadership in Africa is frequently so negative and pessimistic that it cannot provide much-needed intellectual guidance and inspiration. The literature tends to treat leadership and governance in Africa as an anthropological aberration. In other words, just as one knows of tropical medicine, there seems be a field in the Western scientific imagination called "tropical politics". Largely dominated by political science and economics, the "field" is made up of literature that has tended to tropicalise leadership and governance in Africa. The key concepts and theories deployed to analyse leadership and governance in Africa are replete with terms that mark out Africa as a tropical deviation from the normal, the deviant child of Weberian rational modernity. These concepts tend to be less about what Africa actually is and more about what Africa ought to be; they are pedantic, prescriptive and even paternalist. In this character, they misinterpret not only the African political environment, but also the core argument Max Weber articulated. Some Africanists have even given up in despair and moved to study other places because they could not change Africa and Africans. Neo-patrimonialism, the view that African politics is driven by a patronage-driven logic comes to mind here.

In the context of the neo-liberal reform project, and in order to avoid the neo-patrimonial species of African leaders, the push to sidestep the state and reach out directly to the people was thought of as a reform strategy. Like the anti-intellectual mood cited earlier, the overarching assumption in this context was that African leaders are disconnected from the people and are therefore not able to function in the people's interest. The market was perceived to be more in tune with African people than their leaders, some of them legitimately elected into power. It was assumed that there was a market mechanism that

could effectively manage the logic of demand and supply and in the process ensure efficient and equitable allocation of resources. Some African leaders actually retreated in despair as only being relevant in creating an enabling environment for the efficient operation of the market. These leaders were reduced, in Thandika Mkandawire's apt phrasing, "to the role of night watchmen; unskilled and untutored persons only capable of watching over the market as it performed its miracle".[6]

The aptness of Mkandawire's remarks should not be lost because these observations accurately summarise the extent to which African leadership is perceived as an aberration. The study by Chabal and Daloz crowned it all by describing African politics as peculiar, and cautioned that such peculiarity should not confound analysts because "that is how Africa works".[7] For them, disorder is in fact the everyday order in Africa. Africa's leaders, according to Chabal and Daloz's views, see disorder as a political instrument. All citizens live by this logic and see nothing wrong with it. These authors obviously missed numerous recorded rebuttals to disorder in Africa. To my knowledge, all democratic struggles in Africa have been against the instrumentalisation of disorder.

The Pan-African logic

In my argument, the third pillar refers to the pan-African logic of our realities. I see this logic in two ways: the first is the context of Hegelian legacy of the two Africas; and the second is the identity issue that emanates from this legacy. Let's call the first the curse of geography and the second the curse of race. The pan-African underpinning of Africa's leadership has a long history whose contours are too complex to do justice to in a single contribution. Briefly, the pan-African logic was built into the nationalist struggle; a struggle that carried the twin objectives of independence for African countries and continental unity. Nkrumah summarised the second objective neatly when he argued that Ghanaian independence was useless if the rest of Africa was not independent.

But soon after independence was attained in much of Africa, the subsequent confirmation of the colonial boundaries as the organising frame of African

nation states frustrated the attainment of continental unity. As we moved into independence, the enemies of continental unity multiplied. Today, not only is Africa fragmented by its borders, its power is also limited by this fragmentation. Worse, is that from a South African perspective, some still perceive Africa through the prism of apartheid education. Africa is not only that contraption South of the Sahara, but also that north of the Limpopo. In other words, there is a racial logic at play here in which the existence of a diverse racial population in South Africa defines the country as an exception to the rule in Africa. Africa is important to segments of the South African economic elite as an investment destination, and South African academies look to Europe for their models and ideas. They do not see any serious epistemic communities in Africa worth engaging.

This curse of geography and of race undermines the pan-African consciousness and makes it difficult to think of Africa as one continent whose destiny needs to be defined by a leadership that knows how much better off Africa will be economically and politically when united.

We need to re-invigorate our pan-African connections as a basis for future development of the continent. Useful strides have already been made through the AU initiatives and by President Mbeki's work in Zimbabwe, Sudan and Cote d'Ivoire. We unfortunately are not doing well on other basics like border and immigration policies. We still require our people to acquire yellow fever certificates to cross borders and often on the law books and in the policy arena are draconian immigration regulations that illustrate our desire to counter any growth in the pan-African spirit. Indeed, it should be a scar on our conscience that citizens of Africa are prevented entry into an African country where non-Africa citizens frequently enjoy easy access.

Notes on the youth in Africa

By way of concluding, I wish to make some comments on the youth and gender question. Normally, we talk about the youth and gender question as an act of political correctness, to satisfy a requirement or play up to audiences. More is needed. The youth and gender question must be at the heart of any leadership training. And here there is an opportunity for all of us to define

innovative programmes that take the youth question seriously. Educational and training programmes will add immense value if they are anchored on enhancing youth agency. A significant segment of our education and training on all levels of society must focus on the youth of Africa and highlight the gains we have made and are making in promoting youth agency. The African state has failed to institute programmes of economic growth that harness the creative energies of the youth for development. From previous and current research there is enough evidence to demonstrate how the marginalisation of the youth often easily transmutes into forms of radicalisation that are potentially dangerous.

We must disabuse ourselves of the notion of the youth as leaders of tomorrow. Tomorrow is too late for our youth; indeed, postponing youth involvement is a dangerous and out-dated idea. The rising numbers of qualified but unemployed youth constitute a time bomb whose desire for a different continent will not be assuaged by a promise for future leadership or prosperity. We have previously seen the energies of this youth directed into revolutionary activity that led to the defeat of regimes in North Africa. This example represents an instance where youth energies were channelled legitimately. The rising demographics indicating a youth bulge in Africa mean that these energies can either go into licit or illicit activities. Often, the response of the state has been to criminalise youth activities. In Kenya, the "innovation" was to create a programme, *kazi kwa vijana*, that reinforced youth identity as that of a manual worker. No wonder many African youth see their future as resting in immigration to Europe and America, in many instances by staging daring flights across the desert and the sea. We should work to create conditions where our youth do not see the need to divest from Africa and embark on a long trek to Europe or elsewhere. Our training institutes and educational institutions have an opportunity and a duty to reframe the discussion away from the old logic of the youth as *watu wa Mkono* (manual workers).

Finally, a programme of leadership must re-invent a notion of leadership that is gendered. A gendered notion of leadership must recognise existing feminist gains and knowledge and seek to build on these gains. We have to reinforce current demands for equity in representation for women in order to

consolidate the gains of the feminist and women movement. Equity in gender representation is an important first step in gendering leadership.

We must tackle the enduring task of changing attitudes and transforming them. There is the challenge of channelling these transformed attitudes into a new gendered framework that redefines leadership in service of those at the margins of society. As we learned under Margaret Thatcher, it is possible to have a female in power who presides over a regime of policies that worsen the situation of women, youth, health services and the position of marginalised peoples.

The point is that examining the overall structure of patriarchy to reveal its sexism and its sanctioning of gendered oppression is fine, but not enough. We need to further examine masculinity as a male expression that imbues leadership with particular masculine values and attributes. Everywhere, the existing notion of leadership is defined by three attributes of masculinity: the assumption that men are owners of property, that they are protectors of women, and finally, that they are the providers. These notions of masculinity sanction male leadership uncritically. As Michael Schatzberg shows in his study on *Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa* which is appropriately sub-titled *Father*, *Family*, *Food*, there is a paternal vocabulary that goes with this notion of leadership. Leadership is not legitimate unless it is defined in this vocabulary. Yet much of the authoritarian streak associated with leadership in Africa has also been justified on the basis of this paternal vocabulary.[8]

We can all agree that these pillars of masculinity have been overtaken by modern society. Men are no longer the sole owners of property nor are they the sole providers to family; indeed, they are no longer effective protectors. In some cases, even though men will carry their macho attitude and act as though they are never uncertain about their actions, quite often uncertainty and vulnerability is evident in their masculine performances.

To add to the above: It is a reality that we train graduates who leave university and cannot get a job. We cannot therefore continue to expect our young males to imagine they hold the masculine privilege of providing or protecting. To redress this we need a gendered definition of leadership that re-examines the

masculine and feminine attributes to distil new gendered knowledge about leadership.

Conclusion

In this contribution I pointed out three spheres on which we need to focus to enhance good leadership education and training on the continent. These included the growing importance of intellectual and academic excellence, the central place of core values and the pan-African context that needs to inform new African leadership in education, training and practice. I also referred to the situation of the youth in Africa and the challenges they face and offered some ideas on improving the situation.

With effort, dedication, commitment and energy focused on positive outcomes, I believe this can be done. We should not delay, but tackle these challenges immediately to ensure a better future and a leadership that can take us and the continent there.[9]

Endnotes

[1] Text of a Keynote Address delivered at the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute Graduation Ceremony jointly organized by Thabo Mbeki Foundation and UNISA on 6th August 2012 at ZK Matthews Great Hall, UNISA. The text was somewhat adapted and edited for this occasional paper.

[2] See Museveni, *What is Africa's Problem*? Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.

[3] Ayesha Imam and Amina Mama, 'The Role of Academics in Limiting and Expanding Academic Freedom,' in Mamadou Diouf and Mahmood Mamdani, eds. *Academic Freedom in Africa*, Dakar: CODESRIA Books, 1994, p. 73.

[4] Mazrui, *Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

[5] Katherine Namuddu, 'Next Generation Scholars: Addressing the Challenge of Retention in Academic Institutions in Africa,' Keynote Address to the 2nd Conference of the African Leadership Centre's Alumni Network on Leadership and Peace Building in Africa, 27-29 June 2012, Nairobi, Kenya, p. 12

[6] Mkandawire, 'Thinking about Developmental States in Africa,' in *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, vol. 25, no. 3, 2001

[7] Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

[8] Michael Schatzberg, *Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001

Leading Africa into the Future – On Leadership in a Changing and Interconnected World

Melanie Burke

Some introductory notes on leadership

Traditionally, many leaders learn to lead by rising through the ranks of formal structures, be they personal, professional, political or societal, and in this way they earn the authority to lead.

Changes in leadership, and on the economic, social and political landscape, have indicated how complex and dynamic leadership issues can be, and how dramatic the effect of a leader can be, whether for good or ill.

African leadership – although there is no single definition of it – is also under the spotlight, with some voices decrying the examples of Africa, and others lauding the fundamental values of this mode of leadership.

Furthermore, and in context, there is the contemporary leadership trend in Africa that is characterised by the emergence of the multi-party system of democracy that suggests the possibility and hope of a period of further democratisation of the continent and the consolidation of peace and security as the prerequisite for social and economic development and transformation. Attaining these goals is frequently associated with the notion of an African Renaissance.[1]

While many African leaders are guided by the political system prevalent in their respective countries, there is yet no single definition of how they should lead as African leaders. While leaders hold positional power, there appears to be no substantive effort to show leadership beyond the direct and immediate outcomes that their continued tenure requires. To date these leaders have been predominantly male and only in recent times have female leaders become visible. Hence questions arise about African leaders and the tenants of this leadership into the future.

Can leadership be seen differently? Can leaders deliver when there is no political power to wield, when there is no formal authority to act? Can they develop an understanding of their followers as well as those who seek to undermine them? Can they lead when there are players they don't understand, when other leaders seem to be proceeding in strange ways, or when people they need don't need them? Can they be leaders who are respected, challenged and trusted?

There appears to be no specific approach to leadership that is unique or endemic to Africa. In an attempt to describe leadership in Africa, one can conjure up the challenges and opportunities that the names of its leaders bring to mind, and even this does not effectively or sufficiently describe African leadership. And if there is such a thing as African leadership, how does one put Mandela, Mugabe, Tambo, Gadaffi, Amin, Taylor, Smith, Botha, Mubarak, Tutu and Nkomo in the same box?

If, however, African leadership means an approach to leading, a leadership style, a competence and quality that is most likely to work in Africa and a style and attitude that result in active and considered personal, professional, political and societal leadership responses, the concept may come close to a definition that Africans can work with and embrace.

In a changing and increasingly interconnected world, African leaders – both men and women – have to build their personal capacity and skills in order to respond appropriately to the many and varied shifts required of them.

As Africa is drawn increasingly into complex internal structures and external relationships across cultures and borders, the African leader's ability to lead across and beyond their own sphere of control becomes ever more important.

So how do African leaders learn to lead in the present in order to be prepared for the future; when they may have succeeded within their own world and yet find themselves as leaders surrounded by a host of new and unfamiliar faces, audiences and challenges? Or when they do not feel they have the legitimacy to lead anything or anyone beyond the authority they believe has been

prescribed for them, whether in government, business or civil society?

This ever-changing and increasingly complex situation requires a different kind of leadership. It requires a different set of perceptions, skills and talents. It also requires further leadership development; development which encourages broader vision and the ability to operate across diverse worlds right from the outset. Africa must prepare for the future and develop leaders who can lead beyond their authority just as effectively as they can within it; leaders who can sustain broader perspectives – and who are confident in making connections between quite different groups of people and reconciling different worlds; leaders who see the wider context and their own role in it, adapt quickly to new surroundings and produce and lead change wherever they are.

It is imperative that leaders ask themselves: How can Africans shine as Africans in the world that has become what it is, despite the numerous very strong influences from outside Africa? How can Africa stand out and still contribute meaningfully to today's increasingly interconnected world? How can leaders contribute to this developing Africa: its histories, its cultures, its beliefs and its diversity?

In this contribution I suggest some ideas – perhaps a catalyst – for a new conversation with leaders and invite them (and all of us) to engage in thinking about leadership in a different way and to explore one suggestion of the kind of leadership required to lead Africa into the future and in an ever-increasingly interconnected world.

A cacophony of leadership voices

There are a range of voices that have tried to define what leadership means for Africa. They offer a great number of perspectives, many particular to their own defined interest.

There appears to be little consensus on a common definition of African leadership, yet some observations have been made that begin to articulate this. According to Colin Hall from Learning to Lead,[2] some pictures emerge

regarding the two clusters of views on Africa and whether they are common to all who consider themselves African. These two clearly different clusters profoundly impact leadership behaviour in Africa. One cluster emphasises practical, independent, transaction-driven, time-efficient success. This implies a society where "my success" is not "our success" – a largely Western point of view. The other cluster emphasises interdependent, communal, relationship-aware and respectful leadership. This implies a society in which "belonging" is more important than "becoming" and success is "ours" – essentially thus African.

To be successful, the leaders of Africa have to earn followers from both clusters – clusters that represent a wide, almost opposite, spectrum of beliefs about society. Such new leaders would have to live comfortably with such a paradox. They would have to understand, respect and operate compassionately and convincingly in a complex environment. They would then have the capacity to mould passionate followers whose views are different, even opposite, into one team, one network, one country and one continent.

Another possible useful concept is that of Ubuntu leadership. Ubuntu leadership has at its core the philosophy "I am because you are – I can only be a person through others". Out of this flow the practices of compassion, kindness, altruism and respect and it embodies the concept of a mutual understanding and the active appreciation of the value of human difference.[3]

Another view on Ubuntu leadership[4] invites people to reclaim their wholeness as human beings, as Africans and as global citizens; to reclaim the possibility of a more human style of leadership. Arguably, Ubuntu goes much wider. The notion is a call for a form of humanity, not only for Africa, but for the world. Much is made of Ubuntu and yet it seems incapable of being sustained in Africa.

Much has also been said about women in leadership and movements that support the emancipation of women in society. In November 2005, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf became the first female to be elected head of state in sub-Saharan Africa. On the face of it, the fact that this important breakthrough

occurred in Liberia may seem paradoxical given that Liberia has recently come out of years of conflict and is one of the poorest countries in the world. Generally, the advancement of women politically has been associated with the economic advancement of a country[5]. However, Johnson-Sirleaf's victory is consistent with new trends on the continent regarding women's political leadership. She was quoted in a recent article:

> Africa has come up with as many different political varieties as anywhere else in the world. But the factor that has always shaped the idea of African politics is that it is a man's world, a closed, exclusive and secretive club that plays by its own rules. This is nothing new, and easy to say when only one woman head of state has been elected in Africa. But it also does women a disservice. Look closer and a different story has always been there, behind the headlines. Africa has been home to some of the world's only matriarchal societies, and over history has promoted women across the continent to positions of power. Today's women stand on the shoulders of great forebears, but what about tomorrow's leaders?
>
> Politics now needs women more than ever because the nature of leadership is changing. Once it was based on strength and dominance, but in a new century the traditional, macho attributes of leadership are giving way to new qualities. As barriers and boundaries tumble, it is the skills of cooperation and collaboration that count in a new age of interconnectedness, qualities in which women excel. More and more women are assuming roles of authority and leadership.

The recent election of South Africa's Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to lead the African Union is another indication of the importance of the role of women in leadership.

In a study by Nonkuleko Malinga[6] where she interviewed women leaders in South Africa, amongst others Dr Namane Magau (President of the Businesswomen's Association), Gloria Buthelezi (Provincial Chairperson of the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa Gender Structure), Dr Devi Rajab (Dean of Student Development at the University of KwaZulu-Natal) and Bafana Khumalo (Deputy Chairperson of the Commission on

Gender Equality) the following key conclusions were drawn:

> Leadership is about being able to lead, inspire, be visionary and responsible in the work that you are doing. Women have to work harder to prove their capabilities in the workplace and fulfil their responsibilities in the home.
>
> Organisations still have to develop to a point where they can lessen the burden for women and be more sensitive to the needs of working mothers. It is very clear that there is a need for alternate leadership practices that allow women to be themselves and be the best leaders they can be. However, it is still apparent that not all women have been properly trained for these positions and need to find sound supportive networks.
>
> Society needs leaders who are exemplary, motivated servants of the people, and who are able to bring out new meanings of what it means to be a leader.

In spite of the recently acknowledged role of women and women's movements in reflecting new leadership opportunities, there are still many challenges faced by women in many African countries. Some views on women's experiences in some of these countries were shared at a debate hosted by the South African Parliament which highlighted the need and support for women's movements.[7] This is telling, and indicated that akin to most societies in the world, Africa is still very much a patriarchal society.

The experience of the women in the six countries discussed during the debate were very different; ranging from the repression of military governments to the more subtle approaches involved in keeping women in subordinate positions. However, all the women at the debate were in consensus about the need for a strong women's movement which serves the interests of the majority of women in their countries. Change cannot be left to the goodwill of the state. It is important that women take the lead in their own liberation. It is also clear that the women of Africa must build strong links of solidarity so that women in countries with repressive governments do not despair. We need to learn from each other's experiences in Africa as the challenges for women are not

specific, but universal in light of the historic context of a male-dominated political landscape.

In an effort to overcome the inequalities women in leadership experience, many leadership training programmes exist. In a study[8] about women's leadership training programmes it was found that the trait theory of leadership claims that leaders possess certain traits or characteristics that contribute towards being an effective leader.

Briefly, these traits include: effective communication, task completion, responsibility, problem solving, originality, decision making, passion, vision, ethics, humour, embracing diversity, self-awareness, confidence, courage, experience and power.[9] Although in earlier writings "traits" were regarded as inherent, theorists presently maintain that these traits can be learned. Leadership training programmes are based on the premise that leadership can be taught and learned, and include activities that are designed to "teach" the participants the above traits. Researchers claim that effective leadership training can enable anyone to become a leader.[10]

Notwithstanding the outcomes of this research, it was also found that women-only leadership training programmes had as an unintended consequence the ability to create isolation and exclusion. So, in spite of the many streams of activity around leadership development in Africa, there is still much work to be done for leadership in Africa to create an inclusive, empathetic, collaborative leadership style and approach for the future.

Practical responses to the challenges faced in Africa

Real challenges ask for innovative responses by committed people. I will discuss some possibilities here. One such response was in post-apartheid South Africa, where the Dinokeng Team[11] comprising diverse people – a group of individuals with widely differing perspectives and experiences – offered three ways in which South Africans might walk into and create a common future. The attendees at this event debated robustly and did not agree on everything. What they did share was a common commitment to the principles of the South African Constitution, an appreciation of the heritage of the South

African past, and a very real concern about how they, as citizens, could contribute to the construction of a sustainable future for South Africa – and presumably the African continent. The three ways offered were:

Walk Apart: This is a scenario of "musical chairs" or "reshuffled elites". It is triggered by the failure of leaders. The message of Walk Apart is that if South Africans fail to address critical challenges, if they fail to build state capacity, and if citizens do not organise to engage government constructively, they will experience rapid disintegration and decline.

Walk Behind: This is a scenario where the state assumes the role of leader and manager. The message of Walk Behind is that state-led development cannot succeed if state capacity is seriously lacking. In addition, a state that intervenes pervasively and that dominates all other sectors will crowd out private initiative by business and civil society and create a complacent and dependent citizenry.

Walk Together: This is a scenario of active citizen engagement with a government that is effective and that listens. The message of Walk Together is that the country's critical challenges can only be addressed if citizens' groups, business, labour and broader civil society actively and effectively engage with the state to improve delivery and enforce an accountable and transparent government. This scenario can only be successful if all three of the present trends identified in the Dinokeng Team diagnosis can be reversed: if citizens re-engage; if the capacity of the state is strengthened; and if leaders from all sectors rise above their narrow self-interests and contribute purposefully to building the South African nation.

Clearly the Walk Together scenario suggests some form of active citizenship accompanied by collaborative contributions by many stakeholders including business, government, labour and civil society. This includes both women and men. The South African example is by no means exhaustive, but it does offer a glimpse into the role each person can play in building an inclusive society.



Moving from subject to citizen implies a shift in mindset away from the perceived powerlessness of nations who have been subjected to colonialism and other forms of oppression. It implies a remembering of inherent and understood knowledge of what makes societies work. It implies the broadening of horizons and finding ways of envisioning the future. It also implies an opportunity to jointly and innovatively build on current realities and into the future as new opportunities present themselves for countries and their communities.

So how does leadership play a role in the larger African nation-building endeavour?

Into the future: leadership for Africa

From the earlier references about women and leadership roles it appears that although many women take up and make themselves available for leadership

roles, leadership is more and more becoming a particular personal response to an immediate situation. It is clear that female leaders respond to these situations in a political, social and economic context; a context that includes men.

Many leaders operate within silos: with each geographic area looking essentially internally. Thus groups seldom look sideways at issues that cross the broader landscape, thus issues and concerns that may also impact on others. While this leadership style may be necessary to build capacity in individual countries historically, the broad African landscape has not benefited from it. Into the future Africa needs leaders who can operate independently in their own country and across the regional constraints. Africa needs leaders who understand the value of networks which extend far beyond the traditional confines of geographic boundaries – and, more importantly, know how to lead these networks.

Africa has a history of conflict and oppression and in the new and developing economic landscape the opportunities (and threats) will not come neatly parcelled to fit any particular country's borders. These opportunities and threats will cross boundaries – and our leaders need to be able to do this too. Society needs leaders who can overcome the silo problem inside their own countries – and then move across different spheres of activity outside their own realm or territory and connect and interact with them too. Then, perhaps, we can start to shift the "silo problem" on our continent and be part of crafting pan-African responses and solutions to current and future opportunities.

This requires a new breed of leaders who are prepared to challenge the "mind-your-own-business" culture that tells everyone to stop interfering where they don't belong. It requires leaders who can take responsibility for problems other than their own, both within their own geography and on a broader scale. It also means leaders who can still lead, even when their legitimacy is constantly in question.

We need to nurture these leaders. We need to give them the confidence they need to legitimise themselves and to challenge the old ways. And we need to make them successful as they create new ways and new stories for the future.

So how do we do this? What are the traits needed by these leaders?

Leading Beyond Authority[12]

Leading Beyond Authority draws on the "circles of authority" paradigm in organisations by which individual leaders can understand and assess their own capacity to make change happen, including where they do not have direct control.

The individual sits at the centre of three concentric circles.



- The first and inner circle is the individual's sphere of direct control – within which they exercise management responsibilities, control budgets and operate within their area of technical and professional expertise.
- The second circle represents the zone between the edge of their direct control and the outer limits of their organisation or business. This arena is populated by colleagues and key stakeholders.
- The final and outer circle represents the outside world – in which authority is either unclear or not present, in which there are many competing and, at times, contradictory interests at play and in which the status and expertise gained in the inner circle is often significantly less useful.

A successful organisation requires its leaders to be able to operate successfully

across the three circles – adapting to the different contexts of each circle. This is the ability to Lead Beyond Authority – and is key to effective, collaborative and cross-functional groups. It enhances the ability of individual leaders to see the bigger picture, to take greater responsibility for the whole rather than just their individual part, and to build relationships across disciplines and organisational boundaries.

So how do leaders learn to Lead Beyond Authority?

When moving to lead in this way leaders need to appreciate, understand and embrace **diversity**. They must be able to work with and inspire people who are different from themselves. It requires leaders to consider who and what is on their radar screen and to make sure they are constantly challenged to see new people and situations in different ways. Leading people, who may not have received the same professional training or may not share the same beliefs or ways of working and living as you, can become a source of creativity, challenge and support. An **interest in people** becomes a much more important aspect of leadership. Whether leading change in a group, across countries or in civil society, leaders will need to develop and manage a large number of relationships. Specialised and homogenous **networks** are limited in helping us solve difficult problems and discovering new ways of looking at the world. Leaders need to become more aware of the filters and influences that affect how we work and network with other people. Imagine then what it would take to lead change across Africa in this way. Issues are never simple and the numbers and different kinds of people involved make it more complex. This means quick wins are few and far between and results and rewards not very tangible. Leading change is a long game. Leaders are not in it for their own immediate reward. Having the end in mind as they work through long change will allow a leader to be ready to take new paths. This may mean **waiting, but being ready** for strategic opportunities. It may be plan B or plan C, or maybe even plan Z. Up until now we have mostly seen "short-termism" in leadership which is linked to the length of the political terms of most leaders. Leading beyond authority requires a different lens through which politicians and other civil society leaders are required to view their roles in office. And; it implies different action, long-term action and wider vision in acting.

Leading change in complex areas requires leaders to have thought through many options and be able to adapt and develop a new strategy or way forward when opportunities present themselves. Being stuck to a five-year plan as the people and environment around you change will see you left behind. Pushing for change without direct authority can cause coalitions to collapse or people to be lost along the way. The strength of Leading Beyond Authority lies in being able to take people with you while knowing when not to let others stop progress. But this can take time, it can mean **being patient.** It's about **pace**, keeping going, sometimes slowing down to make sure people are with you, but never losing momentum and never going backwards.

Our ability to effect change is greatly influenced by our recognition of different kinds of **power**, how we use it and where we get it from. When leading within our authority we often draw a lot of our power from our position, our professional training or expertise and the experience we have gained in our career, whether in business, government or civil society. When moving into a leadership role where our specialist knowledge and position may not count the same, we need to understand where our power and influence come from, and find other sources of authority. It's not that power is different when you lead within or beyond your authority but, if you are leading beyond your authority, different sources of power work to different degrees.

Most people have had to draw on different sources of power throughout their lives, whether in political decision-making rooms, economic fora, family situations, when on committees, organising social or charity events or just influencing friends. However, recognising these sources and using them more consciously can be a challenge and requires a certain awareness and commitment. When Leading Beyond Authority, leaders need to be able to weigh and plan who they are going to work with, who are the supporters of the change, who is against it and what are the obstacles that can be overcome and what needs to be worked around. It asks for thinking and reflection and doing.

For example, it may ask the leader to **build guiding coalitions** and not to work for **consensus.** Many leaders working to build consensus will miss

opportunities and get stuck because of the time taken to pull everyone together, while a limited consensus can leave a leader able to achieve little due to a compromised plan or proposal. Moving towards building coalitions will require a stronger approach from leaders who are familiar with and able to take a stand on what they believe in and the end goal they want to reach. It's in this area that some of the most difficult leadership decisions are faced.

Stepping into a different world, either physically different, with different people, or into a way of leading that is different, leaders will need to develop their courage. Whether they are involved in a process of leading change, are starting out to change something, or have for a while cared deeply about something that needs to change, they will need to be brave enough to take those first steps and have the courage to continue. Courage allows leaders to step forwards on issues and not backwards, but it doesn't come to all of us all the time. Courage needs to be cultivated and used regularly by leaders. By stepping into uncomfortable situations a little bit at a time, leaders can become more comfortable with exercising their courage. Just like a muscle, courage needs developing and maintaining. Being able to listen and take on board new ideas, views and especially feedback about ourselves can be very difficult and for many it is difficult to find the courage for this kind of listening. As difficult as listening can be, the courage to challenge people in a way that they know you are trying to help, and not trying to belittle them, can be difficult. This doesn't mean courage for the sake of it and so caution is equally important when stepping forward into something unfamiliar.

Beyond your authority, you have to have passion. It comes in different forms. It may be direct, loud, and demanding, or softly spoken, private, and understated. But passion is what people long for in their leaders. Leading change in an area without direct control and authority can take a long time or become frustrating when compared to a leader's experience of effecting change where they have great positional power from their expertise or professional status. The determination and patience needed to see this through is determined largely by the leader's passion for the issue. This passion will have a significant effect on their ability to connect to other leaders, to involve people in their challenge, and to effect change. There will be times when leaders get it wrong in displaying their enthusiasm and

excitement when what was needed was a calmer and more dispassionate approach. Leading change in areas where you don't have direct authority means you will always need to keep a check on who you are working with, where they come from and what motivates them in order to be able to communicate effectively with the many and varied people you will be working with. The variety of different people, different ways of working and different professional language requires a leader to find ways to resonate, express themselves and to get "people listening without just shouting louder". To be able to lead in a new world will mean understanding things you have taken for granted all over again. To gain credibility you will need to understand the new context, the issues, the sources of power, the human actors, the potential gains and the pitfalls. To be able to do this will require moving into new environments more frequently, looking for how things work and not assuming they will follow the same old rules. The ability to ask the right questions comes to the fore; it becomes a more valuable asset than knowing the right answers. A leader becomes known for the speed in which they can come to terms with the new rules and start relating to the situation, not the speed in which they can impose a pre-made solution. Leading change may require more willingness to adapt, listen and understand someone else's truth, than to prove your point through intellectual rigour.

An essential part of Leading Beyond Authority is understanding that you will inevitably need to **play different roles** at different times in different situations. There are no hard and fast rules, leaders will need to experiment and learn from themselves and others in order to work out which role (or combination of roles) is likely to be most useful in leading change. It is likely that leaders will have a tendency towards a preferred position when leading change, depending on the situation they find themselves in, and it's their ability to consciously choose the most appropriate role for the situation that will improve their ability to Lead Beyond Authority.

Concluding thoughts

We live in a multi-layered world with ever-evolving challenges. Africa is no different, but arguably faces more complex challenges. Demands are made on our time and imagination. These demands frequently push us out of our

comfort zones and into other realms of action. Whether we are formulating government policy, having to find resources for homeless children, run a business or act as a mentor or advisor, we all have to play to our own personal strengths and abilities. And increasingly, we have to find ways of doing this in **collaboration** with others. Working on the premise that people buy people before they buy concepts, we are inevitably judged on the ways we choose to communicate with others. It is in this area, deeply embedded in our leadership practice, that creativity and vision can play a vital part. Many leaders are recognising that tapping into others' innate creativity can positively affect output. Creative, solution-based decision making is the hallmark of innovative leadership.

There are no easy answers, no shortcuts to developing leadership into the future and in Africa it is probably even more challenging given our histories. But what is certain is that we no longer have the luxury of sitting back and waiting for others to make change happen.

The change is in our own hands, we need to build our capacity to lead in different ways and here I explored but one suggestion. There are many more and the invitation is really for each of us to dig deep to remember our own capacity to be the change we wish to see on the African continent and in our world.

Endnotes

[1] The African Renaissance is the concept that African people and nations overcome the current challenges confronting the continent and achieve cultural, scientific, economic, etc. renewal. The African Renaissance concept was first articulated by Cheikh Anta Diop in a series of essays beginning in 1946, which are collected in his book *Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in Culture and Development, 1946-1960.* This concept was popularised by South African President Thabo Mbeki during his term of office, heralding the beginning of The African Renaissance, and it continues to be a key part of the post-apartheid intellectual agenda http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_Renaissance

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[10] Foster, 2000; Hughes, Ginnett&Curphey, 1993; Mitchiner, 2000; Steven, 2000; Whitten, 2000.
[11] The Dinokeng Scenarios. Available: www.dinokenscenarios.co.za.
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