


# South African Military Logistics: A View from Afar

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# A caveat . . .


- We are not logisticians.
- An academic perspective.
- An outside-in perspective.
- Strategic Studies view.
- Holistic & top-down.



"The kit's finally arrived then."

# There is no strategy without logistics . . .

## Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means




“If you only get one thing right as a leader, opt for a correct strategy before anything else ... once you have worked on the strategy, you must always base your plans on sound logistics”

• Mike Martin – How to fight a war.

# Logistics


# Strategy



“... a complex mix of physical entities, processes, and rules - a system - governed by mostly abstract concepts and principles, aimed at physically supporting military operations.”

“Logistics also fulfills a psychological function by affecting the morale of the troops. As a provider of military resources, logistics play an important role in unifying the force, preserving its motivation and strengthening the moral authority of its commanders.”

Moshe Kress



“... the purpose of logistics is quite clear:

“... to support military operations and sustain the troops who take part in it.”

1. Facilitate movement and fire;
2. Treat and evacuate casualties;
3. Deploy and position human resources;
4. Supply the troops with food and other personal needs.

- Determine the level of risk
- Intensity of ops
- The system will look after you . . .

“The science of planning and execution of the movement and maintenance of forces.”

- Research, design and development, acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposal of **material**;
- Movement, evacuation, and hospitalisation of **personnel**;
- Acquisition or erection, maintenance, operation, and disposal of **facilities**;
- Acquisition or provision of **services**.

# “How to Fight a War”

Mike Martin

Logistics means getting everything the soldier needs into his hands.

## Four critical guidelines:

1. Position your logistics **as close as possible** to the point of consumption.
2. You must be able **to predict** your consumption of logistics.
3. You must be able **to move** your logistics.
4. Make provision for the **reverse flow** of logistics.

## The three logistical options:

1. Obtain in the battlefield.
2. Carry with the troops.
3. Ship to the forces.
4. . . . Combining the options.

# The Intricacies of Power

## John Ferris


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Power = **material factors** X bureaucratic capacity X political will.

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
“Power is a concrete quality: the **resources** a state taps for strategic purposes, as against those it might, but does not.”

# Historically the SA Military role centres on . . .





# African strategic realities



## Africa as a strategic domain

- Limited, disconnected & un-maintained infrastructure.
- Challenging geography.
- Distance is a reality.
- Culture of deconstruction & vandalism.
- . . . making power projection & sustainment over distances difficult & filled with friction.

# South African strategic realities

- Peacetime neglect.
- Continental strategy; Army-based
  - Border War logistical structures.
- South Africa since 1994 from a logistics perspective
  - Systems disintegration & failure of maintenance – road/rail/air/electricity/fuel/water
  - De-industrialisation – armament production
  - Institutional erosion/degeneration – corporate memory
  - Failure in the management of strategic risk
  - No contingency planning



# The South African way of war

Go alone / or lead country

“The British regimental system, the ‘can-do’ experiences of the Boer commandoes, and the irregularity of African war

“... a high emphasis on mobility.”

“The importance of intelligence, the agile projection of power, and strategic reach.”

“... the lack of a clear operational design.”

# South Africa in Political-Military Context

- National democratic revolution, developmental state, and centralised state-driven planning & execution
- State centralisation and control
- Dogmatic retention of struggling state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) including in the defence industry
- Penetrative model of subjective civil-military relations
- Lack of a peacetime defence management mindset in a democracy?
- **Resistance to democratic and administrative reforms – still no DOD asset register – qualified audits.**
- Legacy defence concepts, force design, equipment and thinking
- Retention of a conventional paradigm
- Tension between preferences for Western vs Eastern . . .
- Ops requirements not prioritised in policy, strategy, logistics

# Facing the realities of the SANDF

## “An army marches on its stomach!”

- Institutional culture
  - Centralisation of command; approval at the highest possible level
  - Culture of distrust and indecision
  - Micro-management of non-strategic issues at military command level
  - Collective decision-making
  - Centralised logistics; it works for PTA & add a week for every 500km distance from PTA
  - Dichotomy . . . “First the horses, then the men, and then the officers”
  - **Disconnect between ops doctrine, C<sup>2</sup> and log - as to who is responsible for log.**
  - Bureaucratic ineptitude and inability to spend additional funding

# Facing the realities of the SANDF

## “An army marches on its stomach!”

- SANDF’s Deloitte & Touche reorganisation based on business model
- Dismantling of the domestic command/group system that allowed for logistical prepositioning
- System of general support bases (GSBs) – never optimised log management for the SANDF
- Eroded the generic support functions of the SANDF
- Centralised system of acquisition and procurement
  - War of the accountants; red-tape; loopholes & turnaround time in the tender procedures
- Commanders have lost control over logistics; logistics is no more a function of command
  - **Delegations of commanders** not streamlined between the Sec Def & CSANDF
- Logistics is not a priority; logisticians have no status
  - Logistics is **not a specialised mustering** anymore after the establishment of GSBs – a generic function with common posts open to any mustering

# Facing the realities of the SANDF

## “An army marches on its stomach!”

- UN, AU & multinational PSOs inhibited SANDF to hone & re-designing logistics for Exp Ops e.g. mostly relied on UN log system
- Insufficient log reserves puts pressure on acquisition
- Systematic log codification problems not addressed
- Outdated and obsolete – log vehicle fleet, basic infantry equipment, codification & containerisation

# Points for contemplation.

- Central Energy Fund: problems with SANDF fuel supply and infrastructure maintenance
- No movement on need for forward operating or log bases in Africa [e.g. Zambia]
- Opportunity – J Ops mandate to buy equipment for specific missions
- High cost of bringing back mil hardware (e.g. APCs) or losing that equipment as written off/donated
- Poor contingency planning for extraction operations in high-risk missions