

“Men of Influence” – The Ontology of Leadership in the 1914 Boer Rebellion

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Abstract This paper raises questions about the ontology of the Afrikaner leadership in the 1914 Boer Rebellion – and the tendency to portray the rebel leadership in terms of monolithic Republicans, followed by those who shared their dedication to returning the state to the old Boer republics. Discussions of the Rebellion have not focused on the interaction between leadership and rank and file, which in part has been obscured by Republican mythology based on the egalitarianism of the Boer commando. This paper attempts to establish the ambitions of the leaders for going into rebellion and the motivations of those who followed them. It traces the political and economic changes that came with union and industrialization, and asks why some influential men felt increasingly alienated from the new form of state structure while others adapted to it. To ascertain the nature of the support for the leaders, the discussion looks at Republican hierarchy and the ideology of patriarchy. The paper further discusses the circumscribed but significant role of women in the Rebellion. This article seeks to contribute to a wider understanding of the history of leadership in South Africa, entangled in the identity dynamics of masculinity, class and race interests.

Man, I can guess at nothing. Each man must think for himself. For myself, I will go where my General goes.

Japie Krynauw (rebel).¹

In 1914 there was a rebellion against the young South African state. In the rural backwoods of the south western Transvaal and northern Free State, eleven thousand farmers and *bywoners* (share-croppers) increasingly alienated the state's failure to alleviate the economic recession rose up against the state. They turned to their old leaders, Republican veterans like Generals Beyers, De Wet, Kemp and Lieutenant-Colonel Maritz, to re-establish a republic. These (chiefly Boer/Afrikaner) men rose against the state for reasons ranging from poverty to nostalgia for a republican lifestyle, before being easily suppressed.² In one significant vignette, a troop of freshly called up soldiers shared the early whispering of rebellion on the train to Potchefstroom in October 1914. The rumours of war were disturbing, the men confused and increasingly anxious. At the station, the local *veldkornet* (veldcornet) and leader of the Rifle Association, Izak Claasen, began to question the *Kommandant* (Commandant), asking where they were headed and why. Tension increased as queries were met with a curt reminder of their orders to proceed and an injunction to obey the govern-

ment. The men kept their eyes on Claasen, their erstwhile leader, as the first span of horses were readied for loading onto the train. Suddenly Claasen shouted: "Those who love me, follow me".³ He remounted and galloped in the direction of Treurfontein. Almost as one man, his former commando members followed him, their horses raising the dust in their haste.⁴

This incident raises questions about the ontology of the leadership on the eve of the Rebellion and generates questions for us on the mechanics of leadership, complicated by the dynamics of class, race and gender. The Rebellion – otherwise of limited interest, with little demographic impact and readily subdued – thus operates as a lens into social dynamics, particularly illuminated in times of civil unrest. There has been a historiographical tendency to portray the rebel leadership in terms of monolithic Republicans, followed by those who shared their dedication to returning the state to the old Boer republics. Leaders are largely described in terms of their organic – almost "mystical" – "influence". Discussions of the Rebellion have not focused on the interaction between leadership and rank and file, at least in part because this relationship has been obscured by Republican mythology which insists on the egalitarianism of the Boer commando.⁵ Yet Claasen's actions and the response of the other men are not anomalies, but variations on the norm. Why in this time of confusion, did the men follow their old leader rather than a government official? Why did Claasen not attempt to use political rhetoric or Republican discourse, but rely solely on the personal loyalty of the men who knew him? Perhaps most important: why did he do it? To establish the motives of the leaders for going into rebellion and the reason why they were followed, the analysis must begin with the structure of pre-Union republican leadership. This discussion traces the political and economic changes that came with union and industrialization, and seeks to establish why some influential men felt increasingly alienated from the new form of state structure while their fellows adapted to it.⁶ Answering the second question must also begin with republican hierarchy and the ideology of patriarchy upon which it was based. The answer lies, in part, in the Boer masculine code, which inculcated a sense of following the "father-figure" in times of confusion. The discussion also looks at the role of women during, and particularly in the immediate aftermath, of the Rebellion, in order to present a more comprehensive analysis.

Leadership before and during the South African War

As Van Onselen, Trapido and others have shown, the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek (Z.A.R.) really only had cohesion as a polity

in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Boer “notables” led the early efforts towards state-building and to create commercial links with the outside world.⁷ The Republican ruling class was more complex than the corrupt oligarchy its historiographical caricature usually portrays. Van Onselen has argued that the “rural bourgeoisie”, which composed Kruger’s government, made “serious, consistent and determined efforts” to come to terms with the forces released by industrial capitalism.⁸ The early republics had seen the reproduction of leadership patterns which had existed in the Cape Colony from which they had come.⁹ In the Dutch settlement, transient Dutch East India Company (D.E.I.C.) officials who held the offices of government, consulted and relied on the wealthy settlers in administration. Wealthy property owners were nominated by the D.E.I.C. to sit on the *Burgerraad* and the *heemraden*. In the old Republics, the *veldkornet* had a multitude of duties.¹⁰ As Van Jaarsveld has established, *Veldkornets*, who had the most local authority, were legally appointed by the *landdrost*, but selected by the *heemraden*. Although the *landdrost* was ostensible head of administration and the *kommandant* the military head, the *veldkornet* was not merely their assistant, but an important official in his own right. In the outlying districts in particular, the *veldkornet* was the first administrator of justice, for both white and black. He could arrest people, levy fines against them and even open suspicious letters. Along with being in charge of organising the commando system, he could excuse anyone from commando duty on grounds of illness. He took responsibility for the health of the community, quarantining people and animals for contagious diseases. He was often expected to ensure the provision and maintenance of roads. He was in charge of inspecting lands, and land was sold under his auspices.¹¹ The position of *veldkornet* was a route to higher office: the president of the ZAR, S.J.P. Kruger; the first premier of the Union, Louis Botha, and, significantly, the two rebel leaders C.R. De Wet and J. de la Rey were all *veldkornets* in their time. The *veldkornets* were policy makers in their own right – their recommendations to the state were taken seriously.¹²

Principally, the *veldkornet* was the link between people and state. Elected by his community, he collected votes for elections, gathered the wishes of his community, while transmitting government proclamations. But he was more than merely a government man in an office, he was their father-figure and protector.¹³ In a case that was not unusual, J.H.G. van der Schyff, *veldkornet* of Lydenburg took in a widow and her seven children, while he organised a farm from the government for her.¹⁴ Only men could fill the positions: it was an important masculine leadership role. The *veldkornet* was a representative of the community and a man of substance.

His role of law-enforcer, military-leader, decision-maker, community protector, liaison with central authority lent him paternal status and authority in the community.

Similarly, a sense of kinship pervaded the commandos of the South African War, where familial relationships had existed between members of “corporalships”.¹⁵ The corporalships – comprising some twelve to eighteen men – often arose, as Deneys Reitz described it, as a “kind of selective process”, with relatives and friends naturally banding together.¹⁶ In November 1901, President Steyn had issued a proclamation that boys of fourteen could be conscripted provided their physique permitted it. General De Wet noted that boys of ten or even younger joined commandos for fear of being sent to the concentration camps. Pretorius has revealed that there were many *penkoppe* (literally: “quillheads”, a name given to young bullocks which are just starting to sprout horns).¹⁷ Pretorius notes that older commando members would often act as “self-righteous patriarchs” towards the younger men, imposing discipline in the same way as their fathers would at home. Younger burghers addressed older ones as “Oom” (uncle), and the older men referred to them as “Neef” (cousin). This was not necessarily age dependent – interestingly Manie Maritz, who was later to co-lead the Rebellion, won the honorific “Oom” – although he was a mere 25 years old in July 1901.

Leadership under Reconstruction, 1902–1910

In the days between the South African War and 1910, the old form of leadership was in crisis, with the former Boer notables under threat as a class.¹⁸ Initially, under the British High Commissioner Lord Milner, there was an attempt to wrest power from the landed notables. His director of the Transvaal Department of Agriculture, F.B. Smith noted in 1908: “If the agriculture of a country is to be developed it must be by radical measures.”¹⁹ Milner attempted to bring a new rural order into being: he imported English settlers into the rural Transvaal and Orange Free State, in an attempt to introduce a class of commercial yeoman farmers.²⁰ In losing control of the state, the Boer notables had lost access to the spoils system and the benefits of office. More importantly, the state began to remove their hold on the people. They lost control of black labour, which had been the sole terrain of the *veldkornet*. The notables were in the process of moving from pastoral to arable producers, with the *bywoner* becoming a hindrance to crop production. The Colonial state introduced land settlement schemes, alternative tenancies for poor Afrikaners, making them “*bywoners* of the state”. This served to erode older patron-client relations, predicated

on paternal class association, which had been the foundation of organic solidarity of the Boer community.²¹

It became clear that the Boer landed aristocracy could not be destroyed, so instead the administration tried co-opt the class for collaboration and support. From 1905 Lord Selborne, Milner's replacement, started to reach political accommodation with the landed Boer notables. It was certain members of this class who were to benefit from state agricultural apparatus. Selborne recognised that they had the power left to resist the state and if placated could be useful in containing both the white and black proletariat. Accordingly, the state created alternative sources of credit, allowing – indeed, encouraging – farmers to commercialise. However, this was not enough to conciliate the leadership. *Het Volk* accepted Selborne's concessions, but there were others who felt the process had been irreversible and yearned for their power. Not all former leaders could be accommodated in the new regime and those that were not began to resent it. Keegan has also pointed out that there is “no direct or unproblematical line of descent between the old landowning class and the new capitalist farmers”, and that the “old Boer landowner and the extensive pastoralist . . . was more likely to be amongst the victims of the industrial revolution than amongst its beneficiaries.”²²

The changes in the state and the difficulty in accepting the new form of government was not only from the side of the dispossessed former leaders. Those who were led in that way began to confront the change in relations. In a portentous moment in 1908, the South African War hero and politician, Schalk Burger, was forced to remind an angry mob of worried farmers in Lydenburg that he had sacrificed much in the war, falling back on his military record and traditional leadership patterns to appease the mob.²³

Union and its Malcontents

The old republican state had worked on a system of local, elected patriarchs – a personal, individualistic hierarchy, based on the commando system. The state had harnessed that personal power, using it to administer, and to control. After unification in 1910 and particularly following the Defence Act of 1912, this system began to “modernise” – institutionalising, bureaucratizing and becoming increasingly impersonal.²⁴ Many were confused by the modernising state, others felt betrayed. The Defence Minister, Jan Smuts noted:

the Act of Union . . . has been the cause of a whole set of new changes in South Africa. Old Governments were swept away, old landmarks to which people looked

were swept away, and the result has been in a certain sense that the people have lost an anchor so to say. No doubt that is one of the causes of the unsettlement that has led to the crises through which we have passed.²⁵

Masculinity theorist, Harry Brod, has noted that as the underlying material or structural bases of gender relations shift, the meaning of masculinity is contested and sometimes even redefined.²⁶ In the shift from pre-capitalist to capitalist there is:

a transfer of power from the hands of individual patriarchs to the institutions of capitalist patriarchy . . . This transfer is part of the widening depersonalization and bureaucratization of human relationships in the development of capitalism, which individuals experience in and as various forms of alienation. Capitalism increasingly creates a gap between institutional and personal power.²⁷

A similar change occurred as the modern South African Union replaced the republics.²⁸ The modernising state eroded the old traditional leadership's power base, institutionalizing processes that were once the province of individual, idiosyncratic leadership styles. Local government officials began to be appointed, rather than elected. The power of the *veldkornet* waned, his *portmanteau* of duties was increasingly taken over by government men. To an extent, people resented the loss of a community representative and father-figure travelling the district on horseback, and his replacement by a desk-bound administrative official. Some of the notables were absorbed into *Het Volk*, and after that the South African Party.²⁹ Symbolic figures could still be harnessed by the state: Meintjes argues that Smuts-Botha [the government] harnessed Koos De la Rey [later an advocate of the 1914 Rebellion, discussed below], while Christiaan De Wet [rebel leader, discussed below] was harnessed by Hertzog and Steyn [politicians in opposition].³⁰

Adding to the changes wrought by the modernising state, the increasing institutionalisation, the breakdown of the traditional world, urbanisation, and the changing position of young women (discussed below), was the immediate confusion over whether South Africa would enter the War on Britain's behalf. Rumours spread rapidly, generated by a handful of German agents and a larger body of anti-government men, and neither confirmed nor denied by the strangely silent state. Boer males living on the periphery of the new locus of central state power in Pretoria, began to turn to alternative authorities to express their grievances and to gain support. In the areas outside of the Reef and in the western-Transvaal and the northern Free State particularly, farmers and *bywoners* who were alienated by the state's failure to alleviate the economic recession, turned, not to the government, but to their old

commando leaders. There had been a move toward the Labour Party, but this was curtailed by the burst of extreme jingoism within the party at the onset of the war.

Leadership on Trial

A study of the men who were placed on trial for treason or sedition after the Rebellion, reveals much about the structure of the leadership. The notion of the leadership by “men of influence” was used by both Prosecution and Defence. Dr Krause, in his defence of the rebel leader De Wet, urged the court to remember that people were as yet unacquainted with the party system of government: “It is an historical fact, that parties grouped themselves together, in the early days, not so much on principles as on personal leadership.”³¹ Although party-politics had replaced semi-feudal allegiances, men often nonetheless referred to themselves as a “Botha-man” or a “Hertzog-man”. Leadership was still linked to the *man*, even if it was just in the imagination – and often more materially, as in the semi-feudal relationship poor white group maintained with De Wet, which is discussed below. The prosecution utilised the same idea of leadership, but he argued that the leaders of the Rebellion were twice as responsible, as they had abused their positions and lead so many astray.

The trials reveal the contradiction in Republican ideology about leadership: all men are equal, but some more equal than others. While metaphors of republican brotherhood abounded, there were still personal followings around symbolic figures, and some men were father-figures. This was expressed by Japie Krynauw, a rebel, whose words contain the central contradiction of Republican masculinity – the way it revolves around leadership: “Man, I can guess nothing. Each man must think for himself. For myself, I will go where my General goes”.³² In this revealing vignette, he urges that each man think for himself, then tellingly admits that he will blindly follow his general.

There were two different levels of leadership: the iconic figures, like De la Rey and De Wet and the less symbolic, practical level of traditional, largely military, leaders. The leadership made use of the unusual, spiritual figures, like populist Boer prophet, the *Siener* of Lichtenburg.³³ The top tier carried much ideological weight. They were often described as “father of the nation” (which should be seen alongside references to iconic female leadership as “mothers of the nation, discussed below). Some notables, like ex-President (of the Orange Free State) Steyn and General Hertzog (South African War celebrity and rising Nationalist politician), were not actively involved in the Rebellion, but were seen to sanction it,

by their refusal to condemn it. The second tier was more practical, based on old administrative structures – like *veldkornets*.

The Iconic Leadership

*Q. If General de la Rey had told you to hoist the flag [go into rebellion], would you have followed him?*³⁴

*A. General de la Rey was my leader. He had great influence in the district, and if he had said so, I may possibly have gone. We had unlimited confidence in him.*³⁵

The top rebel leadership have explored their own motivations in autobiographical works.³⁶ The top rank of leaders were emblematic – their “images” or ritualised personae carried great weight. These figures had personal followers.³⁷ Even the contemporary British press understood this phenomenon: “But the backveld Boer . . . dearly loves a hero.”³⁸ They were loyal not only to the man, but to what the man represented. Thus leaders could be taken as metonymic for a nostalgic republicanism.³⁹ Meintjes notes that De la Rey was not a politician and his hold on people, like that of De Wet, was emotional. They were men to be “proud of in the growing concept of Afrikanerdom.”⁴⁰ Leadership was individual, charismatic and deeply ingrained in the popular consciousness. The rebel leader, General Manie Maritz, for example, had just prior to the Rebellion (when he was still in the South African Defence Force), young men coming under his command as Staff Officer, who had sung his praises in folksongs as children (during the South African War, 1899–1902).⁴¹ A popular dance melody included the couplet:

“Manie Maritz with his black moustache,
Completely surrounds the British soldiers.”⁴²

There was no single typical representation of a leader’s appearance. He could be genteel like De la Rey, with his suits made at the upmarket department store Garlicks and his disapproval of gin, or rough like Coen Brits, who drank heavily and was proficient at distance spitting. Some were well-educated like Kemp, while others like Wolmarans, were virtually illiterate. They did not all conform to the dour, sober stereotype – Maritz, for example, was a flamboyant dresser, affecting a German-style uniform. Icons were consciously manipulated to make the personal political and the political personal. It is significant that, in 1906, when a con-artist named Durand tried to whip people up in to rebellion, he used the popular names: Beyers, Kemp, Schalk Burger, Genneral Viljoen.⁴³ De la Rey was manipulated posthumously by De Wet, playing on

his status and the duty owed to De la Rey's wife. At the funeral (which immediately preceded the outbreak of open Rebellion), De Wet noted:

We stand here at the grave of De la Rey. Who does not feel this tragic loss for South Africa? But no one feels the loss like his wife. What can we do to comfort her? Only God can do that. But if there is something we can do, then General De la Rey was worth it – one of the bravest of the brave, one of the most trusty of the trustworthy.⁴⁴

In the early days of the Rebellion, in August, “call up” was done verbally in the name of De la Rey.⁴⁵ After his death, from October 1914, General De Wet became the mobilising icon and the message spread from farm to farm: “De Wet is riding again!”⁴⁶

The Backbone of the Rebellion

The second leadership tier, “men of influence”, were usually landowners, local patriarchs elected to the office of *veldkornet*. Van Jaarsveld has demonstrated the power of the *veldkornets*, as discussed above. An analysis of the group tried with Kemp sheds light on the second tier leadership. Their average age of the 46 was 38.5, the median 38, the mode 42 – this was therefore not a revolution by *Young Turks*. Their profession was preponderantly farming – only one man was a clerk, and one a builder/contractor. They were tried as “men of influence”.

Trapido notes that post-Anglo-Boer War the landed notables were “shorn of their commmando system”, both by the defeat of their state and by the decline of the social relationships which made it possible.⁴⁷ But this is a premature notice of death for a system of leadership. Commando networks were re-activated in the industrial disputes of 1913 and 1914. Certain traditional leaders tentatively began to reconstitute their dormant political networks. Meetings were held frequently at the houses of farmers. The men attending, as a police report noted, were principally those of “local influence and fairly good standing, such men as J.J.v Niekerk, “an ex-*Veldkornet*,” and J.N.R. Joubert, “an ex-scab-inspector”.⁴⁸ They gathered in bitter semi-secret and shared their grievances, as their informal networks grew.


Many were disappointed in their new positions in the Union. M.J. Krogh, for example, was resentful and joined the rebellion because he felt the government had done him out of a job. He maintained that he should have been commandant – but in his band of rebels “I hold a much higher position now”.⁴⁹ Some ex-notables predicated their rebellion on simple envy. The community was being broken

up – some went up, some went down. Class differences were becoming increasingly overt. There was a sense of deprivation, which escalated into rebellion. The rebel leadership were largely those men with whom the new state had not reached an accommodation – or sufficient accommodation. In many ways the state did act against this old guard, who did not fit easily within the new state blueprint, but the government was also the scapegoat for other forces. The state acted, in part, as a political lightning rod, receiving the focussed blame for the effects of spreading capitalism.

As the graph indicates, it was not a young man’s rebellion. Clearly the leadership was not comprised of young men in their twenties railing against an *ancien regime*. But, interestingly, a man as young as 26 was said to be possessed of enough “influence” to stand trial.

Most of the leadership was concentrated in specific areas, mainly in Lichtenburg and Potchefstroom. Their origins, however, were disparate – some came from the Cape and most were not born in the area in which they lived. This is a highly significant point: it illustrates that leadership on this level need not necessarily be hereditary, in the sense that these men probably did not follow their fathers into local positions of power. It also suggests that the men did not necessarily grow up together but formed their networks at an adult level.

Men of influence derived their power from their wealth in land, their military office or record or their kinship ties. There was no simple linear relationship between land and status. Position did



Graph showing age distribution of rebel leadership tried with Kemp.⁵⁰

not rest solely in land-holding, possibly because of the poor productivity of Transvaal agriculture, but most of the leaders were farmers. As previously discussed, Keegan has shown that there was no direct relationship between the old landowning class and the new capitalist farmers.⁵¹ Both military record and position were also important. As Hertzog noted after the Rebellion: "These 200 to 300 imprisoned men were mostly leaders in the Boer war, and would never lose the respect of the Dutch people."⁵² Similarly, the SAP Inspector noted of one rebel Christian Mussman: "He was a field cornet . . . He is a farmer at Matjesspruit I consider him a man of influence, in virtue of his office".⁵³ Another rebel leader, Jack Smith, was a *veldkornet*, and head of the Rifle Association.⁵⁴ Also, Jan Cronje was a leadership figure as an influential man as a son of the old Republican General Piet Cronje. He was a *veldkornet*, and was farming for General De la Rey.⁵⁵ Kinship did play a role: familial prominence was often a criterion for local status, as in the case of Kruger's grandson, Pieter Gert Wessel Grobler, for example, who was a member of the *Volksraad* and a farmer. The court dealt with the local prominence of the accused, and said "his mere presence was sufficient to encourage them to go into rebellion. In view of his position he was certainly guilty of hostile intent . . ."⁵⁶ Although he did not actually fight with them and moreover, as his advocate Tielman Roos, said in mitigation of sentence, he also lost the local directorship of S.A. Mutual worth £160 a year and had forfeited his seat in parliament owing to not attending the last session, he nevertheless received two years and a fine of £500.

As noted above, an analysis of Kemp's co-accused revealed that the profession of rebel-leadership was farming. There was a strong connection between land and power. Under republican rule, *veldkornets* had been in a particularly good position to accumulate land. Landowners established an informal network which supplied them with information and furthered their land-holding.⁵⁷ Those without land were neglected. At one of the trials, a clerk named Pieter Mussman, mentioned above, although a *veldkornet*, was noted to be not as influential as a farmer, *because of his landlessness*.⁵⁸ This correlates with the fact that all attempts to re-form the so-called degraded, emasculated poor whites were based on attempts to return him to the land, right up until the 1930s. Status was acquired from wealth in cattle, allowing the owner to settle down and hire others to do the herding. Large herds allowed such settlement – and in a time of flux, with almost constant movement in search of new pastures among the burgher farmers – few other people settled down long enough to gain local prestige.⁵⁹ During the Rebellion, the Government made an attack on this status. The

Government wired that the cattle of the leading rebels could be confiscated and used on commando.⁶⁰ This may have been to win support by giving people the immediate gratification of wealth in an economic crisis.⁶¹

Juta, the magistrate of rebel hot-spot Lichtenburg, noted that his community was ignorant but largely law abiding and that it was not the Government's decision on German South West Africa (G.S.W.A.) that intensified feeling, but a meeting organised by Beyers, De Wet, Kemp, Van Broekhuizen.⁶² This illustrates a common point, that it was not so much the G.S.W.A. expedition but *the way their leadership reacted to it*, that galvanised the countryside. It is significant that the rank and file witnesses use names almost *causally* – their discussion of their part in the Rebellion are scanty, instead the *names* of leaders, the *men* themselves are given as the reason.⁶³ Significantly, the rebel newspaperman, Harm Oost used a similar reason for following De Wet: "Where the General dies, I will die too. And where the General is victorious, there shall I be victorious."⁶⁴

Interestingly, it would appear that it was not the poor white who was drawn by the individual personalities as much as the smaller farmers, younger men of higher class.⁶⁵ It may be speculated that the poor whites were too alienated from the system already.⁶⁶ The operation of the leadership at grassroots level in the Rebellion is illustrated in Izak Claasen's report, which presents the onset of Rebellion from the perspective of a member of the second tier. Claasen was a *veldkornet*, a man strongly loyal to General De la Rey.⁶⁷ Just before the outbreak of overt hostilities between Germany and Britain, Claasen was repeatedly asked by men in his neighbourhood to ask "Oom Koos" [De La Rey] how to behave in this new context. De la Rey urged cautious appraisal of the situation. Later, Claasen received a letter from De la Rey requesting that he assemble his men for a meeting at Coligne. Claasen immediately spread the word that the local men would be expected to arrive with horse and shot and eight days provisions. De la Rey simply told the assembly to await his further command. Claasen subsequently received a message from Botha to appear before him in Pretoria and, alarmed, proceeded directly to De la Rey – who assured him he would be protected. "Oom Koos said that they will shortly gather together and that he will defend me."⁶⁸ De la Rey then spoke of the betrayal by the Smuts-Botha government, of Smuts betraying his people in 1912 and now Botha also turning his back.⁶⁹ Claasen returned to the men of his area and reassured them that "the General [De la Rey] would tell them what to do upon his return".⁷⁰ Then he received the news of De la Rey's death. The rumours reached the local men who came singly and in pairs to

consult with Claasen. At the funeral, speeches by Beyers and De Wet made Claasen doubt that “Oom Koos’s” death had been an accident, but rather part of a government plot. He was called up and went to Lichtenburg, where he was invited to dinner by a fellow officer in a festive, indeed bibulous, mood.⁷¹ Hints of *ad hoc* promotion to *Kommandant* reached him by word of mouth, while he networked and consulted with friends and acquaintances. Upon being called up for service by the state, he led his followers into the quasi-spontaneous rebellion described in this paper’s opening vignette.⁷²

Family Men

Leadership was largely a public projection of the relations of the domestic realm. As previously discussed, the paternal relations of commando had reflected patriarchal societal relations – *ooms* and *neefs*, fathers and sons.⁷³ A commentator has, for example, observed of the commando system: “The nephews and brothers are placed under the control of an older family member, the corporal.”⁷⁴ Public expressions of loyalty were made in terms of the father and son relationship. At Steyn’s funeral, for example, in the year following the Rebellion, De Wet noted: “All the burghers know that in the last war Martinus Theunis Steyn was [my] father and he was accorded the respect a child accord’s to his father.”⁷⁵ The 1912 Defence Act appeared to be an assault on Republican masculinity.⁷⁶ The commando-system derived much of its power by reflecting the domestic situation. The system was re-activated in 1913 industrial action. After 1913, and in the build up to the Great War, leaders of the Rebellion invoked the familial nature of commando, the band of brothers, to inspire rebellion. At the meeting following De la Rey’s death, De Wet said:

I think of our deceased brother. We are used to saying “burgher” or “brother”. If there is someone here present who is not a brother, let him leave.⁷⁷

Boer domestic life was patriarchal. Patriarchy can assume an amorphous quality causing some theorists to refuse use of the term.⁷⁸ Although the term is admittedly often used in an ahistorical way, this study requires a term which describes the Boer family structure, with a father figure at the head of the house. This study does accept, however, that the term “patriarchy” is descriptive, rather than explanatory and to assume it as paradigmatic, *petitio principii*, is to assume as true that which is to be proven by argument. Patriarchal refers here to a family structure in which fathers control the lives and labour of family members, children, slaves,

servants, and wives.⁷⁹ Moreover, in the ideological realm, the notion of a *Volksvader* and *Volksmoeder* operating in complementary roles has been shown to have been a powerful nationalist image.⁸⁰ Leadership, particularly through the commando system, which served to buttress this notion of control, was a projection of the domestic realm. Why were certain men followed, what was the societal, structural basis for it? Commando structure and the paternalism of domestic life made men used to following their “father’s” word. The “men of influence” were, in essence, a community fathers, operating on the same domestic principles which was extended into the public arena. Grundlingh has shown, for example, that General De Wet maintained a paternal relationship with the poor white community, the “Kopjes (Koppies) Nedersetting”.⁸¹ In 1910, the government had assumed formal control, but De Wet retained his links with regular visits and held several meetings in September and October 1914. It was not surprising, as Grundlingh observes, that he was able to win wide rebel support in the settlement, as an extension of his almost feudal patronage system, with himself as *paterfamilias*. This should be understood in a broader gendered context, incorporating the role of women in the Rebellion, because – as Bradford has demonstrated – the omission of women produces not only an incomplete picture, but distorts the fabric of the historical event.⁸²

“Rebels in Petticoats”

In a revealing cameo, Hendrik, the youngest son of one of the rebel leader De Wet, mentioned above, although still in short pants at the outbreak of the Rebellion, was nevertheless keen to join the commando and fulfil his ideals of becoming a man.⁸³ Believing him to be too young, General De Wet wanted to leave the boy at home. But his wife, Cornelia “Tant [Aunt] Nelie” De Wet, would not hear of it. She insisted on sending her son to war, saying publicly to her husband: “My old husband, if your life is not too good to offer up for your people, then neither is Hendrik’s.”⁸⁴

When Cornelia De Wet insisted on Hendrik’s joining up, she was both *validating* and *maintaining her social location* as a civic republican mother. An Afrikaner Nationalist culture-broker, Harm Oost, noted of this incident that De Wet, known from the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) as a redoubtable Boer woman, was a laudable example for her *volk* (nation) sisters.⁸⁵ Whether as publicity stunt or expression of genuine sentiment, her action is significant in what it reveals of the socio-political role played by Boer women and their relationship with the state.⁸⁶ It is part of a frequently repeated theme. Kitchener, for example, who was in charge of British mili-

tary operations in South Africa during the South African War, deplored “[t]he Boer woman in the refugee camp who slaps her protruding belly at you and shouts “When all our men are gone, these little Khakis will fight you . . .”⁸⁷ It has been noted that the tradition of militarised citizenship, of which Boer republicanism was part, has promoted a narrative in which women are either “mirrors to male war” (as civic cheerleaders) or a “collective Other”, embodying higher virtues and softer values, and as such, anti-war or subversive of *realpolitik*.⁸⁸ Certainly in the Boer Rebellion, some women acted as “mirrors” and some, while sympathetic to the rebel cause, called for an end to violence. There was, however, another, and separate, dimension to their participation.

Women who identified themselves with the rebel side played three roles. First, many women adopted the attitude of republican “cheerleaders”, encouraging and inspiring their men to rebel. On the eve of Rebellion, a contemporary noted that among the Boers, “women as well as men know how to approach extremes of national inflexibility” and the “intensely passionate patriotism” of both genders was responsible for the 1914 Rebellion.⁸⁹ He noted particularly, the power of the women’s encouragement: How, then, could the young bloods turn a deaf ear to the seductive call of the veldt (“Freedom at hand!”), egged on as they were by the blandishments of their womenfolk’s language?⁹⁰

The converse side of this cheerleading, was a “white feather” function, in which men who refused to rebel or volunteered for active service were publicly castigated by women.⁹¹ Secondly, a small faction of women played a practical, auxiliary role in the physical rebellion itself, as go-betweens, providers of food, hoarders of weapons and purveyors of war news. Thirdly, a large group of women played a significant role in the post-Rebellion Women’s Demonstration of 1915. The Demonstration was pro-active, women-lead, and appealed, with its militant nationalism, to higher, but not “softer” values.

There exists a broad consensus among historians that there was a strong tradition of Boer women’s involvement in the political realm, although without formal rights.⁹² However, the degree of these women’s involvement is much debated historiographically. There has been a grudging acknowledgement of women’s political role by the Liberal school, which concedes that Boer women exercised a “petticoat influence” on their men.⁹³ The Afrikaner nationalist historians have argued much the same, but in more depth, creating the idealised *volksmoeder* with her origins in apologetic Dutch-South African historical writings of the nineteenth century.⁹⁴ Western suffragette feminism was not purportedly part of the Boer woman’s intellectual environment. Merriman noted that

“Oddly enough in South Africa the women have always exercised a great influence. I say “oddly”, because they are so utterly opposed to the modern view of “women’s rights”.⁹⁵ Van Rensburg noted that Boer women would not assimilate overseas feminism, but did play an influential role in times of national crises.⁹⁶ The Afrikaanse Christelike Vrouevereniging (Afrikaans Christian Women’s Association, A.C.V.V.) resolved in 1906 to ask that parliament not give women the vote.⁹⁷ Women, however, only got the vote in 1930 – and then it was only white women.⁹⁸ An outline has been sketched of Afrikaner women’s limited but purportedly morally powerful role in the political realm.

An image of martyred Boer womanhood came from the concentration camps of the South African War, in which 26,000 inmates (mainly women and children) are believed to have died. This image of Afrikaner womanhood – the *volksmoeder* (mother of the nation) – was further articulated and promoted through the erection of the Nasionale Vrouemonument in Bloemfontein (National Women’s Monument) in 1913 in Bloemfontein, on the eve of the Rebellion. The monument represented the graphic icons of Afrikaner suffering: the emaciated child, incarceration in the concentration camps, ruins of burnt homesteads.⁹⁹ The iconography drew heavily on the ideology martyrdom, stoicism, and loyalty.¹⁰⁰ Revisionist scholars, however, like Louise Vincent, Elsabe Brink and Andrea Van Niekerk, have questioned the hegemony of the *volksmoeder* ideal, demonstrating that Afrikaner working class women did not automatically accept the prescribed role, and that battles over class and gender relations were inextricably connected to the creation of Afrikaner identity.¹⁰¹ Even gender sensitive scholars, like Cheryl Walker, have not recognised the large civic space for women in civic unrest. In discussing the Boer tradition, Walker notes: “The political culture that developed in the white settler societies of southern Africa was a thoroughly male one . . . Settler society rested on a military foundation and war was the province of men.”¹⁰² But war was not solely the province of men in the militarised republican state. The social historian, Meintjes notes that “At a time when European women had few rights and little say, the Boer woman had exceptionable privileges which she had earned through fighting side by side with her menfolk.”¹⁰³ This is hyperbolic, as women usually adopted non-combative roles, but it was not necessarily a passive role.

The primary active role of women during the Rebellion was supportive and infra-structural. Women kept the farms going, while attempting to provide both physical and spiritual sustenance. Morale was kept high by symbolic acts, like the waving of hand-sewn *vierkleurs* (republican flags) at public gatherings. Inter-

estingly, explicit links were made and articulated by the women themselves between the rebels and previous Boer “martyrs”. Christina Joubert, of Frankfort, after having had her house searched by government troops during the Rebellion, wrote to her husband:

Now, my husband, don't worry. The almighty God will protect me and my children. Whatever happens to you, yes, even if you die, like the five heroes of Slagtersnek [a rebellion against British by Boers in 1815], like Gideon Scheepers [executed by the British in the South African war] . . . and all the martyrs who gave their lives for our beloved nation, then you will die like a man. I know you always fought and struggled like a man . . . I will struggle even if I have to die, with my children.¹⁰⁴

And it was not only immediate family but *any* rebel that received support. A rebel, Harm Oost, noted an oft-repeated phenomenon. After being separated from De Wet after Mushroom Valley, he sought refuge in a local homestead at Doornfontein. He approached the woman who appeared to be in charge, saying with a defiance born of desperation: “I am a rebel. And you all?” Martha Wolmarans replied simply: “We too.”¹⁰⁵ She was a woman who had survived the concentration camps, but lost a child to them, and she would not tolerate “n kakie” [a man wearing khaki uniform] in her house, be it Englishman or government soldier. Like many other women, she looked after the rebel, although he was a stranger.

Some women left their homes and joined the rebellion actively, though in a non-combative role. A “Mrs van Alten”, for example, was a shadowy figure during the Rebellion. She appears to have run a small-scale smuggling operation for the rebels, providing food and basic necessities. She helped one rebel escape to the relative safety of Natal, by supplying him with a train ticket and a pair of false spectacles. She also visited captured rebels in gaol, urging them to write down their thoughts. The support network of women extended into the post-Rebellion world with their husbands in gaol. They smuggled food and medicine, cooked newspapers into cakes, and carried messages.¹⁰⁶

Eight years after the Rebellion, in the 1922 Strike on the Witwatersrand, women joined in the urban commando movement, assaulting the police and disciplining strike-breakers bodily.¹⁰⁷ The Rebellion, however, saw few such incidents of physical violence by women. A “Petticoat commando” of women tried to disturb the peace in Bloemfontein, but a single fire engine hose was sufficient to dispel them.¹⁰⁸ Government troops reported only one incident of a woman brandishing what they thought was a gun.¹⁰⁹ Women did, however, initiate action that was not purely passive and supportive.

The Women's Mass Demonstration

The rebel leader De Wet was sentenced to six years imprisonment and a fine of £2,000 for his role in the Rebellion. Two days after the pronouncement of sentence, two eminent Afrikaner women Hendrina Joubert and F.G. "Nettie" Eloff had an open letter published in various newspapers calling for the women of all four provinces to take part in a "monster vrouwenbetoging" [mass women's demonstration] during which the Governor-General would be asked to set aside De Wet's sentence. The opening address was to the "fellow-sisters and daughters of South Africa".¹¹⁰ In the open letter the image of the *volksmoeder* is clearly articulated and laid claim to: She contends she saw "the first Afrikaner blood flow on the breast of South Africa". She helped "make bullets in the fight against the barbarians". She knew the "land when you could not leave your wagon without a gun". She helped "maintain Boer manners. She helped exterminate the wild animals to help prepare the way for civilisation". She was often the "only woman in the war lager. More than once she was able to give a soldier coffee and food, and care for his wounds."

The women who organized the Demonstration were women of "influence", powerful, older women, who formed part of a leadership network that paralleled that of the men's.¹¹¹ They did not have a clearly articulated network like that of their male counterparts in the commando system, but women had begun to organise in a number of ways.¹¹² The previously mentioned A.C.V.V., for example, was established in 1904 for the "preservation of our nation, of our language and the support of our church."¹¹³ The Suid-Afrikaanse Vroufederasie (South African Women's Federation, S.A.V.F) was initiated a month later in 1904, by the wife of Louis Botha, president of the young Union of South Africa. The wife of South African War leader Steyn, mentioned above, started Oranje Vroue-Vereniging in Bloemfontein in 1908. The organisations concentrated on welfare work, charity and education. Women, like their male counterparts, were local leaders by virtue of their kinship links, possession of land, age, wealth, and renown – the latter often based on the war record of their husband coupled with their own war effort during the 1899–1902 conflict. They were said to come from the "first families of the land".¹¹⁴

This leadership network was an old guard of Boer matriarchs, wives of generals for the most part. The leaders of the Demonstration were not average Boer women and cannot be read as a representative slice of Afrikaner womanhood. Jacoba De la Rey had been incarcerated as an "incurable" during the South African War, choosing to join her husband in the field rather than a concentra-

tion camp. She was widely reported to be the most bitter of the *biterteinders*. Cornelia De Wet, for example, had been singled out as an "incorrigible" during the South African War.¹¹⁵ After the peace treaty of Vereeniging, she noted: "A terrible peace! I would rather see my husband in his grave than that our weapons be laid down."¹¹⁶ Another leader was stern, bespectacled Hendrina Joubert, called "the general in petticoats".¹¹⁷ The biographer of her husband, General Piet Joubert, has noted that "the true spirit of a Commandant-General was not in Joubert but in his wife".¹¹⁸ Hendrina loved fire-arms, commando life and the odd battle. She accompanied her husband and shared his war experiences, while briskly rearing a family.¹¹⁹ At age 85 she was redoubtable, visiting rebel leaders in gaol, bearing pancakes. During the Rebellion she had wanted to travel by ambulance and join the rebel leader General Beyers; permission was refused by the premier, Louis Botha, himself.¹²⁰ Another leader, mentioned above, was Nettie Eloff, who was from a well-connected family and widely considered to be the former Republican President Paul Kruger's favourite grandchild.

Joubert and Eloff placed advertisements in the newspapers calling for the "mothers and daughters of South Africa" to gather in Pretoria, to plead with the government for the release of General De Wet and his fellow prisoners. Almost seven thousand women arrived in Pretoria on the 4 August. They marched in rows of seven, silently, to the Union Buildings. Young men walked on the outskirts of the rows in case of violence. They marched, divided by their provinces, the Cape Province first, then the Orange Free State, then Natal, and finally the Transvaal. They gathered in the amphitheatre of the Union Buildings, for a prayer. Then a deputation of influential women, including Joubert, Eloff, Kestell, and Steyn presented a petition to Lord Buxton, the Governor-General.¹²¹

In total 11,000 men took part in the Rebellion, but an astonishing 6,000 women gathered for a single march. Moreover, in the little towns and villages of the Transvaal and Free State, the Demonstration was enacted in microcosm.¹²² The rhetoric implied that women should stand by their fatherland, just as they would by their father or husband.¹²³ The young nationalist mouthpiece *Die Brandwag* noted:

As a flood invades an area of land, slowly, confident that it is irresistible, so the crowd invaded the semi-circle in front of the Union Buildings and powerless, mute, the mockery and hate retreated and dared not utter a disruptive sound.¹²⁴

Joubert noted proudly: "The daughters of South Africa have awakened."¹²⁵ The Transvaal committees united to form the *Nasionale*

Vroueparty (National Women's Party): to work for freeing the rebels, caring for the families of the rebels, raising bursaries for children, and to support the newly created National Party, which focused more exclusively on Afrikaner political advancement. In Pretoria a Women's Committee was created to stand by the rebel leaders and ease their lot. The first congress was held in 1916 in Johannesburg, with the wife of the rebel Van Broekhuizen as chairperson, and Johanna Brandt as secretary.

The Women's Demonstration reflects the significant, albeit highly circumscribed, role of women in the political arena. Afrikaner nationalism was "imagined", to use Anderson's term, in terms of maleness: but this operated on two levels. "All nationalisms are gendered . . ." but as Enloe remarked, "nationalisms have typically sprung up from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope."¹²⁶ Here a burgeoning nationalism was articulated by women – admittedly only uneasily republican and certainly not egalitarian. Their positions were framed in the discourse of their role as women rather than citizens, but they were nonetheless acting in their own right. In a significant step for the Afrikaner Nationalist woman, she began to define her nation: "those who call themselves rebels are my people".¹²⁷ Significantly, the nationalist politician Dr D.F.Malan declared later that this demonstration answered the question as to whether the Afrikaner "should persevere and stay a nation".¹²⁸

Although there were no women who went on commando against the state, there were, however, women who considered themselves to be rebels. After the Rebellion, with the Mass Demonstration, they couched their actions in traditional, patriarchal, *volksmoeder*, suffering, martyred discourse – but their post-Rebellion actions were radical, albeit limited. In essence: they had come to free a man. The discourse of this Women's Demonstration is highly revealing. It was a specific post-rebellion development, an event solely engineered by women "of influence", largely participated in by women alone and with ramifications for the entire nationalist movement of both Afrikaner men and women. It was an uneasy "familial" republicanism – no call was made for female suffrage, their demands were couched in terms of their relative position to men – as wives, mothers and daughters of the state.

The Melancholia of the General

Never throughout his trial was De Wet referred to as "General", the name that was once almost universally accorded him.¹²⁹ De Wet was afflicted with a terrible melancholy for which his doctor could find no physical reason. During the Rebellion, De Wet had felt "younger",

his kind of leadership was relevant once again.¹³⁰ In this way the Rebellion was about reasserting old codes, old forms of leadership in an attempt to assert a social understanding of identity, particularly masculinity, that was being challenged by the emergence of the modern state, the development of industry, the commoditization of land, the disruption of the family. The suppression of the Rebellion signalled the end for De Wet's style of leadership.

In gaol, the leaders began to turn other things. The redoubtable General Kemp took to knitting socks. Both the first and second tier of leadership underwent ontological changes. The top leadership of the Rebellion suffered: De la Rey was dead, Beyers was drowned in the Vaal, Maritz was in exile and De Wet and Kemp were in gaol.¹³¹ Effective silencing measures were imposed by the government. Once released from gaol, rebels were forbidden from holding public office. They were prohibited from holding political gatherings and giving speeches.¹³² Their movements were controlled: each was issued with a card, which had to be stamped by the local magistrate if permission was granted for travel. The economic and political power base of the old notables who had not been absorbed into party-politics, had crumbled.

The second leadership tier began to operate increasingly through the National Party. As the Afrikaner Nationalist movement gained momentum, culture brokers increasingly controlled the imagination of the Afrikaner. One rebel noted this move from old-fashioned Republican leadership forms which relied heavily on the oral dissemination of information, which limited influence to a specific locality, to a broader literate circle: "Rebellion taught the Afrikaner to read".¹³³ The localised, hands-on approach of the *veldkornets* changed to a wider nationalist movement with Hertzog's National Party at the helm. Rebels like Kemp, Piet Grobler, Wessel Wessels, and Chris Muller joined forces with the National Party. Although it was the end of a kind of leadership in the mainstream, there has been a dormant residuum, a hankering for the old ways. In 1936, one of the "men of influence", Piet Grobler, proposed the abolition of the parliamentary system.¹³⁴ The next public uprising of the disaffected was in 1922 Rand Strike, when the commando system was imported into the mines by the urbanising Afrikaner. These commandos fused Boer military traditions with combat experience from WWI and trade union militancy.¹³⁵ The structure was changed, with, for example, women commandos and an urban, rather than rural, context. Similar personal leadership was later visible in the *Broederbond* and in the fascist movements, but never again was it so mainstream.

The old republican state had worked on a system of local, elected patriarchs – a personal, individualistic hierarchy. The state had

harnessed that personal power, using it to administer the young state. After an assault on the ontology of leadership during Reconstruction and Unification in 1910 this system began to “modernise” – institutionalising, bureaucratizing and becoming increasingly impersonal. The leadership that was the backbone of the Rebellion was *fin-de-siecle*. After the Rebellion, there was change in the ontology of leadership – a change in both the people who were leaders and the manner in which they lead. Increasingly, leadership was re-formed along constitutional party-political lines, with only occasional deviations. The internment of the rebels, their official silencing during the war years, and the inexorable machine of the capitalising, modernising state meant their end.

A final cameo epitomised the end of a particular kind of leadership invested in the old commando system and embedded in a lifestyle that was rapidly disappearing. Near the end of the Rebellion, General De Wet decided his only hope lay in joining Kemp across the Kalahari, in German territory. At Maquassi, however, heavy rains turned sand into mud, into which his men’s horses’ hooves sank.¹³⁶ On the trail of his mounted commando was a petrol-driven fleet, a caravan of cars under Colonel Saker. At a little oasis at Waterbury, the cars converged, and defeat was complete.

General De Wet’s comment is, perhaps, the best metaphor for the end of Republican leadership, the end of the commando system as a viable entity, brought about by the modernising state and all it entailed. He said wearily: “It was the motor-cars that beat me.”¹³⁷

Notes

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¹ “Man, ek kan niks raai nie, elke man moet vir homself denk. Ek, voor my, sal ons Generaal volg waar hy gaan.” A 947 *Die Suid-Afrikaanse Protes 1914 – Wedevaringe en herinneringe van J.D.T. (Japie) Krynauw*. p6.

² See also John Bottomley, “The South African Rebellion: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whiteness”, African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, Seminar Paper, June, (1982). T.R.H. Davenport, “The South African Rebellion”, *English Historical Review*, 78, (1963); N.G. Garson, “South Africa and World War I”, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, VIII, (1979); G A.M. Grundlingh, “Die rebellie van 1914: ‘n historiografiese verkenning”, *Kleio*, xi, 1&2, 1979; D. Scholtz, *Die Rebellie, 1914–1915* (Johannesburg, Voortrekkerpers, 1942) and S.B. Spies, “The Rebellion in South Africa 1914–1915”, (MA Witwatersrand University, 1962); Sandra Swart, “A Boer and his Gun and his wife are Three Things Always Together”: Republican masculinity and the 1914 Rebellion, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 24, no.4, 1998 and Sandra Swart, “Desperate men – Rebellion and the politics of poverty in the 1914 Rebellion”, *South African Historical Journal*, 42, 2001 and

Sandra Swart, "You were men in war time' – the manipulation of gender identity in war and peace", *Scientia Militaria*, vol. 28(2), December, 1998.

³ "Die wat my lief het, volg my!" N.A. Coetzee, "Rebellie: die Herinneringe van PGW Roets", *Historia*, 9, 1964, p118. Although Coetzee refers to "Claase", it was probably Izak Claasen, the local *veldkornet*, later tried as a rebel. Claasen himself remembers saying: "Burgers die van julle wat nie op die bloed van Ons Voortrekkers en ons vrouens en kinders wat in die kampe vermoor is wil trap nie . . . volg dan vir my." This is contradicted by all the eyewitness reports and is probably confused with his memories of discussions with De la Rey, who used the same words. A 1449, "Verklaring van Izak Edward Claasen".

⁴ Personal correspondence with N.A. Coetzee, who interviewed Roets before his death. Others have recorded the same story of Commandant Claasen. S.C. 1–15, Testimony of C.E. Schulenburg, p169 and S.C. 1–15, Testimony of Commandant H.J. Lombard, p165. Claasen was veldkornet of Lichtenburg. He was born in the Orange Free State in 1872, which made him 42 at the time of the Rebellion. He fought under Genl De la Rey in the Anglo-Boer War. According to his own testimony at the outbreak of WW I, he was requested by many burghers to speak to De la Rey. De la Rey used him to call a meeting, at which De la Rey mentioned in elliptical fashion, changes to come. He was tried with Kemp and 45 others. A 1449. 2. "Verklaring van Izak Edward Claasen".

⁵ This is true particularly of the Afrikaner Nationalist school, see Chapter One, "Regarding the Rebellion" in Sandra Swart, *The Rebels of 1914: masculinity, republicanism and the social forces that shaped the Boer Rebellion*, MA Thesis, UND, 1997.

⁶ This article seeks to contribute to a wider understanding of the history of leadership in South Africa, entangled in the identity dynamics of masculinity, class and race interests. See for example, Robert Schrire, *Leadership in the Apartheid State – from Malan to De Klerk*, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1994. It also seeks to contribute to the wider debate on the role of the military in the making of the polity. See A. Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa* (London: Tauris, 1996).

⁷ Stanley Trapido, "Landlord and Tenant in a colonial economy: the Transvaal 1880–1910", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 5, 1 (1978) p26.

⁸ Charles Van Onselen, *Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand*, vol 1 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1982) p13. Van Onselen notes that what Kruger and his coterie had always envisioned was the "emergence of a state in which industry was the logical outgrowth of, and ultimately dependent on, the output of a dominant agricultural sector". Kruger's policy on concessions was an attempt to promote industry which could process the agricultural output of the Boer constituency and sell it, either within the Republic or in adjacent territory.

⁹ Stanley Trapido, "Reflections on land, office and wealth in the South African Republic, 1850–1900" in Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore, *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa* (Longman: London, 1980) p351.

¹⁰ This very thorough piece of empirical research provides a systematic description of the *veldkornet's* duties and position. F.A. Van Jaarsveld, "Die Veldkornet en sy aandeel in die opbou van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek tot 1870", *Archives Year Book*, II, 1950. I am grateful for Lieutenant-Colonel Ian van der Waag for calling my attention to this article.

¹¹ A practice which made many rich. Piet Joubert, for example, used his position to acquire 29 farms, while Paul Kruger speculated with land and Louis Botha formed a land syndicate.

¹² After Andries Pretorius's death, for example, it was a group of *veldkornets* who requested that his son, Marthinus, be made *Kommandant-General*. Van Jaarsveld, "Die Veldkornet", p316.

¹³ Van Jaarsveld, "Die Veldkornet", p331.

¹⁴ Van Jaarsveld, "Die Veldkornet", p331.

¹⁵ F. Pretorius, *Life on Commando during the Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902* (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1999). P.232.

¹⁶ D. Reitz, *Commando* (London: Faber and Faber, 1929), pp.21–22.

¹⁷ Pretorius, *Life on Commando*, p.238.

¹⁸ Trapido, "Landlord and Tenant", p49.

¹⁹ Quoted in Trapido, "Reflections", p362. Smith was to be permanent secretary of the Union Department of Agriculture from 1910 to 1920.

²⁰ Marks, Shula and Trapido, Stanley, "Lord Milner and the South African State", *Working Papers in Southern African Studies*, vol. 2 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1981).

²¹ Trapido, "Landlord and Tenant", p50. See also Bp. 1904 LXI Cd, 2104, 998. Further Papers relating to the Administration in the Transvaal. For erosion of patron-client relations see Timothy Keegan, "The restructuring of agrarian class relations in a colonial economy: the Orange River Colony, 1902–1910", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 5, 2, (1979).

²² Keegan, *Rural Transformations*, p17.

²³ S.B. Spies, "The Rebellion in South Africa 1914–1915" (MA Witwatersrand University, 1962), p23.

²⁴ Discussed in Chapter Three "The Gender of Rebellion – Republican Masculinity and the 1912 Defence Act" in Swart, *Rebels of 1914*.

²⁵ HAD 1915, col. 76.

²⁶ Michael Kimmel, *Changing Men* (California: Sage:1987) p134.

²⁷ Harry Brod, *The Making of Masculinity*, 1987, p13.

²⁸ Hearn has noted that patriarchy is "more than economics", but, as E.P. Thompson notes in *The Making of the English Working Class*, a change in economics leads to change in class itself, with the gendered aspects also affected. See Jeff Hearn, and David Morgan, *Men, Masculinities and Social Theory* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990) p103.

²⁹ N.G. Garson, "Het Volk', the Botha-Smuts party in the Transvaal", *Historical Journal*, vol. ix, 1, 1966.

³⁰ Johannes Meintjes, *De La Rey – Lion of the West* (Johannesburg: Hugh Keartland, 1966), p319.

³¹ A 333, Vol 15, Krauseversameling. Transcript of Shorthand writer's notes of address of Dr Krause, KC for the Defence, p8. See also "Points to Remember", *The Friend*, 19 June 1915.

³² "Man, ek kan niks raai nie, elke man moet vir homself denk. Ek, voor my, sal ons Generaal volg waar hy gaan." A 947 *Die Suid-Afrikaanse Protes 1914 – Wedevaringe en herinneringe van J.D.T. (Japie) Krynauw*.p6.

³³ Nicholas Van Rensburg, Prophet of Lichtenburg.

³⁴ De La Rey was a South African War hero and frankly proposed to utilize the war as an opportunity to strike for freedom, hoping to concieve Smuts and Botha to concur. He was killed in a police roadblock in September 1914, purportedly shot in mistake for a criminal.

³⁵ S.C. 1–15, Testimony of Anthonie Christoffel Lombard, p174–175.

³⁶ JCG Kemp, *Die Pad van die Veroweraar* (1946); Maritz, *My Lewe en Strewe* (1939); C.H. Muller, *Oorlogsherinneringe* (1936) and Harm Oost, *Wie is die Skuldiges?* (1956)

³⁷ David Yudelman, *The Emergence of Modern South Africa* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), p110.

³⁸ "Botha and the Backveld", *Evening Standard*, 29 July, 1915.

³⁹ Discussed in Chapter Three "The Gender of Rebellion – Republican Masculinity and the 1912 Defence Act." in Sandra Swart, *The Rebels of 1914*.

⁴⁰ Meintjies, *De la Rey*, p319. "[De la Rey and De Wet] were the embodiments of the Transvaal and the Free State respectively, of the emotional core of the ex-Republics." p319.

⁴¹ Oost, *Wie is die Skuldiges?*, p63.

⁴² Manie Maritz met sy swart moestas Keer die kakies in die kringmuur vas Oost, *Wie is die Skuldiges?* p59.

⁴³ Oost notes: "Die skelm was 'n indrukwekkende militere figuur." p36.

⁴⁴ Ons staan hier by sy graf [De la Rey]. Wie voel nie wat 'n verlies dit vir Suid-Afrika is? Maar daar is niemand wat die verlies gevoel soos sy eggenoot nie. Wat sal ons sê om haar te troos? Die Almagtige God alleen kan dit doen. Maar as daar iets is wat ons kan doen – generaal De la Rey is dit waardig: een van die dapperste van die dapperes, een van die getrouste onder die getroues'. Kestell, *Generaal De Wet*, p180.

⁴⁵ Except by Commandant Wolmarans who issued "call up" letters. S.C. 1–15, Testimony of Hans Jurgens Lombard, p161.

⁴⁶ Eric Rosenthal, *General De Wet*, p137.

⁴⁷ Trapido, "Reflections", p362.

⁴⁸ SAP Conf.6/245/14/280 p513.

⁴⁹ S.C. 1–15, Testimony of W. Whipp, p194.

⁵⁰ S.C.C. 1915, Vol. 2. List of men tried with Kemp.

⁵¹ Keegan, *Rural Transformations*, p17.

⁵² "Mr. Hertzog's Plea for Rebels", *The Times*, 2 December 1915.

⁵³ S.C.C. 1915 P319.

⁵⁴ S.C.C. p297.

⁵⁵ S.C. 1–15, Testimony of Jan Carel Juta, p184. Cronje of Lichtenburg went into rebellion and was captured in Treurfontein fight.

⁵⁶ S.C.C. -1915, p258.

⁵⁷ Trapido, "Reflections", p357.

⁵⁸ S.C.C.- vol. II 1915 p319.

⁵⁹ Trapido, "Reflections", p355.

⁶⁰ S.C. 1–15, Testimony of Jan Carel Juta, p180.

⁶¹ On a deeper level, by giving people the right to take the status symbols of the men they had grown up with as leaders, the government, perhaps unconsciously, helped to revise the people's world view – making them see the rebel leadership as ordinary men under the government who could be treated with impunity.

⁶² S.C. 1–15, Juta, p185.

⁶³ A counter-argument is, of course, that in the trial transcripts, they were being called upon to give witness to prosecute the leadership – naturally they would concentrate on names. But names of people **not on trial** at the time are mentioned. More compellingly, later accounts of the Rebellion by rank and file focus almost exclusively on the names, without examining their own motives. See Roets, Krynauw.

⁶⁴ "Waar Generaal sterf, daar sal ek sterf. En waar Generaal oorwen, daar sal ek oorwen". Oost, *Wie is die Skuldiges?* p45 He said this in railway cafe on Pretoria Station.

⁶⁵ It is too easy to render the Boer/Afrikaner sector of society a bleak political cartoon, a dichotomy between *heerenboeren* and poor white. There were also small tenant-farmers. See O'Connor, *The Afrikaner Rebellion*, p11. This provides interesting contemporary critique on the mistake of homogenising the Afrikaner.

⁶⁶ There has been little research on familial interconnectedness and *bywoner* status, on the independence of patrons and clients. "We do not know whether bywoners committed themselves to opposing the government out of free choice . . . or whether they were forced to follow the lead of wealthier farmers whose land they occupied." Bottomley, *Public Policy and White Rural Poverty*, p253. Perhaps, however, the written evidence from poor whites themselves is too scanty to allow for this assessment.

⁶⁷ TAD A 1449, "Verklaring van Izak Edward Claasen".

⁶⁸ "Oom Koos sê toe dat hulle binnekort bymekaar kom en dat hy my sal verdedig." P.4. TAD A 1449, "Verklaring van Izak Edward Claasen".

⁶⁹ "Hy se toe: Jan Smuts het twee jaar gelede ons verraai en nou het Genl Botha ook sy rug op ons gedraai . . . p.4". TAD A 1449, "Verklaring van Izak Edward Claasen".

⁷⁰ Ek kalmeer hulle en se dat die Genl vir ons sal sê wat om te doen as hy terugkom. p.4. TAD A 1449, "Verklaring van Izak Edward Claasen".

⁷¹ "Daar is baie wyn." P.4. TAD A 1449, "Verklaring van Izak Edward Claasen".

⁷² A 1449, "Verklaring van Izak Edward Claasen".

⁷³ For a discussion of *Kommando* and its social and symbolic implications, see A Boer and his Gun and his wife are Three Things Always Together': Republican masculinity and the 1914 Rebellion, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 24, no.4, 1998.

⁷⁴ "Die neefs en broers is onder die bevel van 'n ouer familielid, die korporaal, geplaas." Grimbeek, p7. RJ Bouch *Infanterie in Suid-Afrika*, pp29-30.

⁷⁵ "Al die burgers weet dat in die laaste oorlog Marthinus Theunis Steyn die vader van Christiaan de Wet was en sy respek was die respek van 'n kind vir sy vader." Harm Oost, *Wie is die Skuldiges?* p298.

⁷⁶ Swart, "A Boer and his Gun and his wife are Three Things Always Together".

⁷⁷ "Ek dink aan ons ontslape broeder. Ons is gewoon om te se 'burger' of 'broeder'. As daar nou hier teenwoordig is een wat nie 'n broeder is nie, laat hom uitgaan." Kestell, p180. A speech recorded by JH Malan by moonlight. Kestell, *Generaal De Wet*, p189.

⁷⁸ Judith Lorber, *Paradoxes of Gender* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

⁷⁹ Robert Ross, "Paternalism, Patriarchy and Afrikaans", *South African Historical Journal*, 32, 1995. J.E.Mason, "The Slaves and their Protectors: Reforming Resistance in a Slave-Society, the Cape Colony, 1826-1834", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 17, 1, 1991. Much has been written on two things to do with paternalism: relations of it in the Cape Colony, eighteenth and nineteenth century; and secondly, with white farmers and their black slaves or workers. Little has been said about late nineteenth century and early twentieth century relations, especially not with black workers/slaves but with white workers, bywoners, and smaller farmers. See, for example, R. Shell, "The Family and Slavery at the Cape,

1680–1808” in WG James and M. Simons (eds) *The Angry Divide: Social and Economic History of the Western Cape*, Cape Town: 1989. CC. Crais, *White Supremacy and Black Resistance in Pre-Industrial South Africa: The Making of the Colonial Order in the Eastern Cape. 1770–1865* (Cambridge: 1992).

⁸⁰ Kruger, L M (1991) Gender, community, and identity: women and Afrikaner Nationalism in the *volksmoeder* discourse of *Die Boerevrou* (1919–1931). Unpublished MA thesis, University of Cape Town; Andrea van Niekerk (1988) “The Use of White Female Labour on the Zebediela Citrus Estate, 1926–1953”, MA, University of Witwatersrand; Louise Vincent, “A Cake Of Soap: The *Volksmoeder* Ideology And Afrikaner Women’s Campaign For The Vote”, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Volume 32 (1999) Number 1; Brink, Elsabe, “Man-made women: gender, class and the ideology of the *volksmoeder*”, in C. Walker, (ed.) *Women and resistance in Southern Africa to 1945* (London: James Currey, 1990).

⁸¹ A.M. Grundlingh, “Die rebellie van 1914: ‘n historiografiese verkenning”, *Kleio*, xi, 1&2, 1979.

⁸² Helen Bradford, “Women in the Cape and its frontier zones”, Biannual South African Historical Society Conference, 1995.

⁸³ Harm Oost, *Wie is die Skuldiges?* P.265. General De Wet and Mrs De Wet had seven sons and sons-in-law, all of whom participated in the Rebellion.

⁸⁴ Translated. Harm Oost, *Wie is die Skuldiges?* p.265.

⁸⁵ “Die toegewydheid van die Boervrouens in hierdie dae was groot, soos altyd in kritieke oomblikke van die nasionale lewe, en mevrou De Wet, uit die die Driejarige Oorlog bekend as die sterk Boervrou by uitnemendheid, was ‘n voorbeeld vir al haar susters van die volk.” Harm Oost, *Wie is die Skuldiges?* P.265. There has been no explicit unpacking of the distinction between volk *sister* and volk *mother*, the two seemed to be used interchangeably, although the latter term predominates.

⁸⁶ Little has been written on the experiences of South African women at the outbreak of war. The First World War was a time of greater involvement in the public sphere for many women. See, for example, Gill Thomas, *Life on All Fronts* (University of Cambridge Press, 1989); Diana Condell and Jean Liddiard, *Images of Women in the First World War* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987); Gail Braybon and Penny Summerfield (1987) *Out of the Cage: Women’s experiences in two world wars* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).

⁸⁷ It is not clear why she referred to the embryonic soldiers as “khakis”, as this was usually a term for British troops. Warwick, *The South African War*, p.174.

⁸⁸ Jean Elshtain (1987) *Women and War*, (New York: Basic Books) 58. Elshtain has traced the relationship between gender and war through discourse analysis.

⁸⁹ Engelenburg, *General Louis Botha*, (Pretoria: JL Van Schaik) p.298.

⁹⁰ Engelenburg, *General Louis Botha*, p.299.

⁹¹ At the same time, in Britain women like Emmeline Pankhurst were literally handing out white feathers to young men still in civilian clothes. Perhaps this icon was drawn from the once popular sport of cock-fighting: a white feather in a fighting-cock’s tail was believed to be a sign of weakness or non-combativeness in the bird.

⁹² S.B. Spies (1980) “Women and the War” in P. Warwick & S.B. Spies, *The South African War*, (London: Lomgman) p.162.

⁹³ Eric Walker, *History of Southern Africa*, p.200. There is a curious obsession with these undergarments from all schools, contemporary and historiographical. It seemed an appropriate title as it is redolent with contemporary images: H. Walpole referred to Mary Wollstonecroft as a "hyaena in petticoats" in the 1790s.; Hendrina Joubert was called the "General in petticoats"; Johanna Brandt organised the "Petticoat Commando" during the Anglo-Boer War.

⁹⁴ A.P. Van Rensburg, *Moeders Van ons Volk*, (Johannesburg: Afrikaanse Pers-Boekhandel, 1966). Lou-Marie Kruger, "Gender, Community and Identity: Women and Afrikaner nationalism in the Volksmoeder discourse of Die Boerevrou, 1919–1931", MA UCT, 1991. The ideology has been articulated frequently, see for example, Dr Okulis, *Die Boervrou: Moeder van haar volk* (Bloemfontein, De Nationale Pers, 1918). There has not been a similar concern with the creation of a *volksvader*. See Albert Grundlingh, "Die Mite van die volksvader", *Vryeweekblad*, 5 April 1991. Elsabe Brink, "Man-made women: Gender, class and the Ideology of the Volksmoeder" in Walker, p275. This ideology has a long pedigree: in 1900, for example, a newspaper noted: "een getrouwe, verstandige en liefdevolle gade werd waarop hijin moeilike tijden, in dagen van kommer zowel als van voldoening steeds heeft mogen steunen." *De Volkstem*, 28 March 1900.

⁹⁵ J.X. Merriman quoted in Warwick and Spies, *The South African War*, p.162.

⁹⁶ Van Rensburg, *Moeders van ons Volk*, p.110.

⁹⁷ Elsie Cloete (1992) "Afrikaner Identity: Culture, Tradition and Gender", *Agenda*, 13, p.51.

⁹⁸ While Boer women lacked a widespread suffragette tradition, there were exceptions like that of Marie Du Toit, wife of the poet Totius. Du Toit's *Vrou en Feminist*, 1921, called for equal pay and education.

⁹⁹ The adoption of a middle class victorian womanhood identity perhaps helped to prevent early Afrikaner affiliation with the Labour movement.

¹⁰⁰ For a discussion of Afrikaner iconography, which includes a brief analysis of the Women's Monument, see Liese van der Watt (1997), "Savagery and civilisation: race as a signifier of difference in Afrikaner nationalist art", *De arte* 55 and more particularly Van der Watt, L (1998) The comradely ideal and the "volksmoeder" ideal: uncovering gender ideology in the Voortrekker tapestry, *South African Historical Journal*, 39(Nov). For an analysis of Afrikaner festival see Grundlingh, A and Sapire, H (1989) "From feverish festival to repetitive ritual? The changing fortunes of Great Trek mythology in an industrialising South Africa, 1938–1988. *South African Historical Journal*, 21:19–37. The monument was unveiled by Rachel Isabella Steyn, wife of President Steyn, on 16 December 1913, while the ex-President, who had taken the initiative toward erecting the monument as early as 1906, himself delivered the opening address.

¹⁰¹ E. Brink (1986) "The Afrikaner Women of the Garment Worker's Union, 1918–1939", MA, University of the Witwatersrand, Kruger, L M (1991) Gender, community, and identity: women and Afrikaner Nationalism in the *volksmoeder* discourse of *Die Boerevrou* (1919–1931). Unpublished MA thesis, University of Cape Town; Andrea van Niekerk (1988) "The Use of White Female Labour on the Zebediela Citrus Estate, 1926–1953", MA, University of Witwatersrand; Louise Vincent, "A Cake Of Soap: The *Volksmoeder* Ideology And Afrikaner Women's Campaign For The Vote", *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Volume 32 (1999) Number 1; Brink, Elsabe, "Man-made women: gender, class and the ide-

ology of the volksmoeder”, in C. Walker, (ed.) *Women and resistance in Southern Africa to 1945* (London: James Currey, 1990).

¹⁰² She does qualify her statements with the contradictory idea that Boer women were not excluded from community affairs and played a strong role in holding society together. *Moeders van ons Volk*, p.317.

¹⁰³ Meintjes, *Commandant-General*, p14.

¹⁰⁴ Translated: Gideon Scheepers was shot during the Anglo-Boer War for wearing khaki (British uniform). Oost, *Wie is die Skuldiges?* P.318.

¹⁰⁵ Translated. Oost, *Wie is die Skuldiges?* P.315.

¹⁰⁶ Oost, *Wie is die Skuldiges?* P.49.

¹⁰⁷ Women used their gender to protect their men against the state. Krikler “Women, Violence and the Rand Revolt of 1922”. See also Bernard Hessian (1957) “An Investigation into the causes of the Labour Agitation on the Witwatersrand, January to March 1922”, MA Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand.

¹⁰⁸ *The Friend*, 12.01.1914 and *Des Vriend*, 12.01.1914.

¹⁰⁹ Oost, *Wie is die Skuldiges?* P.319.

¹¹⁰ “mede-susters en dogters van Suid Afrika’, *Die Spectator*, August 1915. Quotes included: die eerste Afrikaner bloed op die bodem van Suid Afrika. . . vloei”.

¹¹¹ Age was explicitly mentioned in the first sentence of the open letter: “The oldest of us two who write this letter will be 85 in a few months” Translated, *Die Spectator*, August 1915.

¹¹² See “Chapter Four, ‘Men of Influence’, Sandra Swart (1997) ‘The Rebels of 1914 – Masculinity, Republicanism and the social forces that shaped the Boer Rebellion”, MA, University of Natal, Durban.

¹¹³ “voortbestaan van ons Volk, en van ons Taal en die ondersteuning onzer Kerk”, H.C. Lambrechts (1957) “Die Eerste vyftig jaar: die ontwikkeling van die Afrikaanse Christelike Vroue-Vereniging”, D.Phil, Stellenbosch University.

¹¹⁴ ‘eerste families van die land, A 356. File 10. Dr H. Van Broekhuizen, “Ons Protesteer”, p.27.

¹¹⁵ Warwick and Spies, *The South African War*, p.168.

¹¹⁶ Translated. Van Rensburg, *Moeders van ons Volk*, p.36.

¹¹⁷ Warwick and Spies, *The South African War*, p.164.

¹¹⁸ Meintjes shows that Piet Joubert’s reputation as soldier belongs to the bravery of his soldiers and the advice of his wife. Johannes Meintjes, *The Commandant-General*, Tafelberg, p.11.

¹¹⁹ The pregnant Joubert accompanied her husband on commando. She even went into labour in the war laager. After her husband’s death in 1900, Joubert still actively engaged in public life. She aided women in the concentration camps, attempting to reveal their plight to the international world.

¹²⁰ Transvaal Archives, A 356. File 10. Dr H. Van Broekhuizen, “Ons Protesteer”, p.16.

¹²¹ Buxton received them cordially and promised to hand the petition to the government.

¹²² A 356. File 10. Dr H. Van Broekhuizen, “Ons Protesteer”, p23.

¹²³ “Die vrou het ook hier weer soos in die verlede haar vaderlandsliefde op treffende wyse geopenbaar.” A 356. File 10. Dr H. Van Broekhuizen, “Ons Protesteer”, p.23.

¹²⁴ Translated, *Die Brandwag*, 1 September 1915.

¹²⁵ “De dochters van Zuid-Afrika zijn ontwaakt”. Van Rensburg, *Moeders van ons Volk*, p.115.

¹²⁶ Cynthia Enloe quoted in Anne McClintock, “Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family”, *Feminist Review*, 44, 1993, p61.

¹²⁷ “die wat hulle rebelle noem, is my mense.”

¹²⁸ “ ‘n volk moes bly”. Van Rensburg, *Moeders van ons Volk*, p115. Future research on the relationship between citizenship and Boer women, should perhaps examine the socio-familial context of her positioning as citizen: her rights as a mother, wife and daughter – relational to men rather than an individual right as citizen. A possible starting point could be an investigation of the journal *Die Burgeres (The Female Citizen)*].

¹²⁹ Eric Rosenthal, *General De Wet*, (Cape Town: Dassie Books, n/d.) p157.

¹³⁰ Rosenthal, *General De Wet*, p145.

¹³¹ Maritz fled to Angola, Portugal and Spain; he returned in 1923 sentenced for three years. In 1924, Hertzog released him, and he farmed in South West Africa, and began a ill-supported pro-fascist movement.

¹³² A prohibition De Wet occasionally ignored.

¹³³ S.P. Boshoff, *Rebellie-Sketse uit mij Dagboek, 1914–15* (Amsterdam: J.H. De Bussy, 1918) p130.

¹³⁴ Patrick Furlong, *Between Crown and Swastika*, p114.

¹³⁵ Jeremy Krikler, “Women, Violence and the Rand Revolt of 1922”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 22, 3, 1996, p351.

¹³⁶ Today called “Makwassie”, near Wolmaransstad.

¹³⁷ Rosenthal, *General De Wet*, p153. This is particularly resonant as De Wet famously maintained that a “Boer without a horse is only half a man.”