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‘No less a foe than Satan himself’:
The Devil, Transition and Moral Panic in White South Africa, 1989–1993*

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There are moments in history where the imagined threat of satanism and the devil have been engendered by, and exacerbated, widespread social anxiety. This article looks at particular moments in which the ‘satanic peril’ emerged in the white South African imagination as moments of moral panic during which social boundaries were sharpened, patrolled, disputed, and renegotiated through public debate. Between 1989 and 1993, white politicians warned against the unholy trinity of ‘drugs, satanism and communism’, while white newspapers reported rumours of midnight orgies and the ritual consumption of baby flesh by secret satanic covens. From the bizarre to the macabre, the message became one of societal decay and a vulnerable youth. Moral panics betray a host of anxieties in the society, or segment of a society, in which they erupt. This article argues that the moral panic between 1989 and 1993, and the emergence of the ‘satanic peril’, betrays contextually specific anxieties surrounding the loss of power and shifts in class and cultural solidarity as white South Africa’s social and geographic borders were transformed. We seek to elucidate the cultural changes in white South Africa during this period by illuminating the social, temporal and geographic boundaries that were disputed and renegotiated through the heightened and shifting discourse on satanism. With context provided by the satanic panics of the late 1970s in South Africa, and the transnational satanism scare of the 1980s, this article concentrates on South Africa’s most virulent satanic panic, which occurred between 1989 and 1993. As this article shows, while the decade of the 1980s was marked by successive states of emergency and the deterioration of the edifice of apartheid, it began and ended with widespread alarm that Satan was making a bid for the control of white South Africa.

The Satanic Era

Satanism, devil worship, ‘Wit wolwe’ thuggery . . . this is what the children . . . are facing. And it is no use hiding our heads, ostrich-like in the sand, pretending this is ‘all just rumours’.

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As if we didn't already have enough problems in this country, we have had our attention drawn in recent times to a new one: a substantial assault on the morals of our youth emanating from no less a foe than Satan himself.\(^2\)

As apartheid died, the devil made a bid for the control of white South Africa. Amidst the uncertainty of political change, alarmist reports claimed that the children of Lucifer were on the prowl, hunting for victims to fill their ranks or lay upon their sacrificial altars. The devil wanted white children. He wanted their souls and their flesh. He wanted to take them, pervert them, and consume them. In 1989, an aged P.W. Botha, blunted by bluster and failing health, exited the political arena. While Botha's successor, Frederick Willem de Klerk, held the reputation of being a 'cautious pragmatist'\(^3\) and a political loyalty that had earned him the nickname 'Mr National Party', it was this conservative or \textit{verkrampte} politician who initiated the revision of South Africa's political and social borders in February 1990.\(^4\) With a 'New South Africa' imminent, the atmosphere was fraught with uncertainty: between 1990 and 1994, civil unrest and barely civil politicking intensified. On all sides, political hubris was aggravated by rogue elements determined to undermine negotiations or hijack the balance of power. Talks broke down repeatedly and the death toll rose drastically.\(^5\) During this period of political change, many white South Africans became fixated on an entirely different black mass.

‘An era of evil, exploited by devil worshippers’, as one newspaper reported, ‘is spreading its tentacles into every strata of society’.\(^6\) In a milieu where the only certainty was that the era of white privilege had come to an end, it became feared that the devil and his ilk were paving the way to the ‘satanic era’ in South Africa. Across the country, newspapers reported that white youths were being led ‘down the path of total destruction’.\(^7\) High on drugs and ensnared by lust, children were reportedly being bound to satanism and secrecy by shame, perverted pleasure and the promise of power.\(^8\) White children were reportedly being lured to the satanic ritual of the ‘black mass’ where they made pacts with the devil as they supped on drug-laced wine and human flesh. Under the thrall of satanic adults, these children of Lucifer purportedly scrawled blasphemous insults in human excrement and blood, summoned demons, and partook in frenzied orgies with males and females, the young and the old, animals and demons.\(^9\) Emerging in 1989, within a year fear of the ‘satanic menace’ gripped the country with reports of satanism in Cape Town, the Peninsula, Paarl, Somerset West, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban, Richards Bay, Pietermaritzburg, Pretoria, Johannesburg, Oudtshoorn, Dundee, Newcastle, as


\(^3\) Quoted in D. Welsh, \textit{The Rise and Fall of Apartheid} (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2009), p. 344.


well as several other small Karoo towns. Diabolic graffiti had been drawn, graveyards had been desecrated, children were missing, and divorce rates were increasing. Tales of blood-smeared walls and burnt excrement – ‘typical of their perversions’ – were rife, as were rumours of black-clad strangers who ‘looked like spooks’. Newspapers claimed that satanic prowlers were searching for sacrificial victims, that suspicious white cars were trailing children around school districts, and that satanists were recruiting children through drug-laced soft drinks, sweets and stickers. Reports maintained that children caught in the devil’s trap were raped and abused, placed in graves with dead bodies and forced to slaughter animals. In Cape Town, a policeman claimed to know of at least eleven white babies sacrificed to Satan – their throats slit and hearts eaten by devil worshippers. It was claimed that satanic parents laid their own children upon the altar, and that unwed mothers were enticed to hand over their new born infants. Others were adamant that the doomed infants were bred especially for the grisly satanic rituals by ‘warlocks’, and that foetuses and body parts were regularly stolen from hospitals.

Whilst bringing horrific allegations of satanic activity in South Africa to the forefront of the public imagination, anti-satanic crusaders grudgingly admitted that ‘getting hold of a real satanist proved as easy as catching the wind’. For such claims-makers the lack of evidence did not detract from the reality of satanism. Indeed, it underscored the very power of these ‘masters of deception [who] are able to disguise their activities to such an extent that no trace can be found’. To some, however, such reports spoke of little more than the


19 Gardiner and Gardiner, Satanism, p. 27.

imaginary spectres in the minds of conservative Christians and self-appointed moral watchdogs. Despite lack of proof and the repeated cautions of both police and church officials not to act on hearsay, widespread rumour facilitated the growth of hostility towards the perceived satanic menace.21 Fears were intensified by repeated allegations that white community leaders, public figures and professionals were secretly working for Satan.22 The sentiment produced was simple but widespread: satanism was ‘a putrid scar on an otherwise decent society’23 and ‘in a civilized society there is just no place for these depraved people’.24 It seemed apparent that there existed a malignant web of satanists whose sole ambition was to cripple the South African nation, and that ‘the softest target for corruption’ was the country’s white youth.25

Capping a decade of political and economic tumult in the death throes of apartheid, the period between the end of the apartheid-era and the birth of the ‘New South Africa’ was marked by widespread unrest and uncertainty. Indeed, as one columnist noted in the waning months of 1989, the notion of ‘managing change’ in South Africa had become untenable, the country was now ‘floating with chaos’.26 With apartheid soon to be in rigor mortis, but the ‘Rainbow Nation’ long in gestation, South Africa occupied a tense liminal space between 1989 and 1994. ‘The old is dying, and the new cannot be born’, wrote Antonio Gramsci, ‘in this interregnum a great deal of morbid symptoms appear’.27 This article explores one such ‘morbid symptom’ in South Africa’s transition to democracy, as fears of the devil and his minions evolved into a moral panic between 1989 and 1993. In white South African society, the horror of devil worship was systematically merged with a host of socially undesirable behaviours including drug abuse and homosexuality, but also articulated intense concern over the perception of youthful and cultural rebellion. We seek to show that the ‘satanic peril’ acted as a scapegoat, and as a vehicle of expression, this folk devil manifested underlying anxieties regarding white hegemony and cultural unity as South Africa’s political and cultural borders were transformed.

Morbid Symptoms, Moral Panic

The devil appears in a legion of guises as a social tool of castigation to police behaviour. A metaphor deployed in condemning new, and older, forms of behaviour, the devil is no stranger to South African newspapers. The 1970s and 1980s, for example, saw a variety of social phenomena equated with devilry and debated on the public platform of the press. Such phenomena included pornography, prostitution, sex shops, premarital cohabitation and homosexuality, as well as seemingly innocuous things like vegetarianism, the ‘bob’ hairstyle,
slipslops, shorts, barcodes, and the notion that women need not wear hats to church. Usually the domain of reactionaries, the watchdogs of convention, the radical ‘right’ and fundamentalists, such claims were usually dismissed by the majority of the public and officials alike. However, at particular moments public sentiment changed, and links between the devil and certain aspects of society seemed more tenable to more people. It is these moments with which this article contends: moments where Satanism emerged as a social peril, a perceived apocalyptic threat to the moral order and social stability of society.

Such moments present periods of moral panic, a social phenomenon in which social anxiety and myth-making combine to produce volatile and perhaps, as we will show, even cathartic social reactions. Coined in 1972 by Stanley Cohen, a young sociologist and South African expatriate, moral panic is a popular – if sometimes loosely applied – concept for a particular social phenomenon. The opening paragraph of Cohen’s *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers* (1972) provides the most useful definition of the phenomenon, and remains the cornerstone of moral panic analysis:

Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylised and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible.

Concerned with the identification, categorisation, and castigation of a folk devil, moral panics are volatile social reactions to a perceived threat. From the retrospectively ‘trivial’ and absurd moments with which this article contends: moments where Satanism emerged as a social peril, the folk devil becomes a separate entity to the objective problem – a perceived apocalyptic threat to the moral order and social stability of society.


31 Thompson, *Moral Panics*, p. 4. As Goode and Ben-Yehuda have noted ‘[a]ll moral panics, by their very nature, identify, denounce, and attempt to root out folk devils’, Goode and Ben-Yehuda, *Moral Panics*, p. 29. It is important to note that moral panics often centre on retrospectively ‘trivial’ matters, but have also arisen around problems like child abuse and paedophilia. These fears are not necessarily irrational or irrelevant, rather the discourse and response during a period of moral panic are perceptibly distorted and disproportionate.

32 Sociologist Howard Becker coined the term ‘moral entrepreneur’ in describing those individuals or groups who seek to provide a society of certain moral codes or rules. Becker elaborated the term ‘moral entrepreneur’ in a
chain of social interaction’, Cohen also noted that ‘successful moral panics owe their appeal to their ability to find points of resonance with wider anxieties’ and it is precisely in this resonance that the moral panic holds analytical value. 33

Essentially concerned with the malleable and shifting discursive definition of a social problem, moral panic scholarship is concomitantly broad – the phenomenon itself not limited to any particular geographic, temporal or cultural context. In African studies the concept has been used, and the phenomenon studied, in topics ranging from social reactions to HIV/AIDS and the politicisation of sexual violence, 34 to grassroots responses to changes in cultural and political hierarchies in Malawi and South Africa. 35 Not limited to any racial context or historical period, moral panics have been explored in work on the emergence of the ‘black peril’ in white South Africa during the nineteenth and twentieth century, 36 while Niehaus, for example, has studied moral panics on the contemporary plains of the South African lowveld as an expression of discontent in black African masculine identity. 37

While neither moral panic, satanic panic, nor satanism are limited by a racial line, this article looks at the emergence of a moral panic in which the ‘satanic peril’ was articulated as a threat particular to white South African society. It is important to note that while these allegations were not always unfounded, they were distorted and driven by rumour that effectively bound a variety of threats and fears into the satanic folk devil. There is a dislocation between the folk devil of the moral panic and the objective dimension of the threat, and also between the portrayal of white youthful rebellion and actual forms of rebellion at the time. While the discursive boundaries of this moral panic were at times porous, there were distinctive lines: articulated, shaped and disseminated by white moral guardians and white newspapers, in this instance the ‘satanic panic’ was largely confined to white Afrikaans and English society. 38

Certainly, there were moments when tales of ‘muti’ entered the discourse – particularly in allegations that satanists were supplying African ‘witchdoctors’ with human and animal

Footnote 32 continued


38 The racial lines of the moral panic are explored further at a later stage in this paper. The ‘satanic peril’ was articulated by English and Afrikaans newspapers and moral entrepreneurs and presented Satanism as a threat to all white society. It was only in the condemnation of the ‘New Age’, explored briefly in this paper, that there was a strong discrepancy between English and Afrikaans interests: warnings of the ‘New Age’ threat found predominantly in Afrikaans newspapers, magazines and churches.
body parts. However, such allegations and, indeed, black African ‘witchcraft’ were relatively peripheral to the focus of the moral entrepreneurs and interest groups who shaped the satanic moral panic of 1989–1993. While this silence, or silencing, of other expressions of ‘occult’ fear in South Africa is an interesting question in itself, this article concentrates on the satanic moral panic. This satanic panic was, as this article will show, a powerful expression of ideological discontent during the country’s transition to democracy. However, it was neither the first nor the last satanic panic, nor was it the only manifestation of uncertainty during the interregnum — the transition mired in kidnap panics, rumour panics, and witch hunts throughout South Africa. This satanic moral panic occurred within a broader context; emerging from a decade of social change in South Africa during the 1980s, and within the climate of a broader, transnational satanism scare, offering an interesting intersection between the local and global.

The Satanic Menace, 1978–1988

By the time the political tide turned in February 1990, white South Africans were anxiously aware that the status quo could not continue. The country needed, as de Klerk asserted, ‘to escape from a corner where everything had stagnated in confrontation’. Policing the geographic and social boundaries of the apartheid state had become increasingly costly to both the economy and morale of white South Africa. Battles were pitched both within and beyond these borders: international sanctions intensified, the ‘people’s war’ against apartheid escalated, and the fissures in the edifice of Afrikaner nationalism widened as the decade of the 1980s progressed. Although the ‘seizure of power’ desired by black resistance was prevented by the state’s security forces, the grip of the ruling National Party became increasingly tenuous as it bled support to the political left and right. By the end of the decade, bastions of Afrikaner nationalism like the Dutch Reformed Church had split with apartheid ideology, a younger generation of white Afrikaners had begun to condemn apartheid’s ‘Afrikanerdom’, while the verkrampte Conservative Party had gained the support of nearly half the Afrikaner constituency. By 1989, as O’Meara has noted, ‘a powerful sense of déjà vu hung over white politics’: like his predecessor B.J. Vorster, an aged and embittered P.W. Botha had lost the support of his party and was foisted from the presidency following a stroke. This déjà vu extended beyond the political arena, however, as Botha’s term in office had begun and then ended with a satanic panic.

41 Such rumour panics included the widespread alarm among black South Africans that disgruntled white farmers had injected all citrus fruit with HIV/AIDS. See A. Goldstuck, Ink in the Porridge: Urban Legends of the South African Elections (London, Penguin, 1994).
43 Quoted in Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century, p. 274.
46 O’Meara, Forty Lost Years, p. 380.
Just two weeks after Botha’s election to premiership in 1978, South Africa’s newspapers turned their attention to the issue of devil worship. It was a society bedevilled by a newfound pessimism over the morality of apartheid and the direction of its government in the wake of the 1976 Soweto Uprisings, political scandals, and international criticism. Some sought causal explanations in religion and mounting concern over the apparent burgeoning of satanism. Sparked by a leaked report by the Dutch Reformed Church, this satanic panic evolved around the fear that ‘black mass’ ceremonies were being conducted across the country. Portable satanic temples comprised of black draped altars and candles were allegedly being erected in derelict parking garages. At these sites, dark satanic rituals purportedly made use of male and female prostitutes to evoke the devil who soon appeared as the buddha sitting serene in the lotus position.47 Rumour and report conflated, concern increased and the perception of satanism distorted. Despite official claims by police that investigations had revealed no evidence of any organised satanic activity in South Africa whatsoever, unsubstantiated figures reported in the press continued to increase dramatically.48 Figures — supplied at first by church reports, then by lone theologians, and then public letters to the editor — grew from an estimated 40,000 satanists in 1978 to 100,000 in 1979, and 250,000 by 1982.49

Converging apprehension about the influence of materialism, eastern mysticism and ‘Americanised’ popular culture on white youth, satanic deviants were allegedly corrupted by drugs, modern art, modern music and modern dancing. The appellation of ‘devil worship’ was attached to a number of activities that were becoming increasingly popular including pop music, karate and yoga. Eastern religions, scientology and new branches of christianity were also conflated with devil worship — a threat decried as determined to punish good white South Africans with financial difficulties, divorce and heart attacks.50 While political right-wing organisations like the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) gained a surer footing as white unemployment skyrocketed in the early 1980s, increasing from 6,000 to 32,000 between 1981 and 1985, the cultural right-wing gained an attentive audience during the moral panic between 1978 and 1982. Self-described ‘movements’ like the Action Moral Standards took the opportunity to decry all foreign popular culture,51 while the National Party used the trope of the devil to condemn the ‘white devils’ who sought to undermine the government.52

Although this satanic panic faded by 1982, several elements persisted throughout the 1980s and fed into the moral panic that arose between 1989 and 1993. Intertwined with the rhetoric of ‘total onslaught’ and the polymorphous threat of communism, alarmist reports constructed the ‘satanic peril’ as a ‘moral onslaught’ that permeated foreign and modern


48 The state had concluded in 1976 that no evidence had been found to corroborate assertions that Satanism was becoming organised or widespread. Noted in ‘Kerk, Staat Verskil Oor Satanisme’, Die Burger, 13 August 1979, p. 5; ‘SA Duiwel Aanbidding Gespaar?’, Die Burger, 18 August 1979, p. 8 and ‘Dis Vet Op Satan Se Vuur’, Rapport, 19 August 1979, p. 15.


culture. The link between pop music, homosexuality, ‘eastern mysticism and Satanism’ persisted throughout the 1980s.\(^53\) Echoing conservative concerns over the ‘countercultural’ influences of popular culture from abroad, in 1987 the report of the President’s Council, a sixty-member advisory committee, sounded alarm over the moral well-being of the youth. The report advocated the need for stricter censorship to halt the apparent increase of ‘social deviation’ exemplified – but not limited to – homosexuality and premarital cohabitation.\(^54\) Although no widespread moral panic occurred in South Africa until 1989, concern regarding the influences on, and future of, the white South African youth increased towards the end of the decade. A survey conducted in 1990, for example, showed that white attitudes towards the decade. A survey conducted in 1990, for example, showed that white attitudes towards homosexuality and premarital cohabitation.\(^55\) and in 1991, nearly a thousand churchmen gathered behind a document that warned of the ‘catastrophic consequences’ that would result from allowing the degeneration of morality in white South Africa to continue unchecked. High divorce rates, homosexuality, as well as uncensored violence on South African television were denoted as ‘factors promoting the general decay of the moral fibre of our society’.\(^56\) While these concerns were at the forefront of the satanic moral panic between 1989 and 1993, neither Satanism nor the moral qualms were entirely unique to the panic or South Africa.

Indeed, while South Africa witnessed no widespread satanic panic during the 1980s, this was not the case abroad. For millions of people the 1980s belonged to the devil as satanic panics spread across the global West, erupting in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s and early 1990s.\(^57\) These panics shared a fear that a hidden cult of devil worshippers was kidnapping innocent children who they tortured, sexually abused, sacrificed and literally consumed in cannibalistic satanic rituals.\(^58\) Largely centred on issues of child abuse and paedophilia, these panics saw the conceptualisation and policing of a new type of crime under the term ‘satanic ritual abuse’. While legal frameworks were adapted to accommodate the testimony of children as young as three years old, allegations of ‘satanic ritual abuse’ caused a modern witch hunt with draconian sentencing.\(^59\) In the United States, the ‘Bakersfield Seven’

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were sentenced to a total of 2619 years in prison on allegations of child abuse and conspiracy, a sentence later repealed when gross prosecutorial misconduct was uncovered and several of the children recanted their testimonies. Of the twelve thousand allegations of ritual abuse in the United States, none could be substantiated, and in 1995 over fifty-nine people were still incarcerated or had died in prison on allegations of satanic ritual abuse.

Breaking out in 1989, the satanic panic in South Africa echoed trends abroad in that it engendered an intensely violent and destructive fear-narrative of satanism. However, while fear of the black mass was a common thread across both geographic and, indeed, temporal boundaries, the satanic moral panic in South Africa manifested localised concerns. White South Africa never experienced a satanism scare of the same ilk as affected Europe and the United States wherein ‘satanic ritual abuse’ was the central concern. The term ‘satanic ritual abuse’ gained no currency in South Africa. Although local reports of satanic ritual abuse appeared in South African newspapers as early as 1986, they failed to grip the public imagination. The pertinent fear of children at risk was mobilised in different ways: the image of children, like that of satanists, occupied a dual position as both vulnerable and threatening, victim and perpetrator. This underscores a significant aspect of moral panics in general – they are not cohesive events. They foster a space in which a number of arguments converge and diverge in feeding off a fear-narrative in a period of social change. While the moral panic over satanism in the 1989–1993 period fed off a wider transnational satanism scare and shared the concern over the vulnerability of children, these global concerns assumed a vernacular cast and were shaped by the specific cultural and political changes in white South Africa.


Sensational and macabre, reports of the devil and his children entered widespread circulation in 1989. Over the next four years, waves of reports gravitated around similar elements of dark debauchery and sinful sedition across white South Africa. Satanic conscripts in the South African Defence Force had been caught ‘committing obscene acts’, whilst a gang of drug-addicted teenage delinquents prone to spray-painting satanic graffiti (including a picture of the grim reaper) had reportedly named themselves the Kids in Satan’s Service (KISS). Dark rituals and perverse sexual orgies were rumoured to have occurred on beaches and in graveyards, attended by children and adults chained to the cult by drug addiction, fear, and blackmail. Satanists had reportedly threatened investigators and church officials with
‘coded letters’ of ‘filth’, the word ‘hell’ had been scratched into a churchgoer’s car, and a
confused teenager had been found with a revolver of which they had no memory. Tales
became increasingly obscene as time passed: human sacrifice was common, cannibalism was
rife, blood writ curses had been cast, and demons had been summoned. The devil demanded
absolute subservience from his followers: one sect allegedly required that its members be
homosexual, a Cape Town cell made regular use of a male teenage prostitute for anal sex,
while another directed its attentions towards the desecration of churches. All satanists busied
themselves ‘preying on children’, as one outspoken police officer insisted that ‘satanists
don’t play golf on a Saturday. They kill children’. By the turn of the decade satanism was
declared the ‘crime of the 1990s’ and was believed to have an intricate network of satanic
cells hidden behind the ‘fanatical cover of secrecy’. Self-confessed satanists, albeit from
behind the cover of anonymity, stroked the curiosity of the press with tales of grisly rituals,
coffin fetishes and blood drinking, which served to accentuate the dangers of the satanic cult
and its members. As one such satanist admitted, ‘I have eaten the heart of a Christian many
times – it’s like eating lamb. It gives us the power of the ultimate desecration’. Articulated
in terms of perversion and anarchy, satanism was allegedly ‘spreading like a cancerous fire
through our country’. Most vulnerable of all were South Africa’s white youth and the first
sign of the devil’s grip was youthful rebellion.

Indeed, the rumours of drug-doused parties that dominated earlier reports of devil worship
aroused debate over music and television as ‘tools of the devil’ rather than the reality of

Footnote 66 continued

1992, p. 3; ‘Oud-Satanis Vertel van Mensoffers’, Die Burger, 18 September 1992, p. 3 and ‘Ek Was in Geheim

67 ‘News of Satanists Pours into Police Files’, Weekend Post, 12 August 1989, p. 8 and ‘Satanic Worship in SA

68 See, for example: ‘Kinders Dalk Vermis Deur Satanisme’, Oosterlig, 27 July 1989, p. 1; ‘Is Gonubie SA’s
Veil on Satanism in PE’, Weekend Post, 5 August 1989, p. 1 and ‘Satan Cult Not To Be Scoffed At, Say Clergy’,
Eastern Province Herald, 7 August 1989, p. 3.

69 ‘Child and Animal Killings Alleged in Bizarre Rituals’, Weekend Argus, 19 May 1990, p. 15. See, for example,
Transvaler, 22 September 1992; ‘Homoseksuele Sataniste Glo in Bfn Bedrywig’, Die Volksblad, 23 September
1992, p. 9. Also see N. Goldman and K. Jonker, Youth and Satanism Exposed (Port Elizabeth, Lion Life, 1990);


71 Made with reference to satanism in the United States as well as in South Africa. ‘It’s the Crime of the ’90s–


remain anonymous but relished the media attention, although their tales did not admit to crimes of murder and
rape. See, for example, ‘Lucifer Behoorlik die Duiwel In’, Rapport, 21 May 1989, p. 10; ‘Exorcism of a

Oosterlig, 21 March 1990, p. 5. A series of articles appeared in Servamus, the official magazine of the South
African Police, including Die G(g)od Wat Jy Dien’, Servamus, June 1991, pp. 13 and 29; ‘Roepstem Uit Die
Hel…’, Servamus, July 1991, pp. 14–15; ‘So Offer Ek My Lewe…’, Servamus, August 1991, p. 46 and

75 See, for example, ‘Movement to Christ Stronger – Pastor’, Eastern Province Herald, 3 August 1989, p. 6;
‘Satan Worship: Focus Falls on Rock Music’, Weekend Post, 5 August 1989, p. 4; ‘Tiener in Greep van
Satanisme’, Oosterlig, 7 August 1989, p. 1; ‘Kommere oor Kinders en Satanisme’, Die Transvaler, 18 August
1989, p. 2; ‘Demone het Haar Beheer, Vertel Meisie’, Oosterlig, 25 August 1989, p. 1; ‘Teenager Warns of
Weekend Post, 26 August 1989, p. 9; and ‘Pastor’s Horror Claim of Satanism in Natal’, The Daily News, 28
October 1989, p. 4.
satanic worship itself.76 Satan’s influence was perceived as festering in the materialism of modern South Africa and disseminated by popular culture.77 Symbolised as much by the rainbow and the yin-yang symbol as by the pentagram and even the swastika, the ‘partially satanic’ New Age was quickly denoted as the devil’s familiar, imbuing popular culture. Indeed, several companies fell under the suspicion of these moral watchdogs, including Volkskas bank and the South African Broadcasting Corporation, whose logos were found to smack of satanic ‘New Age’ influences.78 Alleged purveyors of the ‘anti-Christ’ included the Star Wars movies and Steven Spielberg’s ET (1982), as well as popular children’s television shows like The Smurfs, The Care Bears and Rainbow Bright.79 Some church officials went so far as to declare that ‘witches’ and ‘Satan’s forces’ had created these television programmes as part of the ‘massive onslaught’ on white society.80 By late 1989, the popular culture enjoyed by South Africa’s white youth had come under heavy scrutiny: church ministers played Voëlvry records backwards on the premise that they were encoded with satanic messages,81 the South African Broadcasting Corporation removed Rainbow Bright from its schedule,82 and a science fiction society at Stellenbosch University was branded guilty of ‘dabbling in the occult’.83

Concern over a dissident youth and deviant elements of popular culture merged in the trope of the ‘satanic dabbler’: the naïve teenager teetering on the edge of the dangerous occult. These ‘dabblers’ tended to have posters of rock stars in their rooms, blaspheme with reckless abandon, have an obsession with the colour black, dye their hair, and were allegedly compelled to lose their virginity after watching occult films like The Exorcist (1973).84 By 1993, concern over ‘satanic dabblers’ – or ‘CNA satanists’ – had led to the condemnation of black clothing, Dungeons and Dragons, and Stephen King novels.85 However, even by 1990, popular culture


77 Such sentiments also expressed a wariness of English permissiveness and materialism, with reports noting that ‘yuppie’ school children were most involved. See, for example “Sommige kinders meer ure voor TV as in die skool”, Oosterlig, 30 August 1990, p. 3; ‘How to Tell if your Child is a Satanist’, Weekend Post, 20 April 1991, p. 11. Also see, for example, “Glassy-glassy” Hooks Two PE Schoolgirls to Satanism, Eastern Province Herald, 7 August 1990, p. 3; ‘Satanism Evident in EL House’, Daily Dispatch, 10 August 1989, p. 1; and ‘Seun Beland in Hospital na Lesing oor Satanisme’, Tempo, 27 October 1989, p. 1.

78 ‘New Age: Or is it as Old as Man?’, Cross Times, January 1990, p. 11. Also see, ‘Teachings of New Cult “are anti-Christian”’, The Sunday Star, 8 October 1989, p. 4.


82 ‘New Age: Or is it as Old as Man?’, Cross Times, January 1990, p. 11.


was literally undergoing a trial-by-fire. In the Eastern Cape, for example, a child plagued by nightmares was cured when his minister burned his possessed toys. A more public trial was undertaken in 1990, with the planned burning of the ‘un-Christian, un-Godly, demonic’ Ninja Turtle toys in the small, seaside town of Hermanus. Decreed as ‘Satan’s turtles’, the public bonfire was explained as an initiative to ‘keep South Africa clean’. The attempt failed, however, when the local municipality stepped in at the last moment and insisted that a permit was required. The offending toys were buried in cement a few days later.

Meanwhile, the long castigated elements of ‘eastern mysticism and satanism’ in foreign rock music were located in the homespun music of the Afrikaans Voe¨lvry movement. Overtly anti-apartheid and anti-establishment, the Voe¨lvry tour – whose headline act was the Gereformeerde Blues Band – was besmirched by several members of the Dutch Reformed Church as disseminating ‘satanic and anti-christian messages’. Inserting Voe¨lvry into the ‘musical onslaught of evil’ initiated by the Beatles and Pink Floyd, an article in Die Kerkbode, the mouthpiece of the Dutch Reformed Church, condemned the alternative Afrikaans music as shamelessly attacking ‘the religion and constitutional values as given in the word of God’. Indeed, one particularly adamant dominee, Jannie Malan insisted that the Voe¨lvry records had been coded with insidious ‘satanic messages’ – one needed only play the record backwards. In the months that followed churchmen and record producers, as well as more self-consciously ‘alternative’ youth, huddled around record players in an attempt to hear the ‘devil inspired messages’. Charged with ‘blasphemy and undermining the youth of the country’, Voe¨lvry had already been banned from the campuses of several Afrikaans Universities, including Potchefstroom and Stellenbosch. Voe¨lvry tour manager and former journalist, Cathy Winter, noted that such official displeasure had actually fuelled the popularity of their concerts. However, the record company took particular umbrage to Malan’s assertions and pursued a highly publicised lawsuit against the church moderator and Die Kerkbode in 1989, demanding that Malan prove his claims or apologise. Malan did neither, but by September 1991 the case had been dropped.

Malan was also embroiled in protests against the planting of two ‘peace poles’ in South African soil. Inscribed with the words ‘may peace prevail’, thousands of ‘peace poles’ had...
been erected in countries across the world by the World Peace Through Prayer organisation. Deciphered as ‘demonic’ obelisks, which sought to revive Babylonian sun worship, over a thousand Christians, armed with prayer and gospel songs, marched against the ‘peace poles’ in Cape Town. While petitions and lobbies damned the poles as containing ‘the spirit of the anti-Christ’ and carrying ‘the seed of complete anarchy’, some New Agers reportedly received death threats and another’s dog was killed. Despite public rebuke by notables, including Archbishop Desmond Tutu, frustrated Christians hacked the poles down while the Conservative Party took the opportunity to lambaste the National Party for allowing such operations by ‘satanic sects’. Amplifying the general anxiety regarding the moral resolve of white youth, a key concern revolved around the type of social environment that was allowing satanism to flourish. Pornography, paedophilia, drug addiction and venereal diseases were linked to satanism, as were abortion, homosexuality, rock music and television. Already occupying the liminal space between the innocence of childhood and the culpability of adulthood, teenagers were perceived as particularly vulnerable to corruption. While children from broken homes were deemed especially vulnerable to satanic influences, it was those children prone to rebellion who were at particular risk from this social threat. For example, the head of the Police Child Protection Unit in Cape Town, Leonard Solms, claimed that it was children who played the ‘anarchy’ game that were the easiest targets for satanists. Children embedded in Satan’s web were allegedly drugged, sexually assaulted and forced to take part in devilish rituals that included sodomy, bestiality and cannibalism. Speaking out against satanism in the country, the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok deemed it ‘a crime against mankind’. Indeed, Vlok continued, ‘[o]nce someone is entangled in this horrible web of agony, fear and violence, there is no escape’. Corrupted and perverted, rebellious satanic children were themselves victims of satanism. Indeed, ‘beautiful girls become pale, their eyes are sunken and they become filled with hate’. However, ‘[w]hat is deeply disturbing’, one reverend noted, ‘are the number of unscrupulous people who prey on the young and ritually abuse them’. Hostility towards satanism thus gravitated around the image of vulnerable and corrupted children who now posed a threat to the health of white society, and the manipulative satanic adults who perverted society’s children and morality. Indeed, according to reports, it was the adult high priest who led the sacrificial rituals, who slit the throats of squalling white babies, who blackmailed young members, and who knelt upon bended knee to pray for the downfall of society.


100 ‘New Age or is it as Old as Man?’, Cross Times, January 1990, p. 11.


106 Quoted in ‘How to Tell if Your Child is a Satanist’, Weekend Post, 20 April 1991, p. 11.

of South Africa. Furthermore, these adults allegedly occupied positions of power and influence. As the oft-quoted claim of one anonymous satanist read: '[m]y high priest is a man of standing and is known countrywide. If his identity was revealed it would shock the whole country. People from all professions – doctors, lawyers, teachers and housewives – are satanists'. Consequently, increasingly alarmed calls were made for the government to outlaw devil worship and tear away the 'sinister veil of secrecy'. Such hostility became increasingly urgent as tales of the devil's minions claimed that 'schoolchildren have become the main target for satanists who use various tactics to draw them into their net of evil'. As a result of demands that that 'this evil must be rooted out at any cost', in June 1990 an official police investigation was launched into the 'diabolical phenomenon'.

Various organisations, societies, public figures and self-proclaimed experts responded to, and shaped, this growing fear and hostility towards the satanic menace. In 1989, several organisations across South Africa, including the Transvaal Afrikaans Parents Association and the Concerned Christian Women in the Eastern Cape, became convinced that satanism was rife in schools across the country – and the press followed suit. Indeed, by August that year, the Minister of Education and Culture, P.J. Clase, was prompted to reaffirm the department's determination to protect children from 'anti-Christian behaviour' and instil sound moral values in young people. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Health and Welfare Minister, C. J. April, when he asserted that decadent values and sick sexual practices in South African society were undermining the development of the youth. Likewise, Rina Venter, the Minister of National Health, noted that the ascendance of satanism was a cause of 'grave concern' and closely associated with the problems of drug and alcohol abuse among teenagers. In response to widespread public concern, the Department of Education launched an official investigation into the issues facing white South Africa's youth, and the extent to which the occult had infiltrated children's literature. A number of societies also evolved to tackle the emergent social problem of satanism, including the Concerned

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110 ‘Satanism is a Reality to be Confronted’, *Evening Post*, 22 May 1990, p. 2.


112 ‘Move to Probe Satanism is a Welcome Step’, *Evening Post*, 14 June 1990, p. 2.


118 See Administration: House of Assembly, *Care For Our Youth 2000* (Pretoria, Department of Education and Culture, c.1990); Administration: House of Assembly, *Satanism and Occultism: Section 1 – Guide for Principals and Teachers* (Pretoria, Transvaal Education Department, 1992); Administration: House of
Christians Against Satanism, Folks Against Drug Abuse and the Parents of Rebellious Children Support Group.\textsuperscript{119} As the latter asserted, satanism ‘is often regarded as a closet problem by parents enduring great anguish and heartache; there is no question that thousands are in a state of great trauma’.\textsuperscript{120} However, reports of satanic activities, indeed conspiracies, were dismissed as ‘pure speculation’ by official police investigations, which could yield nothing to substantiate claims of devil worship in the country.\textsuperscript{121} Likewise, an academic symposium on the subject noted that ‘on the available evidence, as opposed to hysteria, the current wave of concern with satanism among certain schools and churches is out of all proportion to the problem’\textsuperscript{122}.

Fear and hostility towards satanism climaxed, but did not dissipate, in 1991 with what was soon dubbed a case of ‘national hysteria’. As rumours and reports continued to circulate, hundreds of South African parents were moved to almost hysterical concern in the days leading up to the end of April 1991 in a countrywide ‘kidnap panic’. Newspapers reported that satanism was a predominantly white problem.\textsuperscript{123} Indeed, when the issue emerged in newspapers with a largely black African readership, satanism was described as imported to the townships by white students.\textsuperscript{124} However, during the ‘kidnap panic’ of 1991, racial lines limited neither the rumours nor the fear – some evidence of anxiety emerged in Indian and coloured areas – while staying predominantly white.\textsuperscript{125} Newspaper reports and allegations by ‘cult cops’ and anti-satanist crusaders were adamant that white satanists were hunting for children to sacrifice on the dark ‘satanic holiday’ of Walpurgis Night.\textsuperscript{126} Concern was amplified by widespread rumour: children were purportedly receiving phone calls from strangers who invited them to deserted areas, a suspicious white minivan had been spotted trolling the streets of various residential areas and school districts, and children had reportedly been disappearing.\textsuperscript{127}

In Port Elizabeth, a pupil of Malabar Primary School claimed to have been chased by a white minivan with the words ‘happy birthday children’ printed on the side, as did two teenage girls from the white suburb of Forest Hill. A similar story was told by a Gelvandale student, who reported that he had been lured to the birthday-bus by a white man and woman who then tried to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[118] Continued
\item[125] The precise demographics of the panic are unclear: Malabar and Gelvandale Primary Schools were situated in predominantly Indian and coloured areas, while Forest Hill and Bellville were predominantly white areas. With regards to the term ‘Coloured’: we accept that this term is controversial and has a history of its own. See for discussion, M. Adhikari, \textit{Not White Enough, Not Black Enough: Racial Identity in the South African Coloured Communities} (Athens, Ohio University Press, 2005).
\item[126] Walpurgis Night (Walpurgisnacht), also known as the Witches Sabbath or the Satanic New Year, is believed to be a special night for witches on 30 April (the eve of May) on which they gather to dance, perform rituals, and have orgiastic sex.
\item[127] ‘Fears of Satanism Keep Children Away from School’, \textit{The Star}, 1 May 1991, p. 5.
\end{footnotes}
abduct him. He explained that his school shirt had been torn when he managed to fight off his abductors, during which he also knocked the wig off the woman’s head to reveal a man in drag. Such stories also circulated in the Cape Town area. With rumoured sightings of a white ‘bakkie’ and black car trailing children around the Bellville area running rife, a number of parents requested that sport and after school activities be cancelled over the ‘satanic holiday’. By the end of April, police departments, newspaper offices, and school principals were inundated with phone calls seeking reassurance or confirmation of rumours, as well as purported sightings of satanists kidnapping and abusing children at local malls. Heightened concern and anxiety became hysteria. In northern Port Elizabeth, parents – armed with knives and grim determination – stormed school halls and removed their children from their classrooms. In several areas, coalitions of parents and plainclothes police officers patrolled the streets, vigilant for any sign of suspicious behaviour. Several schools in the Western Cape kept students locked safely behind school gates and, like schools in East London, advised children to travel in large groups. Throughout the country schools reported exceptionally low attendance rates with hundreds of children kept at home.

April ended, the first day of May passed and a ‘bemused calm’ replaced the anxiety. Warnings from individual police and state officials grew silent. Action from the police headquarters in Pretoria had been quick: a ‘gag order’ placed on police officers that had been speaking to the press and exacerbating concern over alleged satanic activities. Police spokesmen categorically stated that no evidence had been found to substantiate the claims of abduction and satanic activity. Indeed, the Gelvandale kidnapping proved particularly fallacious when it was discovered that the boy had torn his shirt stealing guavas from a nearby neighbourhood. As such, it was with some sober retrospect that newspapers could report only a curious incident of national hysteria in South Africa.

‘The Hound of God’: The Devil and the Detective

Allegations of the children of Lucifer continued to flourish in newspapers across South Africa, although they were momentarily stilled by the gagging of outspoken ‘cult cops’ Leonard Solms in Cape Town and Kobus Jonker in the Eastern Cape. In the face of this ‘gag order’, Solms nonchalantly rebutted that he would continue his investigation in his spare time where ‘no-one can point a finger at me’. However, while the gagging eclipsed the figure of Solms (earmarking him as little more than a satanist ‘fundi’), it marked the ascendance of Jonker’s career as ‘God’s detective’. Several months after the anti-

climactic Walpurgis Night of 1991, Jonker and his officers finally found some evidence of Satanism in South Africa, albeit in the form of teenage satanic dabblers, a few condoms and a marijuana pipe. 139 More substantial proof came just a few months later when the ‘initiation headquarters of the Satanist movement in the Eastern Cape’ were found in the undercarriage of the Van Staden’s bridge near Port Elizabeth. 140 Such publicised successes together with on-going concern over satanism eventually led to the creation of the Occult Related Crimes Unit in the South African Police force, necessitating Jonker’s move from the Eastern Cape to Pretoria where he headed the small unit. From here, Jonker enjoyed a government-sanctioned platform from which to launch an awareness campaign involving public talks, educational seminars at schools, and the distribution of pamphlets regarding the dangers of satanism. 141

Apprehension over the devil’s purchase on white South Africa’s morality and children gradually subsided towards the end of 1993. In the miasma of public scrutiny for all signs of the devil, several companies treaded carefully: the Shell petrol company removed ‘glider balls’ from their shelves when the promotional toy eyeball was deemed too satanic for children, while broadcasters were forced to monitor programmes for ‘satanic’ symbols like the yin-yang sign. 142 Meanwhile, echoes of the same alarm over satanism among school children continued to reverberate around the country, particularly in the Cape and the Transvaal, 143 while another Afrikaner music group was slammed for being lascivious and satanic. 144 Having erupted in 1989, by the end of 1993 satanic-related panic had receded. Although the church and moral entrepreneurs would continue to fight the devil and his influences, they did so with considerably less attention from the South African public, the media and the state.


The Unholy Trinity: Interpreting the Moral Panic, 1989–1993

Marking a period of moral panic in white South Africa between 1989 and 1993 the devil accrued a considerable amount of public attention and concern. Although regularly disputed and denied, distorted and exaggerated tales of the devil’s influence in South Africa caused considerable agitation and debate that resulted in the creation of several societies, reports, protests and eventually a specialised police task force. Occurring in waves of reports and rumour, this moral panic engendered a powerful folk devil in the threat of the white satanist. A polymorphous figure, the satanic deviant straddled the image of the teenager trapped in drug addiction and sexual perversion, the vulnerable child twisted as much by the influences of popular culture as the satanic predator, and the satanic adult who silently directed the diabolic movement. This folk devil subsumed a large portion of the blame for the shifting cultural terrain in drawing attention to immediate social problems like drug abuse, divorce and suicide. After all, in addition to undermining law and order in general, satanists reportedly prayed for the financial ruin and breakdown of marriages of white South Africans. Here, journalist Arthur Goldstuck made an important point, albeit with some hindsight, when he noted that ‘backed by the flimsiest of evidence, the police and the media have transformed satanists from a fringe group of occult dabblers and sexual perverts into a powerful threat to the white way of life’. This ‘powerful threat’ reflected more than overt and tangible changes in youth culture and family structure. The image of children at risk also acted on a symbolic level, amplifying the deviance of the ‘satanic threat’ and the danger posed to society. Heterogeneous and uneven, the moral panic explored in this paper articulated a myriad of concerns regarding the current and future health of white society and broadly reflected changes in the arena of political rhetoric.

Articulated in terms of a rebellious but fragile white South African youth, this moral panic manifested deeper concerns relating to the power and future of the country’s white society. Ascending with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the characteristics of the dying threat of communism shifted onto the threat of the New Age and devil worship. Indeed, calls to ban satanism in South Africa were couched in terms of ‘destructive freedom’ and coincided with the legalisation of both communism and the African National Congress. In June 1990, the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, successfully merged such circulating fears when he asserted that the unholy trinity of drugs, satanism and communism threatened South Africa’s white youth – the precious ‘building blocks of the new South Africa’. Here Vlok also typified some of the contradictions of the arena of daily politicking during South Africa’s political transition. In reassuring the public that the government did not condone satanism


147 A. Goldstuck, ‘Satanic Vices are Hot Stuff for Media’, Weekly Mail, 1 October 1992, p. 11.


even though it was legal, Vlok noted ‘[t]oday there is the false perception by some people that the Government now condones communism in South Africa, because it is no longer banned’.  

Echoing the rhetoric around the alleged ‘Third Force’, a secret force of right-wing whites attempting to sabotage negotiations and which threatened to plunge South Africa into bloody civil war, as well as verkrampte claims that the National Party had betrayed its people, the satanic menace had allegedly infiltrated positions of power in South Africa. Amid calls for the government to take action, one newspaper noted ‘[i]t is time the issue was given attention at top level. The sinister veil of secrecy over the movement’s activities must formally be lifted and its ringleaders exposed, especially if – as has been claimed – there are among them people in key positions in our community’. Underscoring this widespread uncertainty was the fact that these allegations went relatively unchallenged. This marked a notable difference from the moral panic of a decade earlier. In 1982, a Paarl clergyman chose to repeat to his congregation the rumour that members of the National Party might be satanists. His comment was met with a tirade of indignation, eventually receiving rebuke on a national scale and forcing the clergyman to make an official apology. In defending his comment as a reaction to whispers among his congregation, the clergyman asserted that ‘when our own people start spreading stories such as this, then it is time to take stock’. The same rumours were widespread but went uncontested in the moral panic between 1989 and 1993, and were even corroborated in similar statements made by public officials, including those of Vlok. Such claims were also made about the South African Defence Force, the mainstay of white South African masculine strength, and more specifically the visible power of the white government. As tales of satanism infiltrating schools spread, so did rumours of devil worship in the military. Fears that servicemen were participating in such devilish behaviour were sparked in 1988 with reports of animal cruelty in the South African Defence Force camps, and again in 1989. Such fears underwent the same amplification as those about the devilish behaviour among a rebellious, but vulnerable youth, and by mid-1991 it was reported that ‘national servicemen have become unashamed about satanism and actively try to recruit members’.

Essentially, sites of white hegemony were portrayed as vulnerable to deviant influences, but also as perpetuating and disseminating these detrimental practices. More specifically, the segments charged with protecting and maintaining white South African values had been inverted – now facilitating the secretive cult of satanists whose mission was to subvert and destroy society. Reflecting this widespread, implicit loss of confidence in the South African state, tales of child sacrifice in themselves symbolically articulated feelings of uncertainty in white South Africa. White children, the very future of white South African society, were

152 Verkrampte means right-wing.
153 Explicit allegations against the National Party arose; see, for example, “‘Satan’ Tract Queried”, The Citizen, 22 February 1992, p. 8.
154 ‘Satanism is a Reality to be Confronted’, Evening Post, 22 May 1990, p. 2.
being consumed by power-hungry white satanists, or perverted by the deviant desires of the satanic cult.159 These feelings were also underscored by the repeated calls for the government to take action against the threat, as well as to limit ‘destructive freedom’ by banning satanism. Such calls were never answered and the official position was never entirely clear: some public officials condemned satanism outright, whilst others dismissed the notion as little more than a flight of fancy. Thus, by directing satanism to sites of white hegemony in South Africa, discourses surrounding this moral panic brought to the surface feelings of white insecurity through the image of the white child as both a victim of a pervasive social evil and as potential purveyor of evil, whilst also reflecting a loss of faith in the apartheid government.

**Conclusion**

In the interregnum between the death of apartheid and the first breath of democracy in April 1994, South Africans experienced a range of concerns and hopes for the ‘new South Africa’. While various anxieties and desires played out in the political arena, and in the widespread violence across the country, this interregnum was also privy to the particularly morbid symptom of a satanic panic in white South Africa. There were different strata of meaning embedded in the moral panic of 1989–1993: one layer involved the convergence of certain types of behaviour to the satanic threat, while a second layer reflected the loss of certainty in the general public – particularly in those institutions that were supposed to protect and maintain cultural values. This second, subtler layer involved the changes in the satanic narrative itself and the areas to which it was directed, most tellingly to the sites of cultural rebellion and power in white South Africa. Perceived as both bred from and engendering social breakdown, the ‘satanic peril’ was perceived as flourishing in the very segments of society charged with ensuring white South African values. Thus, the shifting discourse of satanism expressed both the immediate anxieties of social change, as well as more deep-seated uncertainty regarding the future of white society or the ability and motives of the government to protect or ensure that future. These fears did not solely express themselves in terms of satanism, nor was this particular folk devil all-encompassing. Rather, these fears regarding the ascendance of the devil and his followers – which occurred in different forms across the global West – served as a scapegoat: a threat through which localised anxieties over social change, powerlessness and insecurity could be funnelled.

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159 Bowman has noted similar sentiments expressed in the growing concern over children and paedophilia during the same period. See Bowman, ‘Children, Pathology and Politics’, pp. 443–64.