# Shipping Security:
Maritime Aspects off Africa
Proceedings of Colloquium
18 February 2021

Glen Segell

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GLEN SEGELL

CONTENTS

PREFACE

The oceans connect nations globally through an interdependent network of economic, financial, social and political relationships. The statistics are compelling: 70% of the Earth is covered in water; 80% of the world's population lives within 100 miles of the coast; 90% of the world's commerce is seaborne and 75% of that trade passes through a few, vulnerable, canals and international straits.

The maritime environment includes trade routes, choke points, ports, and other infrastructure such as pipelines, oil and natural gas platforms and trans-oceanic telecommunications cables.

At the same time the world's oceans and seas are an increasingly accessible environment for transnational criminal and terrorist activities, including the transport and deployment of weapons of mass destruction and associated materials. Criminal activity in the maritime environment includes the growing range and rate of pirate attacks, which raise concerns about the safety of vessel crews and private citizens.

Maritime security is a fairly new sector. It entered on to regional and continental agendas around the middle of the first decade of the 2000s. The content of African maritime security as a policy field is currently contested. It can be located anywhere between traditional security politics (such as related to piracy and unregulated fishing), developmental and environmentalist concerns, and efforts to regain economic sovereignty over African territorial and offshore waters.

Of the 54 African states, 38 have a coastal border while the others rely on them for their

imports and exports. Continental communication routes landward of the maritime, and stable security both landward and maritime are therefore a continental concern. Any maritime issues are symptoms of landward causes!

Africa has 48 000 km of coastline and 13 million km2 of maritime zones. There are more than 100 ports in Africa, with 52 of them handling containers and transnational trade. The continent's maritime economy is thought to represent close to 90 percent of its total commerce but African countries do not fully benefit from their marine resources, mainly because of insufficient investment capacities. Foreign-flagged vessels transport 95 % of Africa's cargo trade.

Around 2009 maritime security reached the agenda of the Africa Union. There was, however, a disconnect between international and African efforts on maritime security and geopolitics.

To examine the topic further, an international conference was convened "Shipping Security: Maritime Aspects off Africa," that was held as an online event, due to COVID-19, on 18 February 2021. The event was open to a global public audience with a Q&A session, recorded and available for viewing.

This volume is a collection of the proceedings of the conference. The Chapters start with the those with the macro picture and move to those with individual regional case studies. I would like to thank all those involved, first and foremost the presenters, and the authors in this volume.

Glen Segell
Editor & conference co-convener
Akko, Israel
18 February 2021

OPENING REMARKS
Dr, Serge Tshibangu
Special Envoy of the President of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo / Chairperson of the African Union

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you for joining us virtually today. We gather to share our perspectives of and involvement in this year's Shipping Security webinar. I appreciate each of you taking time to be here on behalf of your institution. Looking at the diversified profile of speakers, colleagues and partners participating in today's event, it is proof of our shared commitment to the Africa maritime security.

The host of this webinar offered me the privilege to give this opening remarks, therefore, it is my responsibility to salute the constructive spirit that will animate the different presentations and discussions that will follow. I would like to express my appreciation for the various contributions that will enable our security horizon to be cleared, thus opening up the prospect of great control of our oceans.

As we all are aware of, the African Union's blue strategy was designed to restore ocean health, reinstate security at sea and strengthen strategic "blue growth" sectors. However, this vital space for ourselves and for the rest of the world tends to become a favorite place for criminal activities of all kinds, in particular, piracy, armed robbery, trafficking in human beings, drugs, weapons, illegal fishing, as well as toxic waste and oil spills.

Dear colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,

A reality will regularly come back to us as Africans: "the blue economy" or the economy of

the sea. Meaning that Africa must see this wealth as an opportunity for sustainable development. Armed with the crucial information that Africa has 13 million square kilometers of maritime economic zones and 17% of the world's freshwater resources, enough to introduce a new deal in the maritime transport, ports, industrial fishing ..., unfortunately, economic sectors have always escaped the continent and, until now, have been largely dominated by international interests. Considering that 90% of the continent's imports and exports pass by sea and that a large number of the most strategic maritime trade corridors are located in the African maritime spaces, we understand all the interest that Africa can derive from better controlling its maritime areas.

In addition, with reference to the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy, it is important for me to point out that developed countries protect African coasts, in particular in the Gulf of Aden or in the Gulf of Guinea, in order to protect their interests. But this also shows that in this area, international cooperation is necessary, including in the form of aid from the richest countries. Africa is more exposed than the other continents for the simple reason that it has very few skills and resources to deal with this situation. In fact, African Heads of State and Government have gradually realized that maritime security also simply means security of their respective territories.

I look forward to today's discussion and want to assure you all that all voices matter and will be heard. Even though we aren't meeting in

person, I want to stress the importance of each member of this amazing team participating in the discussion. In addition, I pose a challenge to everyone "here" virtually today: let's each find a way to connect with one of our partners on a one-on-one basis, so we can exchange ideas and strengthen individual relationships. By doing so, we will strengthen the foundation of the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy as we forge our collective path forward.

With that, I'll turn it over to Professor Hussein Solomon, who has a lot to share with us.

Thank you!

1 A CRITICAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU AND AU'S MARITIME STRATEGIES

Mr. Timothy Walker
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Introduction

Continued instability and insecurity at sea will detract from the ability of littoral communities and states to safely and securely conduct maritime trade, attain inclusive economic growth and social development, as well as fulfil their international obligations. Secure and sustainable development of the African maritime domain is increasingly expected to greatly contribute to the African Renaissance and the achievement of African security and development goals.

Since 2010 the AU and EU has facilitated the adoption of several pan-continental initiatives and instruments that provide a framework for establishing collective security and governance mechanism and institutions through which member states can both address common security challenges and threats and pursue opportunities and benefits.

Both the EU MSS and AU's 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy) were designed to be the core strategy guiding the organisation and its member states towards improved protection of the seas and the creation of novel development opportunities (which the AU and member states usually term as 'wealth-creation'). The increasing number of associated instruments shows that both European and Africa countries are acting on the

realisation that greater cooperation is required between them and with other actors around the world if they are to successfully combat incidents of transnational maritime insecurity that hinders their collective ability to create the environment necessary for the sustainable development of their maritime resources. The main observable divergence occurs when we see how many signatory state parties have then gone on to ratify these instruments and by looking at progress in strategy implementation and achievement of goals.

Impetus for strengthening collective maritime institutions

The impetus for strengthening collective maritime institutions can be primarily attributed to the following factors.

Firstly, research is showing that countries and coastal communities are acutely vulnerable to a wide range of maritime security threats and transnational organised crimes. The failure to tackle maritime crimes, either through enhanced law enforcement or collaborative capacity-building severely impacts the ability of vulnerable countries to create the preconditions necessary for sustainable development.

Secondly, maritime crimes can be characterised as 'wicked problems' as they defy simple, national solutions due to their increasing sophistication. For instance, crimes such as illegal fishing, drug trafficking and piracy are becoming complex and multidimensional as they are often committed by well-organised criminal groups engaging in multiple criminal activities in multiple jurisdictions. Wicked problems require

transnational solutions that are best assured through regional mechanisms designed and operated by regional states.

Thirdly, most African states lack the means to undertake national or unilateral actions as they possess great variations in their individual capabilities for asserting their sovereignty and exercising their authority through robust maritime law enforcement and developing infrastructure to facilitate trade.

This enduring challenge leads onto the final factor discussed in this section of the paper – the growing interest in deriving substantial benefit from the development of oceanic resources for African economic growth and prosperity. Decision-makers have become more receptive to the idea of investing in maritime or blue economic industries such as fisheries, aquaculture and tourism and no longer regard maritime investments as irrevocable or sunk costs.

A Brief History of the African Union's maritime initiatives

Both the EU and the AU are taken to be the ideal venue in theory for establishing the required inter-state mechanisms that facilitate the creation of greater, collective maritime security through well-designed and functioning international institutions. The institutions established and consolidated at this level will be challenged though by the extent to which they can realistically accommodate both the divergent and convergent interests and perspectives advocated by member states to provide appropriate responses. In regards to the AU, the number of member states brings with it an increased risk of stalemates between

actors unwilling to compromise on their perspectives and interests in the absence of a strong arbitrator.

The result of this gap has been the weak incorporation and integration or mainstreaming of maritime into the overall work of the AU. This was most clearly evident in the lack of references to the role of maritime security in some of the pillars informing its peace and security architecture. As Len Le Roux observed in 2006, "reading these documents leaves the impression of an Africa without a coastline or maritime zone, let alone broader maritime interests such as trade and maritime resources". These include the Common African Defence and Security Policy of the African Union and the Protocol that established the AU Peace and Security Council.

Finding a permanent anchorage within the Commission

The AUC's main attempt at establishing a permanent and cross-cutting maritime anchorage took place from November 2010, while the 2050 AIM strategy was being drafted, after the Chairperson issued a directive to establish an appropriate AU taskforce. It subsequently steered through the drafting of the strategy in 2012 and its endorsement by maritime ministers in 2012 - an arduous task involving numerous expert meetings, a lack of seconded experts from member states and complicated by an institutional movement away from the PSD to the Office of the Legal Counsel. It was inadequately funded and, in practice, now adrift from many of the networks in which it was previously embedded.

In the meantime, AU maritime momentum

was already starting to shift away from the OLC-STF-2050 AIM Strategy wave and was instead gathering behind a Togolose proposal to convene and host a regional piracy conference. Interest in the conference led to it being turned into an extraordinary summit, and the Togolese set their sights on a charter as a goal. A major problem though was the subsequent lack of transparency and inclusivity in drafting. The draft Charter was only presented to two of the AU's Specialized Technical Committees prior to the Summit. As a result, the Charter presented for consideration and signature concerned some attendees by appearing to prioritise its security and safety aspects and procedural articles over development issues such as blue economy, fisheries and tourism.

Further progress only became apparent in March 2018 when the Legal Counsel convened an informal meeting with AU Member States and invited them to designate maritime and law of the sea experts to serve on a revived Strategic Task Force for the Implementation of the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy. The most significant outcome was that the STF agreed that finalising the Annexes to the Lomé Charter should be considered part of its mandate to consider the AIM 2050 Strategy's technical details to produce a road map for its incremental implementation.

The result of the inertia on 2050 AIM Strategy and the slow finalisation of the Lomé Charter has increased the risk of the Lomé Charter replicating the AMTC and RAMTC - neither of which came into force. So far only Togo and Benin has ratified the Lomé Charter.

A subtle irony here is that the Lomé Charter now depends on the 2050 AIM Strategy, which it had overshadowed, even marginalised from 2016 onwards. This has been marked by a growing acceptance of the need for both formal and informal actions, which does bode well. The STF would, for one, be in a position to finally focus on its initial mandated task of revising the implementation plan of the 2050 AIM Strategy. This was underscored by the 2020 PSD/AU request to begin convening consultative maritime forums on the way forward without it being necessary to have completed Lomé Charter annexes.

Conclusion

The AU and its commission has struggled to both establish and consolidate maritime institutions that can benefit member states in the pursuit of their enduring and emergent maritime interests. This can be attributed to the weakness of its intergovernmental functions and to a reluctance among member states to consider policies and concepts that have an strong or inherent supranational dimension. Each of its maritime instruments has been marked by a wave of enthusiasm and accompanying high-level meetings/events, but the capacity of the commission to implement them was not enhanced (either by internal decision or member state championing). Instead the slow finalisation or implementation of each successive instrument produced by the AU has resulted in its superseding and overtaking by another, often with duplication or dilution – leaving the core implementation actors bereft of institutional momentum and memory. While each additional instrument has

been designed to complement or enhance those that came before, the fact that these were unfinished meant they overlapped and duplicated each other significantly. This also occurred between RECs and the AU where, the principle of subsidiarity notwithstanding, the AU has yet to play the facilitative or catalyst role that was originally envisaged and seemed possible when it was ahead of the EU.

2 NATO'S MARITIME DIMENSION VIS-A-VIS AFRICA

Dr. Glen Segell
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Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, also called the North Atlantic Alliance, is an intergovernmental military alliance between 30 European and North American countries. The organization implements the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed on 4 April 1949. Article 5 provides "that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked."

To be defended are the territory, citizens and interests of the state. One of those interests is the maritime that includes coasts, ports, sea routes and the shipping. The NATO Alliance Maritime Strategy of 2011 informs that whether in support of Alliance joint operations, or when leading in a predominately maritime mission, maritime forces have critical roles to fulfil, defending and promoting the collective interests of the Alliance across a spectrum of defence and security challenges, as defined in the Strategic Concept of 2011.

The maritime environment also lends itself well to strengthened engagement in cooperative security. It identifies the four roles of NATO's maritime forces: deterrence and collective defence; crisis management; cooperative security – outreach through

partnerships, dialogue and cooperation; and maritime security.

Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) is the central command of all NATO maritime forces and the MARCOM Commander is the primary maritime advisor to the Alliance. MARCOM was officially launched on 1 December 2012, to reflect the NATO Heads of State's decision to create a leaner and more effective command structure. Like its land and air counterparts (LANDCOM & AIRCOM), MARCOM answers directly to NATO's Allied Command Operations (ACO) which is located in Mons, Belgium.

NATO has Standing Naval Forces under the control of NATO Allied Maritime Command which responds to Allied Command Operations. They are comprised of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 and 2 and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups 1 and 2. This multinational, integrated force is continuously available to perform tasks ranging from participating to exercises to conducting NATO missions. These forces are part of the maritime component of the NATO Response Force.

NATO's maritime defense interests

NATO allies share Africa's three sea basins: while eight of its European Member States are coastal states on the Mediterranean, and five on the Atlantic. This makes the African coast and landward from a central focus of NATO. The Atlantic Ocean, north of the Tropic of Cancer, and the Mediterranean Sea are part of its region (in-area) to be defended as these are the location of its member states. Africa is the southern border of NATO in Europe. NATO member states share the Mediterranean as a maritime border with North African states.

Seas, as direct or transit routes for illegal migration from Africa to Europe, are an important concern. European and African economies through trade depends on secure sea routes and shipping security in the Mediterranean and onward through the Straights of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal.

Where and when necessary NATO has conducted military operations to protect shipping off Africa's coasts and also landward. As these African states have or could host elements that would endanger the security and indeed the shipping security both civil and military of NATO member states. Since the end of the Cold War in 1990, looking at each instance of NATO assistance and military involvement vis-a-vis Africa shows the two main focuses of NATO and Africa. The first is in 1994 when the North Atlantic Council initiated the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) It currently involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. There are also specific operations for immediate security needs for example to support United Nations Resolutions in 2011 on Libya.

The second is with the African Union (AU) and its request. It is NATO policy, and it has in practice assisted, non-NATO African states because it is in NATO interest to do so as their security and stability projects into NATO member states security and stability. Landward security and stability is a prerequisite to that of maritime. As such, for example, shipping security, both civil and military, sea route patrols, and air-sea surveillance and rescue are part and parcel of NATO's maritime dimension

vis-a-vis Africa. These have included Non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CRO) can be described as "multifunctional operations that encompass those political, military, and civil activities, initiated and executed in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law, contributing to conflict prevention and resolution and crisis management, or serve humanitarian purposes, in the pursuit of declared Alliance objectives."

The Africa maritime security dimension

The content of African maritime security as a policy field is currently contested. In Africa initial continent-wide efforts to beef up search and rescue capacities evolved within the context of the 2000 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue. At this stage, the debate on maritime security in Africa was advanced by the United Nations and the IMO, which set the tone by introducing sector standards. In 2008 the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted a series of resolutions that, among other things, led to the establishment on 14 January 2009 of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), pursuant to Resolution 1851 (2008). The IMO sponsored a meeting of sixteen African and Arab states in Djibouti on 26 January 2009 that adopted a Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (IMO 2009).

The EU, NATO, and others responded to the security implications of African piracy by launching a number of joint operations. NATO guided by its latest strategic concept "Active Engagement, Modern Defence" (NATO 2010),

launched a combined task force Operation Allied Protector (March – August 2009), Allied Provider (October – December 2008) and then Operation Ocean Shield. The last for example authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2020, which calls on states cooperating with the Somali government to use "all necessary means" to combat piracy. Also at the request of the UN Secretary General, NATO's naval forces escorted ships of the World Food Program (WFP) transiting in the Gulf of Aden.

This led to 'African Union - Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy – Adopted in 2014 (AIM 2050). It has its origins a discussion since around 2005 on the Africa Maritime Dimension (AMD) in the context of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean (East Africa), and the Gulf of Guinea (West Africa), in order of degree. Various African actors - among them, member states of the African Union (AU), the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (RMs), and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union Commission — have responded to dimensions of the ADM with a set of policies in an effort to integrate their evolving practices into a coherent maritime security and safety policy.

AIM 2050 addresses all major issues that Africa is confronted with, namely: i. Diverse illegal activities, which include toxic waste dumping and discharge of oil, dealing in illicit crude oil, human, arms and drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea; ii. Energy exploitation, climate change, environmental protection, conservation and safety of life and

property at sea; Research, innovation and development; and iv. Maritime sector development, including competitiveness, job creation, international trade, maritime infrastructure, transport, information, communication, technology, and logistics.

NATO's security interests

A number of concerns continue to be a reality on the African stage that could have impact on Europe and hence NATO and their potential to become global in nature. These include social radicalization and terrorism, energy and environmental disasters, civil war, unstable / failed governance, illegal migrants and refugees, and criminal activities in weapons, drugs, and humans, only to name a few. These landward issues pose both a security threat and threaten economic interests seaward for example, the pursuit of lawful commerce at sea close to African shores.

There is also a clear and present threat in the new "Scramble for Africa" by external actors. The main players other than NATO members are China, Russia, the European Union, India, Brazil, Turkey, Iran, South Korea and the Gulf State countries who are all interested in increasing cooperation with Africa. Part of their involvement is detrimental to local interests. For example arms trade, and radicalization of the population.

Some have established foreign bases in Africa that could lead to proxy conflicts. Naval examples are China in Djibouti (port of Obock, cross the Gulf of Tadjoura), India in Madagascar (listening post set up in 2007 to keep an eye on ship movements in the Indian Ocean and listen in on maritime

communications) and The Seychelles (allocated land on Assumption Island to naval base for counter-piracy and an eye on China) and United Arab Emirates in Eritrea: (developing the mothballed deepwater port of Assab for operations in Yemen, including the naval blockade of the Red Sea ports of Mokha and Hodeida and has a 30-year lease on a naval and airbase at the port of Berbera.) And indeed Russia.

NATO Mediterranean Dialogue

NATO has recognized that non-NATO alliance partnerships are required because shipping security and indeed sea routes and trade in the Mediterranean from the Suez to Gibraltar and the Black Sea are closely linked to security and stability within Africa states.

In 1994 the North Atlantic Council initiated the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) It currently involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. NATO's MD is primarily bilateral in structure (NATO+1). That is a testimony to the unstable governance of some of the seven and the disputes between and among them that prevents them functioning in unity.

The MD is based upon the twin pillars of political dialogue and practical cooperation. Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia have all agreed on tailored Individual Cooperation Programmes with NATO. These include maritime cooperation for example intelligence, surveillance, joint exercises and sea route patrols for civil and military shipping security, air-sea rescue, and the use of port and logistic facilities.

A specific military operation in the Mediterranean region was the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector in Libya 2011 that had some distinct maritime components: 1) the enforcement of an arms embargo on the high seas of the Mediterranean to prevent the transfer of arms, related material and mercenaries to Libya; and 2) air and naval strikes against those military forces involved in attacks or threats to attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas.

An example of a current NATO maritime activity in the Mediterranean can be seen from the decision at the NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016, of the transformation of the Active Endeavour counter-terrorism mission in the Mediterranean to a broader maritime security operation. The new operation received the name Operation Sea Guardian. Operation Sea Guardian is a non-Article 5 maritime security operation aimed at working with Mediterranean stakeholders to maintain maritime situational awareness, deter and counter terrorism and enhance capacity building. Some of the tasks include supporting maritime situational awareness, upholding freedom of navigation, conducting interdiction tasks, maritime counter-terrorism, contributing to capacity building, countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and protecting critical sea routes and land and sea infrastructures.

NATO conducts maritime exercises in the Mediterranean. For example NATO exercise Dynamic Manta (DYMA20) began on Monday, 24 February 2020 off the coast of Sicily. Ships, submarines, aircraft and personnel from 9 Allied nations are converging in the Central

Mediterranean Sea for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-surface warfare training. The aim of Dynamic Manta was to enhance interoperability and proficiency in anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare skills to participating units, providing complex and challenging training serials. Units from Canada, France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey with submarines from France, Greece, Italy and Turkey under NATO Submarine Command are participating in 2020 edition. Italy as the host nation, is providing support at the Catania harbour, naval helicopter base in Catania, Sigonella naval air station and Augusta naval base with logistic support including refueling operations, medical assistance and personnel accommodation.

NATO and the African Union

Much has been said about allowing for African solutions to African problems. But what happens when African solutions fail, or do not achieve anticipated results? What happens when the failure of African solutions threatens to destabilize regional or international security? The use of regional organizations to solve African issues is not a new phenomenon. One issue is that the African regional organizations cannot sustain themselves for prolonged security operations and logistical concerns plague them. Two of the significant African regional organizations currently operational in various security missions across the continent are 1) The African Union (AU), currently all 55 African states except Morocco and 2) ECOWAS, comprised of 15 West African states.

They need support for their missions and NATO is well placed to provide this. At the

beginning of the 1990s, after the Cold War NATO began to assume an increasingly proactive role within the international community and gradually projected itself beyond the Euro-Atlantic space (out of area operations). With this NATO took on new responsibilities within the international community. NATO's Prague Summit 2002 finally laid to rest whether or not NATO would be in the business of out-of-area operations, including Africa south of NATO's southern border with Mediterranean states.

Since 2005, NATO has been cooperating with the AU. The NATO-AU relationship started modestly with AU requests for logistics and airlift support for its mission in Sudan. The cooperation has evolved over time and, although primarily based on ad-hoc military-technical cooperation, NATO Allies are committed to expanding cooperation with the AU to make it an integral part of NATO's efforts to work more closely with partners in tackling security challenges emanating from the south. Cooperation is being developed in three main areas: operational support; training support; and structural assistance. Operational support includes strategic air- and sealift, as well as planning support. NATO has also supported the build-up of the African Standby Force through exercises and training. For day-to-day activities, the Alliance maintains a liaison office at the AU's headquarters in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. NATO and the African Union signed a new cooperation agreement on Monday (4 November 2019), laying the ground for closer practical and political cooperation between the two organisations. The deal supersedes an

earlier NATO-AU cooperation agreement from 2014.

NATO deployment in and off Africa

NATO's deployment in Africa has been driven by direct requests from the AU for support in very specific areas and with United Nations Security Council Resolutions. This was to firstly improve the humanitarian situation in Darfur from 2005 to 2007 in support of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) by providing logistical airlift to AU forces.

Following this NATO provided logistical airlift to AU forces in Somalia and conducted naval operations in reaction to the increase in acts of piracy along the Somali coast. NATO naval forces conducted surveillance tasks and provided protection to deter and suppress piracy and armed robbery, which were threatening sea lines of communication, shipping security and so economic interests. Examples are Operation Allied Provider 2008 and Operation Allied Protector 2009 off the Horn of Africa. Operation Ocean Shield contributed to the international efforts against piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa from 2009 to 2016.

In detail NATO's role in Operation Ocean Shield was to provide naval escorts and deterrence while increasing cooperation with other counter piracy operations in the area in order to optimise efforts and tackle the evolving pirate trends and tactics. NATO conducted counter-piracy activities in full complementarity with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. All Allies contribute to the mission, either directly or indirectly, through NATO's command structures and common funding.

NATO Allies provided ships and maritime patrol aircraft to NATO Standing Maritime Groups, which in turn assigned a number of ships, on a rotational basis, to Ocean Shield.

Also at the request of the UN Secretary General, NATO's naval forces escorted ships of the World Food Program (WFP) transiting in the Gulf of Aden. There have been no successful piracy attacks from May 2012 onward, even though Somalia-based piracy has not been eliminated.

Looking forward

Why NATO and not the EU or the UN to support AU maritime? The answer is that NATO brings to the table more so than any other in its interoperability and American contribution. Also even though the UN and EU do have many missions in Africa, they lack the naval capabilities of NATO. Time will tell also on NATO support to the AU's continent-wide "2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy" (2050 AIM Strategy).

NATO support to the AU may even be with partners such as China. While NATO and China's operations are distinct, interaction through meetings of the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) initiative, for example helped to build mutual trust over the years.

Thanks to the SHADE process, 'China, India and Japan in early 2012 agreed to coordinate their merchant vessel escort convoys through the Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC) off the Horn of Africa with one country being 'reference nation' for a period of three months on a rotational basis.'

Also in the Mediterranean, the increased presence of Chinese naval assets alongside

long-standing NATO ships have led some analysts to go as far as argue for joint Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) patrols.

Conclusion

It would be fair to assume 1) that there is an unstable situation landward in many parts of Africa and 2) this is projected maritime off its coasts and hence 3) this juxtaposed with the essential security and economic interests and role of NATO and its member states would 4) tend to the conclusions that NATO is going to strengthen the efforts in the Mediterranean Dialogue and 5) further support for the African Union where 6) shipping security would be high on the list of priorities.

To examine this in detail with evidence further research would permeate through a singular line of questions: What does Africa mean for NATO? Is NATO unified for action in Africa? What do African states in the MD and AU want from NATO? and What would transpire if NATO were not to be active especially in shipping security and the maritime dimension of Africa.

3 THE SAFETY OF SHIPPING OFF AFRICA: A JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE

Mr. Hirotaka Mori
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Office

Japan mostly depends on the maritime transportation to import energy/mineral resources, marine/agricultural products and other resources, accounting for 99.6 % of total trade volume(tons). Therefore, the navigational safety is the key for the daily life of Japanese people as well as for the economy. The Gulf of Aden is one of the vital shipping lanes for Japan, because it connects Asia with Europe via the Suez Canal where 19,000 vessels, including approximately 1,700 Japanese-related vessels (vessels registered in Japan, and vessels registered in other countries but operated by foreign companies which are wholly owned by Japanese shipping companies), pass annually. Furthermore, since approximately 15% of container cargos over the world and 18% of the vehicles for export from Japan were transported through the Gulf of Aden in 2019, the safety of merchant vessels is still one of the urgent and critical issues for Japan.

Japan remains concerned about the continuing threat posed by piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. According to the annual report of ICC-MRB (International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime Bureau), the number of piracy incident has increased sharply and there were over 200 incidents per year around 2009 to 2011. Although a marked reduction has been seen in the number of attacks and hijackings around off

the Coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden since 2012, and no piracy incident was reported in 2019 and 2020, Japan observes that the underlying causes of piracy remain in place, and the number of piracy incidents would rise unless stakeholders continue their global cooperation.

This decrease is achieved by the implementation of counter-piracy measures by each shipping company and the results of international cooperation for the counter-piracy operation by many countries including Japan. The below measures would be considered as examples.

- Japan's actions against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden

- Special measures to embark privately contracted armed security personnel

- Best practice to deter piracy by shipping companies

(1)   Japan's actions against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden

In March 2009, after receiving the approval of the Prime Minister based on the Cabinet decision, the Minister of Defense gave the order for Maritime Security Operations in order to protect Japan-related vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Following this order, two Japanese destroyers departed from Japan and began escorting Japan-related vessels in the same month. Moreover, to conduct more effective counter-piracy operations over an extensive marine area, the other order was given in May 2009 to dispatch two P-3C patrol aircraft, and these aircraft commenced warning and surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden in

June of the same year.

In view of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Japan subsequently enacted the Act concerning the Punishment of Acts of Piracy and Measures to Deal with Acts of Piracy (the Anti-Piracy Measures Act) in July 2009 in order to deal appropriately and effectively with acts of piracy.

In July 2013, Japan decided to participate in the CTF151(Combined Task Force 151) to commerce so-called zone defense in addition to escort missions as before, while coordinating closely with the units of other countries that are engaged in counter-piracy operations, for the purpose of conducting more flexible and effective operations each other. Following this, the surface force started zone defense in December 2013. In addition, the air force has been participating in the CTF 151 since February 2014.

The maritime patrol aircraft (P-3Cs) based in the Republic of Djibouti make use the excellent cruising capability in conducting warning and surveillance activities in the vast area of the Gulf. The flight zone is managed by the CTF151 headquarters. The flight activities total 2,428 in flight mission and 18,179 in flying hours on as of December 31th, 2019, counted from July 2009, when the JSDF started the surveillance activities. Furthermore, aircraft have identified approximately 201,600 vessels and provided information to vessels navigating the area and other countries engaging in counter-piracy operations on around 14,420 occasions.

In addition, three JSDF officers have served as the CTF151 commander so far. (May to August in 2015, March to July in 2017 and

March to June in 2018). These opportunities have boosted the JSDF reliability in the international community and represented the JSDF's continuous contribution to maritime peace-keeping.

As of December 31st 2020, 3,922 vessels have been escorted under the protection of the JSDF's destroyers. Not a single vessel has come to any harm from pirates and these vessels have all safely across the Gulf of Aden. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism(MLIT) of Japan provides a sole contact point for coordination with the JSDF's escort.

(2) Special measures to embark privately contracted armed security personnel

The number of piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden rapidly increased in 2008, and spread to the Indian Ocean later. Under these circumstances, it became common among major maritime countries that Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) were on-board of their flag vessels. These PCASP contributed to decrease of attacks by Somali pirates. However, under Japanese laws, it was prohibited to employ PCASP on Japanese flag vessels.

Therefore the Act of Special Measures Concerning the Guarding of Japanese Ship in Pirate-Infested Waters was enforced on November 30, 2013 to endure the security of Japanese flag vessels by PCASP.

Under this Act, PCASP that is confirmed by the Minister of the MLIT of japan can guard Japanese flag vessels in the Pirate-Infested Water based on the Designated Guarding Plan authorized by the Minister.

(3) Best practice to deter piracy by

shipping companies

A lot of practices to deter piracy and enhance maritime security have been developed by shipping companies. These practices include below measures.

- Citadel

A citadel is a designated area where, in the event of imminent boarding, all crew may seek protection. Communication with the outside is secured, by VHF, satellite portable telephone, etc.

- Razor wire

Razor wire fixed along on the whole upper-edge circumstance of her body creates an effective barrier if properly rigged and secured.

- Water discharge facility

Water shall be discharged from a water discharge facility toward the sea surface along the side of the ship.

- Control of access to accommodation and machinery spaces

It is important to control access routes to the accommodation and machinery spaces to deter or delay entry. Higher gate around the weather deck and security enhanced doors/hatches are effective.

These practices are compiled in Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, BMP5, supported by some organizations including International Chamber of Shipping. Each shipping company takes necessary measures with reference to the document.

Due to the efforts and cooperation of many stakeholders, the number of piracy incidents has been at lower level in recent years.

However, the threat of piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has not completely disappeared. Further continuous efforts would be expected to secure the safety of shipping off Africa.

4 PROMOTING MARITIME SECURITY OFF AFRICA: THREATS, COOPERATION AND THE USE OF DATA

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Backdrop

Any basic image or tracts of shipping on the world's oceans indicates that a significant part of shipping travelling between the large economic powers in the Eastern and the Western hemispheres pass through African waters. Add to this the presence of lucrative living and non-living resources requiring diverse shipping operations off Africa, an image emerges of a continent standing central in current and particularly future global ocean activities of various kinds.

Two important catalysts underpin the above scenario. Shipping off Africa requires safe and stable seas to conduct their globally important economic activities. Second, Africa is obliged to play a role in ensuring that its ocean territories are secure to provide stable maritime environments for economic activities and to pursue the continent's own commitment to a vibrant blue economy as part the AIMS-2050 strategy of the African Union (AU). Collectively cooperation and good data make a useful contribution for decision-making on maritime security.

Discussion

Maritime threats, cooperation, and the use of data

Maritime security threats in African waters largely stems from non-traditional threats with

terrorism and insurgency beginning to straddle the divide between soft and hard security threats. In addition, irregular and regular threats manifesting as hybrid threats at sea also seem to be taking shape. While listing threats is a popular way to depict maritime security threats off Africa, the quest continues to refine and become more prudent in framing the threat landscape to better direct African responses. However grouped, cooperation and good information are bound to remain constituent elements of any sets of counter-measures to address maritime insecurity.

Waters of the Gulf of Guinea, the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea as well as the Mediterranean off the north African coast (Libya in particular) are maritime landscapes under threat. Further south in the Southwestern Indian Ocean, insurgency in Northern Mozambique and its implied overlap with an Islamic State faction show a lingering threat to offshore economic maritime activities. Here large offshore gas fields and vulnerable coastal communities living off the ocean are under threat. The aforementioned areas also reveal extensive responses to contain threats with the Gulf of Guinea, the southern approaches to the Red Sea and waters off Somalia perceivably harbouring the greatest dangers for shipping and offshore economic activities.

Responses to maritime security threats

Two pathways of actions assist governments to ensure better maritime security off Africa. Cooperation and use of reliable data form part of the overall notion of information sharing to direct prevention and other responses as a

fundamental tenet for promoting maritime security. As concepts that inform how coastal countries and regional entities react, East and West Africa offer architectures and inclusion in data sets to foster cooperation and gather information on security aspects.

Regarding cooperation, West Africa's architecture for cooperation is largely configured by the regional economic communities of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). ECOWAS covers fifteen states, while ECCAS comprises ten states. In total both entities include about 17 coastal states pending double membership of some.[1] Turning this regional notion of cooperation offshore, the 2013 Yaoundé Code of Conduct) (YCC) spans coastal states and two island states of ECCAS and ECOWAS. The YCC builds upon the regions' common interests to also work towards maritime security and deal with armed robbery, hijacking of vessels and hostage taking of crews as well as capturing and illegal selling of petroleum products in the Gulf of Guinea.[2] In addition, information sharing is a central function of the YCC with its different zones covering coastal states from Angola to Senegal including Sao Tome & Principe, as well as Cape Verde.

The waters off the Horn of Africa in the Gulf

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[1] Some coastal countries (Angola and DR Congo for example) hold overlapping memberships with ECCAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

[2] By early 2021 the Gulf of Guinea is labelled the 'piracy' hotspot of Africa due to the increase in attacks on shipping passing through these waters.

of Aden and into the southern Red Sea hold its own array of threats to shipping. In spite of its dramatic decline, piracy and attacks on shipping remain the apex threat off Somalia alongside interconnected criminal activities such as smuggling of weapons, people, drugs and illegal fishing. Somalia also reflects the primary focus of extensive capacity building programmes and international involvement that collectively helped to suppress armed attacks on shipping and assisted the country to gain some resemblance of governance over its littoral waters. Somalia in fact became a testing ground for anti-piracy measures and outreaches and projects supporting vulnerable governments with maritime security capacity building.

In the northern waters of the Gulf of Aden and towards the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the war in Yemen still fosters dangerous threats to shipping in this part of the Northwestern Indian Ocean. Primary being the sowing of sea mines off the harbour of Hodeia by the Houthi movement close to the entrance to the Red Sea. A further danger stems from indiscriminate attacks on commercial and naval vessels off Yemen by way of unmanned platforms. A third threat lingers around the huge Safer oil storage platform anchored outside the port of Hodeia that holds the potential of causing a major ecological disaster if the UN is not allowed to maintain this platform properly. A major spill could shut down the shipping lane through the Bab-el-Mandeb and leave vessels damaged or having to be rerouted around Africa's southern tip. A secondary threat is the disruption of shipping transporting food supplies to large

displaced populations in Yemen resulting from the ongoing war. Overall, the war in Yemen and its spill-over leans towards hybridization of the threat with dangerous military systems being transferred to the Houthi movement including the capability to attack commercial and naval vessels.

Cooperation off the Horn of Africa is less structured along the region's economic entities if compared with the Gulf of Guinea's architecture. While the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (8 members), the East African Community (EAC) (6 members) and the AU represent potential actors to address maritime threats off the Horn region in a cooperative way, the most effective response to date came from international cooperation on naval deployments off Somalia and setting up the Djibouti Code of Conduct (2008) and Jedda Amendment (2017) (DCoC/JA) including 10 African coastal and island states. The DCoC primarily aims to contain and prosecute piracy, and through the 2017 Jedda Amendment, deal with other maritime threats that prosper alongside piracy and armed robbery at sea. Alongside an array of capacity building endeavours to address Somalia's maritime security deficit, the international responses in cooperation with some littoral African governments probably contributed most to mitigate serious threats in this important ocean region and the strategic sea lane passing through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

Turning to information sharing and the use of dedicated data in particular, the Stable Seas Index and the Mo Ibrahim Index on African Governance hold an Africa focus. Updated data

sets on security, governance, threats and rule of law in coastal states and their littoral waters jointly offer decision-making information to direct or redirect resources to neglected domains. The Ibrahim Index is updated annually offering room to compile littoral countries' standings on national security and safety, rule of law and justice, accountability and transparency, and anti-corruption. Although landward, the concept of liminality connects landward security conditions to what transpires in a country's maritime domain as landward vulnerabilities and threats also fuel insecurity at sea by way of interconnectedness and interdependence.

The Stable Seas Index measures maritime security off Africa by way of data sets linked to selected issue areas: Governance (International cooperation, rule of law and maritime enforcement), economic matters (coastal welfare, blue economy, fisheries) and threats (piracy and armed robbery, maritime mixed migration and illicit trades). Collectively, the issue areas offer decision-makers quantified indicators on where more attention, resources, capacity building and time are required. If employed alongside the Ibrahim Index security indicators, decision-makers and other responsible parties have an opportunity to compile a security governance image of their maritime areas of responsibility. The art remains to merge available data to build an actionable information picture.

Both above mentioned indexes also allow for compiling unique regional indicators of the East and West African regional economic communities discussed earlier. This makes

possible cooperation within regions and not only to enhance their own capacities, but also assist member states to build capacity in neglected areas. Both the YCC as well as the DCoC/JA ultimately depend upon the quality and functionality of their member countries to contribute and not allow room for crime, insurgency and terrorism to gain a foothold or foster hubs of criminality plundering the seas to the detriment of those who use the oceans responsibly. In this vein data indexes help coastal states as well as regional collections of coastal states to build information packages to pursue maritime security.

Summary

Shipping and related maritime industries remain the backbone of the global economy and for national economies. Part of this economic reality resides in and around Africa with its vast ocean territories harbouring marine resources and shipping lanes. Maritime threats off Africa hold stark elements of weak maritime security governance in some regions and these regions house the very resources and sea routes deemed important for economic progress. Subsequently, maritime security governance promoting stable and safe ocean territories off Africa remains paramount.

Responses to maritime security threats off Africa are not always well-exposed, but growth is visible. Architectures for cooperation probably shows improvement with the Gulf of Guinea and countries bordering the Western Indian Ocean reflecting how African governments attempt to cooperate and make their oceans safer and more secure. The YCC and DCoC remain two flagship developments

that contribute to more secure ocean territories off Africa.

While efficient information sharing is rightly noted as a critical element of maritime security governance, the neglected element is reliable data from indexes. The Mo Ibrahim Index combined with the Stable Seas Maritime Security Index offer useful indicators to African governments to better understand their maritime security challenges and act where the need for capacity and resources are found wanting. If merged with cooperative arrangements the combination offer a viable model to help improve maritime security off Africa.

5 THE FORGOTTEN CHOKE POINT
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Allow me to start with 2 quotes. The first is from Vice Admiral (Retired) Lutz Feldt, in his excellent paper entitled Maritime Surveillance as a Pre-Condition for Maritime Security, and I quote; *"The character of the sea has changed. From an open space where freedom was the rule, it has become shared, a common good for humanity, vast but fragile, needing worldwide management and protection"*.

The second comes from closer to home; former President Nelson Mandela at the International Fleet Review in Cape Town on 5 April 1997, and I quote parts; *"The sea is a vital national interest and that is why we maintain a navy. We accept our obligation to combine with other maritime nations to uphold the freedom of the seas and to protect our national interests through naval power"*. The first question is thus; are we heeding these wise words?

On the Southern tip of Africa lies Cape Agulhas and the Cape of Good Hope. Off the East coast of Africa, the Cape Sea Route runs off the dangerous coasts of Somalia and Yemen whilst to the West, the Gulf of Guinea has become a hotbed of maritime crime. To the South lies the unforgiving seas of the roaring forties which channels any shipping traffic close to the Cape of Good Hope. This Cape divides the often strategically overlooked Southern Atlantic and Indian Oceans and also provides a handy gateway to Antarctica.

In the past, a choke point would refer to a

specific geographical position. During modern times, this may have to be adapted to choke point areas. The sea lane of communication (SLOC) is channelled along this area (much like in the Malacca Strait or the Gulf of Aden. The Cape Sea route is channelled along the Mozambique channel, and then hugs the SADC coastline until Saldanha off the West coast.

Depending on the author, there are between 9 and 12 international maritime choke points, with the obvious ones being the Strait of Hormutz, Straits of Malacca and the Suez Canal and Sumed pipeline, linked to Bab el-Mandeb. Not mentioned but very much in the picture with regards to volume, is the Cape Sea route. Current volume places the route in the top three whilst also acting as a much-needed alternative to routes passing some of the most volatile and unpredictable areas in the world. This was well appreciated in 1955 with the Simon's Town Agreement between the UK and the then RSA. However, with time and relative security, the route and its strategic importance may have been forgotten. Vice Admiral Feldt states that "maritime chokepoints may be local or regional but their importance is global". Ignoring the importance of the Cape Sea Route is a mistake; by both the neighbouring SADC countries and the maritime world as a whole.

The factors affecting maritime security of any SLOC is quite generic. However, the Cape Sea Route has some unique factors that require investigation.

> Although the threat of piracy along the Somali coast has diminished, it has all the potential for future escalation. Until the failed state scenario ashore has been

rectified, the potential for piracy incidents will continue to drive insurance costs and sea routing.

Climate change is playing a role in forcing shipping closer inshore along the Southern coast. This was already taken into account in drafting the IMO Circular 198 of May 1995, entitled "Routing Measures other than Traffic Separation Schemes".

The geo-political environment of the SADC region has changed dramatically. The previous colonial alignment has been replaced by a non-aligned, independent climate with super power friendships varying greatly. This is further complicated by a number of young democracies with a potential for failed state status. The current economic climate, partly due to the Covid 19 pandemic, will not assist in the establishment of a secure environment.

Linked to the above, is the new challenge of the Al-Sunnah insurgency in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique and the seeming inability of both Mozambique or SADC to counter this evolving threat. Al-Sunnah has the potential of disrupting a 60 Billion Dollar gas field investment. In addition, their presence along the coast could also disrupt sea traffic making use of the Mozambican Channel.

Lastly, the void left by departing powers is being filled by the emergence of China as a super power with associated new resource requirements and ambitions. There are currently more than one million

Chinese nationals residing in Africa. They are there to action the wide variety of Chinese investments and projects currently underway. Investments and projects that may require protection. Reports indicate that both India (Seychelles) and China continue in their efforts to obtain African bases (also South of Djibouti and even on the West coast of Africa). It is important not to place a purely negative perception on these actions. These long-term strategies may well be a win-win scenario for all involved as long as it remains balanced and well managed.

To ensure the maritime security of the sea route, one must first examine the scope of this term. The term is a widely used "buzz word" encompassing everything from marine pollution control to SAR and even full-scale war. This is well illustrated by the Maritime Security Index compiled by Christiaan Bueger in his paper entitled *"What is Maritime Security"* and uses similar principles to those proposed by Geoffrey Till in his famous work entitled *"Good Order at Sea"*.

The Index leads us to tasks, missions and roles (from which the required tools for the job can be deduced). Most relevant in this case would be salvage, anti-piracy or anti sea robbery operations, fishery protection and pollution control. Changes to our world indicate that PSO and maritime counter terrorism tasks are on the horizon. The biggest challenge is that these tasks require action from a wide variety of role players. Role players that do not always communicate with

each other and who guard their own territory and designated budget with much zeal and diligence.

In Africa, there is a new player on the field, namely private military companies (PMCs). Previously operating ashore, they are increasingly visible at sea, protecting foreign investments left unguarded by neglected government maritime security assets. Operating in the void left by governmental "sea blindness", they are mostly proving to be effective despite the misgivings of naval officers. However, it is imperative that the roles and legality of PMCs be fully appreciated and managed.

Within the navies themselves, the classic Ken Booth trinity of naval missions remain valid today with an emphasis on the Constabulary tasks which could be handled by basic assets. However, maritime assets need to be deployable. Internet force design comparisons do not look into the reality of neglected and inoperable maritime security assets. What is the availability of the maritime security tools within SADC? Allow me to pose some questions in this regard and we will leave the answers to the owners of the various processes.

> Is the SADC maritime security strategy operationalised and are the relevant agreements in place to provide a regional response on the operational and tactical levels?
>
> Does SADC have an integrated MDA picture with a JIIM Command post to direct assets?
>
> Do we have the sensors in place to populate this Common Operating Picture

(COP)? This would include satellites, Shore radars, MSAs, VTS, port controls and others.

Are the processes in place for command decisions to be taken (delegations) to direct available assets on a 24/7 basis?

Do we have the operationally available forces to deploy as directed? This would include MSAs, OPVs, IPVs and Boarding Parties. In addition, are the forces interoperable between the various departments, PMCs and countries?

If the above seems to be lofty ideals, be aware that this is the pure basics and other regions in Africa are achieving much of this already. SADC may have fallen behind.

If the answer to any of the above may be in the negative, then we within SADC have not succeeded in providing a secure and sustainable environment to foster maritime security within our region. The lofty ideals and vision of AIMS 2050 and the Djibouti Code will then remain just that; a vision far removed from reality. The challenge is twofold:

We need to keep our strategic vision realistic, achievable and affordable, and

We need to action these strategies to provide tangible effect to provide the required maritime security to the Cape Sea Route and our region.

6 ARABIAN GULF STATES AND MARITIME
SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
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In order to defend strategically vital international shipping lanes, the Arabian Gulf countries have expanded and deepened their cooperation with governments and sub-state actors in the Horn of Africa in recent years. Threats to the waterways adjacent to the Horn persist given persistent instability in neighboring countries. Although pirate activity originating from Somali territory has abated in recent years, regional maritime security is also impacted by the ongoing conflict in Yemen.

The main waterways adjacent to this region, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, constitute one of the most strategically important sea routes in the world. This paper first outlines the nature of the threats to maritime activity from littoral states. It then examines the policies pursued by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as the two most active Arabian Gulf states in the area. The paper will conclude with a discussion of how interregional cooperation between the Gulf and the Horn of Africa states might help to stabilize the Horn's adjacent seas in the future.

Local threats to maritime security

Projecting the Horn's adjacent seas is an issue of growing importance, given that shipping travelling through the Red Sea to the Suez Canal and beyond must transit the Gulf of Aden and the critical chokepoint of the Bab el-Mandab Strait. The strait consists a waterway that is only 18 miles wide at its narrowest point

between Yemen and Djibouti, with the route being further narrowed into two navigable channels separated by the Perim Island. In 2018, a total of 6.2 million b/d of crude oil shipments passed through the strait according to the US Energy Administration.

The security of the waters of the Horn of Africa is tied in with the broader global and strategic importance of the wider Indian Ocean. Within the general regional security context, the political and economic instability that have affect the states on the African side of the Gulf of Aden littoral has been a persistent threat.

This is particularly the case with Somalia, which has lacked an effective central government since 1991. The fragmentation of local authority, absence of security governance and economic deprivation have created the circumstances whereby piracy has increasingly threatened shipping The onset and persistence of insurgency against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and subsequently the Federal Government of Somalia since 2006 led to increased attacks on shipping, which provoked in turn the creation of the Combined Task Force 150 anti-piracy coalition tasked with the mission to protect commercial shipping in the Gulf of Aden.

Although instances of piracy have declined markedly in recent years, potential threats remain from both opportunistic raiders and terrorist and insurgent groups. Piracy has been largely suppressed by international initiatives such as the US-led Combined Task Forces, and the EU's Operation Atalanta. Nevertheless, the United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) continued to warn of the risk of pirate

activity in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in December 2020. In the first half of 2020, eight instances of attempted or suspected piracy against shipping were recorded in the international recommended transit corridor (IRTC) in the region.

There remains concern that international shipping in the Gulf of Aden is at risk of terrorist attacks stemming from the ongoing conflicts and instability in Yemen. On 3 March 2020, it was reported that three skiffs, one of which might have been an unmanned water-borne improvised explosive device (WBIED), attempted to attack a Saudi-flagged vessel sailing 90 nautical miles off the Yemeni port of Nishtun. On May 17, in a similar incident, two skiffs fired on a British-flagged chemical tanker en route from Al Jubail to the Red Sea. Security forces on the tanker responded by destroying one of the skiffs, which was suspected to be carrying explosive substances.

The location of the attack ruled out activity by Houthi rebels, though the Houthis have also previously used WBIEDs in the Bab-El-Mandeb strait to specifically target Saudi vessels. Nevertheless, there are doubts over the existence of local terrorists with the capabilities to launch attacks such as those allegedly recorded in March and May 2020. Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) was notorious for its attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and two attacks near the port of Mukalah on the Southern Yemen coast in 2016. However, AQAP was effectively neutralized and broken up by UAE- and US-led counterterrorism operations after Mukalah was pacified in 2016.

Whether the skiff attacks in the Gulf of Aden

were launched by residual terrorist cells or organized by an external power remains a matter of speculation at present.

Intervention by the Gulf States: Saudi Arabia and the UAE

As well as protecting vital interests, Saudi and Emirati activity in the Horn indicates a new assertiveness spurred by intensified geopolitical rivalries in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. In addition, their growing involvement in the region is a reactive response to Iranian support for the Houthi rebels in Yemen. In this context, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are seeking to balance their traditional security and military relationship with the US with growing commercial links with China.

In recent years, the expanding influence of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the Horn has been manifested through a range of political initiatives, diplomacy, aid, and investment. In its bilateral relations with regional governments, the UAE in particular has sought political and security partnerships to build on traditional commercial ties symbolized by the Dubai-based DP World's development of the Doraleh port in Djibouti after 2006. In addition, Emirati diplomats mediated in the 2018 agreement that ended a twenty-year long conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have also intervened to ease tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia.

However, relations between the Arabian Gulf states and the Somali government have been affected by rivalries between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand and Qatar on the other. The Somali government of President

Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed ("Farmaajo") has been seen as being too dependent on Qatari investment and influence, with the result that the Saudis and Emiratis have sought to build their security and trading relations with local authorities in Somalia's federal states. Following contested election process in Somalia in December 2020, there is a risk that renewed tensions could lead to further fragmentation of the state.

Securing local maritime routes

One important development for regional security has been moves to create a "Red Sea Forum" that has the potential to mediate disputes and address ongoing and emerging threats. However, a key question is the extent to which external powers should be permitted to shape a regime at the expense of the interests of the littoral states of Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. While the EU and China have suggested their support for a forum, there is skepticism over the extent to which the United States might become involved, a significant factor that indicates Washington's waning interest in acting as security guarantor in sub-regions such as the Horn.

A multilateral framework could offer a means of managing a range of issues including security, conflict management, trade flows and migration. It could also provide a mechanism to enable African states to engage with Arabian Gulf actors to their mutual advantage. However, the efforts made to date suggest differences between the potential main players. A joint Saudi-Egyptian initiative launched in 2017 a series of high level meetings and ongoing engagement, though differences soon

became apparent. By virtue of its geographic location, Egypt naturally sees itself as pivotal region actor through its links to the Arab and African worlds and custodianship of the Suez Canal. To this end, Egyptian diplomats have stressed that a Red Sea forum's members should only include those bordering the sea itself.

Conclusion

The Arabian Gulf States' engagement in the Horn of Africa and its adjacent seas therefore derives from evident security, political and economic imperatives. While a 'regime' such as the Saudi-Egyptian Red Sea Forum could emerge, the precise shape of security governance in the region is still in a state of flux. Through measures to build multilateral cooperation on local maritime issues, the Arabian Gulf states could play an enhanced role in underpinning the security of the maritime routes adjacent to the Horn of Africa. The successful Saudi and Emirati mediation efforts with Egypt, Ethiopia and Eritrea demonstrated the potential of Gulf involvement in this respect.

As the partial rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Qatar is now in place, there is potential for the Gulf states to adopt a more coordinated approach to a range of regional security issues, including a resolution of the Yemen conflict, maintenance of the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace, and strengthening the authority of the Somali government, as essential elements in securing the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea routes.

7 MARITIME POLICY AND ILLEGAL FISHING IN WEST AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN SECURITY

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Introduction

Illegal fishing has always existed, but the sharp rise in this practise in recent time has drawn attention to it. While so much research has been undertaken and policies developed by affected governments and International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) to curb poaching of animals on land and their illegal trade in order to preserve their species, a dearth of research and too few policies have been enacted to address Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing. Despite regional and international efforts to stop IUU fishing the phenomenon is still a growing problem and West Africa is one of the worst hit regions.

Lacking the resources and capabilities of the developed countries, poorer countries in the global south have developed unique approaches to tackling the problem of IUU fishing and the human and environmental security risks that come with it. Though these have yielded different degrees of successes, experts and authors agree that significant and sustained progress can only be made when concerted international effort is harnessed to deal with the problem given the fact that the governments of the poorer countries do not have the capability and capacity to combat illegal fishing practices in their territorial waters. This is evident from the case studies treated in this chapter. While the effort of

Sierra Leone at checking illegal fishing can be commended, the same cannot be said of Nigeria where too little is done. So while the discourse on Nigeria is used to show the impact of illegal fishing on a country's security if unchecked, Sierra Leone is used to capture the challenges that have to be braced in order to make little successes that go a long way preserving human security.

The Problem and Impact on Security of Illegal Fishing

The nature of IUU fishing makes it difficult to observe and tackle, since it occurs on the high seas where monitoring or intervening is more strenuous. The problem of overfishing confronts many coastal states and many seem unable to check the trend and safeguard marine life and revert the impact on human and environmental security. Illegal fishing is connected to crimes such as forgery, money laundering, labour abuses (slavery), tax evasion and various types of trafficking. Declining fish stocks, which is the effect of illegal overfishing is a major contributor to the rise in piracy. Denied of regular healthy fish hauls and with survival bleak, young fishermen take to piracy.

Decreasing fish stocks have forced fishing operators to travel further distances to catch fish. More days at sea means higher crew costs which is circumvented by employing cheaper migrant (or illegal) workers. These workers are vulnerable to human trafficking at sea. Decreasing fish stocks has caused an overcapacity of fishing vessels. These vessels are well suited for migrant smuggling, illicit trafficking in drugs, piracy, and the operators become a danger to the coastal state because

they possess good navigational knowledge of these coastal waters. The impact of IUUF on maritime, national and human security is further accentuated by the observation that the declining fish populations lead to increased levels of competition and conflict among operators and local fishermen over the remaining stocks, that leads to decreased economic food security, reduced environmental sustainability and threats to peace and order. In addition, IUUF is linked to issues such as inducing slave labour, supporting insurgency, terrorism, organised crime, piracy, kidnapping, illicit trafficking of narcotics, humans and small arms. Maritime security threats are complex and interconnected, and although they may occur at sea they are known to have extensive on-shore impact. In Africa where there is ineffective governance at sea and insufficient capacity for monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS), these threats can proliferate and lead to maritime insecurity. The debate therefore should not be about mitigating these threats, but addressing illegal fishing which gives rise to these threats.

Most authors agree that since illegal fishing has become a trans-organisational crime involving well connected crime syndicates, it will take international collaboration to curb it. International political will to curb IUU fishing is certainly the way forward.

Challenges in Addressing Ilegal Fishing and Improving Maritime Security: Cases from West Africa

The capacity of coastal states, especially developing ones, is a major issue in curbing IUU fishing. Considering their limited naval

capacities, it is difficult to conduct regular patrols over large areas. This makes it rife for IUU fishing to thrive in these areas since in these countries, the actual likelihood of detection while violating fisheries regulation is close to zero, vessels involved in IUU fishing are empowered to carry on with their activities. Again, countries with poor governance records are more susceptible to IUUF activities. It is for this reason that many coastal states in Africa suffer the presence of illegal vessels from as far off as China, European Union, Korea, Russia, Taiwan and Yemen. The poor wages of workers in countries with poor governance, the weak state of local institutions, and the high level of patron-client relationships in these countries because it is a source of survival, occasions rampant corruption that is exploited by illegal foreign fishing vessels. Maritime officials often turn a blind eye in granting licenses to vessels irrespective of the reputation of these vessels. This symptom negatively affects deterrence, monitoring, enforcement and prosecution and sometimes restrains state officials from imposing severe penalties, all of which can prevent illegal fishing from occurring.

Nigeria: The rich marine endowments of Nigeria have attracted genuine foreign operators and investors. This has substantially given rise to illegal coastal activities by foreign and local companies. The huge maritime policing deficiencies have aided the growth of IUU fishing. The depletion of the country's marine resources compels local and artisanal fishing operators to move farther out to sea with ill-equipped vessels. Such movements have found them venturing (or straying) into foreign

waters which becomes a threat for potential conflict between Nigeria and its neighbours. Adding to this problem is the lop-sidedness of research that focuses mainly on improving maritime security in relation to militancy and piracy for improved oil revenue. Similarly, the inland focus of Nigeria's security has left its maritime sphere deprived of necessary attention.

Sierra Leone: In the past decade, industrial foreign vessels have increased their presence and illegal activities in Sierra Leonean waters either on their own or by enticing small-scale fishers into illicit partnerships, such as acting as trans-shipment vessels in near shore areas. This increase in fishing activities that impact on the operations of the local fishermen prompted them to take matters up in protecting their livelihood. Consequently, local fishermen have chased and boarded illegal vessels and handed them over to the navy for prosecution. These local fishermen stood up to protect their livelihood and their environment.

The government of Sierra Leone made the effort to install Satellite Technology and Automated Information Systems (STAIS) to improve Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) of its waters. This has led to an increase in the number of offenders caught and charged with the highest fines. While some experts feel that the fines are not enough to deter illegal activity since offenders often have more than enough to pay, a study by Doumbouya et al concludes that illegal fishing declines as the fines imposed become more severe. Complementing the use of technology the government of Sierra Leone in April of 2019

imposed a one-month ban on all fishing by foreign vessels to protect its resources. This policy was to combat IUU fishing in its territorial waters. The ban temporarily eased the tension between international fishing vessels and the local fishermen and brought relief to the latter who are forced to travel much further into the sea to get good hauls. Some experts argue that exercising such bans about three times in a year will surely help the socio-economy of Sierra Leone as the country's fishermen will have access to more fish, improve their economic standing and thus reduce the threat of piracy. The economies of some coastal towns rely solely on fishing, so, leaving three months of the year to the local fishermen, will not only check overfishing and environmental/marine devastation, it will empower locals economically and so curb piracy, and encourage them to partner with the government in checking illegal fishing and its attendant negative impact on state and human security.

Conclusion

Where illegal fishing is allowed to thrive, poverty is more widespread among populations of coastal towns and especially in areas where the majority population depend on artisanal fishing for survival. Illegal fishing has thus been linked to security threats such as sea piracy and human trafficking and smuggling which explains the emphasis on countries policing their coastal waters to curb illegal fishing. In supporting this approach to curbing illegal fishing, the debate therefore should not be about mitigating these threats, but addressing illegal fishing which gives rise to these threats.

The uneven approach to the problem at regional level hampers collective international effort which is badly needed to check illegal fishing and its impact on a nation's security. In view of what it will cost in terms of equipment and training to effectively police international waters, most African countries cannot go it alone. A lot also depends on the countries of origin of the foreign vessels involved in illegal fishing to be sincere in their efforts to stop this trade.

ABOUT THE ACADEMIC PARTNERS
AND THE CONTRIBUTORS

The Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States
University of Haifa, Israel

The main mission of the Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States, University of Haifa, is to promote research, achieve a better and deeper understanding, and provide crucial insights into the society, economy, politics, religion and culture of Iran and other countries of the Gulf, through the expertise of a sterling team of specialists and the employment of interdisciplinary tools and methods, covering the region's past, present and future. The Ezri Center also aims at becoming a hub of advanced research on the relations between Israel and Iran as well as one on the Jewish communities of the Gulf, and particularly Iran. Through its various activities - which include innovative research, policy analysis, local and international conferences, workshops, symposia, colloquia, occasional lectures, book launches, film presentations, exhibitions, and cultural activities - the Ezri Center wishes to provide a better and deeper understanding of the complexity and the undercurrent processes of Iran and other countries of the Gulf as well as the region as a whole. The Center also draws on the vibrant local Iranian and Arab communities, as well as the cooperation and collaboration of other Institutes and Centers, for events aimed at the dissemination of and familiarity with the Iranian and Arab arts and culture.

The Department of Political Studies and Governance, The University of the Free State, South Africa

The Department of Political Studies and Governance consists of two components: Governance and Political Transformation and Political Science. These components or divisions have their own distinct institutional roles and functions, but they find common ground in their relation to the study of the state, government, relevant non-governmental institutions, and politics in general. Much of the common scholarly focus, interest, and research relate to the science and art of government; the science dealing with the form, policies, organization, and administration of the state or a part of one; and with the regulation of its relations with other states and non-governmental organizations.

The Department provides an ideal setting for students at all levels of undergraduate and postgraduate study to engage with novel ideas through learning, practicing scholarship, and creative research in various sub-fields of politics and governance, as well as in an array of interdisciplinary areas of inquiry. Its aim is to encourage its students to think broadly, critically, and internationally about the core features of democratic and global citizenship.

Its mission is to pursue excellence through quality teaching, research, institutional and community engagement. This it seeks to achieve through offering innovative and relevant programs on national, regional, African, and global issues and the creation of opportunities to develop competent staff in teaching and research. It does this with a staff on all three campuses of the University of the Free State.

Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA), The University of Stellenbosch, South Africa

SIGLA is a research institute of Stellenbosch University located with the Faculty of Military Science, Saldanha, South Africa. SIGLA envisages to position itself as one of the leading African research institutions and strives to build leadership capacity and generate knowledge resources in the areas of security governance in support of sustainable development. SIGLA recognises that without governance and leadership neither security, nor development may be sustained.

SIGLA's research activities relating to leadership and governance on the African continent focus upon landward, maritime and cyber security governance. SIGLA builds partnerships with likewise institutions such as the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme, the Royal Danish Defence College, NMIOTC on maritime security and anti-piracy, and the Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria) to execute its mission. Faculty members, an international grouping of Research Fellows and Extraordinary Professors work with SIGLA in the respective focus areas. Knowledge products are offered by way of seminars/webinars, offering a platform for collaborative research, partnerships on research projects, a series of annual SIGLA Briefs and research articles and participating in book publications. More information is available at: About SIGLA (sun.ac.za)

AUTHOR BIO

Dr. Serge Tshibangu is Special Envoy of the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since President Felix Tshisekedi was officially sworn in as President of the DRC, Dr. Serge Tshibangu became his Advisor and later, the head of Politics and Diplomacy commission in the Presidential Task Force. He holds a PhD degree in Petroleum Engineering and a Master of Engineering degree in Electrical and Information engineering from the University of the Witwatersrand (WITS) in South Africa. Also, he has a specialisation in International Trade Law from the World Trade Institute/University of Bern, Switzerland and another Specialisation in Defense and Security Development Strategy from the College of Hautes Etudes de Stratégie et Defense (CHESD). For the past two years of work at the Presidency of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Dr. Tshibangu was head of the Congolese Government team that negotiated with General Electric South Africa Ltd. the signing of a 1.8 billion worth of energy and health infrastructure projects. He was also the head of the Congolese Task team that led to the revival of the Military Cooperation with the USA which was suspended 9 years ago. He finally led the DRC Task Force Team on AGOA which led to the reintegration of the DRC in the AGOA program. Dr. Serge Tshibangu is fluent in English, French, Lingala and Swahili.

Rear Admiral (Retired) Hanno Teuteberg SM MMM joined the South African Navy (SAN) in 1977. He qualified as a submariner and then completed his Officers training in 1979. He served

as a Combat Officer onboard several surface ships until returning to his submarine roots in 1985. From 1985 to 1996, he served onboard all SAN submarines in all Combat Officer posts, completing his stint there with command of a Daphne Class submarine. During this period he was also involved in all submarine upgrade programmes and lastly as the user specialist for the Type 209 acquisition project. After completing studies in Business Management and Staff courses, he returned to Simon's Town as the Senior Officer Submarines over the period 1999 to 2001. From 2001 to 2003, he served as the Director Fleet Quality Assurance, responsible for maintaining the standards of the sea-going fleet. He had the honour of serving as the Defence Attaché to Berlin (Germany) over the period 2003 to 2006. This period coincided with the delivery of 4 SAN Frigates and 2 Submarines (acquired from the German Defence Industry). From July 2006 until Dec 2008, he served in the post of Director Fleet Force Preparation. The post has functional control over the SAN ships and submarines in commission and is responsible for preparing all SAN operational forces for employment by Joint Head Quarters. He served as the Director Maritime Warfare from June 2009 until December 2010 in Pretoria where he was responsible for current and future naval force employment, design and doctrine. From December 2010 until November 2011 he was employed as the Chief of Fleet Staff at Fleet Command in Simon's Town after which he assumed the position of Director Joint Force Preparations and Training with Chief of Joint Operations in Pretoria. He was appointed as Chief Director Maritime Strategy at the Navy Headquarters as from 01 February 2013 and as Deputy Chief of the Navy on 1 April 2014. He

retired from this post on 31 March 2017. Since retirement, he has remained current in matters of maritime security and had presented papers at numerous institutions, including the annual SMM Maritime Conference in Hamburg, Germany. R Adm (Ret) Teuteberg has received training in the following fields: Surface and sub-surface maritime operations, National and Military Strategy, Business Planning and processes, Joint and military operations and the planning thereof and Combat and Mission Readiness Training for Joint (Army included) and Naval Forces. He has been awarded several decorations, including the Southern Cross, Military Merit Medal as well as the Navy Cross Decorations from both Argentina and Brazil. Hanno Teuteberg is a keen yachtsman and has participated in ocean races on all oceans, including Admiral's Cup and Fastnet Races. He has also won the Cape to Rio Yacht Race on-Line Honours as well as handicap (Class 2). He has been presented with provincial and national colours for yachting.

Mr. Hirotaka Mori is Head of Japan Ship Centre(JSC) in London and Director-Maritime, London office of Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO). He studied Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Tohoku university in Japan, and joined the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism in 2001. At the ministry, he has been in charge of policy making for all transportation mode including maritime, aviation and automobile. He also has a unique experience at Japanese shipping company where he was in charge of the procurement of new building vessels in 2018-2020. Following the various maritime experience, he joined the JSC and JETRO in July, 2020. He is in charge of

research and analysis of maritime market around Europe in addition to promoting Japanese maritime industries including Shipbuilding and Ship machinery industries.

JETRO is a government-related organization that works to promote mutual trade and investment between Japan and the rest of the world. One of the main activities of JETRO London is to support British, Irish, Swedish and Finnish companies looking to invest in Japan.

JSC was established in London in 1965 as a joint office of Japan Ship Exporters' Association (JSEA) and Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). Since its establishment, JSC has been active for research, public relation and international cooperation on maritime market, as a bridge between Japanese shipbuilding / marine equipment industry and European maritime industries.

Professor Francois Vreÿ is Emeritus Professor in Military Sciences, Stellenbosch University He lectured in the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University for 22 years and now serves as the Research Coordinator for the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA), Stellenbosch University. He is a C1 Rated Researcher of the National Research Foundation of South Africa. His research fields include Africa's emerging maritime security setting and maritime security governance off Africa in particular. His current post involves building international research partnerships on leadership, landward and maritime security governance, and cyber security.

Dr. Stephen Blackwell is an analyst, researcher, and writer with more than 20 years'

experience in roles across the think-tank, academic and media sectors. He is the author of a book entitled British Military Intervention and the Struggle for Jordan: King Hussein, Nasser, and the Middle East Crisis, 1955-1958, as well as numerous journal articles and book chapters. He has also written for the opinion and news analysis sections of The National, Abu Dhabi's first English language newspaper. Dr. Blackwell previously worked as a Researcher at the Emirates Center of Strategic Studies and Research in Abu Dhabi. Before moving to the UAE, he was Head of the European Security Program at the Royal United Services Institute in London and Editor for Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments. He has also lectured at University College London (UCL) and at the University of Aberystwyth, where he also completed his doctoral thesis on 'Anglo-American Defense Policy in the Middle East, 1957-1962'.

Mr. Timothy Walker is the Maritime Project Leader and a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa. Since 2011 he has worked to promote maritime security as a policy priority with organisations such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Southern African Development Community and the Indian Ocean Rim Association. He is currently leading the implementation of an ISS project to strengthen African maritime security institutions. His areas of interest include maritime security, piracy, the blue economy, China-Africa relations, international relations theory and human security. He has a master's degree in political and international studies from Rhodes University in South Africa.

Glen Segell (DPhil, FRGS) is Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, South Africa and Professor at the University of Cambridge, England. He was born in South Africa and educated to a BA and MA at the Hebrew University Jerusalem and to a Doctor of Philosophy (DPhi)l at the University of Oxford. He specializes in intelligence studies, civil-military relations, the nexus between air and sea power and strategic communications where he also consults as an expert for NATO. He has held teaching and research positions in the United Kingdom, Israel and South Africa. These include the Center for Defence Studies King's College London, The University of Reading, The Institute for National Security Studies Tel Aviv and the Ezri Center for Iran and Gulf States Research, University of Haifa. He holds the rank of Brigadier-General (Reserves). He was involved in active intelligence and offense operations in Iraq, Kuwait, Sudan and Libya. He has published a substantial number of peer reviewed articles and books. ORCID 0000-0002-4186-2761

Dr. Jude Cocodia is an Assistant Professor (Senior Lecturer) and Acting Head of the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Nigeria. He has a BA and MA in Philosophy from the University of Ibadan and Erasmus University Rotterdam respectively. He also holds an MSc and PhD in International Relations from the University of Benin, and the University of Nottingham respectively. He is a 2014 awardee of the International Peace Research Association and an Associate Fellow of the Higher Education Academy, UK (2016). He authored the book Peacekeeping in the African Union: Building Negative Peace (Routledge, 2017)

and has written several book chapters, journal articles and working papers for research think-tanks on security and development in Africa. Some of his current research include: the constructivist influences of Nigeria's Heads State; Small and light weapons and Terrorism in Africa; and the relevance of the African Union to the continent's development. Outside academics, Jude worked with Everyone Counts International Charity, a London based NGO as the Project Coordinator in Yenagoa, Nigeria (2011-2012) and London, UK (2013-2016).

ABSTRACTS

Rear Admiral (Retired) Hanno Teuteberg SM MMM

The Forgotten Choke Point

On the Southern tip of Africa lies Cape Agulhas and the Cape of Good Hope, forming the natural choke point for the Cape Sea Route. This choke point ranks right up there with Hormutz, Malacca and Suez. In terms of volume, it remains in the top five choke points globally. So important that the Simon's Town Agreement (1955) between the then United Kingdom and Union of South Africa was specifically signed to help guarantee the maritime security of this Sea Lane of Communication. However, for some reasons, it is often ignored, perhaps due to its remoteness and perceived stability along its borders. This is true for even the SADC states, despite the fact that more than 90% of all imports and exports arriving or departing southern African shores do so via the sea – truly an island economy. The factors affecting the security of the Cape Sea route are dynamic and requires investigation to better understand the current situation and future scenarios. The maritime security index, tasks and toolbox are well known factors. Where does the SADC region stand in terms of these tools? Many strategies and plans with not so much actual action. Investigating the existing deltas in this maritime toolbox in order to fill the gaps has become a matter of priority.

Mr. Hirotaka Mori

The Safety of Shipping off Africa - A Japanese Perspective

Japan mostly depends on the maritime transportation to import energy/mineral

resources, marine/agricultural products and other resources, accounting for 99.6 % of total trade volume(tons). Ensuring the safety of navigation of ocean-going vessels is much important for Japanese economy and their lives. The Gulf of Aden, which is on the important sea-transportation route connecting Asia and Europe and is about 12,000 km away from Japan, is one of the most important area because about 1,700 Japan-related vessels (vessels registered in Japan, and vessels registered in other countries but operated by foreign companies which are wholly owned by Japanese shipping companies) pass there. The piracy off the coast in the area has remained a big threat for Japanese shipping companies, although the number of the piracy has marked a significant reduction. In this webinar, speaker introduces Japan's effort and international contribution against piracy, and some practice of Japanese shipping companies.

Emeritus Professor Francois Vrey

Promoting maritime security off Africa: Threats, cooperation and the use of data

Maritime insecurity plagues swathes of ocean landscapes off Africa. The said insecurity comprises multiple interconnected threats and vulnerabilities that call for smart retorts. Cooperation and credible data sets are two important factors to direct capacity building and countermeasures in support of more profitable and predictable ocean environments for shipping and other economic uses of the ocean as a transport and resource medium. A secure maritime setting off Africa, furthers safer shipping lanes and port visits for ocean going vessels. Cooperation implies building partnerships and using existing regional

cooperation arrangements as well as focused bi- and multilateral collaboration to address threats. Data access calls for using and refining existing data sets on Africa and its surrounding oceans to help governments direct resources and skills where the need is greatest. Collectively, cooperation and data (including information sharing) help authorities and other maritime agencies to better protect ocean territories and related infrastructure for the safe use by industry and ensure productive ocean landscapes for future generations.

Dr. Stephen Blackwell
Arabian Gulf states and maritime security in the Horn of Africa

In order to defend the strategically vital shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf countries have expanded and deepened their cooperation with the Horn of Africa in recent years. This increased activity has been spurred by a range of factors included the upsurge of piracy following Somalia's fragmentation and the ongoing civil conflict in Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular become more proactive in terms of security engagement with local actors. As well as protecting vital interests, this activity indicates a new assertiveness spurred by intensified geopolitical rivalries in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Given the recent instability and economic dislocation in the Horn of Africa, there is a growing imperative for improved multilateral cooperative and governance mechanisms to manage the full spectrum of risks which persist in the region.

Mr. Timothy Walker

A critical comparative analysis of the implementation of the EU and AU's maritime strategies

I outline the development and implementation of the maritime strategies of the European Union and the African Union. The success of the EU is underpinned by a stronger recognition of/less reluctance to cooperate in spite of maritime security's supranational dimensions. The EU's intergovernmental component is well institutionalised, whereas the AU's is challenged by the fact that its strategy has to be operationalised outside of a supranational framework and its intergovernmental element is comparatively weaker.

Dr. Glen Segell

NATO's maritime dimension vis-a-vis Africa

The African coast and landward from it have always been a central focus of NATO. NATO is a regional security alliance formed in 1949 where the Atlantic Ocean, north of the Tropic of Cancer, and the Mediterranean Sea are part of its region (in-area). Africa is the southern border of NATO in Europe. Some NATO member states share the Mediterranean as a maritime border with North African states. Their economies through trade depends on secure sea routes and shipping security in the Mediterranean and onward through the Straights of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. Where necessary NATO has also conducted military operations out of area to protect shipping off Africa's coasts for example the Horn of Africa and also landward, for example in Sudan, Somalia, and Libya. NATO assistance and military involvement is in two focuses 1) the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and 2) support for the

African Union. There are also specific operations for immediate security needs for example to support United Nations Resolutions in 2011 on Libya.

Dr. Jude Cocodia

Maritime Policing and Illegal Fishing in West Africa: Implications for Environmental and Human Security

Illegal fishing has long been in existence, but research on it and its ripple effects on the environment and man has been relatively new. Newer still is establishing the nexus between illegal fishing, maritime policing and human security. This chapter addresses this issue and contends that in contributing significantly to overfishing, illegal fishing pushes local fishermen out of their livelihoods, runs down coastal economies and so encourages sea piracy and trafficking among other social ills. The studies of Nigeria and Sierra Leone used in this chapter present two very different approaches to the problem. Much of the effort of these countries has been local or national, and as such, a lot remain unachieved. To address this problem effectively, countries ought to have a seaward focus on security just as they do toward land, and seek international and regional cooperation in doing so.

Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, University of Haifa
Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State
Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, University of Stellenbosch
International e-Conference

Shipping Security: Maritime Aspects off Africa

February 18, 2021
Time: 10:00-12:00 (South Africa Time)

Moderator

Professor Hussein Solomon
Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, South Africa

Opening Remarks

Dr. Serge Tshibangu
Special Envoy of the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo / Chairperson of the African Union

Presenters

Mr. Timothy Walker
Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa
A critical comparative analysis of the implementation of the EU and AU's maritime strategies

Dr. Glen Segell
University of the Free State, South Africa / Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, University of Haifa, Israel
NATO's maritime dimension vis-a-vis Africa.

Mr. Hirotaka Mori
Japan Ship Centre, London and Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), London Office
The Safety of Shipping off Africa: A Japanese Perspective

Emeritus Professor Francois Vrey
Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA) University of Stellenbosch, South Africa
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Dr. Jude Cocodia
Niger Delta University, Nigeria
Maritime Policing and Illegal Fishing in West Africa: Implications for Environmental and Human Security

Q&A at end of conference by submitting written questions via Chat only

This volume is a collection of the proceedings of the international conference "Shipping Security: Maritime Aspects off Africa," that was held as an online event due to COVID-19 on 18 February 2021 and open to a global public audience. The video recording of the webinar was made available after the event. There has been a rigorous peer-review of the presentations published in this volume. The volume has been edited by Dr. Glen Segell, Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, University of Haifa, Israel and the Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, South Africa. Contributors in addition to the Chapter from the Editor are Opening remarks by Dr. Serge Tshibangu, Special Envoy of the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo / Chairperson of the African Union, and Chapters by Rear Admiral (Retired) Hanno Teuteberg SM MMM, South African Navy, Mr. Hirotaka Mori, Japan Ship Centre, London and Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), London Office, Emeritus Professor Francois Vrey, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA) University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, Mr. Timothy Walker, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, Dr. Stephen Blackwell, Trends Research and Advisory, UAE, and Dr. Jude Cocodia, Niger Delta University, Nigeria .