The Devil Rejoiced: Volk, Devils and Moral Panic in White South Africa, 1978–1982*

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Abstract The first four years of P.W. Botha’s premiership in apartheid South Africa were plagued by intra-party politicking, renewed anti-apartheid resistance, economic instability, and Satan. Between 1978 and 1982, the heavy political rhetoric of “total onslaught” inflected perceived “moral onslaught” in a virulent moral panic over Satanism in white, and particularly Afrikaner, South Africa. With attention to its discursive and socio-political context, this paper seeks to explore the emergence of this distinct satanic moral panic in white South African history, arguing that it reflects the intense political and moral ambiguity of white society as the edifices of apartheid began to fracture.

The Devil rejoiced because it was the beginning of the end for the Republic.¹ For many white South Africans the anti-apartheid struggle started in pixels. It began in the year that television made its belated arrival in South Africa, and which would be, as one British journalist remarked, “like the opening of Pandora’s Box.”² It started in 1976 with the images of violence spewing from the Soweto Uprising: fists raised in protest, streets filled with the smog of teargas and burning cars, fleeing schoolchildren and Hector Pieterson’s limp body. It started in the year that black consciousness became black defiance and the carefully tended illusion of stability in South Africa was shattered.³ Newly legalised television sets “brought the world into the home” at a time when renewed internal resistance and international pressure was slackening the grip of white political domination.⁴ Together, political unrest and critical media served to erode the relative isolation of white South Africans, challenging both the geographic and social borders of the apartheid state and white hegemony.⁵

Signalling the rebirth of black resistance in South Africa, the Soweto Uprising marked the decline of the white oligarchical state.

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Facing economic instability and mounting criticism, the ruling National Party entered a period of crisis from which it never wholly recovered. Moving ever further from its ideological roots and rhetorical underpinnings, the National Party under P.W. Botha announced that “apartheid is dead” as it began the process of dismantling the country’s racial policy. Although such a diagnosis was premature, the decline and international scrutiny of the apartheid state from the mid-1970s instigated a growing introspection among white South Africans: of the moral costs of apartheid policy on the one hand, and the security of white values on the other. Indeed, during this period of political and ideological divergence, an intense fear that Satan himself was undermining the integrity of white South Africa became widespread. As this article seeks to show, political fragmentation and concomitant pessimism were reflected in, and channelled into, a moral panic over Satanism between 1978 and 1982.

Hostile social reactions to an apparent threat, moral panics are engendered around a folk devil: a perceived threat hybridised from identifiable deviance, symbolic transgression, and underlying social anxiety. As this article will show, a moral panic erupted in white South African society during a period of acute political and cultural schism and the rapid mutation of Afrikaner nationalism in the face of socio-political and economic instability. With Satanism at its epicentre, this moral panic was sustained by consistent waves of sensational report, bizarre urban legends and rumour in the media, as well as the claims and agendas of various moral entrepreneurs and politicians. In unpacking this satanic moral panic, which far preceded the more infamous international Satanism scares and panics of the late 1980s and early 1990s, this article focuses upon a distinct and hitherto unexplored “satanic peril” and moral panic in white South African history. A social phenomenon fomented in the media, this article relies on regional and national newspaper material in reconstructing the discursive and epistemological arena during this moral panic. Viewing the moral panic as both a conceptual tool and a historical phenomenon bound to its context, we first establish the theoretical and temporal parameters of this article and then its socio-political context. In so doing, this article seeks to explain how the contours of this particular moral panic were shaped by the politics of ambiguity and social crisis, in a period where the permeability of ethnic and civic boundaries was called into question.

**Volk Devils and Moral Panics**

A volatile social reaction to a recognised and codified threat, the moral panic is a cathartic distillation of ideological dissonance
within a society, or segments of a society. Conceived in 1972 by sociologist Stanley Cohen, the concept of the moral panic denotes a particular social phenomenon in which the ideological foundation of a society – its social order – is perceived as under direct and systematic attack. In his seminal study *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers* (1972), Cohen exposed how mechanisms of media, politicking and moral rhetoric combine to produce a particular type of social panic in the vilification of certain forms of youth culture in 1960s Britain. Moral panics see the identification and increasing stigmatisation of a discerned threat: the folk devil. This folk devil is stripped of any positive characteristics as it becomes symbolic of all that is wrong in society. The articulation and codification of the folk devil is achieved through the press media, a public platform that disseminates the claims and agendas of moral entrepreneurs and experts, as well as the hearsay, opinion and speculation of an increasingly worried public. As Cohen explains, moral panics result from “a complex chain of social interaction”: the conjunction of overt and conscious actions of claims-makers and news media with underlying processes of cultural change and anxiety. They are typified by rapid myth-making – distortion and exaggeration facilitating the convergence of separate social problems, threats and anxieties into the single menace of the folk devil. Indeed, as Cohen explains, moral panics characterise situations that are sensationalised, hyperbolic and based on purportedly “self-evident facts.” Consistent public concern and corresponding media attention sustain the moral panic while amplifying public anxiety and hostility to the extent that the social reaction can be defined as disproportionate to any verifiable dimension of the folk devil itself.

Essentially, redirecting underlying social anxiety, moral panics see the rapid interpellation of a identified threat in the construction of a folk devil reflective of myriad, and sometimes competing, concerns and agendas. Inextricably bound to the contexts in which they occur, the phenomenon of the moral panic is geographically and temporally complex. Debates about the moral integrity of a society are neither unique nor specific to periods of moral panic; rather these discourses and their proponents are more visible during the phenomenon. The process of symbolisation, in which “images are made sharper than reality”, which produces the deviant folk devil relies on both the identification of new elements of cultural and material life, and the resurgence of older fear-narratives in a society. So moral panics are typically marked by a resurgence of nostalgia for an idealised past: a fictional “golden age”, in which the social order is con-
strued as safe and static, is juxtaposed with the chaotic and degenerative present. Temporally, then, moral panics combine contextual social problems and sometimes-transient anxieties with older moral discourse and symbolic elements. Similarly, because they are largely discursive manifestations, moral panics are geographically complex: regional moral panics can articulate their folk devil as a national or global threat and vice versa, and elements imported through global media can obscure the tensions between local and localised discourses.

The moral panic over Satanism between 1978 and 1982, together with much of the scholarship on satanic perils, reflect these complexities. Certainly most of the academic attention paid to the emergence of satanic perils, scares and panics has focussed on the widespread and virulent events of the late 1980s and early 1990s when the fear and persecution of the satanic menace became a transnational phenomenon. Indeed, the devil’s decade of the 1980s saw satanic panics occur across the global West. Half-truths, rumour, and fantasy fuelled garish reports that devil-worshipping hordes of lecherous paedophiles with a tendency towards cannibalism had infiltrated almost every level of society. As Richardson and La Fontaine have argued, these panics were fomented within the climate of escalating concern over the safety of children and the threat of sexual abuse. Combined with the activities of several interest groups to vilify and preclude these dangers, overt concern over child abuse and more localised underlying anxieties resulted in widespread public awareness and hostility towards the newly categorised crime of Satanic Ritual Abuse – later shortened to “ritual abuse” when the satanic element became overly contentious. First emerging in the United States in 1983, satanic ritual abuse allegations and panics appeared in Canada in 1985, and had crossed the Atlantic to Britain by 1987; while scares regarding Satanism and alleged ritual abused appeared in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Australia and New Zealand by the late 1990s. Located within the arena of social deviance and moral panic, the secular academic approach is similar in focussing on the satanic menace (as opposed to religious Satanism) as a discursive threat mobilised to combat perceived transgressions in society. Scholars like De Young, Jenkins, Bromley and Best, for example, have identified the satanic ritual abuse panics of the 1980s and early 1990s as specifically moral panics, while Victor and Ellis have studied their emergence as instances of rumour panic and modern legend respectively. Perhaps the most well known investigation is that of Jeanne La Fontaine into allegations of Satanism and ritual abuse in the United Kingdom from 1987. Finding no evidence of ritual abuse or Satanism, La Fontaine
concluded that the satanic panic was a product of a modern demonology disseminated by sensationalist media and advanced networks of interest groups, and propelled by various local anxieties including the pressure on the welfare system to intervene more actively in child protection.\textsuperscript{19}

This points to a vital aspect of moral panic scholarship, and the argument of this paper: while folk devils are produced by discursive formations unbound by global media and the transnational networks of interest groups, these formations are contingent upon local anxieties and localised vocabularies of fear. Indeed, while South Africa also experienced satanic moral panics during the late 1980s and early 1990s, which similarly deployed images of young children at risk of sexual violence, as well as the corruption of teenage youths, it never articulated these threats around Satanic Ritual Abuse.\textsuperscript{20} In fact, reports of satanic ritual abuse had emerged in South Africa as early as 1986, with the criminal trial of a young white army conscript who claimed to have been raised as a Satanist since a young age and subjected to a slew of sexual abuse during grisly rituals involving cannibalism and devil worship.\textsuperscript{21} However, while the case and the subject of ritual abuse were discussed by a string of psychologists and clergymen and reported in the press, it never garnered the attention of the South African public. Similarly, neither Satanism nor moral panics are restricted to white society in South Africa. As Niehaus has shown, moral discourse regarding incest taboos has been used to express discontent in black African masculinity on the contemporary plains of the South African lowveld,\textsuperscript{22} while Falkhof has argued that particular instances of satanic discourses betray notions of racial power and particular ethnic conceits regarding morality. Falkof has argued that in tandem with the escalation in satanic-related discourses and crimes relating to black South Africans in recent years, has been the interlacing of “African” and “Western” occult. For example, in recent years stories of satanic rituals have replaced the traditional black cat of western lore with the muti-bound chicken.\textsuperscript{23} However, it must be noted that there is no linear progress of racial merging in occult-related discourse, rather these discourses are shaped specifically by the moral entrepreneurs and press and inflected by the particular racial, ethnic, classed or gendered boundaries in flux. In 2008 for example, the satanic peril emerged briefly, in a pithy moral panic during a year of considerable economic instability, the xenophobic riots and the forced resignation of Thabo Mbeki from the presidency. Anchored by the so-called “Samurai Sword Killer”, a mentally unstable teenager who murdered a classmate while wearing a mask, this moral panic connected mental illness, drug abuse, and Satanism with familial breakdown and white
parental impotence – and was directed and contained to specifically white society by its formation in the press and its articulation by particular white interest groups.24

Essentially, while dependent upon media sensationalism and claims-making, moral panics are distinct and contextually located phenomena produced in times of considerable underlying social anxiety. Thus, although the decade of the 1980s was dotted with regional satanic-related debates, ranging from the “bob” hairstyle and vegetarianism to reggae music and communism, after 1982 there was no widespread or consistent anxiety regarding Satanism until 1989.25 The moral panic over Satanism in white South Africa between 1978 and 1982, addressed in this paper, was thus a temporally and geographically distinct phenomenon. Though it invoked imagery of the black mass and a youth at risk, as this article shows, it imparted none of the darker and more violent imagery of the later panic or the transnational Satanism Scare. Moreover, while it was intoned with imported imagery of Satanism and the 1960s American counterculture, a discursive awareness of these global networks gave particular cast to the satanic moral panic explored here. Between 1978 and 1982, heightened awareness of the power of imported media and the permeability of ethnic boundaries shaped the satanic folk devil, situating it directly within the realm of the volksvreemd (literally “foreign to the people”). Viewed as an external and interpellated threat, all anxieties and agendas merged with the Satanic folk devil were thus understood as unnatural, imported and predatory upon the organic, natural and once contained white South Afrikaner society. While occurring at a time when ethnic divisions between English-speaking and Afrikaner white South Africans were blurring, this article shows how this moral panic was predominantly understood as a threat to white Afrikaner society and constructed within a particular crisis in Afrikanerdom. Indeed, as we will demonstrate, in fusing older fear-narratives and contemporary concerns surrounding an uncontrollable youth, foreign and English-speaking influence, capitalism, spiritual corruption, and communism within the single threat of the white Satanist, the moral panic of 1978 to 1982 engendered the ultimate volk devil.

Political Crisis and Moral Pessimism, 1978–1982

Having come to power in 1948, the National Party advanced a white Afrikaner unity based on class solidarity and patriotic morality. Indeed, as Dunbar Moodie has argued, Afrikaner nationalism itself developed into a kind of civil religion, which conjoined in unholy alliance the Afrikaans language, a particular strain of Calvinism
and an understanding of God’s role in Afrikaner history.\textsuperscript{26} This Afrikaner nationalism, however, was recast by its own economic and political successes, which at first inflected, and then shaped, the ideological cohesion of the National Party and its constituency. Indeed, following the birth of the Republic in 1961, the country enjoyed an economic boom while the National Party became increasingly fraught with internal contradiction. With an extraordinary economic growth rate cresting at over five per cent per annum during the 1960s, white poverty was eradicated. By the following decade over eighty per cent of Afrikaners were urbanised, with some sixty-five per cent employed in white-collar positions.\textsuperscript{27} But levelling the economic playing field among whites progressively necessitated changes to apartheid policy: without enough whites to sate the thirst for skilled labour, the State was increasingly unable to prevent the urbanisation of black South Africans outside of the designated “homelands”. As nationalist wariness of the divisive power of capitalism was diluted by economic success, the old antagonisms between English-speaking and Afrikaner whites diminished as ethnic boundaries were overwritten by dynamics of class and capitalism.\textsuperscript{28}

Growing contradiction between loyalty to traditional Afrikaner nationalism and the aspirations of a modernising South Africa soon manifested in political infighting and the alarmist rhetoric against construed social decadence and moral corruption. Afrikaner nationalists found their ranks increasingly divided between verkrampte (conservative) and verligte (enlightened) sympathies. While the former clung to the anti-capitalist Afrikaner-first principles of the 1940s and 1950s, the verligtes sought to adapt the ideological boundaries and politics of white Afrikaner nationalism to a modern world.\textsuperscript{29} These divisions were not limited to the political sphere, but reverberated in the moral discourse of Afrikaner nationalism. Cultural guardians feared that prosperous whites were becoming “worshippers of Mammon”, and that the trappings of wealth and prestige had become the altars upon which traditional white (Afrikaner) values and volk unity were sacrificed.\textsuperscript{30} As Du Pisani and Grundlingh argue, these fears were not unfounded: economic growth and the rise of an educated white middle class steadily corroded the dream of a “single-minded, abstemious ‘volk’ prepared to make considerable sacrifices on behalf of a greater ideal.”\textsuperscript{31}

The erosion of the homogenising forces of Afrikaner nationalism intensified during the 1970s, and was aggravated exponentially by the ferment of the Soweto Uprising and renewed anti-apartheid resistance. In viewing the phenomenon of the moral panic as historically located, the first section of this article seeks to reconstruct
the socio-political and discursive context in which it occurred. While the gulf between the verligtes and verkramptes widened, these divergences resounded in the public sphere and underlying social anxiety both fostered and fed off the ambiguity of P.W. Botha’s early reforms. As this article shows, the satanic moral panic of 1978–1982 emerged within a particular historical period in which the once relatively inchoate tensions within Afrikaner nationalism were cemented and fully realised.


The winter sun bore down on some twenty thousand black schoolchildren on the morning of 16 June 1976. Their march began peacefully, the children armed with placards announcing that “We are not the Boers!” and that “If we must do Afrikaans, Vorster must do Zulu!” in reaction to the new language rule which enforced Afrikaans in black classrooms.32 The police arrived, stones were thrown, shots were fired, and several demonstrators killed in unleashing a wave of violence countrywide. State repression was swift and police action severe: 575 dead and 2389 wounded by the end of 1976.33 Despite anxiety regarding the decolonisation of African states, which left South Africa and Rhodesia the only white-ruled countries on the continent, the Soweto Uprising occurred at a time of considerable confidence in South Africa. Anti-apartheid resistance had been suppressed in the 1960s, with what little was left of the African National Congress (ANC) in exile, while economic prosperity had greatly bolstered the conviction of its ruling elite that it had achieved a modern South Africa.34

Indeed, having largely ignored the rumblings of black consciousness and the reports of discontent in Soweto, the events of 1976 appeared to take the apartheid government by surprise.35 With reports of the raids, arrests, detentions and deaths in the State’s attempts to quash resistance, the media spotlight on the Soweto Uprising unleashed a torrent of international criticism towards South Africa. While the government struggled to regain political stability and international condemnation grew, the country’s economy was also in the precarious position of being dependent upon foreign investment. Lending fresh impetus to the growing anti-apartheid lobby was the death of black consciousness leader, Steve Biko, while in police custody on 11 September 1977. Banning eighteen black consciousness and anti-apartheid organisations a month after Biko’s death, the South African government now faced the official international rejection of its policies. The United Nations proceeded to place an arms-embargo on South Africa and
demanded that anti-apartheid organisations be unbanned and detainees released, while United States president Jimmy Carter pledged to bring about majority rule by peaceful means.\textsuperscript{36} While the National Party faced a public relations nightmare and the glare of international scrutiny, South African premier B.J. Vorster had lost his drive in the political arena. No longer the charming leader known for his “witty after-dinner speeches”, Vorster had begun acting like “a man ready to retire”, which only compounded the crisis of the apartheid state.\textsuperscript{37}

The tarnished image of South Africa abroad and the crisis of its government were further intensified, ironically, by ham-fisted attempts at propaganda. Backed by Vorster’s “heir-apparent” Connie Mulder, the head of the Information Department, a number of secret state-funded projects were launched in an ill-fated bid to burnish South Africa’s reputation abroad. In addition to the attempted purchase of several leading newspapers in South Africa, Britain, France and America, such projects also included the bribery of international and local public figures and reporters to speak positively of South Africa’s policies. Secret funds were also poured into convincing officials in Zaire, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Israel to entertain Vorster’s highly publicised visits. In addition to public suspicion of the lavish holidays enjoyed by senior members of the Information Department, rumours of illegal projects, blackmail, and even murder were endemic by the time the scandal broke in 1978.\textsuperscript{38} With over R80 million wasted in illegal and largely ineffective propaganda projects, the “Information Scandal” of 1978 implicated both Vorster and his “crown-prince” Mulder just before the election. With rumours of Mulder’s complicity encouraged by then Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, a Commission of Inquiry caught Mulder in a public lie and the scandal was soon dubbed “Muldergate” by the press.\textsuperscript{39} A disgraced Mulder was forced to resign while Vorster chose to retire, the two soon remembered as “the bumbling politicians” by the South African press.\textsuperscript{40}

The intrigue of Muldergate accelerated both reform and the eventual rupture of Afrikaner nationalism. By the time P.W. Botha was elected as prime minister in September 1978, the apartheid state had managed to restore internal order, its economy was beginning to recover, and the international threat of sanctions had been realigned to a policy of “constructive engagement”.\textsuperscript{41} However, the crisis following the events of 1976 had accelerated intra-party tensions and made the failures of apartheid abundantly clear. With the \textit{verkrampte} position firmly against adapting apartheid policy but reform urgently needed, Botha’s early administration was marked by political infighting and opacity. With the National Party increasingly hamstrung by internal division, Botha’s sceptics came
to refer to him as the underwhelming “breeze of change”.\textsuperscript{42} As one foreign newspaper commented: “South African policy now amounts to little more than trying to postpone on every issue the inevitable consequences of apartheid in practice.”\textsuperscript{43}

Although Botha pushed reform, it came at the cost of cementing the \textit{verkrampte} position and splitting “Afrikanerdom”. While far from liberal, Botha continued the relaxation of petty apartheid laws at the cost of the National Party’s relationship with its foundational allies of the \textit{Susterkerke} (Sister Churches), which had long provided ideological justification for apartheid policies.\textsuperscript{44} This only compounded the ideological tailspin of Christian-Nationalism in South Africa: the \textit{Susterkerke} themselves facing crisis following their implication in the “Muldergate” scandal of 1978, where they were forced to admit accepting money from the government. Mounting tension in the relationships of the official Afrikaner churches with both their congregations and the National Party were exacerbated in 1979, when Botha began repealing laws against interracial relationships on the basis that none of the biblical authority upon which such legislation was passed could be found.\textsuperscript{45} Juggling the risk of international condemnation and the need to calm internal opposition, Botha averted the charge of outright deviation by predicating his administration on the threat of “total onslaught” and the need for white South Africa to “adapt or die”.\textsuperscript{46} Yet while this heavy-handed rhetoric could, at least superficially, push the reform needed for economic stability, it did so at the cost of unbinding the ideological tenets of Afrikaner nationalism.

Certainly in conservative discourse the hybridity of Christian-Nationalism and an ethnic and racial patriotism modulated an ideological teleology in white South African thinking that became clearer as these ideologies began to fragment. Though maintaining the exclusion of black South Africans from political franchise, Botha urged socio-economic reform as vital to the survival of white South Africa: his administration supported big business and moved to repeal the apartheid policies impeding it. Botha’s labour reforms, which allowed greater black mobility, facilitated the growth of the radical right in South Africa as white unemployment skyrocketed at the onset of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{47} Between 1979 and 1981, the average income of whites declined by twenty-three per cent and, as Swart has argued, economic insecurity strengthened the persuasive power or right wing groups like the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) who “promised a return to the sanctuary of white male privilege.”\textsuperscript{48}

The Soweto Uprising not only struck a resounding blow to white confidence, but also saw some three thousand politically militant youths revitalise the ANC and usher in a new phase of militant
resistance. The National Party responded by seeking allies outside its white constituency: under the urgency of “adapt or die” Botha moved to grant political representation to Coloured and Indian South Africans. A reform aimed at reinforcing white dominance in the country, the expanded franchise had the opposite result: the exclusion of black South Africans from the Tricameral Parliament of 1983 only added fervour to anti-apartheid resistance, while Afrikaner nationalism imploded. Botha’s reforms – cosmetic and otherwise – only solidified the verkrampte position. The verkrampte politician Andries Treurnicht, nicknamed “Dr No” by the press due to his stance on racial integration, became one of Botha’s strongest opponents. The decision to include Coloured and Indian representation in the white parliament cleaved an irreparable rift in the National Party. Scoffing at Botha’s reforms as “treasonous to nationalism”, in February 1982 eighteen members of the National Party followed Treurnicht out of parliament to form the Conservative Party: an act which made it abundantly clear that the unity that had been carved out and lauded by Afrikaner nationalists for several decades had come to an end.


Plagued by infighting, scandal, incompetence and corruption, the National Party had been in crisis, administratively and publically, since 1976. The political infighting of the ruling party only compounded the blighted confidence of white South Africa in the midst of renewed anti-apartheid struggle, international castigation and economic instability. In a milieu marked by a “sense of impending catastrophe”, competing moralising and pessimism increasingly inflected socio-political discourse. As one Afrikaner newspaper lamented in reaction to the Soweto Uprising, “[w]e do not want blood on our language.” Compounding a loss of faith in the nationalist government and its churches while betraying its internal division, the Muldergate scandal “rocked white South Africa, undermining the Afrikaner’s self-image of puritan righteousness and volk unity.” Against the bruised confidence in the National Party, the election of Botha initially inspired hope for reform. As one South African daily commented, Botha “may yet save South Africa’s nation from destroying itself through greed and the desire to maintain privilege at the expense of our great people’s dignity.” Though intra-politicking and moralising had been on the rise since the twilight of Verwoerdian apartheid, the crises from the mid-1970s spurred and secured divergent discursive formations regarding the integrity and direction of white South Africa. Indeed, even the
muckraking of the Muldergate scandal, as O’Meara has noted, incurred a public reaction and moral introspection that was relatively disproportionate to the other political scandals dotting the history of the National Party.\(^{57}\)

Such moralising paralleled the growing contradictions within the political arena and opened a platform where a diverse range of fears were voiced: from the distaste for apartheid policies and concern regarding international isolation, to anxieties surrounding the long held fears of cultural miscegenation and the deterioration of white values. Mirroring political schism and the growth of the right wing, the demise of apartheid saw the concomitant rise and radicalisation of moral movements and their entrepreneurs regarding the sanctity of white morality in South Africa. One particularly virulent group was the Action Moral Standards movement (AMS), which seemed to bridge the Afrikaner-English divide in declaring itself the moral guardian of white society. Emerging to little effect in 1973, by 1982 the grassroots organisation of the AMS proclaimed itself a movement and boasted to have some 800 000 members.\(^{58}\) Concerning itself with the moral health of South African society and the integrity of whites in particular, the AMS condemned the “pornography” of pop music and fought for stricter censorship to prevent the “seeds of communism and other immoral ideas” from taking root.

Both the AMS and the paramilitary AWB were founded in the early 1970s, but where the latter would threaten to infect the pools of interracial holiday resorts with syphilis,\(^ {59}\) the members of Action Moral Standards fought from the local soapbox and letter columns of the press. In the early 1970s, however, the little noticed AMS enjoyed only a few sporadic and modest successes. In 1974, for example, the AMS successfully prevented the display of women’s underwear in shop windows, although only in the small town of Vryheid. That same year, their Venterdorp branch, which was also the base of the AWB, caused a small media sensation when it made a bonfire of all literature it considered to be “objectionable” and responsible for the spread of communist and satanic ideas. This interest group condemned in particular the slippery slope of “modernisation” and popular culture, which included modern bathing costumes, unisex clothing, shorts, flip-flops and statues of naked women.\(^{60}\) However, although the AMS echoed the verkrampte rhetoric of the 1960s, they strongly rebuked the idea that they were themselves verkramp. They gained little sympathy with the verligte press, who increasingly condemned all things considered conservative in the spheres of culture and politics. Certainly, in denying the verkrampte-label the AMS implied that the term undermined their credibility. However, such a rebuke was in vain after the group’s leader blamed a nudist colony for a regional drought – a
claim reminiscent of the schoolteacher who blamed South Africa’s loss in the rugby in 1970 on the miniskirt.61

The position of the AMS had changed considerably, however, by the end of the decade. Like the political right wing, a radicalised Action Moral Standards movement grew in strength and size as it gained a space in the media spotlight.62 Under the leadership of Eddie van Zyl, who gained the epithet of “South Africa’s moral man” in the press, the AMS increasingly tackled what it saw as a corrupt and debauched society. Taking their campaign “underground”, the AMS employed guerrilla tactics in their stringent letter writing campaigns. With little success as a group, the AMS co-ordinated each member to write as an individual: thereby creating the perception of spontaneous public outcry.63 This tactic afforded more substantial success for the group, including the banning of several editions of Scope magazine and later the Hollywood blockbuster Mad Max Two (1982).64 By 1978, the group had several branches on university campuses. Moral Actions Tuks (MAT), for example, made headlines when it traumatised several unsuspecting first year students with a particularly graphic anti-abortion video.65 That same year, the countrywide movement declared war against immorality – a declaration that communicated a significant change in their view of white South Africa and its leadership.

In the early 1970s, for example, the AMS asserted that the international condemnation of South Africa was not the result of its racial policies, but rather because white South Africa was a Christian society which recognised the Bible.66 The AMS also condemned outright those writers who criticised the National Party government and apartheid policy, denoting them the “spiritual terrorists” and “cancer cells” eating away at the “healthy body of society”.67 Although they remained wary of foreign influences and imported popular culture, by the end of the decade the AMS had changed its evocation of white South Africa: no longer a “healthy body” that recognised the Bible, white society had degenerated into a “sick community” who had “the cheek to call itself a Christian society.”68 In 1980, Van Zyl unveiled a two-year campaign to restore the sanctity of family-life and God in the daily lives of white South Africans, declaring that the AMS would stand against the “satanic evils that are overcoming our country.”69 In tackling the social problems of prostitution, drug abuse and gambling, the AMS proceeded to tackle massage parlours, pinball machines and most commonly the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) for the “degradation and destruction of the people of South Africa’s morals and values.”70

These pursuits aside, in condemning modern society as bedevilled by homosexuality, prostitution, drug abuse, divorce and
suicide, the rhetoric of the Action Moral Standards reflected an intense pessimism towards the state of South Africa. Indeed, by 1982 the radical moral campaign asserted that the country was on the verge of total disintegration – the moral and spiritual health of white South Africa deteriorated and traumatised. As Van Zyl warned,

"We are on the brink of the cataclysm because of our complacency – sitting in a land of plenty, with too much money and too much time to find things for idle hands to do . . . We are like a man sitting in a luxurious pool, drowning happily without even realising it."

Such moral introspection, shrouded in pessimism and nostalgia, was fertilised by the climate of political and economic instability. Facing a recession, the resurgence of African nationalism and a militant anti-apartheid struggle with international support, white South Africa’s government, press and cultural arena were plagued by internal bickering. While this would facilitate the growth of a radicalised right wing in the 1980s, it also strengthened increasingly radical moral campaigns like that of the AMS, which grew in strength between 1978 and 1982. In this same period, white South Africa experienced a moral panic over Satanism. A phenomenon in which the concerns of moral entrepreneurs and interest groups like the AMS intersected with the political rhetoric of “adapt or die”, this moral panic reflected the disjunction between rhetoric and reform and expressed a sense of foreboding, pessimism, and ideological floundering in white South Africa.


With the dust still to settle following the political scandal and resignation of the embittered Vorster, the pragmatic P.W. Botha was elected as prime minister in September 1978. However, just two weeks after the surprising election of the Cape leader known for his temper and single-minded resolve, South Africa’s newspapers turned their attention to the devil and his minions. According to a leaked report undertaken by the Dutch Reformed Church, the moral fibre of white South Africa was under systematic attack by the agents of Satan. In the shadow of the moon, white Satanists were reportedly gathering in derelict areas to worship the devil beneath the symbol of the “Baphomet”. Kneeling before a black draped altar constructed by their high priests, initiates reportedly recited mangled versions of the Christian prayer and lapped the blood of slaughtered cats to enact the rejection of Christ. Induced
by drugs and alcohol, perverse sexual acts that required male and female prostitutes were performed in rituals to invoke Satan. The “spirit who overshadows the temple”, summoned by their chanting and sexual frenzy, would then appear before the convocation of Satanists: Buddha, sitting serene in the lotus position.74

Heralding the arrival of the “anti-Christian age”, the white press announced exponentially increasing numbers of white Satanists active in South Africa.75 The Church estimate of 40 000 Satanists in 1978 was found too modest by observers, and adjusted to 100 000 in 1979 and then at least 250 000 by 1982.76 The Dutch Reformed Church was adamant that Satanism was a very real and growing threat, and that the servants of the devil knew how to manipulate the weak and the naïve. Having trained for a minimum of ten years, satanic high priests studied the effect of music on the mind, of modern art and dancing on the soul, and were adept at concocting addictive substances to affect the body.77 Presented at a general synod meeting of the Dutch Reformed Church in October 1978, the report claimed that pop music from abroad was laced with “in-depth advertising” for Satanism. Such music, the report maintained, derived its beat from the sexual techniques of the Kama Sutra and was specifically designed to stimulate its young listeners beyond their normal moral reasoning.78 Bolstering the concerns induced by the DRC and press, heavyweight cultural organisations such as the Afrikaanse Christelike Vroue Vereeniging (Afrikaner Christian Women’s Association or ACVV) publically declared their hostility towards popular youth culture in decrying the “era of permissiveness” that allowed violence, nudity and horror comics to reign unattended.79 The AMS also joined the fray, Eddie van Zyl asserting that “if these rumours are true, then our greatest fears – that the flood of permissive materials in the forms of books, films and LPs that has swept across this county is taking its toll on our youth – have been realised.”80 Indeed, the emerging folk devil of white Satanism converged easily with the concerns of the AMS campaign – giving particular credence to the group’s condemnation of “revolutionary and soul destroying” pop music as part of the Marxist ploy to use literature, music and drugs to sexually stimulate and corrupt the youth of South Africa.81

Within a discursive context laden with the rhetoric of “total onslaught” and “adapt or die”, this satanic peril crystallised the notion that white South Africans were particularly vulnerable to a “moral onslaught” from beyond its cultural and geographic borders. Emerging as a threat to all white South Africans, but more specifically Afrikaners, the folk devil of Satanism was solidified through waves of sensational reports, exaggerated figures and rumours, and the claims of various moral entrepreneurs and interest groups like
the AMS, as well as self-declared experts and politicians. Indeed, following the discussion generated by the leaked DRC report on Satanism, particularly strident voices from the white tower of theology fuelled public hostility towards the manifesting “satanic peril” by repudiating Eastern religions and damning their newfound influence among white Afrikaners. They railed against the popularity of yoga and kung-fu whose origins were found to lie in Zen Buddhism, as well as the “satanic temples” of Hindu and Buddhist places of worship. White youths were reportedly being lured to such places with the “promises of exotic sex and free liquor” only to become trapped in the nightmare of Satanism, with blackmail ensuring their compliance. Taking immediate action, the AMS charged several esoteric groups like the Association of Creative Thought and The Emissaries of Divine Light with devil worship. As such concerns regarding social problems like drug abuse were merged with those regarding popular culture and other religions – the potential threat of these activities becoming embodied in the image of the white Satanist. As a result of these converging fears and agendas, public anxiety continued to amplify with repeated calls for overt action. Indeed, while the validity of such claims was debated in the press, the Transvaal Congress of the National Party received a public request that all “occult” literature be banned from South African bookshelves.

Initially sparked by DRC investigation into Satanism, the moral panic was fuelled and sustained by claims-makers and moral entrepreneurs, as well as several bizarre reports in the press that included lurid accounts of satanic body-swapping as well as moralistic urban rumours. One such example of the latter was the widely publicised account of a French school headmistress in, perhaps ironically, the small town of Parys. It was rumoured that “Mademoiselle Jeanne” had been a prolific hunter of black cats, which she sacrificed to Satan during her midnight rituals. It was for this reason, reports continued, that the foreboding woman had died friendless and alone in her hospital bed at the age of eighty-four. Such stories came in lieu of a particularly scandalous affair surrounding the church, homosexual intimacy and a self-confessed satanic high priest, Phil Botha. In “an evil voodoo ceremony” performed in a seedy Durban hotel, Botha claimed that he swapped souls with a pregnant eighteen-year-old named Madeleine, who had killed herself. Stating that Madeleine’s soul was now trapped within him, Botha’s story ignited widespread debate among church officials and congregations – particularly after it was revealed that a confused young deacon had fallen in love with the woman inside Botha. In a month long media frenzy which stoked the furore towards Satanism still further, the testimony of the ex-Satanist also
fostered debate about homosexuality. Indeed, the notion that one could be both Christian and homosexual was damned in particular by the former moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church, Dr Koot Vorster, the brother of the since shamed and retired South African premier, B.J. Vorster. In an ironic parallel to the political sphere, a disgusted Koot Vorster stated that he was “fed up with [the Church’s] ignorance of spiritual matters” and prompted to resign by the affair surrounding the satanic Botha.88

Macabre stories of “blood-swigging” Satanists luring innocents with sex and liquor and assertions of the moral vulnerability of white South Africa continued in the media, despite the overt lack of proof. As the synod of the Dutch Reformed Church, for example, admitted “[w]e’ve not been able to collect any specific evidence for their practices but these people are on the increase in the country as a whole.”89 Despite such confessions and reminders that official police investigations had yielded no proof of Satanism in the country, claims that devil worship was a festering problem in South Africa continued unabated. As is typical of a moral panic, the frightened hyperbolic claims were more widely reported and more readily believed than sober appraisals of the verifiable dimension of such claims. Indeed, one reverend worried that “the stage is being prepared for the appearance of the Anti-Christ whoever he may be.”90

By 1982, the satanic folk devil had become completely reprehensible, and accused of stealing dead babies from mortuaries,91 large scale drug trafficking and pornography,92 as well as the regular corruption of “innocent young girls.”93 While white South Africa in general was under attack, it was the Afrikaner who was perceived to be the specific target and most vulnerable. While cities and towns throughout South Africa were “riddled” with satanic cells, it was particularly rife in the seat of Afrikaner learning, Stellenbosch University.94 In addition to their resolution to “destroy the religion of the Afrikaner volk”, Satanists were punishing good white South Africans.95 Indeed, 1981 was the year of divorce and 1982 the year of heart attacks.96 Most significantly, the sudden thriving of devil worship was deemed to stem from the hubris of the Afrikaner volk on the one hand,97 and because Satanism was “big-money” on the other.98 In early 1982, papers announced that an official police investigation had been launched into the satanic threat in South Africa, now thought to involve at least 250 000 white South Africans from “all walks of society – academics, business executives and politicians.”99

A typically volatile social reaction, the moral panic came to a rather sobering halt in May 1982 after a Paarl clergyman was publically castigated for repeating the rumour that members of the
National Party might be working for the Devil. A recording of the sermon was scrutinised amidst a storm of public resentment towards the idea that cabinet members of the ruling party might be Satanists. Indeed, despite the earlier allegations of the press that “household names” were devil-worshipers and that many white South Africans “had sold their souls to the devil”, the notion that members of the National Party were susceptible to the satanic influence was met with a tirade of public rebuke. Claiming that he had been misinterpreted, the reverend asserted that while he did not believe the rumours himself, he understood the threat they posed to the government as “when our own people start spreading stories such as this, then it is time to take stock.” Although his defenders noted that the entire situation had been “blown out of all proportion”, the reverend of the Dutch Reformed Church was forced to make an official apology to calm the countrywide storm of protest. After the storm came calm: the amplified threat of Satanism submerging from the public spotlight.

South Africa’s “Grave New World”: Interpreting the Moral Panic, 1978–1982

The public spotlight on the perceived threat of Satanism in South Africa began and ended with the Dutch Reformed Church. Although moral crusaders like the AMS continued to evoke the devil in their rhetorical strategies, the moral panic had come to an end by mid-1982 with the apology of a clergyman to the ruling National Party and its outraged constituency. Resonating with underlying social anxieties regarding the future and direction of white South Africa, the moral panic over Satanism between 1978 and 1982 was a powerful expression of ideological discontent. Feeding off the ambiguous administration of a ruling party impeded by infighting, this moral panic was suffused with the perception that the social structure was weakened and destabilised: divorce rates were increasing, parental authority was decreasing, and the youth was more susceptible to corruption. Articulating apprehension over cultural hegemony and solidarity, the social order was construed as degenerating from a period in which white authority – moral, spiritual, and familial – was absolute and ethnic solidarity secure. These concerns underpinned the particular discursive formations of the panic and motivations of its moral entrepreneurs, while the moral panic itself reflected the embedded nature of Christian nationalism – in which political crisis resounded in both ideological and spiritual crisis.

Occurring in the heyday of Botha’s “total onslaught” rhetoric, the moral panic engendered the phantom of total “moral onslaught”:
indeed, the enemy of the Christian-Nationalist society was the both Devil himself and the weakened ethnic and geographic borders of the nation. That the panic’s discursive tide pushed for a reappraisal of the direction of Afrikanerdom and the efficacy of its chosen political and spiritual leaders did not escape notice. Certainly this moral panic opened a space for radicalising movements like the AMS to bolster their crusade for social improvement in white South Africa. Arguably, the panic’s discourse revealed the rising contradictions within the rhetoric of Afrikaner nationalism in coveting its role as the guardian of Western culture in Africa, while rejecting modern Western culture as immoral. More specifically, the moral panic provided a situation in which the Dutch Reformed Church, increasingly conflicted in its ties to the National Party and drawn into the ruling party’s political crisis, could reassert its dominance on moral issues. The National Party and Botha also took note, the latter adding his voice in a timely moment of intra-party politicking: officially condemning the “white devils” in the country while reaffirming the commitment of the National Party to protect South Africa. “In the name of Christianity and freedom,” Botha stated in August 1981, “Satan walks around in the guise of whites to seduce other population groups and idealistic youth groups to the devil’s work.” In declaring that the National Party stood against such devilry, Botha conflated and decried communism, radicalism and liberalism in asserting that the Afrikaner nationalist government was the only feasible choice in protecting family values and a constitution of multiculturalism in South Africa. Essentially, in Botha’s conceptualisation, the satanic threat lay in the “desire of saboteurs” to undermine his administration and the reform that was so urgently needed for the survival of white South Africa.

In reflecting a sense of persecution and victimhood in Afrikaner South Africa, the moral panic not only compounded the pervading sense of pessimism in white society, but also served as an outlet for considerable social anxiety between 1978 and 1982. It is this intense social tension that facilitated both the rapid construction of the folk devil as a significant threat to white society and the disproportionately attentive response of the public towards it. It is thus significant that the moral panic occurred when it did: the first four years of Botha’s administration, a period characterised by infighting, hubris and “total onslaught”. Converged in the threatening phantom of the power-hungry, cat-killing, blood-swigging, drug-taking satanic white youth, the folk devil of the Satanist was portrayed as hostile to the Republic and determined to destroy Afrikanerdom. This literal folk devil or, rather, volk devil of the white Satanist was perceived as placing their material ambitions before those of the Afrikaner volk, attacking the religion of the Afrikaner...
volk, and infiltrating the cultural strongholds of the Afrikaner volk. Where centred on the threat of “foreign” influences and the “contagions” of imported popular culture, the moral panic located its folk devil within the realm of the volksvreemd (“foreign to the people”). Indeed, throughout the moral panic social boundaries were reiterated: white, heterosexual relationships were to be upheld, wayward women were vulnerable, “modern” and foreign influences were to be treated warily rather than embraced, and material desire was to capitulate to the needs of culture and family.

However, it is the abrupt end of the moral panic in the rallying defence of the National Party in 1982 that is most revealing. The moral panic over Satanism between 1978 and 1982 corresponded closely with the political divergences of the period: the ambiguity of an embattled Afrikaner nationalism in the political sphere resounding in social malaise and insecurity regarding the direction of white Afrikaner society. The satanic moral panic began with the surprising election of reform-orientated and pro-capitalist Botha in 1978 and ended shortly after the formation of the breakaway Conservative Party as the culmination of increasingly detrimental intra-party tensions. As a conduit of underlying anxiety that conflated the fragility and vulnerability of Afrikaner society with the polymorphous threat of Satanism, that the moral panic’s end coincided with the splitting of the National Party and the formation of the verkrampte Conservative Party is significant. Although the support base of the right wing had grown considerably since the late 1970s, the formation of the Conservative Party – which sought the support of the entire white right – provided a far more cohesive and politically adept voice for conservative white South Africans and, led by an ex-dominee, provided both a political and spiritual leader. Arguably, the timing of this moral panic points to the fact that while traumatic to Afrikaner Nationalism as a whole, the fracture of the ruling party was productive and necessary to calming amplifying public anxiety and social pessimism. In solidifying varying concerns in the folk devil of the white Satanist, this moral panic served to articulate and dissipate social anxiety as white South Africans re-orientated themselves in a changed socio-political and economic climate. It only subsided when newly cemented political representatives provided the necessary ideological infrastructures for the concerns and aspirations of its constituencies.

**Conclusion**

This article has explored the cultural and political fissures that occurred along the fault lines of the fracturing homogeneity of white
social norms at a key moment during apartheid. Catalysed by the Soweto Uprising of 1976, anti-apartheid resistance within and beyond the geographic and racial borders of white South Africa intensified, as did feelings of powerless and insecurity in the face of political and economic instability. As this article has shown, between 1978 and 1982, moral pessimism and a sense of foreboding, together with socio-political crisis, produced a moral panic over Satanism in white South Africa. Throughout this moral panic South Africa’s white youth was construed as particularly vulnerable to a host of satanic influences, as well as a secret cult of devil worshippers, the “Black Mass” and the satanic Buddha. While interest groups drew considerable attention to their concerns regarding eastern religions and mysticism, changing youth norms and popular culture, the public response bound these concerns to fears that Afrikaner solidarity was fragmenting and that white society was on the brink of losing control of its youth, culture and future.

Asserting that moral panics are indivisibly bound to their historical context, this article argues that the value of this particular panic lay in its tendency to mirror, display and redirect social anxiety during a period of political opacity and recognisable divergences between class and cultural aspirations among white Afrikaners. Both shaping and fuelling this panic were ethnic organisations like the Dutch Reformed Church and ACVV and race-orientated moral crusaders like the Action Moral Standards movement, as well as a host of claims-makers in the media and the press. Indeed, the moral entrepreneurs of this moral panic were predominantly, though not exclusively, educated middle-class males who presented themselves as cultural guardians: their charge the protection of a wayward youth, symbolising both the immediate power of the state and family unit, as well as the future of white South African society. Although not restricted entirely to white Afrikaners, the threat was located within the strongholds of Afrikaner nationalism: the church, government, and cultural organisations. As this article has shown, the emergence of the satanic folk devil echoes the shifting perceptions of ethnic solidarity and hegemony as the edifices of Afrikaner nationalism splintered. Certainly, then, this moral panic reflects how the institutions of the church and government mutually reinforced Afrikaner Nationalism. The National Party in crisis was paralleled by the crisis of the Afrikaner church – the upheaval of both, and particularly the disunity between them, pulsating throughout the moral panic. In creating a particular volk devil, this moral panic manifested the ideological backlash as the divide between verkrampte and verligte widened and solidified.
Notes

* This paper is drawn from Danielle Dunbar, “The Devil’s Children: Volk, Devils and Moral Panics in White South Africa, 1976–1993” (MA thesis, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, 2012), supervised by Sandra Swart at Stellenbosch University. Many thanks to our anonymous referees, Lindie Koorts, Dané van Wyk, the HFM graduate discussion group at Stellenbosch University, and the insights of those when an earlier version of this paper was presented at a seminar for the History Department of Stellenbosch University in May 2012, and at the Conference of the Historical Association in Pretoria, South Africa, 6–7 July 2012.


3 An assertion made by Dr Albert Hertzog, the verkrampte leader of the Herstigte Nasional Party (HNP) in D. Van der Vat, “Television will have profound social effects”, The Times (London), 26 October 1970, 8.

4 Van der Vat, “Television will have profound social effects”, The Times (London), 26 October 1970, 8.

5 See R. Krabill, Starring Mandela and Cosby: Media and the End(s) of Apartheid (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2010).


8 Sociologist Howard Becker coined the term “moral entrepreneur” in describing those individuals or groups who seek to provide a society with certain moral codes or rules in his study of legislation regarding marijuana in America. See H. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (1963).

9 As Thompson notes: “Convergence occurs when two or more activities are linked in the process of signification as to implicitly or explicitly draw parallels between them . . . the net effect is amplification, not in the real events being described but in their threat potential for society.” See Thompson, Moral Panics, 20. This process occurs through the mechanisms of news-media, which, as McRobbie and Thornton note, “both frame subculture as major events and disseminate them.” A. McRobbie and S. L. Thornton, “Rethinking ‘Moral Panic’ for Multi-Mediated Social Worlds”, The British Journal of Sociology, 46, 4 (1995), 565.

With tensions running high, moral panics are characterized by an especially rapid process of meaning-making during which the mass media reflect and disseminate information and images that are both bred from and fertilize the social imagination. As Goode and Ben-Yehuda have asserted, “[a]lthough myth-making characterizes all societies at all times, during times of the moral panic, the process is especially rapid and a given myth is especially likely to be believed on relatively little evidence.” Goode and Ben-Yehuda, *Moral Panics*, 25.


Despite difficulties in measuring disproportion, scholars have pointed to volatility as a sign of disproportion while Goode and Ben-Yehuda have pointed to four further indicators: the exaggeration of figures, the fabrication of figures, the existence of other harmful conditions, and change over time. Goode and Ben-Yehuda, *Moral Panics*, 43–45.

Hier has termed discursive process during a moral panic as the “volatility of moralization” in contrast to “moralization” in general. Pearson has noted how similar anxieties regarding children, immorality, and weak parenthood have occurred together with a nostalgic discourse regarding an idealized past throughout history and are not as novel as they appear. See Hier, “Thinking Beyond Moral Panic”, 173–190 and G. Pearson, *Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1983).


Pearson also asserted that “[w]hat this historical journey has revealed to us, by contrast, is a seamless tapestry of fears and complaints about the deteriorated present; a long and connected history that makes plain the shortcomings of the more usual view of our cultural inheritance which is severely limited by its simplistic nostalgia for ‘the old way of life’.” See Pearson, *Hooligan*, 207–11.


29 The terms “verkramp” and “verlig” were coined by Wimpie de Klerk in 1969 in reference to the different camps within white Afrikaner politics regarding the relationship between white power and the state. See van Rooyen, Hard Right, 17. Also see D. O’Meara, Forty Lost Years: The apartheid state and the politics of the National Party, 1948–1994 (Randburg: Raven Press, 1996), 155–156.


35 As Welsh has noted, the Soweto Uprising was preceded by several school strikes, a number of attacks on police in the township, as well as an attack on a black Afrikaans teacher with a screwdriver. Welsh, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid (Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2009), 155.

36 A. Jeffery, People’s War, 19.

37 Giliomee and Mbenga, New History of South Africa, 350 and Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century, 222.

38 These included attempts to pay off foreign reporters and purchase several newspapers, including The Washington Star, L’Equipe and a British journal. Liebenberg and Spies, South Africa in the 20th Century, 465. O’Meara, Forty Lost Years, 214; Welsh and Spence, Ending Apartheid, 43; and B. J. Liebenberg and S. B. Spies, South Africa in the 20th Century (Pretoria: J. L. van Schaik Academic, 1993), 465. When the “Information Scandal” broke in 1978, it was speculated that the suspicious murder of NP election candidate Dr Robert Smit and his wife in 1977 had been to prevent Smit from revealing the illegal projects of the Information Department. O’Meara, Forty Lost Years, 214.


40 “A year of chains and changes”, Post, 30 December 1979, 6.
Barber, *South Africa in the Twentieth Century*, 224.

This was a satire of MacMillan’s 1960 “Winds of change” speech. Mosely, “Is the time for blacks coming?”, 5.


Quoted in Barber, *South Africa in the Twentieth Century*, 221.


Swart, “‘Man, Gun and Horse’: Hard Right Afrikaner Masculine Identity in Post-Apartheid South Africa”, 78.


Barber, *South Africa in the Twentieth Century*, 233.


Quoted in Barber, *South Africa in the Twentieth Century*, 234. Also see O’Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 308.


Quoted in Welsh, *The Rise and Fall of Apartheid*, 102.

Barber, *South Africa in the Twentieth Century*, 223.


O’Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 231.

It is unclear how large the group actually was, or whether its membership was predominantly Afrikaans or English-speaking. C. Bauer, “This man is watching you”, *Sunday Express*, 9 May 1982, 5.


L. Bekker, “And the censors behind the scenes”, *Sunday Express*, 1 January 1978, 13.


The term “radicalised” is used here to refer to the increasingly extreme views and methods of the AMS.

C. Bauer, “This man is watching you”, *Sunday Express*, 9 May 1982, 5.


R. Northcott, “38 massage parlours were brothels”, *The Citizen*, 19 June 1978, 1.


The symbol of Baphomet, a composite of a goat’s head and the pentagram, is popularly associated with the modern Church of Satan which was formed in the 1966 by Anton LaVey. See the official Church of Satan website (Available: http://www.churchofsatan.com/home.html).


78 “Are you rocking to the devil’s beat?”, Sunday Tribune, 22 October 1978, 10.


80 Eddie Van Zyl: “As hiedie gerugte waar is, is one grootste vrees bewaarheid dat die vloedgolf van permissiewew material wat in die vorm van boeke, rolprente en langspeelplate die land oorspel now sy tol onder ons jeug begin eis.” See “Studente, skoliere se optrede wek sorg”, Die Vaderland, 17 October 1978, 3.


86 See, for example, “Oud-hoof jag katte vir Satan”, Die Burger, 24 March 1981, 12.


